The First Circle: The United States
UNTIL 1979, EL SALVADOR, LIKE MOST of its Central American neighbors, was left by the U.S. State Department to languish in benign neglect. Even the Carter Administration's 1977 decision to cut...
...Looking at U.S...
...The timetable for ending the conflict is almost entirely in the Administration's hands...
...First, as the recent wave of strikes attests, he risks creating an uncontrollable backlash from his neglected mass support base, which has to carry the main economic burden of the war and of policies that benefit the private sector...
...Embassy and the Agency for International Development (AID), Duarte has adopted programs that strengthen his ties to the private sector...
...The United States has always exercised tremendous influence over El Salvador's internal affairs...
...Many Salvadorean agencies have been reluctant to act as conduits for AID "humanitarian aid" programs...
...intervention...
...Here is Duarte's paradox in a nutshell...
...It has also acted as the main mouthpiece within the Tegucigalpa Group for U.S...
...The Sandinistas took Managua in July, and in El Salvador the rise of the popular movement played a major role in triggering the October coup...
...From the U.S...
...now, the Christian Democratic Party runs the country for the benefit of the Reagan Administration...
...Since the bottom line of Duarte's economic, military and social programs is the defense of U.S., not Salvadorean, interests, it is the Reagan Administration that benefits most from his presence in office...
...The main beneficiaries have been industrial exporters, and though the new model offers some measure of protection to the growers of traditional export crops, many of them--especially coffee farmers-are vehemently opposed...
...The country's formal authorities have acted in a purely managerial capacity, running a political and military program that they had little or no role in shaping, and that was not designed to address El Salvador's national interests...
...Salvadorean wishes are relevant only to the degree that they present tactical obstacles to the continuation of the war...
...policy goals...
...The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and even the Christian Democrats appear to have offered Patria Libre some support, attempting to forge an alliance between the new party and some dissident sectors of the Popular Democratic Unity (UPD) labor coalition...
...This vicious dynamic means that, after 18 months in office, Duarte appears to have lost much of his luster in REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 18"Washington's eyes...
...But from the Salvadorean point of view, where the name of the game is peace and reconstruction, they are intolerable...
...While Duarte's image helped Reagan dismantle congressional obstacles to the U.S...
...The new policies are in line with the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the report of the Kissinger Commission, both of which stressed the importance of directing new export products toward the U.S...
...D UARTE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, SIMIlarly, are geared less to Christian Democratic doctrine and the needs of his party than to U.S...
...These changes coincided with a more optimistic reading of how the war was going, as well as reflecting the need to grant major economic concessions to the right-wing private sector...
...The United States' goal in El Salvador is to maintain the political and economic status quo, duly cleansed of its excesses and thereby made stronger and more stable...
...Field commanders' refusal to honor Duarte's call for a Christmas truce illustrated their disdain for orders from their "commander in chief...
...Once he took office, Congress duly approved substantial increases in aid to El Salvador...
...T HE RESULTS ARE CLEARLY MEASURAble in the Duarte government's international posture and its domestic policies...
...And though the United States undeniably needs Duarte less than Duarte needs the United States, the fact remains that Washington does depend on the Salvadorean leader to a certain extent...
...But the conflict is only "lowintensity" from the U.S...
...However, this was only after the United States had felt obliged to intervene repeatedly to keep the Christian Democrats in the game...
...The answer seems to be that Duarte sees his government as totally reliant on U.S...
...strategy...
...But the erosion seems an irreversible trend while current policies continue, for they will only further alienate Christian Democratic voters and bolster the president's traditional enemies...
...Between 1982 and 1985, Washington sponsored and financed four elections, which culminated in Duarte's election to the presidency, a Christian Democratic majority in the Legislative Assembly and control of most mayoralties...
...This U.S...
...national security interests, as the Reagan Ad* The other members of the Tegucigalpa Group are Costa Rica and Honduras...
...Whichever way the Administration chooses to escape from its present dilemma, the result is bound to be greater U.S...
...The only way out of the spiral is to go back to the negotiating table with the FDR-FMLN...
...Budget lines assigned to the social welfare ministries have been steadily cut back in the face of increases in the defense budget and demands from the economic ministries for greater allocations to subsidize private capital...
...market...
...Since the basic premise is that the United States must not and will not lose, the Salvadorean government and its armed forces must go on fighting for as long as Washington considers necessary, whatever the cost in human lives and material resources...
...These huge sums, and the numbers of U.S...
...interests than at Duarte's own...
...To the extent that it can be kept within the bounds of "low-intensity conflict," the war remains "manageable...
...But since the June 1985 Zona Rosa killings of 13 people, including four U.S...
...viewpoint...
...On the contrary, an increasingly autonomous military is likely to exercise even greater direct control over government policy...
...And though the military has grown in size and competence, the revolutionary opposition has not been weakened...
...In the Administration's view, a Christian Democratic election win could open more space for the United States to isolate the FDR-FMLN politically, drive a wedge into the rebel alliance and compel the Left to negotiate on Washington's terms...
...Duarte has made constant appeals for the center and Right to close ranks against the "common enemy" of the FMLN, behind a government of "national unity" headed by the Christian Democrats...
...Each time Duarte calls on U.S...
...The price of his survival, and the only means of keeping the domestic Right at bay, is to rely on U.S...
...The present leadership appears loyal to Duarte, in part as a result of pressure from the U.S...
...But from the perspective of El Salvador's national interests, and those of the Christian Democratic Party, they spell failure...
...The tax breaks and credit privileges granted to the private sector at Washington's urging have led not to economic recovery but to growing social unrest, which has in turn been worsened by government repression of organized and spontaneous protest...
...His power is too limited, his dependence too great...
...From $9.5 million in 1979, military and economic aid grew to $578.5 million in 1985...
...Without U.S...
...The image of civilian control over the military has been severely dented...
...interests...
...help to confront these opponents, he fritters away a little more of the limited room for maneuver he enjoys by virtue of being Reagan's temporary favorite...
...The events of 1979 put Central America back on the State Department map...
...The third new group, CONAES, offers a vehicle for powerful commercial interests which found the existing Chamber of Commerce and Industry an inadequate forum for their views...
...Everything about the man enhanced his reputation in Congress and allowed him to get what he asked for: his image as a sincere democrat, his lifelong respect for human rights, his determination to deepen long-overdue structural reforms, his commitment to eliminating violence, achieving peace and ushering in the rule of law...
...Duarte may in effect be creating the very force that will supplant him when his term ends in failure-a failure whose roots lie in his inability to confront stronger right-wing forces in the first place...
...Even the Carter Administration's 1977 decision to cut military aid in response to intolerable human rights violations did not necessarily mark a major shift in the U.S...
...His image as aFour elections in three years democrat makes him-at least for the moment-the Administration's best means of selling the war against the FMLN to Congress and the Western allies...
...objections to the Contadora treaty.* Inside El Salvador, both the overall goals of the war and the day-to-day course of the fighting are dictated by U.S...
...However, the increases in military and economic assistance did not match each other, and the sums allocated to each category hinted more at U.S...
...but the more aid he receives, the tighter his straitjacket becomes, the less he can hope to carry out programs of his own that diverge from Reagan Administration policy...
...If this dynamic persistsand assuming that power continues to change hands through the ballot box-Duarte would seem to be digging his own grave, preparing the ground for his political opponents on the right to remove him from office in the 1989 elections...
...personnel needed to administer them, have transformed the relationship between the two countries...
...The conflict between Duarte and his former supporters has been aggravated by his social policies, which are almost entirely dictated by the demands of the war...
...It is also likely that he will have managed to hold off economic collapse by artificially propping up the country's finances with U.S...
...But there was now a quid pro quo of a different sort, in which Reagan's gain was Duarte's loss...
...But the word "influence" no longer adequately describes the extent of U.S...
...Salvadorean diplomacy has been based on unconditional allegiance to the State Department line...
...The more aid Duarte unlocked from Congress, the more conditions Washington placed on how he could use it...
...non-governmental organizations are involved in the field, most of them with a track record of collaboration with U.S...
...They are, however, the price that Duarte must pay for agreeing to manage El Salvador on behalf of the "super-government" in Washington...
...These kinds of results may be satisfactory in terms of the Reagan Administration's definition of U.S...
...Second, the time is not ripe for a fresh initiative on dialogue, given the depth of hostility from right-wing businessmen and the military...
...The Christian Democrats could never have come to power in the first place without U.S...
...Washington, in other words, is trying to build a "civilized Right...
...Duarte's diplomats have played an increasingly aggressive role toward Nicaragua and have spearheaded efforts to obstruct the Contadora process at a regional level...
...It recognizes that the old oligarchy is no longer the group best equipped to guarantee a coherent future for a development model led by the private sector: more efficient and "modernized" leadership is required...
...point of view, these may be adequate goals, since the name of the game is management and control...
...project in El Salvador, Duarte himself forfeited his ability to determine how the new funds were spent...
...This leads to perhaps the central contradiction plaguing the Duarte government...
...For Duarte and the Christian Democrats, the only possible outcome is reduced room for maneuver, a declining ability to negotiate with opponents, less chance of enacting reforms and ever greater subservience to the United States in order to cling on to power...
...Or should a change be effected through some quasi-electoral ploy that does not infringe constitutional niceties-perhaps something along the lines of the recent ouster of President Nicolis Ardito Barletta in Panama...
...T HE EQUATION HAS ALSO BEEN ALTERED for the Reagan Administration since the spring of 1984...
...intervention in El Salvador, and greater pressure to impose the U.S...
...consequently, an increasing number of U.S...
...interests in this context helps shed some light on how the Duarte/"super-government" relationship operates...
...policy or interfere with the rhythm of the war...
...intelligence agencies...
...This state of affairs has become even more apparent since Jos6 Napole6n Duarte and his Christian Democratic Party took office in 1984...
...First, Duarte rejects the rebels' analysis that they constitute a de facto parallel government in some areas of the country, and are thus a legitimate party to negotiations...
...plans, making requests to Congress for economic and military aid easier and more palatable...
...support for its very survival, and this perception has left him hostage to Washington's basic goal of wiping out the FMLN...
...pressure has been far from altruistic...
...At the beginning of his term, Duarte depicted himself as the only person able to untie congressional purse Just offshore, the battleship "New Jersey" strings...
...JANUARY/MARCH 1986 15Zea ort, z4 AmecnLa Duarte ministration perceives them...
...The rightward shift is the price that Duarte must pay to remain in office with the Administration's blessing, yet at the same time it leaves him increasingly vulnerable to pressure from the far Right and the most hardline tendencies in the military...
...The Reagan Administration's hope is that the businessmen who spearhead the new non-traditional export model will in turn become the United States' most reliable long-term allies in El Salvador...
...Between 1982 and 1985, elections offered a convenient way of reshuffling the deck: but elections are not a ready option today...
...Patria Libre, which emerged from a split in the ultra-rightist ARENA party, depicts itself as the party of enlightened conservatives, a kind of "thinking person's Right...
...By the end of 1985, Duarte even faced angry opposition from Christian Democratic signatories to the "social pact" the president endorsed before taking office.* Eighteen months into his term, then...
...national security interests...
...Marines, the * For a fuller description of the social pact, see Chris Norton, "Build and Destroy," Report on the Americas, Vol.XIX, no.6 (November-December 1985...
...The more perceptive and dynamic of Salvadorean businessmen have also recognized that local and regional markets are totally unable to sustain any major export expansion...
...By JANUARY/MARCH 1986 17 implementing an economic strategy that runs counter to the traditional doctrines of his party, Duarte has accepted a trade-off, opting for power (which is, in any case, more apparent than real) at the expense of his original program...
...Why then has Duarte not used his leverage to carve out more space for the reformist aspects of the Christian Democratic program that are at variance with U.S...
...This arm-twisting in fact reached the point where the United States withheld congressionally approved funds from Duarte-funds that he had made possible in the first place-unless he agreed to specific AID-sponsored measures, such as the gradual devaluation of the col6n, drastic cuts in public expenditure and the adoption of economic policies designed to favor the private sector...
...reliance on Duarte, however limited, does offer him some leverage over his adversaries in the armed forces and the private sector...
...ideological conceptions, Washington's desire to build new political alliances and the demands of the war...
...approach...
...But he has no real consensus to show for his efforts...
...From 1984 to 1985, the pattern changed...
...With Ronald Reagan's arrival in the White House in 1981, Central America became a test case for U.S...
...FUSADES, meanwhile, which functions as a think tank and pressure group, receives its operating budget of more than $2 million from AID...
...Should Duarte be kept in power...
...The most noteworthy, either by virtue of the funds and support they receive from the Embassy and AID or because of their links to the Christian Democrats, are the new party Patria Libre (Free Fatherland), the Salvadorean Development Foundation (FUSADES) and the National Commission of Salvadorean Businessmen (CONAES...
...The most that can be expected from his government are token political and social measures that do not challenge U.S...
...The chances are that he will have blocked a rebel victory, prevented mass discontent from spilling over into insurrection and stymied any negotiations that could lead to FMLN participation in government...
...The Salvadorean far Right would also be forced to fall in step with U.S...
...D URING HIS FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS IN office, Duarte has made more visits to the United States than any other foreign dignitary...
...If Duarte succeeds in serving out his term, how will his record look...
...After all, the main purpose of Salvadorean Christian Democracy is not to advance U.S...
...U NDER THIS KIND OF RELATIONSHIP, the government of the day may indeed run the country, but the ultimate beneficiary is the "super-government...
...To defend its national security interests, the United States has prevailed upon the government of El Salvador to adopt a set of policies and programs designed in Washington...
...Any serious attempt at economic reforms at this stage would be blocked by the private sector...
...military aid dropped by 25% to a budgeted figure of $146.25 million...
...Military aid, which stood at $81.3 million in 1983, climbed to $196.55 million in 1984...
...FUSADES is in charge of the theoretical development of the new economic model, conducting research on the needs of the private sector and presenting policy recommendations...
...But this by no means suggests that they will submit to the constitutional powers of the civilian authorities...
...Positive though it may seem at first glance, this U.S...
...The high command may become more intransigent, or its members may be replaced by more hardline officers...
...aid may prevent the situation deteriorating from the armed forces' perspective, and it may artificially stave off complete economic collapse...
...Second, those policies are boosting a powerful sector of the Right whose interests are not those of Duarte's own party--a sector which is nothing less than a sanitized version of the oligarchy that Duarte has devoted his political career to opposing...
...foreign policy...
...El Salvador, for instance, was the only country in Central America to voice support for the U.S...
...economic embargo against Nicaragua...
...As a precondition, the FMLN must be crushed and the revolutionary movement channeled into the paths of formal democracy...
...The foundation appears to exercise considerable influence within the Legislative Assembly and to have the ear of the Ministry of Planning...
...The trend in economic aid was the opposite: it fell from $261.88 million to $223.08 million...
...He is no longer the convenient ally he was a year ago...
...Public expressions of discontent within the armed forces have become more frequent, and the United States has been required to flex its muscles to keep the lid on military unrest...
...The thrust of Duarte's program has been to strengthen the most dynamic sectors of private enterU.S...
...Neither the FMLN's armed struggle nor growing mass unrest is likely to force Duarte into concessions on the issue of talks: to do so would risk Washington's wrath and jeopardize the survival of the government...
...agenda...
...Since 1981, the United States has operated as a kind of "super-government" in El Salvador...
...In the old days, the armed forces ran the country for the benefit of the oligarchy...
...Over the past 18 months, the Christian Democrats' economic policy has aimed to reorient the Salvadorean economy toward the production of non-traditional exports such as seafood, clothing, textiles and food processing...
...It was because of this that Duarte was able to appeal for peace talks at La Palma and negotiate the release of his kidnapped daughter...
...Yet it was not until 1980, when Carter was about to leave office, that the rusty machinery of economic and military aid creaked back into action...
...His government has been pulled inexorably to the right by this need to turn to the Reagan Administration for support...
...The armed forces will play along with Duarte's current program because of its essentially militarist character...
...Though critical of the government, Patria Libre has played a moderate role in opposition, and is currently attempting to broaden its base of support...
...The war, it seemed, was to be the first priority, and the armed forces the main ally...
...For the Reagan Administration sees Duarte as the best way of packaging its search for a military victory over the FMLN...
...The prolongation of hostilities, therefore, serves U.S...
...Duarte finds himself trapped in a spiral of political deterioration which will not be easily broken...
...Already, organized expressions of this new right wing are in evidence, in the form of political parties as well as think tanks and professional bodies...
...control...
...W HY HAS DUARTE BEEN UNABLE TO win any greater independence from Washington...
...Although the numbers of people affected by the war are growing, to the point where their discontent may become a major political headache, the government is channeling emergency relief and humanitarian aid through programs that are designed to complement the counterinsurgency effort, not confront the social dimensions of the problem...
...Though the party did eventually outpoll its opponents, its electoral majority did not translate per se into real power...
...military and economic aid-once his best hope of keeping office and outmaneuvering his opponents--has now become his biggest liability...
...At the behest of the U.S...
...L OOKING AHEAD, THE SAFEST PREDICtion is that Duarte will find it impossible to carry out policies of his own...
...We may, for example, see some limited dialogue with the FMLN to resolve specific minor issues, but no opening to more far-reaching peace talks...
...From 1979-1985, the United States would invest a total of $1.835 billion in El Salvador...
...By the end of 1985, there were persistent rumors that sectors of the officer corps were pushing for a tougher line...
...The overriding interest of the United States in the region is its own national security-however that may be defined-and its credibility on a global level...
...The political erosion that is underway in the Duarte Administration may not be sufficiently acute or rapid to bring down the government in the immediate future...
...The paradox facing Duarte is that U.S...
...They have come at the expense of the social reforms which Duarte promised to his mass constituency, and in exchange for which his supporters delivered the Christian Democratic vote in 1984 and again in 1985...
...Only Washington's intervention prevented the rightist parties from subverting the elections to their own ends-something the Salvadorean Right has done traditionally, and tried to do again in the most recent voting...
...While Nicaragua was anathema, El Salvador was to be the Administration's model success story...
...backing...
...It sees both as threatened by insurgents trying to "subvert" the established order...
...for Salvadoreans, it has brought the country to the brink of irreparable destruction...
...Under Duarte, the fighting has dragged on and become more costly in human and material terms, while talks to end the conflict seem more distant than ever...
...Economic aid rose by 94% to $432.23 million...
...aid, he cannot stay in power...
...In part, this may reflect Duarte's assessment that a solid pact with the private sector is a safer way of shoring up his position at the moment than relying on the support of a social base that may now seem of secondary importance...
...advisers, apostles of low-Intonslty conflict prise, who were not touched by the economic reforms of 1980...
...Yet by bending to the United States in matters of economic policy, as well as to powerful adversaries on his right, Duarte further weakens his position...
...2 6 - 3 6 . Reagan Administration is not likely to permit any steps in that direction...
...D UARTE'S CONDUCT OF ECONOMIC POLicy demonstrates the narrow limits within which the Reagan Administration allows him to operate...
...But his most powerful domestic opponents (with the obvious exception of the FMLN) are precisely those sectors that Washington regards as its most secure allies in the long term...
...With no elections in the offing, Duarte does not need to galvanize his mass supporters to get out the vote, and their active backing may seem a dispensable asset...
...Embassy, but this may change...
...It claims a commitment to the democratic process and argues the need for the free competition of ideas...
...The other major change was that Congress suspended most certification procedures and removed the majority of the conditions on aid to El Salvador...
...AID, meanwhile, had registered its discontent at the lack of "a coherent national strategy of investment which will help the private sector take advantage of the opportunities presented by the CBI, restore the activity in 'free zones' and, in general, take advantage of the qualified and cheap labor force, and its proximity to the United States...
...El Salvador simply seemed a place where Carter's human rights policy could be mechanically applied at low cost...
Vol. 20 • January 1986 • No. 1
