The Military Balance
THE RELATIVE LULL IN MILITARY ACTIVITY after the March 1982 elections, a result of the political setback suffered by the insurgents, coupled with the rumor of serious rifts within the FMLN,...
...For the first time since the start of the war, the guerrillas seem to have decided not to interrupt the harvests...
...Embassy has accused two heads of intelligence with the security forces, three field commanders and a departmental intelligence chief, as well as the head of security for the Constituent Assembly...
...In response to a spate of FMLN ambushes in September and October, the Army went back to mounting cumbersome sweeps by large numbers of troops...
...The White House has taken pains to convince friend and foe alike that Grenada is an illustration of its will to use force to reverse situations which it regards as a threat to its national security...
...HroE CONTINUING SURRENDER OF GOVERNment troops, sometimes entire companies, shows the morale problems that still afflict the armed forces...
...The training program has enabled the Army to maintain an aggressive recruiting drive...
...Army specialists...
...the attacks on the communications base at Cacahuatique and the garrison at El Paraiso...
...On October 10, 1982 the FMLN launched its "Heroes and Martyrs of October 1979 and 1980" offensive...
...The rate in fact increased after September 1983...
...It seems to have grasped that sabotage-though draining resources from the govern- ment's war effort-may be counterproductive, affect- ing the living standards of much of the population and damaging the country's productive capacity...
...But the Kissinger Commission report seems designed to do more than just gain bipartisan support for current military policies...
...advisers have criticized the Salvadorean Army's poor mobility and urged it to increase mobile patrols by small tactical units to "saturate the countryside" and impede the free movement of the FMLN...
...intervention...
...Major "clean-up" operations proved necessary, yet they too have made little headway...
...Beginning in June 1983, the military launched a simultaneous counteroffensive on several fronts and embarked on the National Plan (CONARA) in San Vicente and Usulutan...
...In all, as much as one-quarter of the country may be under FMLN in- fluence through alternative modes of government, ranging from "zones of coexistence," where the guer- rillas move freely but do not interfere with local authori- ties, to "zones of influence" in which the FMLN shares governmental administration, and "zones of control" where the FMLN has named its own authorities and operates as sole power...
...the "military civic action" programs which, apart from winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population, would also tend to reduce military abuses against non-combatants...
...r, Cuscatlar " : 'ooa, a ,San Vicente...
...the adoption of small mobile unit tactics and seven-day operations, as opposed to the more leisurely pace of battle previously commonplace...
...First, the declining rate of economic sabotage since October 1983 (dynamiting power lines, burning crops, vehicles and government buildings) suggests that the The Cuscatlan bridge after guerrilla attack, December 1983...
...The most recent wave of death squad attacks on trade unionists, cooperative members, public employees and institutions such as the Catholic Church and the National University, reflect these disputes...
...The root of the problem seems less a lack of communications equipment or transportation than poor coordination, aggravated by the loss of control over the secondary road network, especially in the eastern and central regions...
...For some time, U.S...
...And the Army's attempt to dislodge guerrillas from San Vicente failed, despite the deployment of 4,000 troops...
...REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 28the attacks show the inability and/or unwillingness of the high command to put a stop to paramilitary activities, Since early November, the Reagan Administration has increased pressure on the Salvadorean government to halt death squad activity and take action against officers "strongly suspected" of links to rightist terror...
...Press accounts from San Miguel and Morazan in mid-November 1983 reported that the insurgents now function as the main military force and local government authority in 17 towns in these two northeastern departments...
...According to the defense minister of the day, Gen...
...EFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERger has now publicly admitted that the military situation in El Salvador is deteriorating...
...It confirms too that the FMLN has managed to reorganize its forces and deploy them in larger-scale actions through the creation of units equivalent to brigades and batallions...
...The FMLN appears well aware of the danger...
...the rout of the El Paraiso barracks in Chalatenango, headquarters of the 4th Infantry Batallion...
...The guerrilla offensive has caused the failure of the National Plan in Usulutan and checked its progress in San Vicente...
...and the central region (parts of Cabanas and Cuscatlan, converging on San Vicente...
...Ahuachapan: - Salvador...
...The failure of the Army to overcome these problems, the increased capability of the FMLN and the progressive involvement of the United States in the civil war all increase the chances of even more direct U.S...
...Bob NickelsberoaWoodfin Camn MAKI-H/Ak'KIL 184 29EL SALVADOR 1984 prisoners including several officers: the equivalent of putting two batallions out of commission in 12 weeks...
...advisers and Salvadorean military commanders...
...O N SEPTEMBER 3, 1983, THE FMLN OPENED its "Independence, Freedom and Democracy for El Salvador" offensive with a surprise attack on the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in San Miguel...
...on the contrary, given present levels of inefficiency, the FMLN would be the biggest beneficiary of increased military aid...
...Those logistical problems were starkly exposed by the latest offensive...
...All this may suggest that the war is once again moving into a critical phase...
...In the southeast, guerrillas threaten the military command in Usulutan and the 3rd Infantry Brigade in San Miguel...
...While augmenting troop strength and firepower could have a serious shortterm impact on the FMLN's development, it would be unlikely to swing the military balance permanently in favor of the Army...
...They include the second seizure of the communications base at Cacahuatique in San Miguel, the most important in the eastern half of the country...
...Though the FMLN operated widely in the central and southern parts of the country, it had never consolidated zones of control or attempted concerted military offensives in these vital economic areas, the rearguard of the regime...
...In the assault on Tejutepeque, for example, the local detachment of 180 soldiers changed into civilian clothes and fled to Ilobasco as soon as the attack began...
...since May, the rebels had restricted large-scale attacks to the northern zone of San Miguel and the southern part of Cuscatlan...
...The armed forces have lost a number of fixed positions which protected major troop concentrations...
...In fiscal year 1983, the United States gave El Salvador $86.3 million in military aid, made up of training programs and sales of equipment, weapons and munitions...
...As in the October 1982 offensive, a number of relatively well guarded towns were briefly taken over by the guerrillas...
...Most of the west of the country, however, principally the departments of Ahuachapan and Sonsonate, remains virtually untouched by the war...
...They have also stressed the importance of night ambushes in the guerrillas' "logistical corridors...
...The offensive, which is still in full spate in early February, seems to demonstrate that the guerrillas still hold the military initiative...
...And the response of the Reagan Administration appears to be to up the military ante...
...It still controls many of them...
...double pay for overtime...
...the presence of a new Salvadorean defense minister, Gen...
...The course of the war is increasingly unfavorable to the armed forces...
...Military setbacks, and political splits in the Constituent Assembly that are reflected in the Army as well, have exacerbated command problems in the field...
...blowing up the Cuscatlan bridge...
...In the September 1983 offensive, more than 70% of municipalities in Cuscatlan, Cabanas, San Miguel and Usulutan fell to the FMLN, cutting off other Army garrisons...
...They attributed improved Army performance to a number of factors: * the continued training of Salvadorean troops by U.S...
...Even allowing for the political restraints of an election year, the Kissinger Commission recommendations, the latest requests from the Salvadorean Army and public statements from Washington all suggest that a new military aid package is in the works...
...But the plan, involving at least nine government ministries, has been frustrated by the failure of its military component...
...Between September and November 1983, the FMLN seized 19 of the 23 major population centers in Usulutan...
...According to the senior U.S...
...Jose Guillermo Garcia, the insurgents were in a "desperate" situation...
...Meanwhile, any hope of making inroads into guerrilla rearguard zones seems to have faded...
...advisers preach aggression...
...The mere existence of this unofficial hierarchy indicates either the defense minister's lack of real power over the military, or his complicity in this kind of behavior...
...In order to hold its strategic containment lines, the Army may need to concentrate more troops there, hampering its ability to protect other areas...
...advisers have reportedly brought about changes in the Army's promotion system, rewarding military skill rather than seniority and partly doing away with the traditional tanda system which favored time-servers over more dynamic, younger officers...
...personnel involvement, whether as pilots for new air transport units while Salvadorean pilots are being trained, in maintenance teams or in training facilities...
...Bob Nickelsbera/Woodfin Camp MAKCLH/AFKIL 1984 25Report o,#, h Americas EL SALVADOR 1984 GUATEMALA ,HONDURAS Chaialanango Santa Ana...
...2. The heavy movement of guerrilla troops to the southern region during the recent offensive points to the failure of the government strategy of containment...
...a seven-hour day and five-day week...
...Indeed, there was a marked change in the tempo of the FMLN offensive after October 25-the date of the Grenada invasion...
...Just as the FMLN was restructuring, the armed forces revamped their strategy and put new military plans into effect...
...Beyond this, the Na- tional Plan, which began on June 10, 1983, had forced the withdrawal of guerrillas based in San Vicente, around the Chinchontepec volcano, and the next phase of the plan had hit FMLN supporters in Usulutan...
...Guerrilla ambushes-occurring at the rate of three to every one by government troops-seem to have caused the Army to relapse into its old tactics...
...The offensive has deepened the isolation of key Army garrisons...
...Though government forces genuinely enhanced MARCH/APRIL 1984 27Repo4t o, he Ae4rcas EL SALVADOR 1984 FMLN sabotage of public transportation has tapered ott in recent months...
...Third, events during the offensive indicate that the FMLN has at least the embryonic ability to lay down norms for local working conditions...
...100% sick pay...
...The expansion of FMLN zones of control and the recovery of thousands of weapons and large stocks of ammunition forced them to undertake a comprehensive reorganization of its forces in March and April...
...Sagging morale is also reflected in the token resistance mounted to FMLN attacks...
...Most have been released by the FMLN into the custody of the International Red Cross, local priests or town officials...
...These attacks have taken place in the context of a continuing erosion and weakening of the armed forces, and persistent problems in their command structure...
...While the Army loses supply routes, the FMLN opens new ones...
...For six months, until April 1983, the FMLN sustained a rhythm of continuous attacks...
...The Army's evacuation of the frontier post of Arcatao, for example, 112 kilometers from San Salvador and 30 from the nearest departmental capital, is a different matter than pulling out of Chinameca, in the heart of a vital coffee-growing district and only a few kilometers from the third city of San Miguel...
...For example, a noose is tightening around the headquarters of the 6th Infantry Brigade in Morazan...
...New weapons recovered by the FMLN between September and November allowed them to create a new batallion with mobile logistical support similar to their elite "Rafael Arce Zablah" Brigade...
...represented a quantum leap forward...
...The decline in acts of sabotage may indicate that the FMLN is more interested in winning credibility for its efforts toward a political solution to the conflict, and in regain- ing popular support in regions hardest hit by sabotage...
...From October 1982 to June 1983 alone, 7,350 new recruits entered their ranks, forming the first "hunter" (cazador) batallions and reinforcing strategic garrisons...
...The results of these offensives enabled the insurgents to swell their forces to a degree that perhaps even they had not anticipated...
...The November reshuffle appears to have had less to do with political change than with the desire to strengthen field commands with officers able to offer better results in the fight against the FMLN...
...T 1E NEW COMBAT SKILLS OF THE INSUR-I gent Army have been shown in their ability to mount far-reaching and simultaneous operations in at least three different places during the current offensive, all without leaving their rearguard exposed...
...Second, there are increasing signs that the FMLN is gradually building alternative political power structures in its newest zones of control and consolidating those structures in its traditional rearguard areas of northeast Chalatenango, northern Morazan, southern Usulutan and Guazapa volcano, where "popular power" has been underway since late 1982...
...3. The speed of improvement in the Army seems insufficient to keep pace with the growing capacity of the FMLN...
...In part, this appears to reflect the existence of Army decision-making levels above the defense minister, in charge of reshuffling military commands and ideologically close to the officers named by the embassy...
...Military Order no...
...Sonsonate La Libertad 1 ,'--' -' ,San Vicente ian Migue - La Union FMLN-controlled area La Paz Migue A. El Paraiso 7. B. The Cuscatlan bridge, destroyed December 31, 1983 " C. The Puente de Oro, destroyed October 15, 1981 EL SALVADOR FMLN is putting more weight on political considera- tions than military ones...
...Government troops abandoned less heavily fortified villages to avoid casualties and the loss of weapons...
...Their presence accounts for poor coordination between land and airborne forces, the failure to provide speedy logistical support and the crushing defeats inflicted on some elite batallions...
...Small unit patrols have been introduced since June 1983, but it has proved harder for the Army to mount ambushes in FMLN zones of control...
...Problems of this nature will not be solved by throwing more money and resources at the problem...
...Accord- ing to the local Salvadorean press, the coffee producers have categorically rejected them as unreasonable, stating that they would rather see the harvest lost...
...involvement in the war...
...Eugenio Vides Casanova, considered more "aggressive" than his predecessor...
...It also looks like an effort to commit the United States to a course of military action in the region from which any future administration, Republican or Democratic, would have the greatest difficulty disentangling itself...
...Between September and November alone, the Arce Batallion graduated from the Regional Military Training Center (CREM) in Honduras and four "hunter" batallions were sworn in...
...Training for Salvadorean elite batallions at Puerto Castilla Honduras REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 24The Army's apparent recovery of the initiative on some fronts led once more to overly optimistic assessments by both U.S...
...In the same period the FMLN took 415 Government troops on maneuvers, San Miguel...
...Until August 1983, most guerrilla attacks had been concentrated in the north...
...The plan was pivotal to the political and military strategy of the armed forces...
...The FMLN also seems to be having success in recruiting new combatants...
...In some districts, the FMLN seems more firmly entrenched than before...
...FMLN assaults on San Miguel and Tejutepeque and attacks on the Army's "hunter" batallions each demonstrated the guerrillas' capacity to defeat as many as three companies at once...
...o - . o. .. ,I...
...and a signed labor contract for the duration of the harvest...
...There have been sporadic actions there, as in La Libertad and the north of Santa Ana, but it would seem that FMLN efforts to open guerrilla fronts there have been fruitless...
...adviser in El Salvador, the guerrillas have now opened a northern corridor which allows them to move freely between Chalatenango and La Union-in trucks and in daylight...
...The recent course of events on the battlefield points to four major trends: 1. There are strong indications that the FMLN is consolidating its military advances on a political level...
...their efficiency and combat capacity between April and August 1983, the September FMLN offensive seems to indicate that a number of shortcomings remain-a lack of mobility, poor logistical support and command problems...
...By September 1982, the Salvadorean military was boasting that the guerrillas' capacity was limited to "occasional spectacular attacks" and acts of sabotage...
...A shift in U.S...
...military advisers, victory or defeat hinged on its success...
...The FMLN offensive has caused the Army heavy losses in casualties and equipment...
...In the center of the country, there is a serious threat to the military garrison in Sensuntepeque, Cabanas and the companies stationed in Ilobasco...
...The Army has always had trouble providing swift air and land support to troops caught in a surprise guerrilla attack...
...Speaking at the plan's inauguration in June, President Magana declared it to be the National Unity government's "most ambitious" attempt to pacify the country and reactivate the economy...
...Between September 3 and November 27, 1983, the Army suffered 1,418 casualties...
...The threepronged attack hit the south and center of San Miguel and Usulutan...
...policy toward El Salvador cannot be ruled out in the event of a Democratic victory in the November elections...
...Their death rattle, he said, was audible...
...advisers...
...The three principal lines of attack in the offensive may have involved guerrilla contingents of as many as 1,500 or 2,000 men...
...Its main component would be to take the main strategic thrust of the war into the air...
...As well as highlighting divisions within the Army (even some military officers have been threatened by the death squads), The guerrillas have improved their supply corridors over the last year of fighting...
...The FMLN shows substantial progress in its ability to concentrate and disperse troops and a qualitative improvement in its maneuverability in the field...
...The renewed Army offensive coincided with a marked decline in FMLN activity...
...Recent declarations have expressed the fear that further military successes by the guerrillas may provoke Reagan to send in U.S...
...Instead, they have distributed leaflets setting forth working conditions and recommended wage scales for farm workers: a daily salary of 14 colones ($5.60), or 15 colones per hundred- weight of coffee picked...
...The Army's real problem seems to stem from the inefficient use of resources-sloppy use of firepower, cumbersome sweeps by thousands of troops, involving vast logistical efforts, and the use of elite units as protective forces rather than shock forces...
...15 of November 25, 1983, made changes in the Army hierarchy that affected some of those accused...
...This had sought to pin the FMLN down in the economically unimportant northern region, while consolidating Ar- my control of key economic regions through a new plan of civic-military operations...
...THE RELATIVE LULL IN MILITARY ACTIVITY after the March 1982 elections, a result of the political setback suffered by the insurgents, coupled with the rumor of serious rifts within the FMLN, gave rise to speculation about the likelihood of a medium-term military victory by the armed forces...
...This would open the way for new kinds of U.S...
...troops...
...The prospects of a government military victory appear ever more remote if the current pattern continues, raising the specter of increased U.S...
...According to figures from the West German news agency, DPA, around 90 soldiers died in the September attack on the 3rd Brigade in San Miguel after several hours of heavy artillery bombardment...
...At the very least, this would imply a delay of several months for the insurgents to devise fresh plans to cope with the Army's tactical innovations and new military technology...
...A Miami Herald story of August 27, 1983 reported that by that date the number of guerrillas was higher by several thousand than the 5-6,000 estimated in June...
...The U.S...
...reactive and defensive where U.S...
...The most recent military successes of the FMLN have hit strategic targets crucial to the fragile military balance...
...But the latest offensive displayed again that incompetent officers remain in key command posts...
...Yet this expansion did not translate into a real advantage over the FMLN, which grew proportionately faster...
...According to the FMLN's Radio Venceremos, some plantation owners in San Miguel and Usulutan have ac- cepted these conditions after some negotiation...
...That, at any rate, is the implication of its most dramatic recent actions-the rout of a whole company of troops at Anamoros, La Union...
...The guerrillas, in contrast, have augmented their capacity with the weapons captured on the battlefield...
...In the view of U.S...
...Its scale seems to have surpassed all expectations, and the campaign forced the Army to reassess its tactics...
...The military received supplemen- tary aid from the United States and inaugurated a crash training program for 1,500 troops at Puerto Castilla, Honduras, to modify the Army's operational plans...
...and the destruction of the Cuscatlan bridge...
...Between October 1982 and the end of November 1983, at least 1,518 troops surrendered to the guerrillas...
...CONFLICTS OVER CORRECT COUNTERINsurgency tactics also continue to plague the Army, above all in attitudes toward non-combatants...
...The FMLN is still likely, however, to deliver body blows to government forces whenever the opportunity arises...
...In part, this is an ideological problem, but it also reflects ill treatment, poor food, lack of logistical support and inadequate equipment in the field-the latter a sign of corruption in the officer corps, for there seems to be no shortage of supplies...
...While FMLN troops were attacking en masse in the south of Usulutan or the north of San Miguel and Cuscatlan, other units held the Army efficiently at bay in the zones of control in Morazan and Chalatenango...
...CONARA put into effect the tactics insistently recommended by U.S...
...several have not yet been reoccupied...
...the northeast, including the departments of San Miguel, La Union and Morazan...
...His advisers in the field confirm that the FMLN has the upper hand in the war...
...1 Guazapa volcano' " Is Cabanas...
...The difficulty of getting supplies through to these posts led to the evacuation of many...
...In the context of electoral campaigns in both El Salvador and the United States, all the evidence points to 1984 as a decisive year in the Salvadorean war...
...Even direct military intervention cannot be ruled out...
...Despite a government campaign to slow the rate of surrenders, it shows no sign of abating...
...The FMLN's ability to deploy such large troop concentrations is ominous for the Army...
...4. There is every indication that the Army will explain recent setbacks as evidence of the need for more resources and materiel, and that Washington will respond by trying to increase military aid...
...Nevertheless, a significant number of men singled out for criticism continue in different military posts...
...This despite the Salvadorean Army's claim to have inflicted 2,000 casualties on the guerrillas in the previous year...
...But guerrilla operations from September to January REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 26Claude Urracal/ygma National Guardsmen killed in combat near Santa Rosa de Lima...
...While this pattern also marked earlier rebel offensives, it never previously touched such critical areas...
Vol. 18 • March 1984 • No. 2
