The Alternatives in Indo-China
ARON, RAYMOND
The Alternatives in Indo-China A French editor says GIs are needed for victory By Raymond Aron In this space last week, Raymond Aron??an editor of the Figaro, France's leading independent...
...In addition to these considerations, French leaders fear that American assumption of the military burden in Indo-China would set a dangerous precedent for the rest of the French Union...
...Excluding the impractical idea of expanding the expeditionary forces sufficiently to achieve victory, there are three: 1. Direct negotiations with the Vietminh...
...Yet, even if we received all the supplies we need, the prime prerequisite for victory would not have been met...
...An editorial appearing on page 22 presents The New Leader's views on this vital subject and its relation to our entire Asian policy...
...Policy No...
...They hold the upper hand only through superiority in artillery and aviation...
...2 might be adopted for a time, but, unless it produced astonishing results, it would sooner or later lead to a shift to No...
...And would not such a move lead to Chinese intervention...
...This outcome would be even more certain if the major participants were the Vietminh, battle-hardened after seven years of fighting, and the Vietnamese Government, with its feeble forces and its faction-ridden parties...
...Only the presence of American troops can reassure the Vietnamese, who, despite their hostility to the Vietminh, refuse to commit themselves wholeheartedly because they lack confidence in French steadfastness...
...These are weighty arguments...
...2 or 3. Against the latter a number of powerful arguments have been raised...
...3. An appeal for direct intervention by the United States...
...And, most important of all, is it France's policy to hand power over to Ho Chi Minh under some appropriate camouflage or to prevent Ho Chi Minh from gaining power...
...The French and pro-French forces are not numerically superior to the Vietminh's...
...Even though the United States has already taken over two-thirds of the cost of the campaign, we still have a great deal of difficulty in obtaining certain types of materiel...
...Ho Chi Minh's new bid for negotiations has already had strong repercussions on French opinion, and it should not be rejected out of hand...
...As far as the French are concerned, there is no hope of total victory in the near future...
...Whatever errors we may have committed in the past, France is today defending a position of vital importance...
...In the present situation, what are the possible policies...
...What kind of armistice are we ready to offer or to accept...
...Paris A military decision in Indo-China is out of the question as long as the conflict proceeds along present lines...
...Assume their share of the defense or accept the loss of the position...
...Each of these alternatives involves risks...
...What would be the nature of post-armistice relations between the Vietminh and Vietnam governments...
...From the standpoint of French national interests alone, the war in Indo-China no longer has any justification...
...even so, they are unable to cut the Vietminh divisions off from their permanent bases, whence come their supplies of manpower and rice...
...But there are some questions we must ask ourselves...
...2. Continuation of the present policy...
...The issue now reduces itself to this simple proposition: Either the war is essential as a measure to block Communist expansion in Southeast Asia or it has ceased to have any meaning whatever...
...If we are unable to carry the burden alone, what will our allies do...
...This would call for indefinite strengthening of the Vietnamese troops under Bao Dai until victory was achieved over the Vietminh or the situation had improved sufficiently to permit negotiations with better hope of success...
...If the first is true, then the responsibility, military as well as financial, for carrying on the conflict belongs to the entire free world...
...This would undoubtedly result in some more or less disguised form of French withdrawal, ending in the Sovietization of Indo-China...
...This year's French operational plan has the limited objective of forestalling a Vietminh offensive...
...Aron's conclusions as to courses of action are contained in the article below...
...However, the consequences of any kind of capitulation to Ho Chi Minh seem to me even graver...
...But to refuse to make a choice??as we have done since the end of World War II??is surely the worst choice of all...
...The Alternatives in Indo-China A French editor says GIs are needed for victory By Raymond Aron In this space last week, Raymond Aron??an editor of the Figaro, France's leading independent newspaper—presented his analysis of the situation in Indo-China...
...Of course, the Chinese could force a quick victory by bringing in Korean-style "volunteers"??but that would mean another war with the United States, which Mao Tse-tung can ill afford right now...
...For the choice, I fear, has narrowed down to a Communist victory or common action by the free world...
...Perhaps it signals some sort of shift in the Moscow line...
...For one thing, is American opinion prepared for the sending of GIs to Indo-China...
Vol. 37 • January 1954 • No. 2
