Of Puppets and Heroes
Weeks, John
IN MAY OF THIS YEAR THE U.S. GOVERN ment suffered one of its greatest embarrassments in the history of U.S.-Latin American relations.' Not only did it fail to overthrow Gen. Manuel Noriega of...
...7 Lest anyone misinterpret the relationship between the United States and the new republic, the process of writing the treaty began at once in Washington, and was concluded and signed in the name of Panama by Bunau-Varilla before any Panamanian representative arrived on the scene...
...The drug charge apparently was known almost 20 years ago...
...5. An agreement of sorts was reached with Zelaya, but it was insufficiently subservient to induce the Roosevelt Administration to initiate work on a canal...
...In essence, the United States moved against Noriega as part of its plan to rid Central America of a leftist regime in Nicaragua, and did not do so sooner because it feared creating such a regime in Panama...
...2 9 The conservative opposition also found it increasingly difficult to maintain unity within its own ranks...
...9 United States viceroyalty distorted Panamanian politics profoundly...
...Whatever Delvalle's virtues, a claim to political legitimacy was not among them...
...As a result, independence remains a source not of pride but of national shame...
...But they also chose to have no alternative...
...military activities than Noriega himself...
...66, No...
...Historically, while Panama can lay claim to a genuinely indigenous independence movement, it obtained country status through the intervention of a foreign power, the United States...
...sanctions was a dubious proposition at best...
...officials had strong evidence in the 1970s that Noriega was deeply involved in the drug trade...
...In late February 1988, President Delvalle, Noriega's hand-picked successor to Barletta, traveled to the United States where he met with U.S...
...Employing U.S...
...pressure on several Latin American countries to weaken the Contadora peace process...
...Noriega's overt tolerance of U.S...
...Most commentators beg this question, going directly to an analysis of the destabilization campaign itself...
...G EN...
...While not precisely saying that his government would not transfer the canal to a Panamanian regime it disapproved of, "Ambassador Davis clearly related the future of the canal to democratization," wrote Ricardo Arias Calder6n, president of the conservative Christian Democratic Party...
...While documentation is understandably scarce, it is widely accepted that Noriega served as an informant for U.S...
...interest in Panama began with the 1849 California Gold Rush, which prompted the construction of a railroad from ocean to ocean...
...The area which is now Panama, though nominally a province of Colombia until 1903, was never securely under Bogot.'s domination...
...At the height of the campaign against Noriega, U.S...
...Delvalle responded by abolishing all offices under the vice presidency and aided another leader of the Liberal Party in an attempt to take the party away from Esquivel...
...Panama's treasury minister estimated n May 1988that real GDP would decline 10-20% for the year as a result of the US intervention...
...While it is not beyond the realm of possibility that some White House advisers recommended such a policy-as Ambassador Davis' extraordinary statement seems to indicate-it could hardly have been the primary motivation behind the campaign to overthrow Noriega.'" A more compelling argument is that the United States sought to guarantee access to its military bases after 2000, when the treaties require their removal...
...6 On November 3, 1903, Panamanian independence was declared, if such it could be called...
...The views expressed are those of the author...
...At a meeting of the Latin American Economic System in late March, 23 of the 26 participating countries voted to extend support to Panama and condemn U.S...
...pressure on foreign debt negotiations, announced that it would make concessionary sales of oil as "an act of solidarity with the Panamanian people...
...This possibility was alleged to be a U.S...
...demand that Delvalle be treated by the opposition as Panama's legitimate head of state...
...This essential stability and apparent instability derived from the same source: the rule of Panama as a semicolony by the United States...
...For 80 years, Panamanian patriots had refused to acquiesce to offers of less than full independence from Colombia...
...Certainly there are U.S...
...Zelaya was the last of these three despots, and earned himself a place in history as a nationalist by seeking to maintain the principle that Central Americans, not North Americans, would dominate and exploit the region...
...25 If that was true, the General's fingers proved to be strong indeed...
...Despite a presidential rule characterized by despotism and repression of the poor, Zelaya made his name as a nationalist hero by reclaiming the Atlantic Coast for his country from the British and challenging U.S...
...This is the historical reality that runs as an undercurrent through Panamanian society...
...In October 1987, vice president Roderick Esquivel of the Liberal Party broke with his government, publicly denouncing it for corruption and tyranny...
...The arrest of Diaz Herrera following his declarations unleashed mass resentment at the government's extremely unpopular economic policies, pressed upon Panama by the World Bank and the IMF beginning in 1983...
...sanctions...
...military intelligence with information on developments in Panama and the Central American and Caribbean region...
...An independent policy toward Central America was the only ideological fig leaf left for Noriega's rule...
...Southern Command cared to do with its forces in the Canal Zone...
...Yet it was precisely support from the United States which discredited the Civic Crusade in the eyes of both the people and the Army...
...However, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt sought an agreement considerably more favorable to U.S...
...While these exercises could be interpreted as symbolic, they did in fact represent the largest participation of U.S...
...22, 1985...
...The New York Times on June 9, 1988 reported that all economic indicators were down (except for unemployment which was up) including a 60% drop in industrial production...
...That is the lesson of Panamanian history for those who seek mass support...
...behest, a clause that granted the U.S...
...and April 12, 1985...
...Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978...
...He was out of politics from 1950 to 1963...
...intervention...
...In the Zone the Panamanian flag could not fly, Panamanian laws would not apply, and a U.S...
...New York Times, March 12, 1988...
...2 (Winter 1987/88), pp...
...l 4 F THE MANY PUZZLES ABOUT THE CRISIS between Panama and the United States during the past two years, the most perplexing is why it occurred at all...
...Arias won his first election with over 95% of the popular vote, for the oligarchy had been so sure of defeat that it boycotted the polls...
...oligarchs.' In 1968 the situation was reversed...
...And if National Civic Crusade, the opposition umbrella group, did not appreciate its tenuous links to the Panamanian people, Noriega certainly did...
...Even before the sun had set that day, Amador Guerro, a Panamanian founding father, wired U.S...
...control, with the timing of the move prompted by the Panamanian presidential elections scheduled for 1989...
...Article III, in a softening of the original wording, gave the United States power to act in the Canal Zone "as if it were the sovereign of the territory...
...7. Cited in "3 de Noviembre de 1903," Didlogo Social (Panama) Vol...
...ABANDONED BY THE PANAMANIAN OPPOSItion it presumably sought to aid, the Reagan Administration also found itself more and more isolated diplomatically...
...The General, reportedly angered by U.S...
...Central America Report, April 8, 1988...
...In addition, most would agree that he was defrauded of victory in the elections of 1964 and 1984...
...6, 1987...
...than those of the incumbent government...
...Yet the entire history of Panamanian politics indicates that these politicians could not form a coherent and cohesive movement to challenge Noriega's rule...
...From the outset the civilian opposition was led by representatives of the upper-class families who, from independence to the coup of 1968, had ruled Panama with little regard for the rights of the average Panamanian...
...To add insult to injury, the Reagan Administration managed to convert Noriega in the eyes of his Latin neighbors from a venal common criminal to a nationalist hero...
...pressure would be to admit that the Panamanian military lacked the power and resolve to govern itself...
...campaign was not limited to Latin America's governments...
...contingency plan by Panamanian sociologist Guillermo Castro, reported in Central America Report, March 4, 1988...
...3. Diplomatic historian Walter LaFeber has argued that Panamanian independence was only incidentally the work of the Roosevelt Administration and stressed the conflicts between the United States and Panama in the years immediately after 1903 to suggest that the relationship was not strictly patron-client...
...press, it is not completely groundless...
...Subsequently it would be alleged that Poindexter was one of the unnamed sources providing revelations about Noriega's crimes to U.S...
...As sanctions became costly and anti-U.S...
...Because most members of the Civic Crusade found Delvalle unpalatable, the opposition was split into the Crusade and Delvalle's hastily-constructed "national reconstruction government," the latter recognized as legitimate by the United States...
...government the right to intervene "in any part of Panama, to reestablish public peace and constitutional order," a liberty which would be frequently employed.' As a consequence of this sordid history, with its legacy of collaboration and national humiliation, a hunger for national pride gnaws at the body politic of Panama...
...His championing of the canal issue repeatedly won him broad support, and if he were alive to run in 1989, he would probably be elected again...
...government...
...This effectively set the parties outside of the body politic of their own people...
...What is surprising is not that he survived, but that opinion was almost unanimous that he would not.26 The Reagan Administration scenario for the ouster of Noriega presumably went as follows: U.S...
...The next day the Panamanian legislature stripped Delvalle of the presidency and appointed in his stead Minister of Education Manuel Solfs Palma, who promptly affirmed Noriega as commander of the military...
...government the option of taking monopoly control over the communications system...
...policy in Central America, maintaining a discreet yet visible presence in Contadora...
...But Abrams was not alone in anticipating Noriega's quick capitulation...
...domination has, ironically, proven a powerful ideological weapon to foil U.S...
...Article II gave the U.S...
...Thus it became extremely tempting for factions out of office to petition their U.S...
...The Administration did not move against Noriega before 1987 for fear that he might be replaced by second-in-command Col...
...ntfrr nt;n 31 Q1hrh tli th ftl r th -n -LmmV nt nf l., vk, l l. . - - w , l- .k , . , , - - tn Mexico, notwithstanding its vulnerability to U.S...
...Central America Report, June 12, 1987, referring to an article in that newspaper of May 10, 1987, relating the criticisms of Noriega to U.S...
...6. William Nelson Cromwell, a New York lawyer, secured the neutrality of Colombian troops in Panama by paying them off: $30,000 to the commander, $10,000 to the other officers, and $50 to common soldiers...
...client, to sign the treaty which would rule the destiny of that nation for the next 75 years...
...All of these difficulties reflect failings characteristic of the political Right in Central America...
...The course of the civilian protest in 1988 indicates the limits of its effectiveness...
...troops, the oligarchy had little reason to take steps to co-opt the poor with reforms...
...indeed, for a decade he had worked to limit the extension of U.S...
...Thus, just two months before he sought to fire Noriega, Delvalle was presented with an opportunity for an alliance with dissidents, but passed it up...
...This vote, in which not a single Latin American or Caribbean country supported the United States, indicated the diplomatic reception that would be forthcoming when economic sanctions were applied...
...Oligarchic power in Panama was even more narrowly based than elsewhere in Central and South America.' It was a small and obvious additional step for the U.S...
...He had been Noriega's loyal sycophant since the General forced out President Barletta in September 1985, and was held in contempt by both the opposition and supporters of the government...
...Indigenously-led insurrections certainly occurred, and U.S.-Panamanian relations were unquestionably tense at times during the years following independence, but it remains the case that the timing of the 1903 insurrection, its bloodless success, international recognition of the new country, and the character of the first government of Panama were all the careful and concerted work of Washington and its agents in the isthmus...
...He grew stronger each day that he survived, recovering the nationalist reputation which he had effectively lost in previous years through his close cooperation with the United States, particularly with the Southern Command...
...The U.S...
...regional strategy...
...military adventures was so blatant that it even enraged the wealthy pro-U.S...
...indeed, the political life of Panama is overwhelmed by the fervor to redress humiliations past and present...
...If overthrowing the General means the return of the oligarchs, few poor Panamanians care to join the cause...
...There is the argument that U.S...
...William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 208...
...Noriega with President Manuel Solis Palma, who is not recognized by the United States 12EPR ONTHE AEICA REPORT ON THE AMERI S 12E VEN BEFORE THE SPANISH CONQUEST the isthmus of Panama served as a major transportation route...
...Negotiations with Colombia did not go well...
...Roberto Diaz Herrera, who was perceived by the White House as a "leftist...
...Embassy and military to serve as arbitrators in intra-oligarchic conflicts...
...4 When Zelaya refused to concede unlimited sovereignty over a strip of Nicaragua, the Roosevelt Administration set the Nicaraguan option on the shelf and negotiated with Colombia.' Again the United States did not seek a treaty as such...
...The terms of this treaty, which in fact no Panamanian ever did sign, would be considered harsh even if imposed as a consequence of unconditional surrender following military defeat...
...But given the obsolescence of the canal, the proposal would be unlikely to attract many capitalists...
...policy towards Noriega changed because of the discovery of his alleged criminal activities, purported to include drug trafficking, murder, commerce in prohibited technology with Cuba, supplying arms to leftist guerrilla groups, and rigging elections...
...The subversion of the U.S...
...The United States acted to remove the General, they maintain, in order to clear the way for a Panamanian government which would permit JULY/AUGUST 1988 revisions in the Torrijos-Carter Treaties to allow U.S...
...Despite his fascist views on many subjects and his overt racism, he was, until his death at age 86 in August of this year, the most popular politician in the history of Panama...
...intelligence agencies, Noriega has earned his place in history: Where others fell, he defied the United States and ruled to boast of it...
...wishes for so long...
...Indeed, on March 12, 1988, with economic warfare raging, Secretary of State Shultz almost waxed eloquent on the virtues of the Defense Forces, referring to the need to "maintain its integrity" (perhaps an unfortunate choice of words), and describing the Panamanian military as "a strong and honorable force that has a significant and proper role to play and we want to see it play that role...
...In 1903 the new government of Panama went so far as to write into its constitution, at U.S...
...Central America Report, Oct...
...The bases probably represent the most important U.S...
...As late as 1902 Congress was on the verge of a commitment to a Nicaraguan canal...
...The response of U.S...
...From the Zone the Southern Command trained and supplied the contras, spied on Nicaragua, coordinated air strikes in El Salvador, and contributed logistic support for the invasion of Grenada, all activities in clear violation of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties which restrict the bases in the zone to the defense of the canal...
...Daniel Ortega made a dramatic trip to Washington that proved a diplomatic coup...
...He enjoyed the support of the Communist Party of Panama (later People's Party) from the 1930s onwards, indicating the overwhelming role of nationalism in the country's politics...
...John Galvin, head of the Southern Command, "...had the tone of an underling reporting to his boss...
...Roberto Diaz Herrera made them public in June 1987, and certainly before the United States chose to rid Panama of Noriega...
...Even more a mockery of the Panamanian nation were the rights granted outside the Zone in Panama as a whole...
...The most charitable thing one can say about the Panamanians who accepted this treaty is that they had no alternative...
...opposition...
...Note] While the General had in fact cooperated to a degree exceeded only by El Salvador and Honduras, Noriega's support for the contras remained evasive and low-profile due to significant domestic opposition...
...2 4 It is, however, perfectly consistent with a policy of installing a more right-wing Defense Forces commander who would form a government more pliant with regard to U.S...
...In part this was the result of the surprising U.S...
...Indeed, the general risked considerable popular outrage by permitting major U.S...
...Virtually all political, social and economic issues are infected with patriotism...
...government was capable of imposing substantial social and economic costs upon the Panamanian population, it was not at all clear that those costs would be borne by Noriega and his supporters, nor that they would accrue in a manner which would directly or indirectly weaken him...
...In March, at the height of the sanctions, non-U.S...
...In June 1987, the Organization of American States passed a resolution, 17-1 with eight abstentions, condemning the United States for interference in the internal affairs of Panama...
...See This Week in Central America, July 14, 1986...
...governor would rule...
...While this initial attempt became mired in scandal and almost brought down the French government, the idea of a canal grew to near obsession in the United States as successive administrations accumulated an empire over two oceans...
...With the 1968 coup, the National Guard assumed de facto political power...
...During the Torrijos years Noriega was head of intelligence for the Panamanian National Guard (renamed the Defense Forces in 1983...
...The Monitor predicts Noriega's continued isolation on one page and reports the cooperation of non-U.S...
...Roosevelt negotiated to secure legal cover for the annexation of territory, and at no point did he intend to grant even cosmetic concessions to the other contracting country...
...In other articles Panama ceded control of its waterways, gave the United States the right of military intervention, and granted the U.S...
...Throughout the 19th century Panamanians rose in repeated insurrections, several of which, ironically, were defeated with the aid of the United States...
...intervention, in part because he indicated interest in offers from other governments to build a canal...
...Now representatives from the old oligarchic parties are prominent in the leadership of the opposition to Noriega...
...not only did the resulting agreement not provide for de facto annexation, it was rejected by the Colombian Senate as an affront to national dignity...
...control over the canal to continue after the year 2000...
...troops in a Latin American country in the 1980s, with the exception of Honduras...
...Panama's service economy does not, for the most part, produce what the country consumes, nor produce at all in the usual sense...
...Latin American nationalists argue that the U.S...
...soldiers...
...March 8, 1985...
...Politically, Panama has been distorted by continuous domination and intervention by the United States...
...GOVERN - ment suffered one of its greatest embarrassments in the history of U.S.-Latin American relations.' Not only did it fail to overthrow Gen...
...Embassy in Panama was well aware that the 1984 election was rigged...
...In effect, the U.S...
...While this argument cannot be proven conclusively, it is consistent with other circumstantial evidence...
...scheme.' While Panamanians can justifiably lay claim to a strong national identity and a series of nationalist heroes, none of them were involved in the events of 1903...
...policy is that it weakened Noriega's opponents while strengthening the General...
...28, 1904, cited in LaFeber, The Panama Canal, p. 42...
...In 1944 a U.S...
...7 Two articles in theMiami Herald, dated November 14 and 27, then reported that the speech by Davis was part of a conscious U.S...
...Serious U.S...
...Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "News and Analysis," Washington, June 12, 1986, p. 2. 15...
...patrons for a shift in the balance of power by professing policies more pro-U.S...
...More fundamental than the military's role in U.S...
...22 The Reagan Administration then rejected the Panamanian opposition's demand that a list of officers be retired along with Noriega...
...4. This Zelaya was not prepared to concede...
...The U.S...
...Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of these exercises was that they coincided with the anniversary of the 1964 demonstration against U.S...
...30 and Nov...
...32 This was followed by several governments offering Panama the facilities of their central banks to act as financial intermediaries to transfer Panamanian overseas assets and clear checks in international transactions...
...To Delvalle's dismay, the man he designated to succeed Noriega refused to assume the post...
...overlordship ensured that no oligarchic party emerged with any significant nationalist leanings...
...military exercises in the country for three consecutive years...
...Perhaps United States power could have substituted for the masses and the military...
...But in essence Panama was extremely stable...
...While the conservative elite expressed disapproval of some of the World Bank's measures, the private sector's objections focused on a tax increase, while it endorsed the measures to weaken organized labor...
...2 PANAMA IS A COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE A nation contorted by three fundamental realities which have rendered nationalism the overriding factor in Panamanian society...
...resentment built up, further splits occurred...
...Among the great ironies of U.S...
...2 !' Admiral John Poindexter, who would later be indicted for his part in the Iran-contra arms scandal, traveled to Panama in December 1985 to seek Noriega's approval to train contras, according to reports at the time...
...Apparently, John E. Ingersoll, Nixon's director of the State Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, told Seymour Hersh (then journalist with the New York Times) that the agency had "hard information" in the early 1970s that Noriega was in the drug trade...
...dominance in Central America...
...journalists in mid-1986, in a further effort to pressure the General into a more pro-contra policy.* *The Administration may have further soured on Noriega after his last-minute refusal to go along with Oliver North's 1986 plan to frame the Sandinistas by planting a shipload of East-bloc weapons in El Salvador to be "discovered" and traced to Nicaragua...
...The Colombian governor of the province acquiesced in the insurrection and was rewarded subsequently with the vice presidency of the new country...
...officials made it clear that the goal was not to dismantle or even reform the Defense Forces...
...decision to move against Noriega, made in June or July of 1987, was part of a larger campaign to prevent the canal from passing out of U.S...
...no fundamental political change occurred or could occur...
...2 1 This tolerance for a military described by a member of the U.S...
...The conservative opposition, on the other hand, was slowly bled white by sanctions as the economy contracted and capital fled...
...For a period the United States did not even permit the Panamanian Government to maintain an army, further increasing the oligarchy's dependence on its patron for internal control and repression...
...Government treated the Nicaraguan agreement as precluding any other foreign power from using the San Juan River-Lake Nicaragua route...
...The movement against Noriega could easily appear to Panama's poor as an attempt by the old elite to recapture power with the overt support of the U.S...
...politicians who would cancel the treaties and maintain U.S...
...Most offensive to Panamanian nationalism were the joint military exercises of January 1985, 1986 and 1987...
...Upon his return to Panama a few days later, he announced in a television broadcast that he had demanded Noriega's resignation as commander of the Defense Forces...
...Arias was inaugurated president in 1941, 1948, and 1968...
...See Larry Rohter, "America's Blind Eye," The New York Times Magazine, May 29, 1988...
...It appears that Barletta secured the cooperation of the private sector in early 1985 by promising to pursue vigorously the gutting of the Labor Code...
...However, if this were the goal, antagonizing Noriega would not be the means...
...naval power and outright bribery, Washington prevented Colombian intervention and assured a swift and successful outcome for its enterprise...
...He overthrew a president (Barletta) whose election, while fraudulent, had been endorsed by the United States...
...government the right "in perpetuity" to seize and utilize any lands which the United States unilaterally judged to be necessary for the construction or maintenance of the canal...
...Roberto Eisenmann, editor of the conservative newspaperLa Prensa, wrote that a memorandum from Noriega to Gen...
...Latin American Monitor, April 1988...
...election issue in 1988...
...46-63, Este Pais mes a mes (Panama, January 1988), and Ricardo Arias Calder6n, "Panama: Disaster or Democracy," Foreign Affairs Vol...
...officials including Elliott Abrams...
...interests than Nicaragua's dictator, Jos6 Santos Zelaya, or the leader of any independent country, would likely grant...
...XVI (Nov-Dec 1983), p. 20 (author's translation...
...official in Panama summarized the country's politics with candor: "As a matter of fact, there has never been a successful change of government in Panama but that American authorities have been 'consulted' beforehand...
...Central America Report, April 29, 1988...
...ROM 1903 UNTIL 1968, PANAMA SUFFERED an almost farcical degree of political instability: 38 governments in 65 years, including two instances in which there were four presidents in a single year (1919 and 1949...
...Whether true or not, the Panamanian people viewed Torrijos as successful in breaking the power of the oligarchy, which had oppressively misruled the country and repeatedly disgraced itself over the issue that mattered most to Panamanians: nationalism...
...That resentment was directed in part at the same people who would subsequently lead the Civic Crusade, as they had lobbied vigorously in favor of the most antilabor aspects of the policies...
...However, unlike Noriega, he fell as a consequence of a U.S.-inspired insurrection in 1908 (which subsequently resulted in the U.S...
...What perhaps misled the Reagan Administration in this regard were the events of July-August 1987...
...Noriega was "hanging onto power by his fingertips...
...intelligence agencies in the 1970s and perhaps as early as the 1950s...
...disclosures of drug-trafficking, siezed the weapons-laden ship...
...But what motivated the Reagan Administration to attempt to overthrow Noriega seems to have been first and foremost its obsession with Nicaragua...
...Omar Torrijos, chief of state from 19681978, sought to consolidate a populist movement which would take economic power from the traditional elite and prevent the return of oligarchic rule...
...More credible would be the argument that the United States might seek a formula involving the essence of control without the form, such as the suggestion that the canal be "privatized" under nominal Panamanian oversight...
...See Central America Report, Jan...
...2 8 The mass protests of July-August 1987 represented a spontaneous and unstable alliance of classes which could not last, particularly when the Civic Crusade made no serious attempt to enter into alliance with actual or potential leaders of the poor...
...Ambassador Arthur Davis in October 1986...
...In a program taped for Vermont Public Television on March 28, he recklessly stated that Noriega "would not fall in 1988...
...The sycophantic competition generated by U.S...
...Secretary of State John Hay: "Proclaimed independence of Isthmus without bloodshed...
...government had deposed Noriega, its policy would have failed, discrediting the conservative opposition it sought to bring back to power and further fanning the flames of Panamanian nationalism...
...The basic problem for Panama's civilian opposition is that it not only lacks the support of the population, the vehicle for a radical bid for power, but the support of the Army as well...
...Latin American Monitor, April 1988, p. 522...
...Electoral fraud, murder and drug trafficking are crimes in Panama as elsewhere, and most Panamanians believe Manuel Noriega is guilty of all of them...
...31, 1986...
...While these demonstrations were called by the Civic Crusade, their success did not necessarily reflect the popularity of the conservative upper-class opposition...
...Even more significant, under the rule of Noriega Panama was extraordinarily tolerant of whatever the U.S...
...New York Times, March 28, 1988...
...Arias Calder6n, "Disaster or Democracy," p. 342...
...Manuel Noriega is well aware of the historical reality of his country, and has used it as a powerful weapon during the events of 1987 and 1988...
...A few years later Zelaya would be overthrown through U.S...
...occupation of the Canal Zone, in which 21 Panamanians were killed by U.S...
...71 (Summer 1988), pp...
...See Richard Millet, "Looking Beyond Noriega," Foreign Policy, No...
...Washington quickly turned to exploring the potential for a canal, though the first concession to construct one went to a French company in the 1870s...
...W ANUEL NORIEGA WAS AN UNLIKELY andidate for the wrath of the Reagan Administration...
...At this point, the Civic Crusade called a general strike, which, after briefly paralyzing the economy, dwindled and was suspended after four days...
...interference in Panamanian affairs...
...The Administration had clear warning...
...Latin American historians will no doubt record the General among the nationalist heroes of the hemisphere...
...and he refused to allow his government to openly support U.S...
...However, such clandestine forms of cooperation between Noriega and the United States represented the proverbial iceberg inverted: The greater part of Noriega's collaboration with the United States was open and above-board...
...designs over Central America...
...In early April 1988 Amulfo Arias took his Authentic Panamanian Party out of alliance with the Civic Crusade, and the Authentic Popular Action Party left to join a new movement opposed to Delvalle and U.S...
...New York Times Magazine, May 19, 1988...
...Civilian politics in Panama since the 1930s has been a contest between Arias and the rest, with "the rest" consisting of factions of the oligarchy discredited by their collaboration with the United States...
...Whether Noriega was liked or disliked by his fellow officers, to remove him in response to U.S...
...While this explanation was ridiculed in the U.S...
...Were the Reagan 0PANAMA Administration seriously to seek an extension of control over the canal, it would require military occupation and a quisling government in the strict sense of that term...
...Indeed, it is difficult to name another prominent Latin American officer who so obediently catered to U.S...
...9. Quoted in ibid., p. 98...
...Panamanians have been down that road many times before...
...328-347...
...The Canal Treaty saved...
...It is difficult to imagine any leader of the Panamanian Defense Forces more compliant with regard to U.S...
...Apparently he served the United States well for at least 20 years...
...From this position he supplied the CIA and U.S...
...Of the many surprising turns of events, this action by Delvalle is perhaps the most inexplicable...
...NORIEGA DID BECOME A SERIOUS em barrassment to the Reagan Administration...
...This simple chain of events involves a number of questionable assumptions which analysts (and apparently the Administration) accepted uncritically...
...Rebuffed by Colombia and Nicaragua, the United States provoked a show of insurrection in the province of Panama, staged by local agents and a French mining engineer named Phillipe Bunau-Varilla...
...Dispatch from U.S...
...Strong suspicions that the main motive for the Reagan Administration's [attack on Noriegal...had to do with the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries have been fully confirmed by Alfonso Chardy of the Miami Herald...
...Each instance of U.S.-Panamanian tension affords yet a new opportunity for Panamanians to confront their past...
...strategy was the role of the civilian opposition, on which the Administration placed such great hopes...
...While the U.S...
...Even if the U.S...
...Estimates of output loss vary...
...Panama's oligarchy, which shared the JIJLY/ALJULJSI 198813 13 JULY/AUGUST 1988PANAMA presidency among its members until the mid-1930s, was relieved of the need to create political parties in the usual sense...
...Washington did not deem it necessary for any Panamanian, not even a loyal U.S...
...With its rule guaranteed by the presence of thousands of U.S...
...New York Times, March 22, 1988...
...If the National Civic Crusade had any hope of forcing Noriega out, it could have done so only through a clear and unequivocal denunciation of U.S...
...Opposition in Congress to contra aid had solidified...
...Small wonder they find it virtually impossible to sustain a mass movement against the General, especially with the heavy-handed role played by Washington in the anti-Noriega campaign...
...Aside from the two cases in which governments came to power through mass armed struggle (Cuba and Nicaragua),for the first time in history the United States pledged to remove a Latin American leader, used the power at its disposal, and failed...
...officials to this vote indicates the state of U.S.-Panamanian relations at the time: "The fact that fourteen...voted against it amply justified the wisdom of our having secured [Article 136...
...and the Central American presidents were moving towards the signing of the Arias Plan...
...Indeed, at one level it was precisely that...
...When all political parties backed national control of the canal, the military lost exclusive leadership on that issue...
...O N MARCH 27 ELLIOTT ABRAMS, ASSISTANT Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, in a flush of anticipated victory, announced that Gen...
...3 0 And Delvalle formally presided over the repression of the protests following Diaz Herrera's denunciations...
...asset in Panama...
...One factor which motivated the Crusade to call it off was the banal desire not to disrupt the scheduled annual trade fair, which the year before had brought the private sector over $300 million in sales...
...Roosevelt sought no less than the de facto annexation of territory, so that the government of the country in which the canal happened to reside would have no rights whatsoever over the waterway...
...2 7 [See Box] That the military high command would conclude that Noriega's removal would defuse rather than intensify unrest caused by U.S...
...Manuel Noriega of Panama, a dictator unpopular in his own land and held in contempt abroad, but in the process it consolidated the the General's power beyond his greatest hopes...
...References Of Puppets and Heroes 1. This article draws heavily upon a joint paper with Andrew Zimbalist, forthcoming in Third World Quarterly...
...And in an extraordinary diplomatic slap in the face to the Administration, on June 14 the new West German Ambassador presented his credentials to President Manuel Solfs Palma, defying U.S...
...Fully functioning democratic institutions in Panama are the best guarantee to Americans and Panamanians alike for success in the turnover of the canal to Panama," said U.S...
...Since independence and the creation of the shortlived Central American Federation, the region was dominated by three local despots with foreign powers playing a growing but secondary role...
...And the 1985 murder of opposition figure Hugo Spadafora was followed immediately by accusations of military involvement.' 6 Knowledge of Noriega's crimes at best provides aprimafacie motive as to why the United States might have intervened in Panama any time after 1983...
...military occupation of Nicaragua...
...Ronald Reagan fervently attacked the canal treaties during the presidential campaign of 1980, and politicians of similar views could be found in the White House and Congress...
...banks and corporations on another...
...From the point of view of the Administration, a worst-case outcome appeared imminent: a peaceful solution to the Nicaraguan conflict resulting in the disintegration of the contras and formal acceptance of the Sandinista government by its neighbors...
...When Arias took office the first two times, the military obligingly stepped in to return power to more proU.S...
...2 ' The dreaded Colonel was ousted in June 1987-freeing the Reagan Administration to follow its interventionist instincts-precisely when Washington needed an enthusiastic and vocal ally for the contras...
...These three realities-or perhaps more correctly, the three aspects of the fundamental national reality-are historic, political and economic...
...However, only those totally ignorant of Panama's politics could believe that any Panamanian government would not demand the transfer of the canal in the year 2000 as has been agreed by treaty...
...2. Noriega's unsavory career combined with his stunning and successful triumph over the United States brings to mind Jos6 Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua...
...Central America Report, Feb...
...Following the denunciation of Noriega by Diaz Herrera, there occurred a series of mass demonstrations against the government, which drew support form all social classes...
...He had already ceded much of his claim to Torrijos' mantle of nationalism and populism, the measure of his political legitimacy, by endorsing behind-the-scenes an IMF/ World Bank austerity package...
...bases to remain in the country, and U.S...
...Among the most unpopular were the elimination of agricultural subsidies and a revision of the Labor Code which greatly reduced job security...
...1 2 This close and cordial working relationship continued regardless of the fact that U.S...
...8. At Panama's constitutional convention, the intervention clause was barely approved, 17-14...
...The nationalism Arias had ignited became the rallying cry of the military that overthrew him...
...economic and political pressure would cause unrest, provoking the leadership of the Defense Forces to break with Noriega and send him packing...
...However, despite an 80-year struggle for independence, those who took power in 1903 were essentially collaborators in a U.S...
...Lest we be accused of 20-20 hindsight, it can be noted that Weeks is on record as predicting the survival of Noriega...
...Rather, they were a measure of the prestige of Diaz Herrera, who, in the popular view, represented the reformist torrijista wing of the military and the official government party...
...The bankruptcy of the oligarchy's parties gave rise to the long and extraordinary career of Arnulfo Arias Madrid, who briefly served as president three times (1941, 1949 and 1968) and was denied the presidency twice more in fraudulent elections...
...control of the canal indefinitely if such were possible...
...Southern Command as "a band of thugs and PANAMA thieves" would be inexplicable if the Administration's goal were to end drug trafficking or protect the security of the canal...
...And economically, Panama suffers from extreme denationalization, far beyond the relatively superficial question of ownership...
...27...
...The deforma14 tion of Panamanian politics by U.S...
...More seriously, Delvalle had loyally provided a civilian front for military rule, continuing in his post when other high officials, including Vice President Roderick Esquivel, publicly broke with Noriega...
...But in Panama they are only misdemeanors compared to the felony of collaboration-or even the appearance thereof-with the Yankee...
...revelations about his allegedly criminal activities provoked an outcry in Congress, which could (and did) become a U.S...
...He had come to the presidency through a coup against his predecessor, who had been fraudulently elected himREPORT ON THE AM Sself...
...banks in Panama cooperated with Noriega's government to ease the financial crisis, and Japanese corporations apparently continued to deal in Panama on a business-as-usual basis...
...government was aware of these accusations long before ousted Col...
...Central America Repor, May 27, 1988...
...Despite his sins, crimes and long career as an informant for U.S...
...recognition of Delvalle as the legitimate head of state...
...The typical conservative seizure of power, even when it enjoys some mass support, has relied upon the army to act at the crucial moment...
...campaign to link the transfer of the canal to political changes within Panama...
...Those explanations that are offered are not very DODTT TU ADIC REP RT ON THE AME $Plainclothes police close in on an opposition radio station very satisfactory...
...The full implications of Noriega's survival, even should he yield power unwillingly at some future point, are difficult for North Americans to appreciate...
...Since these are all activities engaged in by other government leaders in Latin America and elsewhere, why was Noriega singled out for punishment...
...36 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS Minister to Panama William Buchanan to Secretary of State John Hay, Jan...
Vol. 22 • July 1988 • No. 4
