Local NGOs in Peru Devise an Alternative Anti-Poverty Program
Burt, Jo-Marie
In the wake of the structural-adjustment program implemented by President Alberto Fujimori in August, 1990, the number of Peruvians living below the poverty line jumped from six million to eleven...
...In the wake of the structural-adjustment program implemented by President Alberto Fujimori in August, 1990, the number of Peruvians living below the poverty line jumped from six million to eleven million virtually overnight...
...Predes, on the other hand, tried to strengthen local organizations and municipal governments through a complex process of consultation and consensus-building...
...In about half the 50 districts where Predes concentrated its efforts, the CDDs began to function regularly...
...Its model of local management and decision-making worked best in communities with existing organizations and strong local leadership...
...Foncodes tried to demonstrate that it was more efficient and that its funds went directly to the population...
...Predes was not a panacea, however...
...The CDDs rarely took root in these areas...
...In Puno, for exam- ple, where Fujimori's 1993 referendum won only Jo-Maw Burt 1s assoc~atp editor of th~s maganne and a Ph D cand~date In pol~t~cal sc~ence at Columl>m Un~vemty She 1s cur- rently part~c~oat~ng m a research project at Colurnhra on NGOs m Latm Amenca soonsor~d hy the North-Sorrth Center inncodes offkials hand our si;:iobs at a pcih'ic school...
...For example, the number of communal soup kitchens doubled to nearly 3,000 in Lima alone...
...Similar to traditional SIFs, Predes' limited operative capacity forced it to rely on NGOs for logistical resources, personnel and program implementation...
...Foncodes, which by 1994 consumed 50% of the gov- ernment's social budget, became a direct tool of the Fujimori regime to sway voters...
...It reinforcesthe extreme personalism of this government, the idea that Fujimori is the state...
...Instead, Peruvians turned to their own self-help capacities- honed over more than a decade of economic crisis and government neglect-to meet their basic nutri- tional needs...
...Suddenly, Fujimori appeared almost nightly on the evening news inaugurating public-works projects in shanty- towns and rural Andean villages, such as schools, water and sewerage systems, and irrigation canals...
...Social policy was not the govern- ment's major concern, however, and it wasn't until early 1993 that Foncodes funding really picked up...
...Predes relied heavily on local NGOs for their experience in local rural development and their close links to the population...
...Predes is interested in collaborating with NGOs because they are the main institutions operating in the region...
...Foncodes, which operated on the demand-driven model of traditional SIFs, funded thousands of unrelated projects-an archipelago of public works that lacked unity or planning...
...Sign reads: "foncodes Comes Tl~roucl...
...The adjustment measures were implemented "without anesthesiaw-without, that is, any government social programs or emer- gency measures...
...This helped avoid a pervasive problem in Foncodes: the funding of projects designed by individual professionals out to make a profit or newly formed NGOs-popularly called the "Foncodista NGOs"-that have little or no link to the larger community...
...Foncodes approved projects more rapidly but they were often of poor quality...
...After months of pressure, the Peruvian govern- ment reluctantly agreed in late 1992 to cosponsor Predes as a pilot project in the south-central depart- ments of Cusco, Apurimac and Madre de Dios...
...Predes had minimal resources to deal with massive social problems...
...Alarmed at the political manipulation of Foncodes, a handful of European governments that provided bilateral assistance to Peru urged the Fujimori administration to adopt a different social- compensation model...
...Between January and May, 1993, Foncodes spent $125 million on 7,100 projects-$38 million more than it had spent in all of 1992...
...For over a year, however, Foncodes functionaries blocked the implementation of Predes, which they saw as dangerously pro-NGO...
...They were two competing models," says sociologist Gonzalo Garcia, who evaluated Predes as it neared completion...
...Foncodes is a new version of the clientelistic state," says Josefina Huam6n, director of Alternativa, a Limabased NGO...
...With all its flaws, however, Predes remains a better option than Foncodes...
...As the Predes pilot project drew to a close in mid1995, Foncodes functionaries seemed glad to see it go...
...This increased funding was due less to a new- found concern for the poor than to the upcoming November, 1993 referendum on Fujimori's new con- stitution, which enshrined neoliberal reforms and permited Fujimori to run for reelection...
...It isn't that Predes is pro-NGO," says Amalia Cuba, who was named as independent manager of Predes in mid-1994, and who successfully got the program off the ground...
...asks Rosario Valdevelleano, president of the Cuscobased NGO Arariwa that helped devise Predes...
...20% of the vote, massive Foncodes spending helped boost Fujimori's credibility: in the April, 1995 presi- dential elections, he walked away with 6796 of the Puneiio vote...
...The CDD model permitted greater local oversight of project funding and implementation than Foncodes had...
...In the Predes model, funding decisions would be based on local demands, but projects wouldn't be devised by isolated groups...
...The Inter-American Development Bank, concerned about the viability of the economic reforms, finally convinced the Peruvian government to establish a social-investment fund (SIF) in mid-1991-a full year after the Fujishock...
...Predes faced intense institutional rivalry from Foncodes...
...While less severe austerity measures sparked intense protest elsewhere in the region, there was little popular protest in Peru...
...By contrast, Foncodes is tightly controlled by the central government-and hence easily manipulated...
...The Fujimori govern- ment saw NGOs as a potential source of opposition, and was openly hostile to the idea of collaborating '- with them...
...In the poorest regions, community organizations are often weak or non-existent, and years of political violence have left many districts without leadership even at the municipal level...
...It is a model of local management, and it promotes participation and decision-making at the same time that it strengthens municipal leadership...
...These forums, known as district development committees (CDDs), would ideally be led by the mayor of a given district, and would unite local institutions and organizations, including peasant communities, grassroots organizations, private-sector interests, and government agencies...
...Why is the state afraid of the Predes model...
...Predes is a slower process, but the projects are more likely to be sustainable...
...The Special Program of Social Development (Predes), designed by non-governmen- tal organizations (NGOs) in Cusco, sought to avoid the trappings of the traditional SIF model by focus- ing not on poverty alleviation but on local institu- tional development...
...This put a further burden on NGOs, whose resources are already stretched to the maximum...
...Predes sought to devolve not only resources but also decision-making capacity to the local level...
...Moreover, it ended up funding projects very similar to those funded by Foncodessocial and economic infrastructure projects that had little redistributive effect aside from the few, shortterm jobs they generated...
...The problem is that democracy and decentralization are anathema to this government...
...Rather, permanent forums established at the local level would regularly meet to discuss the community's needs and to prioritize development and infrastructure projects to be funded...
Vol. 29 • May 1996 • No. 6
