Brazil - Metalworkers Strike
Keck, Mimi
On May 11, the 41-day strike by Brazilian metalworkers ended in defeat for the workers, but its political implications go far beyond industrial relations. Not only the tough government...
...The issues are too clear, and the lines are too clearly drawn...
...New forms of worker organization which encourage participation by many more than the traditional leaders will make it difficult to keep the unions in check for long...
...Already, following the 1978 metalworkers strikes, the international business press had noted that the basis of the Brazilian "miracle," i.e...
...Textile workers in Rio Grande do Sul had received a 20% productivity increase...
...The first week in May the workers in Santo Andre returned to work, and a week later, when Sao Bernardo workers went back, the strike was over...
...XIII, No...
...Wage increases based on gains in productivity were to be negotiated directly with employers, but were to be limited to 5...
...The government "intervened" in the unions, arresting Lula (Luis Ignacio de Silva, President of the Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo do Campo) and 33 others, including many members of the elected Wage Commission, as well as two lawyers from the Justice and 42 Peace Commission of the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo...
...But the strike's impact cannot be fully gauged by its failure to achieve its goals...
...A joint statement by all major opposition parties comdemned the trade union law as the "perpetuation of an unjust and wicked social order concentrating power in the hands of a privileged minority...
...In its third week, that decision was reversed and the strike was declared illegal...
...In a surprise decision on April 2, the Regional Labor Court of Sao Paulo proclaimed itself incompetent to declare the strike illegal...
...On a local level, support groups met daily in neighborhoods with members of the Wage Commission...
...A support committee headquartered in the Legislative Assembly included members of the legislature, professional associations, local associations and representatives of other unions...
...Early in the strike, Lula declared that workers would lower their demand for a 15% productivity raise to 7% if a job guarantee went along with it...
...the existence of a submissive and apolitical labor force, had been cut away...
...1, January-February, to enable the employers to resist the workers' demands through direct aid to the companies and military repression of the unions...
...Public Support for the Strike Public support for the metalworkers came from all over Brazil, as the strike became the focus of "*Movimento, April 14-20, 1980...
...As one young workers in Sao Bernardo do Campo said, "People are conscious of the fact that they are not just fighting for a raise...
...As the strike neared its fifth week, 120,000 people commemorated May Day in Sao Bernardo after a tension packed morning in which the government first prohibited the use of both the plaza in front of the Matriz Church (which had become strike headquarters after the intervencao) and the Vila Euclides Stadium (where workers' assemblies are traditionally held), then at the last minute rescinded its decision and called off the troops...
...Part of the reason for government intransigence is increasing foreign concern with the size of Brazil's foreign debt (estimated at $53-$57 billion, with current reserves at approximately $6.7 billion...
...Government Intransigence There is some evidence that employers were willing to negotiate to a far greater extent than they did, but the government would not allow it...
...This was a major victory for the metalworkers...
...So the government decided to make an example of the metallurgical workers...
...The degree of repression which the regime had to employ to break this strike and the widespread support it commanded show that there will be no easy "abertura" in Brazil now...
...JulylAugust 1980 political opposition to the regime...
...In addition to the quality of the demands and the workers' militancy in fighting for them, three aspects of the strike appear most important in judging its future effects: the form of organization of the strike, the degree and organization of public support, and the government's hard line reaction on the side of the employers...
...It reflects the growing struggle in recent years for an authentic trade unionism coming from the workers themselves...
...3, MayJune, 1979...
...At the suggestion of Lula himself, a directorate was elected from the Commission to take over leadership of the strike in case of arrest of the union officers...
...The government also removed union officials, including Lula, from their posts and took control of union headquarters...
...See NACLA, "Brazil: 'Controlled Decompression' ", XIII, no...
...The workers' determination to win on the non-monetary demands, especially the right to have delegates inside the factory, was a direct challenge to the government-controlled union structure...
...it shows that people have more confidence in themselves...
...And that's good...
...Fernando Uchoa 43update * update . update * update in taking consistent public positions in support of the metalworkers...
...As a delegate from Mercedes said, the main advantage of the Commission was that "it awakens in each worker his ability to assume his own struggle...
...When the companies concluded that it would be cheaper for them to settle than to last out a long strike, the government relaxed Bank of Brazil lending restrictions for the affected companies...
...Since meetings were prohibited in the factories, elections for the Commission were held in churches and at union headquarters in a series of section meetings, from November to March...
...The workers of Sao Caetano went back during the third week of the strike with the 7 % productivity increase approved by the Labor Court, but between 100,000 and 150,000 workers stayed out in Sao Bernardo and Santo Andre...
...Inflation is currently running at 80% per year...
...Not only the tough government reaction, but the very process and organization of the strike itself showed the failure of the Figueiredo regime's "abertura" policy, the latest halfhearted democratic "opening" of the military regime that has ruled Brazil since 1964...
...But despite this apparent victory, and continued support from the Church and all major opposition parties, the strike was beginning to collapse...
...The strike, involving workers in the "ABC" suburbs of Sao Paulo (Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo and Sao Caetano), began at midnight on March 30, and was so widely supported in major firms (principally foreign-owned automobile companies, including VW, MercedesBenz, Scania and Ford) that there was no need to maintain pickets...
...It is not only the factory and the labor courts that are wrong-it's the whole policy of this regime...
...And another delegate said of the strike in Sao Bernardo, "this year you don't hear people shouting 'Lula, Lula, Lula!' the way they did last year...
...Participation was encouraged and facilitated by the division of the Commission into subcommissions with specific tasks, thus bringing many more people into positions of responsibility...
...Mimi Keck is a graduate student at Columbia University and a free-lance translator...
...The strike itself has further eroded foreign confidence due to its probable effect on export performance as well as its implications for the overall labor climate in Brazil...
...The goal was clearly NACLA NEWS "Steelyard Blues" in Spanish CIDE (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas) of Mexico City has published NACLA's Report on the crisis of the steel industry ("Steelyard Blues", Vol...
...The advantages of this form of organization were manifest in the degree and duration of mobilization in this strike...
...In addition, the 5% limit on productivity raises was proving impossible to sustain...
...The government's hope for a peaceful intervention and a quick return to "normalcy" was thus dashed, and the ABC industrial belt became a virtual armed camp, commanded by General Milton Tavares of the Second Army...
...With increased forums for discussion and consultation, the negotiating process was demystified...
...The Church was particularly important, in providing meeting places after the intervencao, and Pre-strike metalworkers' rally, March 1979...
...Cardinal Arns of the Archdiocese of Sao Paolo, accused of inciting workers to strike, replied that he was "simply offering spiritual and material support to enable the workers to make their own decisions as free men, free of repression and the pressure of hunger on their families...
...By early April, however, it was already clear that the government was manipulating the official cost-of-living index, when it came out lower than the index in the ten leading cities on which it was to be based...
...The government had hoped to control labor demands by decreeing an automatic cost-of-living adjustment on a graduated scale, with 44 lower paid workers receiving slightly more than the inflation rate and highly paid workers slightly less...
...But even this is not likely to be enough...
...This struggle has been spearheaded by the metalworkers, but this year's strike was the first time that Lula had taken such a strong stand...
...Organization of the Strike No longer dependent on a sort of charismatic relationship between Lula and the workers' assemblies, this strike counted on NACLA Reportupdate * update . update * update the efforts of an elected Mobiliza- tion and Wage Commission com- posed of 480 metallurgical workers...
...Fundraising, through sale of bonds and door to door collections, food distribution, and other support activities were carried on at the local and national levels...
...The government has had difficulties obtaining the new committments it needs to cover both obligations coming due and the new payments deficit expected to accrue this year...
...Although attendance was often high, participation was lower than if the elections had taken place in the plants themselves...
...The demands which proved so unacceptable to the government were not over monetary questions but rather job security and the right to have workers' delegates in the factories...
Vol. 14 • July 1980 • No. 4
