The Political Failures in Italy

...If the surrendering Italian army had done their utmost we could have had all of Italy...

...Alas, the Allied leaders were once more afraid of a wave of popular feeling which might hnve taken a different form from what they expected...

...n d * h o - t ' t e r a careful weeding out, might have formed an important part of a new Italian army...

...The Allies must be faithful to the seven points of the Moscow meeting without further subteVfuge or delay...

...Fortunately there was scant military opposition from RegsTio to T»r»n-to nod Out invaders were able to make rapid progress on the Adriatic roast to Brindisi and Foggia and, on the Tyrrhenian side, beyond Salerno, with the result that after one month Naples and Foggia were captured while Italian troops took over Sardinia and the French were able to land in Corsica thanks to a revolt of local patriots and the Italian soldiers cooperating with them...

...Today the depressed condition of the Italian people In the liberated provinces is well known...

...A sentence in a letter which I received from an authoritative friend seemed to reproach me for preferring not to see the immediate liberation of Italy from the Naxis and Fascist...

...My own impression, based en hits of wellfounded information, is that the occupation of the region north of Calabria waa decided during the Sicilian campaign...

...Even if the importance of the fall of Mussolini was misunderstood and underestimated, the Allied leaders should have seen that Corsica afforded a ban for a rapid and daring blow...

...The landing at Salerno, according to Eisenhower himself, was a matter of necessity, since fighter planes could not cover a point farther from their bases...

...But why must* Eisenhower bewail the lack of cooperation on (ate part of s non-existent srmy when Km fniled to encourage resiatance on the part of the Italian people in the tones where such resistance was possible because the Germans were not in control...

...For thi* reason in an article dated September 18, 1943, in // Mondo I further explained my point of view, saying: "My enduring preference for a campaign in the Balkans (as I set it forth in the New York Times •f September 11) has three reasons whkh I believe self-evident...

...The P/on of the Campaign in Italy pENBRAL EISENHOWER, in his farewell inter^* view from Algiers on December 27, revealed that at the time of the landings in North Africa no decision had been made in regard to Italy, "while the Sicilian campaign was decided on in January" (Thi Sew York Tuntil, December 28, 1943...

...An editorial in The New York Timet, December 20, 1943 declares: "In the pattern of events that marked the Allied invasion of Italy last September many observers thought they could see hope for a short and decisive campaign which would win most of the peninsula...

...If Stalin really insisted on being given a free hand in Yugoslavia and Albania or at least on postponing an Allied invasion until the Russians should arrive in Rumania, there still remained'the possibility of launching commando attacks from Sardinia and Corsica on the Ligurian and Tuscan coastline or, better yet, of making a definite landing much farther north than Salerno...

...First, in Yngoslsvia the terrain has been prepared by two years of guerrilla warfare which baa lust culminated in the captnre of the porta of Split (Spalate) and Susak on the Adriatic...

...Although this policy obliged Eisenhower to postpone for another week his landing in Calabria he did find the Calsbrisn highlands as welcoming to the.AngloAmerican troops as were later the Samnite hills...

...The occupation garrisons in France and the Balkans were mostly imprisoned by the Germans except for such of aj-assk and Yugoslav Parti nana...

...But it takes time for certain truth* to reveal themselves...

...I am not so presumptuous *s to lay claim to being a strategiit but I may say that I am an historian with political experience or, if you prefer, a man of politics who has studied his history...

...It Would have been sufficient to strike at Leghorn or Speain in...

...this difficult expeiience confirms the statement of Don Sturzo...

...order to place the Allies in aposition »i advantage for a campaign in either Italy or Southern France...

...Today, too, we are all convinced that the toad to Rome or even the road to Northern Italy does not lead straight to Berlin...

...V I do not suspect s lack of good-will or good intentions en the part of the Allies...

...The fact ha* been clear enough ever since July 10 when the Allie* landed in Sicily...

...there is no reason for any such opposition becsuse sntumn is already here and there nre only two more months left fpr engaging Hitler's forces on the Russian front...

...there are no Italian war correspondents...

...For this reason I do not hesitate to quote from what I wrote about the campaign in Italy eight months before it had started...

...snd Federxoni of the Italian Academy...

...moreover we are beginning to nee that we do not really know where it does lead, while, at the same time, we know that all roads do lesd to Rome...

...Of this Eisenhower himself must have been aware for he was in favor of co-belligerency at a time when other military leaders opposed it...

...A reenforcement by selected units of a new Italian en inv would be of great moral and political value...

...there are no communiques from the Italian troops in the South...

...Those who are scqusinted with this terrsin will see this dajige...

...From what we know, the decision about the Italian mainland depended on the it suits of the campaign in Sicily...

...There are the Italian p n s - enei* of war held by Britain and America who were -smpposed to be repatriated after the declaration of colellif...

...These quotations have been somewhat long but they have- saved me from repetition and have' afforded proof ¦ that I have consistently followed the same line of thought for over a year, a line of thought which has begun to be shared by others only today when it is too late, since the clock, alas, cannot be turned back...

...for those who do not know it explsnations are out of place at this time...

...fad ok tie, on the other hand, is in the process of reEysnixinf such fragments of the army na are to be Cad in Southern Italy...

...Jfltfsyed ,bf titair officers or disarmed by the Germans, sre assuredly treated as prisoners or interned in a*j*roiaii> under the yoke of Nasi barbarism...

...Let the progrsm set forth in Moscow become the common aim of Allies and Italians alike...

...The soldier* who had fought in Corsica had been reduced to the statu* of an auxiliary corps, disarmed and denied the hoaor of having aided in the liberation of the island...

...We know that the Germans intend to defend their position south of Rome as long as possible...

...T"* troops which freed Sardinia were and perhaps still are stuck there with no means of getting to* the mainland...

...there is, however, a lack of imagination, sensibility snd speed due to the aluggishnasa of military bureaucracy...

...Unfortunately for those "many observer*" they were ignorant of Italian history, geography, and climate and, above all, they did not attach sufficient importance to the German troops which poured into Italy during the month of August when the Italians, according to < linn lull's kind admonition, were supposed "to stew in their own juice" becsuse he did not wish to be left with an Italy broken up into a state of anarchy...

...he is entirely dependent on Km Allies for arms since there are no Important war 'industries in this region...

...The Political Failures in Italy By LUIGI STURZO S*c««dorr Frm»t A CHORUS of military expert*, war correspondent*, columnist* and radio commentator* have just made the discovery that the Italian front has not been a second front but a secondary front...

...The recent difficult months in the lower Appenines would have been even longer if the Allies hsd had to face a hostile population bent on turning them back at every mountain pass, every ford in the rivers, every village block...

...And now we see a fifth, or perhaps a seventh, wheel sdded to this mechanism, the Interallied Advisory Commission for Italy which has no power to make decisions of its own but must safer every question to offices in London, Moscow snd Washington whose views do not always coincide...

...No one yet knows the terms of the srmistice sccepted by Bsdoglio...

...Inflation, the black market, uncertainty, the confusion of administrative orders, the lack of transportation and political obstructionism have Impeded the formation of a solid home front whose creation is indispensable...

...The idea of retracing the steps of Garibaldi from Marsala to Gaeta was an obvious one but it was not meant for application to the present war whose mechanical character is so plainly in contrast to the romanticism of the nineteenth century...

...They all know Ihst the Germans are their real enemies and the Allies their liberators, but this elementary truth is not enough to raise a spirit of resistance, especially when it is accompanied by continnens veiled resentment snd distrust towsrds the Italians, often by bitter and contemptuous criticism...

...This, then, is how it came to be decided that all Italy should be conquered...

...It me it seems dangerous and purposeless to crawl through Italy up to the valley of the Po to engsge in a major battle where the Allies would have behind them an upset country and a very long supply line...

...Why, we may ask, was not an Italian Legion set up before the invasion of Sicily 7 Eisenhower seamed to favor snch s project and so, it is said, did the OIBce of Strategic Services, but the State Department barred the way...

...This point was constantly clear in my mind as can be seen throughout what I wrote during 194,1...

...This military axiom has no less fore* when applied to politics...

...This article was written lie fore the landing on Anzifl Netttino shoies...

...For it wo* an enormous error in politic...

...This strategy is political rather than military...

...there are only fragmentary bits of news of resistance snd guerrilla warfare in Central and Northern Italy...

...And yet what a stimulating effect might have been derived from the presence in Sicily, Calabria and Apulia of a band of Italian volunteers, under their own flag and with the spirit of Garibaldi to guide them, at the time of the Allied invasion, even before the fsll of Fascism...

...it wii not necessary to follow exactly the plan of the daring Carthaginian who was the greatest strategist of hit time...

...A tremendous watte of time ia bound to result...

...except for general plans and their alternatives studied in London, Washington and even Algiers, everything was in suspense...

...The German occupation of Southern Italy should be considered a parallel to the Roman epoch of the Samnite and Pyrrhic wars and the invasion of Bannibal, who chose to attack from the North, marching through Spain and Gaul and across the Alps rather than to march from Sicily to Rome...

...These successes appeared to justify the initial plan, but they were due in large part to the failure of the Germans to fortify Southern Italy and to the prompt action of the Italians in Sardinia...

...And what would they have to say about the "apathy" on this tide of the ocean, where strikes threaten, where the opera, the moving-picture and the sport arenas are filled to overflowing and where the coming election is already hotly contested...

...4 Holding Offensive" C1X MONTHS have thus gone by and now the best prospect held out to us in Italy ia what General Eisenhower terms a "holding offensive," a reasonable program for the period of preparation of a second front in France, the Low Countries and, let us hope, the Balkans...

...Hut Allied purists are still studying their exact Isgal status under international la/w and i t is to be geared that -they will reach no conclusion before the smd* of the war...

...After the embarrassing fiasco of the "Austrian Legion" and Cordell Hall's distrust of the Fighting French, it looks as if it were s esse of "once, burned, twice shy"— shv even of cold water...

...First of alt they must era**- from their minds t he idea that the Italian people were fascist-minded and that no anti Fascists are to be found...

...After the decision to march through Italy from South to North all plans should 4>ave been revised and the whole campaign given the importance and the aims which it deserved...

...The plan for a "holding offensive" must not be interpreted as a "standstill," which would be particularly dangerous in the mountains of the Abruzzi or the region of Minturno and Gaeta...

...Correspondents have spoken recently of the "apathy1* of Naples and other Southern cities...

...I do not believe the rumor that Russia is barring the wsy to Yugoslavia...

...It is obvious that these gains (to which he should have added Sardinia, Corsica and the ports of Apulia) were valuable less for the prosecution of a drive through the Abruzti mountains than for an invasion of Southern France or Liguria or Tuscany on the Tyrrhenian side or an invasion of the Balkans from the Adriatic...

...These days were no less precious than the month which elapsed between Badoglio's request for an armistice on August 3 and its actual signing on September 3. Where was the Italian army on October 13...

...they cite as proofs the fact that the San Carlo opera house is crowded, that business is carried on as usual, that tne people have returned to sitting in'cafes, that wrecked buildings have not been instantly reconstructed...

...the Italian fleet seems to have disappeared from the surface of the seas, the Italian flag is flying nowhere...

...psychology to demand of the Italian army both uneesditional turrender and an iirnui rerticn againtl the Germans...

...Is this the way to arouse enthusiast among the Italian soldiers...

...They had already set up the mechanism of the AMG and were counting on the monarchy and the so-called moderates among the Fascist leaders, including even such shady figures as those •f Count Grand...

...The others...

...At the very beginning of the Sicilian campaign, before the fall of Mussolini, 1 wrote in Sazioni Unite: It is up to the military leader* to decide whether the Allies will be best served by going on to Rome or rather by making a jump from Southern Italy to the Balkans or from Sardinia and Corsica to France...

...We are sorry that Eisenhower had a political burden on his shoulders from the very beginning of the Mediterranean campaign...

...Let us here admit that, because our views as Italian democrats do not always coincide with those of the Allies, we may at times sound a bitter note...

...This is one reason why I do net see the occupation of Italy as the best immediate cojectfve fn thi absence Of the possibility of w comptete knock-out or the probability of cooperation a la Darlsn...

...Let a spirit of understanding and confidence reign in the mountains and plains where the fighting is hardest and at the same time in the towns and villages where civilian life has been resumed and there are hopes of a better future...

...it allows time for a full utilization of Italian resources in manpower and piovisions (aside from the seizures already made) and engages the Allied forces on a secondary front in the hope of turning resistance into a counter-offensive at the moment of the opening of a major front in the West or elsewhere...

...It is perhaps for this reaiton that, forgetful of the unhappy policy of unconditioned surrender and the delay in achieving the Italian armistice, he makes an unjust charge against the ItaliM army...

...Under the circumstances outlined above a number of well-armed Italian divisions would plainly be of the ^ n a t e s t use and the delay in setting them up is an bad error...

...Of course the examples of history have only a relative value...

...It is true that the Allies are rightly counting on a great offensive in France, the Low Countries and the Balkans but at the same time they must avoid a -weakening of their forces on the Italian front and a i'hom- to thair operations directed toward central Halv...

...Allied press and propaganda anthorities do- not seem to realize the harm done to their cause by the mystery and secrecy they hsve thrown about Italian affairs...

...There was an opportunity to assemble several thorougly prepared divisions of fighting men, but sll that we have seen ia the tmall group which msde the rash frontal attack in the Mignano hills north of Naples and has since dropped into oblivion...

...I*e fftjhfin, Fro.* o a d r*« rVoaf I*hind the LJnnt IT is* an elementary truth that there cannot be a * vigorous and active fighting front without cooperation snd high morale behind the lines...

...After stating that the decisive bsttles of the war would take place in Northern France, the Netherlands, Poland, Austria, and Hungsry, I added: "I exclude the battlefield of Northern Italy a* the scene of decisive battles since, in the event of the Allies reaching and occupying Lombardy and Venetia without having first invaded France, a frontal battle would here be too far from the centres of supply, too perilous in case of defeat, without good protection to the rear and in a country that is presumed to be hostile and taking part in the battle on the opposite side...

...The political effect of such a two-pionged drive would be great, for it would furnish an objective to the anti-German and anti-Fascist revolt in Northern Italy and give to mch a revolt an ample chance of success...

...moreover they were left for over two weeks wit* neither food nor military supplies...

...In the event of being taken by surprise (and the fall of Fascism was a surprise only because of it* unexpectedly early date) oue must be ready for whatever may happen...

...Garibaldi was able to overcome the more powerful Bourbon army because his "Thousand" were animated by a spirit of adventure and a political faith while the Bourbon mercenaries had only a sense of duty and no determination to die rather than surrender...

...This seems to me the real reason for the lack of both military and political preparation which caught the Allies napping when Fascism fell at the end of July, a reason more cogent than that given by Churchill to the House of Commons, although we should not neglect his words to the effect that in modern warfare and with the danger presented by enemy air-power improvised binding is to be avoided and the most minute details of an invasion must be settled long in advance...

...In an article published simultaneously in New York (The Sew Leader) and London (People and Freedom) In mid-December of 1942, which was written just after the Allied landing in Algeria, I predicted as follows: "To this end (to make sure of the whole of the Mediterranean) I think they will try to occupy the islands of Psntelleria, Sicily, Crete and the Dodecanese, probably Sardinia and Corsica as well...

...the fault is not his but that of Churchill and Roosevelt...

...there is talk of a "Siegfried Line" in the Appenines stronger than "Gustav" and "Adolf" lines...

...To plans Aft*' or a hundred or two hundred thousand Italian soldiers in the -front lines or the auxiliary services while they sre in a state of worry about the economic position of their families and the uncertain future of their country is to ask too much of them...

...In Northern and Outi«' Italy many officer* and soldiers formed guerilla Mipi already in action for the last five months sattkout the enjoyment of the American and Russmn tmblioly gieea t« tan followers of Tito...

...But meanwhile forty days were lost between September 3 when the armistice wss signed and October 13 when the status of co-belligerency was announced...

...In summing up the Italian campaign Eisenhower rightly puts on the credit side of the ledger the acquisition of the Italian fleet, the ports of Taranto and Naples snd the sir-fields at Foggia...

...If the Italian people had been hostile to the Allies they would have opposed their invasion by joining the German opposition, and in this case Sicily would not have been occupied in thirty-eight days snd the Cslabria-Apulis region in lees than thirty...

...If, as we hope, the Allies soon make a drive in Yugoslavia mid southern France (or peihaps in Liguria) the whole campaign in Italy will necessarily result in a tactical withdrawal of the Germans to the river Po and the Alps where they might be attacked simultaneously from , S|i«/ih or Genoa on the West and Trieste or Finnic on I he East...

...While BadogUo, during the period previous to the armistice, stressed the danger of s German occupation of northern and central Italy, the Allies were worried by the idea of an Italian revolution fa fear which perhaps misled them into bombing the populated renters of Milan, Turin and Genoa) at s lime when they should have already taken over the district sround the Ionisn Sea from Reggio Calabria to Taranto...

...An f aca.se Which Turns Act motto* IN his farewell speech quoted above Eisenhower pronounced a sentence worthy of attention when he said: "The surrender did not give us all we had hopeo for...

...Italy must be reborn from the ruggednsss snd harmony of its own people with the trusting aid of (he Allies and Ihe bravery of their soldiers snd ours togethe...

...The Balkan campaign which 1 hope to see put into execution should begin at •nee...

...Of course military problems have « priority, but often politic* may easa . their solution...

...Second, when the Allies arrive in Belgrade, Central Europe will fall to nieces and the road will be open to Budapest, Bucharest snd Vienna, whereat, after covering the same distance from Reggio Calabria to Salerno or from Salerno to Rome, Central Europe will still be intact and likewise the Po River line within Italy...