The Revolution Stumbles
"In reality we made important military advances in recent weeks, but we created such expectations through propaganda that it looked as if we failed." -guerrilla leader in the New York Times' In...
...an apparent willingness to allow people to vote in others...
...Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Jorge Melendez...
...8. La Republica, Rome, March 5, 1982, cited in FBIS, March 12, 1982, p. P2...
...Central to the perception of FMLN plans for election day were the statements by one of the five top commanders of the FMLN, Ferman Cienfuegos, leader of one of the five rebel organizations, the National Resistance (RN), spoke to the Washington Post from Managua on March 8. Within days, he said, he would return to El Salvador to call for a popular uprising that would make the election impossible to carry out...
...4. Washington Post, March 8, 1982...
...tries to work as conciliator in FMLN...
...But we'll have to await military and political events before it's evident that nothing has changed and negotiations are still necessary...
...Interview with Saul Villalta, 0200GMT, March 23, 1982 cited in FBIS, March 26, 1982, p. P5...
...THE REVOLUTION STUMBLES 1. New York Times, March 31, 1982...
...Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS] Formed in 1931...
...4 Came March 28, in a few places the electricity was out temporarily, business continued relatively normally, traffic did not move, and several towns were encircled, while some were even occupied...
...Principal spokespeople: Joaquin Villalobos...
...The most important thing right now is to follow the instructions that the FMLN will give, not on the elections, but rather on the great tasks that must be undertaken to prepare for this huge popular effort that must be carried out at the moment that the FMLN so decides and announced through Radio Venceremos and the various [unorganized] means.'" Earlier that day, Saul Villalta of the FDR Executive Committee told listeners: "We are approaching the decisive days in which the Salvadorean people should be on the alert for the call of their vanguard...
...While supporting negotiations, however, these forces agreed that the elections should be allowed to take place...
...1 9 Similarly, its ability to operate openly throughout one-third of the country suggests that it enjoys, at least, a FMLN supporter in rebel-controlled area...
...Principal spokesperson: Shafik Jorge Handal...
...From this base the FMLN maintained their war of attrition, attacking military convoys, carrying out economic sabotage and carefully avoiding major clashes with the Salvadorean Army...
...The end result was confusion: isolated attempts to disrupt elections in some parts of the country...
...As the possibility of mass insurrection reawakened, so did the old debates about its timing, rekindling the same animosities...
...They identify themselves variously as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist and Marxist influenced...
...The differences over tactics have centered around questions of the timing of the insurrection, the nature and role of mass mobilization in a period of war, the correct strategy for defense, the nature of the relationship to members of the Salvadorean government's armed forces...
...Notes from meeting with Rub6n Zamora taken by Philip Wheaton, April 29, 1982, in Washington, D.C...
...29NACLA Report no doubt include an intense effort to broaden the differences among the forces of the FMLN through offers of amnesty and the like, that tactic is not likely to go far...
...FMLN/FDR, "On the Elections of March 28, 1982," March 31, 1982...
...Interview with Jorge Melbndez, Radio Venceremos, 0230GMT, March 22, 1982 as cited in FBIS, March 25, 1982, p. P12...
...Salpress-TV, Ballots or Bullets...
...2 2 The Salvadorean armed forces are expected to begin a major military offensive sometime between June and August, probably billed as an effort to clean up those "1000 terrorists" of the FMLN/FDR...
...Principal spokespeople: Ferman Cienfuegos...
...FDR Two FMLN fighters during recent attack and occupation of Usulutan...
...a crisis of morale among the urban masses because of fear of the repression...
...Interview with Joaquin Villalobos, Proceso, Mexico, No...
...It was important, he said, for "our people to understand that their support is of vital importance...
...National Resistance [RN) Formed in 1975 as split from ERP...
...Formed on October 10, 1980, the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) is a coalition of four "political-military organizations" and the Communist Party of El Salvador...
...Joaquin Villalobos of the ERP said frankly, "There have always been problems with the unity...
...Villalobos, interview, Proceso, p. 32...
...We are no longer waiting for the enemy in our rearguard positions...
...These "operativos" were classic search-anddestroy missions, killing the civilian population in the disputed area, burning crops and slaughtering livestock...
...While regional forces are likely to continue to feel U.S...
...ofFMLN guerrillas waiting in Chalatenango province...
...An important objective was to prevent the FMLN from taking the offensive by forcing them into a prolonged defensive war...
...In addition to tactical differences that still exist, personal animosities among their leaders have a political effect on the entire movement...
...They noted the pressure from Nicaragua and Cuba not to cause a crisis, but admitted that internal disagreements over strategy had played a part...
...Operates in Chalatenango, San Vicente, Usulutan and Cabanas provinces...
...At the same time, they said they would "respect" the elections of March 28.' But as that day approached, the question of what actions to take regarding elections became a subject of furious debate within the FMLN/FDR and between them and their key allies...
...Problems of Unity After the elections, the FMLN acknowledged the political setback...
...In January, the insurgent forces had reiterated their judgment that the elections were a "farce," imposed on a population divided by civil war...
...Radio Farabundo Marti, 0100GMT, March 1, 1982, as cited in FBIS, March 2, 1982, p. P12...
...operates Radio Venceremos...
...In clashes with the FMLN, the Army increasingly lost weapons and ammunition to the other side...
...The moment of insurrection, if it comes at all in El creating conditions for insurrection with mass work oriented toward support of military actions...
...Small military presence...
...2 The War Ahead Since fall 1981, the FMLN/FDR forces have pressed for negotiations to end the war...
...2. New York Times, March 30, 1982...
...Their combined armies are estimated to be from 5-7,000 with 20-25,000 persons in people's militias...
...Mass organization: People's Leagues-28th of February (LP-28...
...almost fatal attacks on the leadership and membership of the political and military apparatus of the FMLN/FDR...
...But there was no popular uprising...
...And these differences were not confined to strategic councils, but were broadcast to people over the different radio stations...
...Political struggle is essential: analysis, debate, agreement, education, organization, combat...
...The FMLN/FDR regard D'Aubuisson's victory as a setback to the negotiation process...
...follows line of "prolonged people's war...
...In the diplomatic work, international solidarity, and the political and military struggle, these differences have caused serious problems several times during the past two years...
...Jorge Mel6ndez-Comandante Jonas-of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), one faction of the FMLN, described the new strategy: "The war is going through a new stage...
...pressure to join the effort to defeat communism in Central America, the Falklands/ Malvinas crisis has already made that effort more difficult...
...See Loren Jenkins, "Elections Replaced by Rebel Political Drive in 'Other El Salvador'," Washington Post, April 5, 1982...
...Elections, they argued, were the event that would trigger such uprisings...
...Election day was brilliantly managed...
...and at the same time, completion of one of the most effective guerrilla military offensives of the war, which made voting in some parts of the country not only impossible but irrelevant...
...Early pledges to respect the election died in the face of a belief that the "people" were ready to rise up...
...Influential in small mass organization, Movement for Popular Liberation (MLP...
...Factories have been closed...
...In so doing the FMLN laid the basis for the consolidation of zones of control and the beginning of a major offensive in Usulutin province...
...Rub6n Zamora, in a March 4 newspaper interview, struggled to rationalize what was happening...
...Melida Anaya Montes, nom de guerre Ana Maria: Salvador Samayoa...
...policy have made a fascist-styled major the most powerful political figure in the country, with the potential to consolidate the class nature of the struggle...
...Its military successes are more widely known through the revolutionary radio stations as well as an increased contact between the FMLN and the urban population...
...a lack of confidence in the power of the revolutionary forces, Since then, Villalobos argues, the FMLN has returned to the cities with a rearguard area now consolidated...
...9. For a good analysis of the war from an FMLN perspective, seeJoaquin Villalobos, Desarrollo Military Perspectiva Insurreccional (COMIN: El Salvador, 1982...
...This attitude causes one to forget that people -workers, peasants, the middle classes, the poor -are with revolution not by nature but because they believe in its aims, because they trust its members, because it offers them something better or because it protects them...
...Concentrated on mass work through the United People's Action Front (FAPU) and trade union work through the National Federation of Workers of El Salvador (FENASTRAS...
...Influential in the People's Revolutionary Bloc (BPR...
...The political crisis and U.S...
...Moreover, the military capability of the revolutionary forces is stronger than ever before...
...Initially urged a Central American perspective...
...People's Revolutionary Army (ERP] Formed in 1971, the most militarily impressive of the five...
...Yet so long as tactical differences, political jealousies, and past rivalries are not overcome, triunfalismo offers a way out: problems are washed away in the fantasy of inevitable victory...
...The rest of the Spanish-speaking countries in the Organization of American States as well, whatever their differences, are united in opposing what they see as British colonialism in the area and increasingly reluctant to trust their northern neighbor as a reliable partner.* And while part of the coming offensive will * Moreover, according to Washington Post of May 9, 1982, Venezuela's government is not pleased with the fall of Christian Democrats in El Salvador, and Honduras is distressed that as a loyal and democratic ally it is slated to receive less economic aid in the Administration's new 5 Caribbean Basin Initiative than El Salvador...
...The war in El Salvador has entered a decisive phase...
...Interview with Comandante Jorge Mel6ndez, 0230GMT, March 23, 1982 cited in FBIS, March 26, 1982, p. P6...
...8 The New Offensive The general offensive, which had started in December, represented a new stage of the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador: taking the war to the enemy...
...The groups are: Popular Forces of Liberation-Ferabundo Marti [FPL] Formed in 1970, largest of the guerrilla armies...
...9 Since the January offensive in 1981, the FMLN had used hit-and-run tactics to keep the junta's forces off balance while they withdrew to the mountainous areas of Chalatenango, Morazin and UsulutAn provinces and the volcanoes of Guazapa and Chinchontepec...
...New York Times, January 28, 1982...
...Not only are the Argentinians less willing to respond to the U.S...
...26 lanMarlApr 1982 ing the centers where the military junta has political control...
...They succeeded only in wearing down their own resources and damaging troop morale...
...Attempts to answer this raise another question: What did the guerrillas plan to do on election day...
...call in the wake of the incident, in which the United States sided with Britain against Argentina...
...2 3 The urban actions in Usulutin and San Francisco Gotera have taught their own lessons about awakening an "insurrectional consciousness" among the poor urban population and how to mobilize that consciousness...
...spokesperson Guillermo Ungo reportedly reaffirmed that there would be no disruptions...
...is smallest of the groups...
...This decision in turn caused problems for the forces of the FDR...
...Speaking over ERP-sponsored Radio Venceremos, Jorge Mel6ndez of the ERP told his listeners to "get ready and collect whatever materials we can gather for the insurrection...
...5. ACAN/EFE, January 22, 1982, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 22, 1982, p. P3...
...Ironically, this is one analysis that the groups within the FMLN probably agree on...
...Principal spokespeople: Salvador Cayetano Carpio, nom de guerre Marcial...
...The military was not only unable to destroy the guerrillas but could not even disrupt their communications and supply networks...
...popular tolerance...
...7. La Prensa Grdfica, San Salvador, March 13, 1982...
...Villalobos traces the problem of FMLN/FDR influence in the cities to May 1980, when mass participation greatly diminished...
...There they consolidated their rearguard areas, training their guerrilla fighters, developing logistical support systems, establishing hospital facilities and building a new democratic revolutionary society...
...In fact, in most places people went out to vote...
...greatly influenced by the Vietnamese experience...
...The United States and the Salvadorean junta refused to consider such negotiations until after the elections...
...7 How then explain the guerrillas' stepped-up military activities...
...I do not deny it," he said in response to a question about recent FMLN actions to prevent elections...
...They then pressed the war further west toward San Salvador into the provinces of San Vicente and La Paz and opened up new fighting in the relatively quiet western front, around the city of Santa Ana...
...While the issue of an insurrection was thus disputed, the five groups eventually agreed that an intensified military campaign should take place around the time of the elections...
...In truth, the elections are not the main thing...
...with that perspective, the war would go on for years...
...In the United States, the Reagan Administration played to the American people's treasured beliefs about electoral democracy...
...The turnout indicated that whatever they were, they were not a farce, causing many to doubt the extent of popular support for the revolutionary forces...
...ficials made the most of it...
...What I am saying is that they are war actions which pursue the general offensive already begun...
...2 Ambassador Deane Hinton declared that the elections proved that the guerrillas were merely some "1000 terrorists," isolated from the general population...
...Central American Revolutionary Workers Party [PRTC] Formed in 1979...
...The messages added up to one thing: confusion...
...The success of that offensive, begun in December, was such that by March, four of the groups within the FMLN came to believe that conditions were ripe for popular uprisings and mass insurrection...
...kidnapped several international businessmen in 1978: Now works closely with the ERP...
...supporters yet grasp the tenacity and intelligence of the forces opposing their victory...
...2 4 The reasons included: * a reduction in mass mobilization, propaganda, information and organization...
...International support for the FMLN/FDR's call for negotiations had grown in the six months preceding the elections, and many European and Latin American allies of the United States had come to regard the elections as a futile and absurd exercise...
...The FMLN also must find a way to build new links with progressive sectors of the Catholic Church and to develop new ties with the government-assisted farmworkers' union, the UCS, which is likely to become increasingly disillusioned with the prospect of land reform under the new government...
...Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz...
...Did this, as Haig claimed, amount to a political repudiation of the revolutionary forces...
...6. Interview with Comandante Salvador Guerra, Radio Farabundo Marti, 0100 GMT, March 1, 1982 as cited in FBIS, March 2, 1982, p. P11...
...As one guerrilla leader said after the elections: "Clearly, in essence, nothing has changed...
...To further isolate the insurgents the Army increased the number and ferocity of its attacks on the civilian population in areas of combat...
...They staged shorter attacks on several of the guerrilla fronts, trying to break up the networks of cooperation among them...
...By calling the elections a farce, the FMLN led all in struggle to be complacent 28MarlApr 1982 about how the elections were being run and what their short-term outcome might be...
...Within the FMLN, factional differences, international pressure and the exigencies of the ongoing war produced different analyses of the revolutionary situation, different strategies for action, and very different messages to their supporters...
...Such tactics won the.junta little internal support and kept the international spotlight on the problems of human rights abuses...
...3 2324 Call for popular uprising - front page article in Washington Post, March 8, 1982...
...Secretary of State Alexander Haig called the day a "military defeat for the guerrillas, quite as much as a political repudiation...
...The greatest political weakness of the revolutionary forces continues to be their inability to work within the cities...
...But they argued against preparations for an insurrection or a call for a popular uprising, insisting the FMLN/FDR was still too weak in the cities...
...We are now attackRegular troops of FMLN in formation...
...For the first time since the January offensive of 1981, the FMLN was back in the cities...
...Despite their differences, all of the forces within the FMLN/FDR are united in opposition to D'Aubuisson...
...Comandante Ana Maria, second in command of the FPL, on March 16 told listeners of Radio Farabundo Marti to listen during the elections for the "development of events" on the "radios of the FMLN.' 1 5 But a week later, speaking on Radio Venceremos, Comandante Jorge Mel6ndez declared: The main thing is that the people should not worry too much about whether or not they're going to vote...
...That success was to prove a major setback in the effort to achieve the unity essential to moving the struggle forward beyond the level of military victories...
...Triunfalismo caused the FMLN to underestimate the forces against them, this time as before...
...Triunfalismo" What is common to all these situations is an apparent endemic tendency toward triunfalismo, the attitude that the "people" are with the revolution and that revolution is inevitable...
...Salpress-TV, Ballots or Bullets, undistributed videotape...
...Reports from the zones of control indicate that where the FMLN has demonstrated its leadership and military capacity it enjoys popular support...
...Interview by Salpress in Radio Farabundo Marti Centro de Documentacidn, March 1982, p. 33...
...Ibid...
...On two previous occasions-the general strike of August 1980 and the "final offensive" of January 1981-similar disagreements have led the revolutionary forces to create expectations beyond their capacity to meet...
...historically has pursued a strategy of conditions are fulfilled are revolutionary forces strong enough to confront, let alone triumph over, the powerful forces determined to defeat them...
...NACLA Report S a l v adl o r a n el -V I L e a d e rl Alia 7L lll I. ''t...
...But in December, the FMLN-with a dramatic increase in combatants-went on the offensive...
...Only when those 27NACLA Report What Is the FMLN...
...The leadership stressed the need for disruptions on election day, declaring it necessary "to prevent this circus and farce from being held...
...Most successful in developing concept of the popular organization linked to military struggle...
...Both the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments thus joined the chorus urging restraint, pointing out that it was vital that nothing happen around elections that might jeopardize these talks...
...Thus, at a key moment in its history, the FMLN once again did not speak with a single voice...
...New York Times, March 31, 1982...
...By election day," he said, "there will be no electricity in the country, business will have to come to a stop, there will be no traffic on the highways and we will have encircled several of the nation's cities...
...The war, they said, would go on "before, during and after" the elections...
...On October 15, 1981, one detail of those commandos had destroyed the Puente de Oro, the longest bridge in the country and a key link to El Salvador's eastern region...
...Meanwhile, the economic crisis continues...
...The U.S...
...Principal spokeperson: Roberto Roca Salvador, will come only when that work is done...
...1 8 Despite the proclaimed and celebrated unity of the FMLN, each of the five political military organizations still competes with the rest to win more influence for itself...
...Clandestine work to store arms and prepare for street fighting is further advanced...
...With a secure rearguard as well as improved communications and logistical systems, systematic training had become possible...
...4 As election day neared, the issue was no clearer...
...An effort to train an elite combat unit 25NACLA Report sensitive to human rights-the Aclacatl Brigade -was a major failure...
...Whoever has the people's support in city battles practically has the battle won...
...If, as the FMLN leaders repeatedly say, the strategic front for solidarity is the United States, neither they nor their U.S...
...There is, of course, no one measure of such support...
...The operation in Usulutin during the election was the largest ever undertaken, involving 500 combatants, and it provided important experience for fighting in large units...
...Unemployment runs at record levels...
...and Salvadorean governments took advantage of FMLN errors: they manipulated the imagery of the election, if not the totals...
...With the demise of the popular organizations and a decline in its influence within the trade unions, the FDR increasingly is the organ for international diplomacy, and its counsels reflect the ebb and flow of the international balance of support for the Salvadorean revolution...
...3 Listeners to FPL-sponsored Radio Farabundo Marti were told nothing about an insurrection, but were exhorted not to vote on election day and "to follow instructions" broadcast over the rebel radio station...
...Served in first junta, October-December 1979...
...in December, the brigade was implicated in the massacre of up to 900 civilians in the Mozote area of Morazin province.'a Now Strategies In September, the Salvadorean armed forces began new efforts to recruit more soldiers and to create more elite brigades, led by officers and soldiers trained in the United States...
...guerrilla leader in the New York Times' In the weeks before March 28 it was the rare report that did not refer to rebel statements that they would disrupt the elections...
...Historically, inevitable victory has been a fatal conception for the Left...
...Il 1y1 lu, itI Oe f att ,,, .. . .. . I,,,,, lJ .t t " ,a r' " ' . I I' 7 , ' "" ; /.:1:7: ,' , ; ; , ' 7: i'ii . . i. ", :, . . . : ?i.N...
...Its member groups orient the work of their respective mass organizations and trade unions and direct the military struggle through the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the FMLN's central command...
...Base of operation Morazan province with forces also in eastern provinces...
...Ibid...
...Joaquin Villalobos, one of the five commanders of the FMLN and head of the ERP faction, is regarded by many as the most brilliant military strategist of the revolutionary forces...
...And during the offensive in Usulut6in, civilian assistance to the "muchachos" was an important element in the FMLN's ability to remain in that city for five days...
...From April through October of 1981, the Salvadorean armed forces mounted a series of operations designed to wipe out the guerrilla forces...
...Worked in electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats and social democrats from 1970 to 1978, opposing both the guerrilla struggle and the popular organizations...
...1 2 These included "bottles to be filled with gasoline, picks and shovels to dig trenches and to dig holes in walls...
...2 1 There will be no negotiations with fascism, they say, nor talks that deal only with amnesty or participation in future elections and do not take up "the fundamental problems of the country, social injustice and the denial of the liberties of the people...
...operates Radio Farabundo Marti...
...The FPL, largest of the five organizations, however, disagreed...
...In the case of elections, differences concerned the nature of the planned actions, what was objectively possible and the effect that an attack on election day might have on different allies and supporters...
...an increase in the repression of the popular organizations and other forces of mass participation that had been used up to that time...
...3. CBS Morning News, March 29, 1982...
...The other four groups countered that the general line of the FPL was LMar/Apr 1982 prolonged people's war, so that for the FPL the time would never be ripe...
...Jenkins, "Elections Replaced...
...An important goal of the military offensive of recent months has been to provide the security necessary to allow those once represented in the popular organizations a voice in the struggle...
...Moreover, in the weeks before the elections, Jorge Castafieda, Mexico's foreign minister, appeared to have achieved some success in persuading the United States to negotiate its differences with Cuba and Nicaragua...
...Thus when election day came and FMLN military actions, especially around the capital city of San Salvador, failed to prevent a large turnout, let alone stop elections from taking place, U.S...
...Special commando units were trained to take the war back to the cities...
...282, March 29, 1982, p. 38...
...The operations lasted as long as 30 days at a time and were aimed at FMLN strongholds in guerrilla zones of control...
...Revolution and the collapse of capitalism are inevitable as an article of faith, not as serious strategy...
Vol. 16 • March 1982 • No. 2
