Pinochet's Heirs: The Fractured Chilean Right
Volk, Steven
For Chilean conservatives, limping along the road to a third consecutive defeat in presidential politics, Pinochet's arrest in London on October 16 struck like a double dose of Viagra. After...
...That business as usual had not been particularly good to conservatives since 1990 was left unspoken...
...1 4 Jarpa's emergence signaled the momentary displacement of Guzmdn and the gremialistas from Pinochet's central core advisors...
...3 When, during the Popular Unity government, the opposition National Party led by Sergio Onofre Jarpa wanted to expand beyond partisan sniping at Allende in Congress to more massive direct actions in the streets, the gremios-truck owners, bus drivers, small shopkeepers, doctors and other medical professionals, white collar unionists, etcetera-were perfectly placed to mobilize their membership in order to disrupt civic life in a way that parties alone could not contemplate...
...Andr6s Allamand and SebastiAn Pifiera typify the RN's moderates...
...One central truth about Chilean politics since the 1973 coup has been that while the dictatorship presented a unitary face to the outside world, internally it was fractured by ideological, political and, to a lesser extent, economic disputes that both shaped the regime and bequeathed to the Chilean right its contemporary contours...
...From a speech given in Copiapb on June 14,1983, cited in Patrick Guillaudat and Pierre Mouterde, Los movimientos sociales en Chile, 1973-1993 (Santiago: Editorial LOM, 1998), p. 155...
...While the institutionalizing project would not have gotten far without support from Pinochet himself, its main backers were the General's colleagues in the military junta and a rightwing activist named Jaime Guzmdn...
...become the "liberalizing military party," devoted to a process of political opening and economic reform within the "protected democratic" matrix...
...the election of the conservative Jorge Alessandri to the presidency in 1958...
...Latin American Weekly Report, November 3, 1988...
...At the top of the political agenda was the upcoming presidential plebiscite, scheduled for an undetermined time in 1988, in which voters would be asked to support the candidate of the military junta, or to vote "no...
...2 Pinochet's fellow junta members, watchful of their own prerogatives, played a key role in this process, but it was Jaime Guzmin and the gremialistas who crafted the institutionalizers' main ideological and political message...
...He recently argued that center-right voters should be allowed to vote in the Concertaci6n's primary elections even though they don't belong to any party that makes up that coalition...
...Quoted in Ruth Behar, The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology That Breaks Your Heart (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), p. 34...
...On the one hand, our recent past will grow even more remote...
...include moderates-over smaller, ideologically "pure" parties...
...6 In addition, a National Security Council dominated by the military was given broad powers over "security" questions, ensuring a deliberative political role for the armed forces...
...Latin American Weekly Report, May 12, 1988...
...Pinochet and the duros weakened their own ability to control the shape of negotiations between the Concertaci6n and the right by attempting to pave the way for another Pinochet bid for the presidency...
...The right can claim the loyalty of up to 30% of the voters in Chile, a figure that has hardly changed since Steven Volk teaches history at Oberlin College...
...These new "institutionalizers" would ultimately find their representation in the UDI...
...So incensed was Guzmin by Jarpa's actions that without informing even Pinochet, he announced the formation of the UDI on October 25, 1983, thereby effectively pulling the gremialistas out of Jarpa's coalition plans...
...146, 156...
...El Mercurio (Santiago), December 2, 1998...
...But the divisions between the UDI and the RN were much deeper...
...Joining the oldfashioned landed oligarchs of the Liberal and Conservative Parties-the "Esteban Truebas" made familiar by Isabel Allende in House of the Spirits-with more sophisticated business and media magnates, the PN grew increasingly authoritarian after 1970, ultimately becoming the most vocal congressional backer of a military coup against Salvador Allende...
...8 The conflicts that surfaced among regime supporters in Chile as they wrote the new Constitution suggested different theoretical understandings of how political systems cope with demands placed on them and with institutional conflicts...
...But these "hardest of hard right" voices were increasingly at odds with the orthodox monetarists of the Chicago school, hegemonic by 1975, whose economic message suggested a "natural" relationship between capitalism and democracy...
...4. Julio FaOndez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile, From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp...
...1 8 Guzm~n was expelled from the RN in mid-April, and he took the UDI out with him, leaving the "umbrella" RN in the hands of the Jarpa and Allamand factions...
...Mayor Cristibn Labb6 called this approach his "mosquito plan...
...186-7...
...Cavallo, Salazar, Sepilveda, Chile, 1973-1988, p. 371...
...As Allamand tried to coax the RN to amend the Constitution again by jettisoning the designated senators altogether, restructuring the Constitutional Tribunal and National Security Council, and by providing Congress with greater oversight powers, Jarpa's faction, which included seven senators, ignored him and repeatedly torpedoed the reform attempts...
...This particular perspective is spelled out in detail in a collection of essays and speeches by Andres Allamand, La centroderecha del futuro (Santiago: Editorial Los Andes, 1993...
...They therefore attempted to fashion a political order that would favor large political blocs-which would, of necessity, aquin Lavin, mayor of Las Condes, Chile's wealthiest municipality, early presidential candidate of the right...
...1 6 In March 1987, facing increased pressure, the regime approved a new party law and parties began enrolling members for the first time since the coup...
...This would inevitably decay and the military would be forced out of power without having changed the nature of the state in an enduring fashion...
...The roots of the present-day Chilean right stretch back long before 1973...
...The economic crisis, and Pinochet's attempts to resolve it, triggered the most significant popular uprisings since the coup, forcing the government to negotiate directly with its opponents...
...For her part, Matthei's RN membership was suspended for ten years in 1993 after a nasty scandal involving tapes, lies and military eavesdropping in an attempt by Jarpa to ruin the presidential chances of RN moderate Pifera...
...The 1980 Constitution limited popular sovereignty by mandating that the Senate seat nine nonelected members...
...The junta ultimately quashed this effort in March 1989...
...Gremialismo (the word has no reasonable English translation as its root, gremio or "guild," calls up images of medieval Europe) emerged in the mid1960s at the Catholic University in Santiago...
...Far from uniting the right, Jarpa's gambit ultimately produced a definitive split in conservative forces...
...Guzmin's talents-he was probably the most intelligent theorist to come out of the Chilean right in decades-were not overlooked by the new military rulers, and he was drawn increasingly close to Pinochet...
...El Mercurio, October 25, 1998...
...Certainly, the most authoritarian wing of this "new right" had a history in various Chilean experiments with fascism and nazism from the 1930s to the present...
...Using modern polling techniques and working with its closely linked think tank, the Center for Public Studies, the UDI discovered that public-safety issues---delinquency, assaults, robbery-were the primary concern of their potential voters in 1992, followed by health and employment issues...
...6. To win both seats, the top party had to win 67% of the vote...
...Latin American Weekly Report, May 7, 1992...
...Allamand, La centroderecha del futuro, p. 13...
...Tercera, September 7, 1998...
...3. Arturo Valenzuela, "The Military in Power: The Consolidation of One-Man Rule," in Paul W. Drake and Ivan Jaksic, The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 44...
...Young party professionals in their early forties, they represent a brand of centrist politics not very unlike that of Ricardo Lagos of the Socialists, Sergio Bitar of the Popular Democratic Party or, for that matter, Bill Clinton or Tony Blair...
...El Mercurio, October 23, 1998...
...Tercera, March 3, 1999...
...the impact of Pinochet's arrest on these two parties, reveals much about the past and future of the Chilean right...
...His actions were paralleled by those of UDI mayor Joaquin Lavin in Las Condes, the site of the British Embassy...
...But they also believed that a party system operating under the Constitution would guarantee the stability of the private-enterprise system, whereas continued or increased authoritarianism would frustrate moderates and destabilize what they had achieved under military rule...
...Un estudio sobre la evolucidn ideolbgica del regimen militar (Santiago: Documento de Trabajo, No...
...June 24, 1997...
...Instead, the strongest component of this faction was made up of previously unaffiliated rightists who believed that the military should move to establish a new institutional order in Chile, not just hand over power to the old right...
...Longueira recently dismissed a suggestion from the RN that the two right-wing parties support the candidate of the Christian Democrats (PDC) in the 1999 elections...
...1 7 Right-wing unity, however, was short-lived as terminal squabbling broke out in March 1988 prior to RN's first internal elections...
...5 (September/October 1988), pp...
...Ercilla (Santiago), April 20, 1983...
...2 6 For its part, the UDI faced the enormous challenge of surmounting the 1991 assassination-still unsolved--of founder Guzmdn, its leader and pivotal ideologue...
...140-141...
...At the same time, the crisis seemed to take the wind out of the sails of those on the right who had placed their hopes in totalizing and technocratic solutions to Chile's problems...
...But as the Pinochet dictatorship changed the nature of the Chilean state, so it provided the space in which a newly defined right both challenged the more traditional right and sought a way to project itself beyond an inevitable end to military rule...
...At the very heart of this conflict among conservatives is the breach between two rightist parties, National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI...
...She is the author of Gendered Allegiances: The Con- struction of a Cross-Class Right-Wing Women's Movement in Chile (Penn State University Press, forthcoming...
...It also included the removal of parking spots reserved for Spanish diplomats, closing the British Cultural Center and the Chilean-British Cultural Institute, and imposing a $7 million peso fine on the Spanish-owned telephone company for having "unauthorized" signs in the neighborhood...
...9. Pilar Vergara, Auge y caida del neoliberalismo en Chile...
...This left Allamand with the only option of "urging" recalcitrant deputies and senators to quit the party or accept internal discipline, which none have...
...Only by introducing a new institutional regime structured around impersonal laws could the military extend its influence beyond its own ability to rule...
...2 8 Joaquin Lavin, the popular UDI mayor of the chic Las Condes neighborhood of Santiago, and the right's frontrunner in the 1999 presidential elections, Pinochet's Heirs: The Fractured Chilean Right 1. Pablo Rodriguez, writing in Tercera (Santiago), March 21, 1977 and in Qu6 Pasa (Santiago), July 18, 1980...
...The Christian Democratic candidate, Andrts Zaldivar, has shown himself open to this prospect if it will further his own flagging campaign...
...9 The gremialistas, on the other hand, placed their trust in coercion as the best means to channel demands and discipline society...
...This meant, for example, that in the Senate elections of 1989, Jaime Guzm~n won a seat from Santiago even though he had 175,000 fewer votes than Ricardo Lagos, the Concertaci6n's candidate...
...4 While the Popular Unity was brought down by a broad and coordinated opposition strategy, the role of the gremios, by articulating a mass opposition, was critical...
...Indeed, they offered to negotiate this amnesia as the means of advancing...
...7. Tombs Moulian, Chile actual: Anatomia de un mito (Santiago: Editorial LOM, 1997), p. 230...
...The traditional right had been represented in the National Party (PN) prior to the coup...
...Indeed, the decision to institutionalize the regime likely arose precisely because of Pinochet's continual attempts to tie the presidency to the army and to locate increasing power in his own hands at the expense of the junta...
...Tercera, December 23, 1998...
...Jarpa accused the UDI of attempting to intimidate its opponents...
...UDI's anger at Jarpa and the traditional right swelled when on live TV, on the morning of October 6, 1988, he was the first to acknowledge Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite, thereby depriving the General of the slight 26NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 26REPORT ON CHILE maneuvering room he had to steal the election...
...The differences between Jarpa and Allamand would widen over time, with Jarpa representing oldstyle, traditional, statist politics and Allamand a more youthful and pragmatic free marketeering...
...The composition of the Senate went from 26 elected and 10 designated senators to 38 elected and 9 designated seats...
...As opposed to a European-style parliamentary system in which party members who disobey leadership orders can be removed from the party, congressional members in Chile are exempted from taking voting instructions from the party...
...While the PN itself continues as an active party today-after having dissolved itself in a show of support for the junta in 1973-the mantle of this political tradition in Chile has passed to the RN, which made its first appearance in the late 1980s...
...Some aspects of the new institutional order, such as a reliance on strong executive power, had been seen previously in Chilean UDI's Jo history...
...7 The infamous Article 8 outlawed participation by parties that "advocated totalitarianism" or believed in "class struggle," reflecting Guzmin's earlier proposal to give the National Security Council the right to veto presidential candidates considered a threat to "national security...
...See Vergara, Augue y caida, p. 352, and Cavallo, Salazar, SepOlveda, Chile, 1973-1988, p. 372...
...December 5, 1995...
...He is credited as the author of Pinochet's path-defining "Chacarillas" speech in which the General set out an institutional trajectory for the regime...
...Tercera, September 1, 1998...
...To do so, he declared, would be to "betray the blood of Jaime Guzman," and he recalled the right's "historical surrender" of 1964, when it supported the PDC, thereby "paving the road for the government of Marxist President Salvador Allende to come to power...
...Tercera, December 11, 1998...
...On the other, both the experience of the Popular Unity and that of the Military Government will have become a part of history in the sense that distance will have given them the character of objects of study or matters filled with objective lessons, without the distortions that are characteristic of partisan positions or personal passions...
...The new rightist forces that emerged during the fight against the Popular Unity and under the dictatorship could not claim as obvious an ancestry...
...Tercera, September 26, 1998...
...Before he could negotiate credibly with the opposition, he needed to weld together a base of center-right support for his project by joining business interests, the right-wing press, some gremialistas and traditional conservative parties...
...See Barros, By Reason and Force, p. 224...
...2 1 This was the RN's bargain: we'll forget about Allende if you forget about Pinochet...
...Latin American Weekly Report, November 16, 1995...
...If the UDI has generally played an obstructionist role in Congress in the nearly ten years since formal rule in Chile passed back into civilian hands, the RN has slalomed between its own obstructionists and compromisers...
...Others, however, not only established and an new directions in Chilean constitutional history, but attempted to ensure that in any postmilitary regime, the principal tenets of pluralist democracy would be severely truncated...
...But while RN politicians supported the military regime, the UDI has always been more strictly allied with Pinochet as a contender for power within the military junta, more supportive of his hard-line proposal to build a truly authoritarian state in Chile-a state that would have featured a largely appointed legislature-and the proscription of all political views deemed to be a "threat to national security...
...Indeed, as the 1988 plebiscite drew closer, UDI's support of Pinochet grew even more clamorous...
...Just as the left opposition began to demand political representation, the right decided that it, too, wanted an "integral renovation of Chilean political life...
...5. Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Oscar SepOlveda, Chile, 1973-1988: La historia oculta del regimen military (Santiago: Editorial Grijalbo, 1997), pp...
...Guillaudat and Mouterde, Los movimientossociales, p. 182...
...Only in 1983 did parties begin to reemerge, largely in response to the collapse of the Chilean economy the previous year...
...Jaime Guzmbn in Tercera, October 2, 1983...
...The military, sooner rather than later, would decamp from La Moneda, the seat of government, opening a critical space that the traditional right could fill...
...RN leaders supported constitutional measures that guaranteed the sanctity of private property, seeing this as an important means of safeguarding their economic interests...
...Furthermore, by the mid-1980s they could see where fortune's wheel was turning...
...2. See, for example, the blistering attack delivered by Air Force General and junta member Gustavo Leigh against Pinochet in a personal letter as quoted in Robert J. Barros, By Reason and Force: Military Constitutionalism in Chile, 1973-1989 (unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago, Department of Political Science, December 1996), pp...
...UDI leaders encouraged the outbreak of RN brawling, and attempted to pick off attractive, marketable, and ideologically "flexible" rising stars such as Evelyn Matthei, who could bolster their rising populist image...
...Jarpa returned to the political fray after a short time away in the early 1990s, this time retrofitted in Pinochetista garb even though he had distanced himself from the dictator in the late 1980s...
...10 The military abolished the entire party system in 1977 as part of its effort to sweep out the old order that had "permitted" the Popular Unity to claim power...
...Pinochet was furious with this turn of events, even though he ultimately capitulated...
...5 Guzmin's analysis of other authoritarian governments had led him to the conclusion that the military could not construct viable, lasting rule based solely on its own arbitrary power...
...May 2, 1996...
...Moulian, Chile actual, p. 319...
...When Pinochet chose not to run, UDI president Julio Dittborn criticized the party's own candidate, Hern~n Biichi, for his "fugitive attitude" in not defending the regime with strength and conviction...
...It effectively checked majority rule by establishing the "binomial" electoral system, practically guaranteeing that the weaker of two electoral coalitions-usually the right-would win one seat in a two-seat district, and by mandating super-majority requirements in the Senate, ensuring minority veto over constitutional changes...
...2 4 In the 1989 and 1993 congressional elections, the RN finished second only to the Christian Democratic Party in the number of senators and deputies elected...
...Both gremialistas and traditional rightists accepted the importance of recasting the Chilean institutional system and limiting ideological pluralism by excluding Marxist parties...
...One should not make the mistake of seeing either of these two parties as "democratic," as both, at different times, have demonstrated their tepid support of pluralism by silencing their political opponents...
...24REPORT ON CHILE as a good moment to challenge strict neoliberal economics in the interest of allowing greater state defense of national capital...
...In fact, it was not until the return of political parties appeared likely that Guzmin publicly changed his tune...
...New articles rejected the proscription of Marxist parties, enlarged the Senate to dilute the UDI leaders quarters afte power of the "designated" senators, and Commander reduced the deliberative power of the National Security Council and the armed forces...
...Yet the gathering of the troops around the aging dictator is instructive because it highlights the contradiction between conservative unity based on a shared history of authoritarian practice and the current reality of right-wing fragmentation...
...Even if Guzmin showed himself willing to move into party politics so as to further his own project, he dismissed Jarpa and the pre-1973 Chilean party right as not being true believers...
...The current UDI president, Pablo Longueira, asserts that the party had "always" dedicated itself to work in the poorer neighborhoods, attributing this concern to Guzmin who had insisted on the UDI's making "a real commitment to the poorest" in society...
...They believe in free-market policies, a small but efficient state, and technocratic, pluralistic politics-all appealing issues to Santiago's postmodern yuppies...
...La Hora (Santiago), October 22, 1998...
...2 3 Still, it was the RN, not the UDI, which controlled the conservatives' agenda after Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite, crafting the 1989 compromise amending the Constitution...
...2 It wanted a return of the party system...
...Latin American Weekly Report (London), March 31, 1988...
...Unwilling simply to resurrect the National Party to act as an institutional party of the right, he tapped Andr6s Allamand, a former PN student leader, to create a modernized organization that could take charge of this process.15 Furthermore, Jarpa saw the economic crisis Margaret Power teaches history at the Illinois Institute of Tech- nology...
...Lashing out at the rising wave of protests in 1983, he warned the sehlores politicos that "we are going to send you back to your Vot XXXII...
...A close examination of the origins and development of this conservative split, as well as The right is caught between conservative unity based on a shared authoritarian past and the reality of ideological fragmentation...
...The RN and those sectors of the traditional right associated with it-the older National Party, for example-were willing to submit that the past could be forgotten...
...No 6 MAY/JUNE 199923 VOLXXXII, No6 MvAY/JUNE1999 23REPORT ON CHILE caves...
...Qud Pasa, October 24, 1998...
...On the RN's reactionary side are oldtimers like Jarpa and Sergio Diez, traditional party bosses who played some role in the military government and who summon their support around olderstyle conservative issues: nationalism, anti-Yankee sentiment, moderate protectionism, support of agricultural interests...
...The shape of the new "protected democracy" appeared relatively quickly after 1977 and took concrete shape in the Constitution of 1980...
...Nacibn (Santiago), October 23, 1998...
...216, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile, August, 1984), p. 287...
...Much of this involved random shootings in poblaciones, intended to reestablish widespread fear of the military...
...La Hora, December 4, 1998...
...Regime opponents organized into a center-left coalition called Concertacidn by February 1988...
...Since they were realistic enough to recognize that the right would not dominate the immediate postmilitary electoral environment, their most likely role would be that of a "loyal" opposition to a center-left government...
...Latin American Weekly Report, September 21, 1989...
...The military government, Pinochet argued in the speech written by Guzmin, would give rise to a new form of "authoritarian, protected, integrated [and] technical" democracy...
...1 3 Still, he appointed Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the leader of the pre-coup National Party and a quintessential politician, as his minister of the interior with the express purpose of opening political negotiations with opposition sectors in an attempt to quash the growing protest movement...
...Naci6n, October 28, 1998...
...2 2 Even in the face of Pinochet's debacle, UDI members and hard-line military officers encouraged him to stand as the right's candidate in the general elections scheduled for 1989...
...Pinochet also resorted to the largest-scale return to armed violence against the opposition since the coup...
...2 0 Smart politics meant grooming themselves for this role until another opportunity arose for them to assume power rather than tying themselves to Pinochet and the past...
...He is the Chair of NACLA's Board of Directors...
...Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken, 1978), p. 255...
...If we could jump forward to [the future] and from that point look back," Allamand wrote, "we would perhaps see something surprising...
...Guzmin accused the FNT and the MUN of trying to buy votes among poor party members and called on his followers to boycott the elections...
...Not only were these programs very much a part of the former socialist agenda crushed by Pinochet, but they were made even more urgent by 17 years of military rule...
...Jarpa began organizing the FNT in 1986 to support his ill-fated attempt to replace Pinochet after 1989...
...With some relief, rightist politicians of all stripes were able to identify "the international leftist conspiracy" as a common enemy, "Chilean dignity" as a common theme, and a common pledge: "business as usual" would stop until Pinochet returned home...
...Leaders like Pablo Rodriguez of the neofascist Fatherland and Liberty movement used the coup to call for the definitive end of liberal democracy in Chile and the abolition of universal suffrage.' These nationalist-corporatists would later gather in the shadowy National Advance (AN), led by senior army officers and former members of Pinochet's intelligence operations, and in a hardright group called the Party of the South...
...Guzmin's death left the party in a weak position to contest elections on a national level, although it actually may have helped to shift the locus of party activity toward the municipal level where the new face of rightist populism was emerging...
...Guzmin had never been active in the party system prior to 1973, and he remained highly suspicious of political parties and the compromises they made to win power...
...The National Security Council's composition was changed and its role reduced to a consultative one in 1989, but the fear of potential military interference in politics remains, 8. Barros, By Reason and Force, p. 173...
...Similar to many European-based corporatist models, such as Franco's Spain, gremialismo sought to replace political organizations and representation based on multiclass parties with functional representation defined by the work place: associations, societies, trade unions and guilds...
...22, No...
...For the bulk of the UDI and its various extremeright campmates, however, there was no forgetting Allende and no betraying Pinochet...
...After more than a decade of squabbles about the future of the right, conservatives again stood tall and united in protection of the past...
...Still, the PN very much represented the party tradition of conservatism in Chile: those who were not above stacking the deck in their favor, but who were most comfortable shaping the political struggle in Congress and through party mechanisms...
...1 9 The RN, on the other hand, was more resigned to working in a traditional pluralistic context, even if it did not fully support pluralism...
...2 5 From the sidelines, VoL XXXII, No 6 MAY/JUNE 1999 Pablo Longueira (right) and Joaquin Lavin (left) leave party head- r hearing the Law Lords decision to deny immunity to the former in Chief of the Chilean Armed Forces, Augusto Pinochet...
...Jarpa's opening to the opposition was intended to preserve the basic framework of "protected democracy" in a postmilitary period...
...But the traditional right, those sectors linked to the National Party prior to 1973 and associated with RN after 1983, saw the party system itself as the best mechanism for dealing with emerging conflicts...
...In the words of sociologist Tomds Moulian, the UDI would become the right's "military party," intent on attacking any process that attempted to separate Pinochet from the transition process, whereas the RN would While neither the UDI nor the RN can be thought of as "democratic," the more hard-line UDI was always more supportive of Pinochet's proposal to build a truly authoritarian state in Chile...
...2 7 Ironically, UDI municipal candidates were able to combine their unconditional support for Pinochet, who "saved Chile from socialism," with a call for municipal programs such as street lighting, work training, sports programs and aid for the "popular" sectors...
...See Steven Volk, "Chile: The Right to Coup," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol...
...Regime adherents registered under the umbrella of the National Renewal, momentarily linking Guzmn's UDI, Allamand's MUN, and the National Labor Front (FNT), a new party headed by Jarpa...
...This shift was most dramatic for the gremialistas who now argued, somewhat disingenuously, that parties could provide stability to the emerging "democratic-authoritarian" system...
...The authors argue that "not a comma was placed [in the Chacarillas speech] that wasn't put there by Jaime Guzmtn...
...February 15, 1996...
...Polling from December 1998 put support for Lagos (PS) at 37%, Lavin (UDI) at 24%, and Zaldivar (PDC) at 13...
...In response, and with Jarpa's approval, Andr6s Allamand created the National Union Movement (MUN) one month later, which would soon transform itself into the RN...
Vol. 32 • May 1999 • No. 6
