Costa Rica: See Saw Diplomacy
Edelman, Marc
There was much snickering when government posters cropped up all over San Jos6 shortly be- fore Reagan's arrival last Decem- ber. Despite the worst economic crisis in Costa Rica's history,...
...This breach of hemispheric solidarity was tempered only by some littlepublicized remarks in which Monge maintained continued support for Argentine sovereignty in the disputed islands...
...In conversations with Reagan, Monge emphasized the needs of the strategic northern border zone, an impoverished and potentially unstable area with a large number of Nicaraguan residents...
...His job went to a career State Department officer, Curtin Winsor, who is also president of a West Virginia coal company...
...Foreign Minister Volio, however, a hard-liner within the administration, welcomed the "tranquilizing" presence of U.S...
...interests in Central America and that White House officials Costa Rica for sale to the highest bidder...
...ambassador to Costa Rica, Francis McNeil, a Carter appointee whom Thomas Enders had pushed for the special envoy position that went to Stone...
...Despite the worst economic crisis in Costa Rica's history, the Monge Administration paid for thousands of colorful posters of Reagan towering over the diminutive, rotund Monge in the White House Rose Garden...
...Carazo's Administration, however, strongly resisted IMF pressure to institute an economic austerity program, arguing that such a move would have devastating consequences for the poor and threaten "social peace...
...Finally in late August, Monge presided at the first meeting between an FDR-FMLN delegation and members of the Salvadorean government's Peace Commission...
...In July, for example, Monge refused a U.S...
...invitation to observe naval maneuvers in Central American waters, declaring that the exercises were "inopportune" and "contribute nothing toward creating an atmosphere of dialogue...
...Winsor, who speaks only broken Spanish, is known to be a hard-liner sympathetic to the most conservative figures in the Reagan Administration...
...Understands U.S...
...In February 1982, the Carazo Administration had played host to the foreign ministers of El Salvador and Honduras at the founding of the Central American Democratic Community, the first of a series of groupings ostensibly aimed at' finding peaceful democratic solu- tions to the crises of the region...
...Position Monge's 1982 election gave new impetus to Costa Rica's growing alignment with the Reagan Administration...
...Thomas Enders, then assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, set the tone of the meeting by accusing Nicaragua of exporting revolution and supplying arms to the Salvadorean guerrillas...
...41update * update update * update IMF-imposed austerity measures could "have devastating consequences for the poor and threaten 'social peace.'" the main target of CBI funds and the one non-Caribbean nation to benefit under the misnamed plan...
...goals in Central America...
...In the Reagan Administration's Central America policy, Costa Rica is emerging as a democratic showcase and as a potential base for destabilizing Nicaragua...
...It is difficult to tell how long the Costa Rican government will be able to balance the contradictory demands of its pacifist ideology with support for U.S...
...Reagan's trip to Costa Rica took place in a climate of growing desperation over the economic situation...
...Within a few days of Reagan's trip, $64.5 million in credits were provided for local businesses to purchase raw materials, machinery and replacement parts in the United States...
...If developed, it could serve as a buffer against the southward spread of revolution...
...Carazo, a Christian democrat, was highly supportive of El Salvador's military-Christian Democratic junta which, by early 1980, had been abandoned by the progressives who briefly joined it in October 1979...
...At this point, the United States seems committed to paying the relatively low price required to maintain Costa Rica's economy and political institutions more or less intact in the face of the severe crises sweeping the region...
...the British during the Malvinas war against Argentina...
...ally...
...Marc Edelman is a doctoral candidate in anthropology at Columbia University and was a visiting researcher at the University of Costa Rica, 1980-82...
...Monge and Foreign Minister Fernando Volio were quick to point out supposed similarities between the group's proposals and those of the Forum for Peace and Democracy...
...Every effort was made to exaggerate the "threat" allegedly posed by Nicaragua and by ultra-Left groups linked to isolated acts of violence during the previous two years...
...The September arrest in San Jose of a Basque nationalist tied to an alleged Nicaraguansponsored destabilization campaign led the government to request heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles from the United States for the airport and oil refinery, weakening the neutralist stance of key moderates, such as Security Minister Angel Solano...
...In July the FDR-FMLN reportedly requested that Monge sit in on planned San Jose talks with Reagan envoy Richard Stone...
...During the 1978-79 war in Nicaragua, dozens of planes loaded with arms destined for the Sandinistas landed in Costa Rica...
...client states...
...Monge's June 1982 visit to Washington occurred at a time when the United States' standing in Latin America was at an all-time low as a result of U.S...
...Once again Nicaragua was not invited...
...Although Monge had repeatedly expressed hostility to the Salvadorean guerrillas, as early as March he offered to mediate the conflict, and in May made it known that he had served as a "communication channel" between the Salvadorean government and the FDR-FMLN...
...But fears that nearby violence could spread to Costa Rica have led the social democratic administration of President Luis Alberto Monge to criticize U.S...
...Excluding Nicaragua, the organi- zation was widely perceived as a club of U.S...
...42 Echoing the U.S...
...Costa Rican officials made little pretense of hiding their hope that the visit would bring new aid...
...need to be hit over the head with a two-by-four...
...This amount, although minuscule in relation to the country's needs, was second only to that provided El Salvador, *The $110 million represents $55 million for assistance with the balance of payments, $28 million in food aid and $27 million for a variety of development projects...
...position at the time, the forum called for regional-not bilateral-talks among the parties in conflict...
...In 1980, a series of minor diplomatic differences with Nicaragua brought charges that the Sandinistas had betrayed a loyal friend and fed a growing anti-Nicaragua campaign in the country's conservative news media...
...Major differences, however, were that the Contadora meeting took place without the United States and called for a series of bilateral talks between the parties in conflict, including the United States and Cuba...
...This stance achieved little international attention, some observers maintain, in part because Costa Rica's creditors were not eager to publicize a position which might serve as an example to larger debtor nations such as Brazil and Mexico...
...In April, Reagan announced that U.S...
...Ironically, Costa Rica's indispensable role as a democratic showcase in U.S...
...NACLA Reportupdate * update . update . update Although the Carazo Administration played a key role in overthrowing Somoza, it shifted increasingly to the right after 1979...
...Costa Rican support for U.S...
...strategy, $70 million was allocated to Costa Rica under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI...
...Desperate for foreign aid, Monge's government has nevertheless been increasingly willing to serve as a loyal U.S...
...Whether such a policy is compatible with the regionalized war which Reagan appears to be seeking remains to be seen...
...goals in the region...
...In October, Monge addressed the AFL-CIO convention in Florida, and plans to visit the InterAmerican Press Association in November...
...pressure on Monge...
...military...
...war moves and to serve as mediator in talks between the Salvadorean government and the insurgent FDR-FMLN...
...The governments of Mexico and Venezuela, a significant sector of Monge's own party and several of the more important parties in the Socialist International also declined to support the forum, criticizing Costa Rica for allying itself so closely with the United States...
...war ships off Nicaragua's coasts...
...economic assistance, and the second largest per capita in the world.* Club of Client States In addition, in a move indicative of the country's importance to U.S...
...Once again, amidst proclamations that the Con- tadora process had reached a dead end, a regional meeting was held in August with the familiar sounding title of Encounter for Peace, Democracy and Social Justice...
...One unnoticed side effect of the May State Department purge of Central American policymakers was the replacement of U.S...
...The Costa Rican government, following the U.S...
...In July, Costa Rica joined Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and the United States in formulating an OAS resolution pinning Central America's problems solely on Nicaragua...
...Costa Rica's regional role in Central America reflects the conflicting demands of dependency "*Two subsequent articles will deal with Costa Ricans' political struggles in the face of the current economic crisis and with the recent efforts of the Costa Rican government, supported by the United States and its allies, to modernize the country's security forces...
...The charge, Monge told La Naci6n in June, was put forth by "leftist totalitarian forces which are developing a costly, worldwide campaign to mar the image of Costa Rica and discredit our democracy...
...Monge also expressed enthusiasm about beginning construction of a road network along the Nicaraguan border to be financed by the U.S...
...policymakers seeking to justify intervention in Central America often point to Costa Rica as a model for the rest of the region...
...This pacific stance-if not infrequently violated in practice-is nonetheless an important element in the country's dominant ideology...
...update the first time supporting bilateral talks...
...It attracted a variety of conservative social democrats, Christian democrats and observers from the U.S...
...economic aid to Costa Rica for fiscal year 1983 would be increased from the planned $90 million to $110 million, making Costa Rica the hemisphere's second largest recipient of U.S...
...With the Reagan Administration eager for support from a Latin American leader, Monge obligingly expressed his "understanding" of the U.S...
...Monge as Communicator The formation of the Contadora Group coincided with stepped up attacks by Nicaraguan contras based in northern Costa Rica...
...Mexico, it was later revealed, had blocked Costa Rica from joining the Contadora Group, since it was too closely allied with Washington...
...lead, was cool to the Contadora Group's April declaration...
...Lacking a militaristic tradition, the country has long been seen as an anomaly in Central America...
...The international snub accorded the Democratic Community led the Monge Administration to hold a similar meeting in October 1982, the Forum for Peace and Democracy, attended by El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Colombia, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Belize, Costa Rica and the United States...
...regional strategy has permitted members of the Monge Administration to voice occasional criticism of Reagan's policies...
...In contrast, the efforts of the Contadora Group-the foreign ministers of Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia-to find political solutions to the conflicts in Central America achieved immediate international recognition...
...These unsuccessful, U.S.-promoted regional meetings were seemingly aimed at isolating Nicaragua and using Costa Rica's international prestige to legitimize the repressive Salvadorean and Honduran governments...
...Faced with the prospect of four years of severe economic crisis, Monge quickly sought increased aid from the United States and arrived at a provisional agreement with the IMF which permitted rescheduling the foreign debt in return for promises to cut spending on social programs...
...Democratic and Republican parties, as well as representatives of Salvadorean and Honduran business groups and such dubious peace advocates as former Salvadorean junta leader Jos6 Napole6n Duarte...
...The posters were a graphic reminder of just how close relations between the two administrations have become...
...support for Nov/Dlc 1983 5 0 In the "strategic northern border zone," seals of both Costa Rica and Nicaragua...
...Petty White House Politics There are recent indications that the United States may be planning a more active role for Nov/Dec 1983 Costa Rica in its efforts to turn back the tide of revolution on the isthmus...
...Through a system of parliamentary democracy, social welfare programs have been established that are without parallel on the isthmus.* But Costa Rican leaders, anxious about the future of this social democratic system, are torn between preserving peace at home and securing economic aid in return for supporting U.S...
...After all, Costa Rica is the one credible Western-style democracy among its client states in Central America...
...Washington also committed itself to seeking rapid action in the IMF on the final accord sought by the Monge Administration...
...Several other events are also indicative of growing U.S...
...Shortly before his ouster, McNeil was quoted in the Dallas Times Herald as saying that "petty politics" were interfering with U.S...
...40 on the United States and the state's historical commitment to social welfare and to a quasi-pacifist philosophy...
...aims in Central America has not always been so pronounced...
...Concerned that fighting in the border region could spill over into Costa Rica, Monge's government became increasingly involved in the Contadora process, requesting that neutral observers be sent to the Nicaraguan border and for NACLA Reportupdate * update update...
...position, suggesting that the diplomatic crisis was little more than an "isolated circumstance...
...Monge's participation in these negotiations allows him to curry favor with the Reagan Administration and enhances Costa Rica's international prestige, both of which generate domestic support for his administration among nationalists and those thirsting for economic aid...
...These arms transfers enjoyed the blessing of the government led by Rodrigo Carazo's Christian democratic Unity Coalition, despite intense maneuvers by the Carter Administration to squeeze the Sandinistas out of any post-victory settlement...
Vol. 17 • November 1983 • No. 6
