Nicaragua

...The bourgeois opposition, meanwhile, has steadily lost political force as a third alternative to Somoza's obstinate dictatorship on the one hand, and to the growing revolutionary movement on the other...

...While there are signs of contradictions within the Guard, the prospect of its rebelling against 41update * upupda te update update Somoza is remote as long as he remains determined to stay in power...

...This lends weight to the persistent rumor that a military autogolpe is being planned...

...All three tendencies recognized that a higher level of unity was essential in order to give direction to the spiraling mass movement, a leadership which no single faction could provide...

...Somoza's policy of "extermina- tion" has troubled certain middle- ranking officers who fear it will exacerbate rather than neutralize the social conflict...

...U.S...

...The National Guard is fundamental to any proUnited States bourgeois solution in Nicaragua, but the Guard's participation presupposes Somoza's acquiescence...

...military assistance, massive arms purchases (primarily from Israel and Argentina) have bolstered the Guard's arsenal...

...Furthermore, the possibility of any rightwing Central American intervention is countered by the likelihood of increased Panamanian and Venezuelan support to the anti42 Somoza forces, and by the United States desire to avoid a regional war that could spark numerous civil wars...

...Given that the bourgeois opposition controls no military force and has a shrinking social base, its choices are narrowing...

...The first is that any effective move against Somoza could shatter the cohesiveness of the Guard in the same way that the removal of the Shah served as the final blow to an increasigly demoralized army in Iran...

...Due to this rapid influx, new soldiers have received minimal training, forcing Somoza to rely heavily on the crack infantry corps headed by his son...

...Repression and violence have become a part of everyday life in Nicaragua...

...The government's inability to service its foreign debt and to meet import bills has made an injection of hard currency imperative...

...NACLA Reportupdate * update . update * update Whatever the immediate outcome of the current struggle, the popular war of national liberation has undermined the traditional apparatus of class exploitation...

...The United States has also blocked calls for sanctions against Nicaragua in the UN and the OAS...

...The results were spectacular...

...In rural areas, guerrilla tactics are being used to draw the Guard into unfavorable terrain, and attacks on several fronts simultaneously force the dispersion of the Guard...

...This political strengthening of the FSLN has been coupled with MaylJune 1979 advances in military preparedness...

...Its only real leverage, as a business sector relatively independent of Somoza, remains its ability to give or withhold support to any new government...

...There are in fact signs of a campaign, which appears to have tacit U.S...

...Further, its leadership within the FPN assures the dominance of popular and working class interests within this nationalist interclass organization...

...The political and economic crisis which has torn Nicaragua since late 1977 is proving irreversible...

...If the constellation of forces should continue to move in the current direction, the United States, given the insistence of its priorities, may well be forced to some form of intervention, preferably indirect, such as through the use of CONDECA forces, or some international "peace-keeping" force...

...In past months urban fighting has grown more effective as well...

...In the final analysis, if any social force is to be triumphant, it must combine a balance of military and political power...

...During the operation, the guerrillas were better able to integrate the local population and minimize casualties...

...two officers who dared express their criticisms publicly were ousted by Somoza...

...The Permanent Commission on Human Rights estimates that five to ten people are executed daily by the National Guard, often for the "crime" of being young...

...Among the contenders at this point, only the popular forces can claim this combined strength...

...Proven petroleum reserves, now MaylJune 1979 the Dominican Republic, may not be out of the question...

...39update * update . update . update January demonstration in Managua commemorates the first anniversary of the assassination of Pedro Jouquin Cham or r o, publisher of La Prensa...

...Moreover, the increased borrowing and associated austerity measures have failed to win the support of the capitalist opposition which regards Somoza's immediate resignation as the indispensable means to the restoration of social and economic "stability...

...Small and large scale attacks against the Guard by the FSLN in the past few months have left a steady stream of casualties, a lowered morale and increased desertion rates...

...Given the shifting balance of social and political forces, an interim "solution" might be required-either the transfer of power to a military junta or the holding of controlled elections at an earlier date than 1981...

...support, to clean up the image of the Guard, both within the country and abroad, giving it a more "patriotic" and "democratic" image...

...The rapid development of the popular movement with its organizational and emotional ties to the FSLN, provide the Frente Sandinista with a mass base of support ready to take arms...

...It is the fundamental prerequisite for a revolutionary victory and continuation of the revolutionary process in the postSomoza period...

...And while Carter refused to release any existing pipeline aid, he allowed the passage of $30 million in "humanitarian" aid to Nicaragua and increased the quota for imports of Nicaraguan beef...

...The sad fact for the United States is that it faces a vacuum of political alternatives...

...In terms of armaments, combatants, organization and experience, the FSLN has never been stronger...

...To this end, Somoza has greatly increased the size and weaponry of the National Guard...

...Since September, Somoza has expanded the Guard from 7,500 to 12,000 members, including a new paramilitary force...

...government-have all been forced to redefine their strategies for transcending the crisis...

...Mexico was laboring under a huge $28 billion public foreign debt, and facing three years of austerity under the stern eye of the International Monetary Fund...

...Revelations in the New York Times on April 22 that the United States is creating a combat force for possible intervention in defense "of American interests in sensitive areas" may be significant...

...These differences with Somoza rarely see the light of day, however...

...The FPN, created in February, is a cross-class alliance of genuine anti-Somoza forces which puts forward a strongly progressive and nationalist program...

...The United States labors under two fears...

...Several of the small populist and petty-bourgeois parties have abandoned their bourgeois mentors and joined the Sandinistabacked National Patriotic Front (FPN...

...The agreements grew out of the "tactical unity of action" decided upon in June of 1978 and the popular upsurge during and since September...

...In order to procure ransom, L6pez Portillo commanded PEMEX, the state oil monopoly, to break out reserves which the staunchly nationalist agency had long concealed from foreign eyes, and to redouble exploration...

...Notwithstanding protests from liberals in Congress, the Carter Administration and the IMF approved a $66 million loan package requested by Somoza...

...The failed U.S...

...A THIRD ALTERNATIVE...

...As a precondition for IMF approval, the government decreed a 40% devaluation on April 6. The depreciation exacerbated the economic crisis by sparking new price increases and forcing the unemployment rate to more than 50...

...FAO's reliance on external pressure to crack Somoza's intransigence and its inability to provide a popularly-accepted alternative program demonstrated its political bankruptcy...

...The presence of this mass movement means that FSLN military gains will not accrue to the bourgeois opposition, but rather, will strengthen the demands of the democratic and popular organizations...

...The larger fear of the United States is that an FSLN victory would have explosive repercussions throughout the region...

...Therefore, we have asked Alejandro Bendarfa, one of the authors of MaylJune 1979 the Nov-Dec Report, to analyze the events since September...

...REUNIFICATION OF THE FSLN The March 20 reunification of the FSLN under a single national leadership constitutes the single most important development in the revolutionary process since September...

...In line with its strategy, the United States has exerted diplomatic pressure on countries in the region to block aid to the FSLN and to crack down on training camps within their borders...

...Despite the cutoff of U.S...

...STABILITY AT ANY COST The United States remains unwilling to bow to the legitimate struggle of the Nicaraguan people...

...Despite the economic crisis and political isolation, Somoza nonetheless continues to control the key element of advantage: military might...

...In the past months the growth of the United People's Movement (MPU) has been nothing short of phenomenal...

...Nicaragua was in the news earlier this year only to fade away and then momentarily reappear with the FSLN Holy Week offensive...

...His gamble is that the masses can be terrorized into submission, thereby neutralizing the FSLN...

...The disintegration of the Guard would of course clear the way for some form of popular government...

...Rather than solving the political crisis, the loan, therefore, can only prolong and aggravate it...

...WAR OF EXTERMINATION Given the current high level of popular mobilization, Somoza is relying even more on the National Guard to maintain himself in power...

...Thus, in large measure, Somoza continues to call the shots...

...Two general strikes, three local uprisings, last September's nationwide insurrection and the repression that followed have radically polarized Nicaraguan society...

...At the same time, a regular Sandinista army is being formed to take on the key units of the National Guard at the decisive moment...

...The reason it is being termed an autogolpe is that should such a coup occur, it will undoubtedly take place with Somoza's consent...

...The principal contenders -the Somoza apparatus, the bourgeois opposition, the revolutionary and popular forces, and the U.S...

...Private banking creditors, anxious to stave off a Nicaraguan default, are willing to reschedule the debt...

...These dictatorships can no longer rely on Somoza for support, nor can they lend any significant aid to him without generating further internal opposition...

...Its historic loyalty during past crises, the servility of the high command and its complicity in the Somocist corruption, as well as the command of key contingents by family members tie the Guard to both Somoza and somocismo...

...The impact of events in Nicaragua has already contributed to the polarization of internal politics in the rest of Central America, particularly in Guatemala and El Salvador where the dictatorships are facing their greatest popular challenge in years...

...mediation efforts earlier this year served only to pull the rug out from under the NACLA Reportupdate * update * update * update Broad Opposition Front (FAO...

...However, they have made such rescheduling conditional upon IMF 40 credits to the government and the concomitant austerity measures...

...military maneuvers in the Canal Zone, have not gone unnoticed in Central America, particularly at this time when many observers are predicting a new allout FSLN assault...

...Either would be aimed at guaranteeing somocismo without Somoza...

...military mission and cutbacks in the embassy staff have been largely symbolic...

...All the United States can do is to apply pressure in critical areas such as the economy...

...In the countryside, peasants have been subjected to bombings and the elimination of male family members during antiguerrilla campaigns...

...Otherwise, infighting within the Guard and the consequent deterioration of its fighting capacity is likely...

...The highly publicized withdrawal of the U.S...

...But direct intervention itself, a la The Mexican oil bonanza began in 1976 when the new President, Jose L6pez Portillo, went exploring with nothing more than his fountain pen...

...Evaluating the development of the political situation in Nicaragua over the past months, given this scanty coverage, is a difficult task...

...Still, Somoza seems resolved to fight to the last soldier...

...The persistence of the economic crisis negates even the illusion of reformist possibilities...

...interests continue to dictate a strategy parallel to Somoza's: the crushing of the FSLN and the isolation of the MPU and the FPN...

...Clashes in Managua and Le6n, especially, indicate the increasing importance of urban militias and commandos in harassing and intimidating the National Guard...

...But as we have seen, the mass movement's support of the FSLN has created a force that is not so easily subdued...

...The hope is to make it less in Somoza's interest to continue to rule, and more desirable for him to save face (and fortune) by hand-picking a successor in 1981, the date of the next scheduled presidential "election...

...The Sandinista columns which took Esteli during the Holy Week offensive were equipped with sophisticated weaponry, medical brigades, modern communications equipment and-to judge from the shooting down of several government planes-antiaircraft guns...

...Although this contingency plan has the Middle East as its principal potential target, the revelation, coupled with renewed U.S...