THE ISRAELI ARMY and THE WAR OF ATONEMENT
Yariv, Aharon
THE ISRAELI ARMY and THE WAR OF ATONEMENT Aharon Yariv THE ISRAELI ARMY BY EDWARD LUTTWAK AND DAN HOROWITZ, New York, Harper and Row, 1975. 461 pp. illus. $15. THE WAR OF ATONEMENT: OCTOBER,...
...Fortunately, the main weakness of the Luttwak-Horowitz book is more than compensated for by General Herzog's excellent book...
...Herzog never says so directly, but implicit throughout the book is the idea that if it were not for the basically sound structure, doctrine, training and leadership of the Israeli Army, Israel would not have won the war so decisively, heroism and sacrifice notwithstanding...
...there were repeated attacks without adequate preparation or intelligence, yielding few results and many casualties...
...By the summer of 1971, most of the ground preparations for Egypt's crossing of the Canal had already been completed, most of the bridging equipment had already arrived, and the bulk of the Egyptian forces had been concentrated between the Canal and the Nile Delta...
...It is a very useful contribution to our understanding...
...The fact is that neither Ben Gurion nor Yadin ever intended to create a British-style officers' caste...
...they were not, however, applied...
...The story itself is well-told, but the analysis is insufficient...
...Nonetheless, some lessons were successfully applied...
...And Herzog also describes the little-known role of the navy...
...the costly defeat in the attempt to capture the city of Suez, and other problems resulting from lack of concentration of forces, or coordination, or clarity of orders...
...Perhaps because of lack of time and perspective, the section on the 1973 War is easily the weakest part of the book...
...Herzog pays special attention to two factors, the Bar-Lev Line and Intelligence...
...The Sinai Campaign was, in fact, an important turning point in the continuing conflict, because it marked the "coming of age" of the reserves, and thereby freed the country of a siege atmosphere that had developed between 1948 and 1956...
...And in fact, there was ample warning, but, for reasons not discussed in the book, the tanks were not properly deployed in time, nor was the air force able to play its assigned role...
...Not enough attention is paid to the effects of the strategic and tactical surprise achieved in the opening stages of the war by the Arab-armies...
...And there is also the credit due Arab troops, whose stubbornness in defense and persistence in offense made them a formidable opponent...
...Nor can I agree with the authors' discussion of the so-called Plan D, which, they allege, called for "the permanent seizure of Arab villages and the expulsion of their inhabitants...
...The authors pay insufficient attention to the structural concept of the army as devised by Yigal Yadin...
...Herzog's account itself makes this clear, and proves that had the attack not come as a surprise, the Bar-Lev Line would have fulfilled its defensive purpose...
...The Bar-Lev Line was not originally conceived as a warning system, but rather as a defense structure with one very limited purpose: to contain, together with air support, any Egyptian attack long enough to permit the deployment of reserves...
...Still, the air force managed an overall 5-1 destruction ratio, and, in air combat, an astonishing 65-1...
...The actual surprise achieved by Egypt and Syria is well-described...
...the tactics of indirect approach were frequently forgotten...
...300 pp...
...without justification, an image that, between 1967 and 1973, had been so positive that it had attracted world-wide attention...
...After the outstanding achievements in 1967, the respect accorded the army bordered on adulation...
...it was, instead, a deterioration in the alertness and combat-readiness of the Southern Command, and among the forces along the Canal...
...Indeed, the authors themselves report that "In many places the Arab population fled of its own accord...
...But personal experience suggests otherwise: the Nachshon operation (initiated at Ben Gurion's personal insistence), in which for the first time ground was taken and held (in contrast with the standard practice of hit-and-run raids...
...Personalized vignettes and accounts of heroism and brilliant improvisation bring the book alive...
...The foresight, in this case of senior commanders, and the heroic bravery of all ranks are compellingly presented...
...While the interpretation is interesting and important, it does not explain the failure of Intelligence or the lack of combat preparedness of the forward troops...
...There is also, in the same chapter, a full discussion of the various schools of thought regarding the character of the officer corps...
...While not crucial then, it was after 1967 that the Army came to rely too much on Intelligence, a reliance which proved disastrous in 1973...
...The essence of the concept is to make a virtue out of necessity by relying heavily on well-trained reserves, and the concept has proved valid and valuable...
...lOl following the war...
...This was the first war in which the Israeli Navy played a major part...
...For this purpose, some three hundred tanks (twice as many as fought the Syrian attack during the first twenty-four hours of the war) were allocated...
...Of the subsequent events, Herzog provided a vivid, thrilling and frequently chilling account...
...it focuses on the society's over-confidence, complacency and ardent materialism, and thereby helps to explain the physical and psychological conditions which so affected military preparedness on the eve of the war...
...This fledgling force, under-equipped, would go on to defeat a far larger, far better equipped and more adequately trained invading force...
...Thus, for example, the Israeli Army did not perform well in night battles — despite its earlier reputation for successful night-fighting — due in large measure to superior sighting equipment on the other side...
...In The Israeli Army, the authors have taken as their theme the men and the ideas that have shaped Israel's defense policy...
...The stories he tells offer convincing proof that the quality of Israel's fighting forces has not declined...
...Herzog makes very clear the important fact that the Yom Kippur War, far from an Israeli failure, was actually Israel's most impressive military success...
...The question of advance warning is complex, and requires a careful treatment which is not here provided...
...Unfortunately, the English edition of the book omits a critical chapter, "And Yeshurun Waxed Fat," which deals with domestic Israeli developments between the wars...
...Herzog emphasizes the dominant role of military Intelligence in the Israel Intelligence community, but fails to explain it, and exaggerates its importance in the determination of national policy...
...It is to Her-zog's credit that he achieves this without mythologizing the army...
...What they did intend was to provide officers with living conditions that would free them for full devotion to their mission...
...THE WAR OF ATONEMENT: OCTOBER, 1973 BY MAJOR GENERAL CHAIM HERZOG, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1975...
...This chapter is essential to a complete understanding of Israel's position on the eve of the Yom Kippur War...
...The account of the Six Day War is also admirable, and shows how the brilliance of the victory led first to overconfidence and then to complacency, sowing the seeds for the bitter harvest of 1973...
...Herzog believes that Israel was at fault for neglecting to deal with the weaknesses and deficiencies that had become evident in the 1967 war...
...They deal skillfully with the interplay of political considerations and defense needs prior to independence, and also with the process whereby a para-military underground organization of static nature developed into a mobile field army...
...They present as well an intriguing evaluation of defense policy, which (for political reasons) was affected by demands for an ever-rising standard of living and of social welfare...
...Here we have a case of a concept initiated in the early sixties, realized a decade later, and proved overwhelmingly justified in combat...
...He does provide an excellent description of the various indications of imminent war which were received by military intelligence, although he omits the fact that military intelligence had in the previous summer very accurately and in great detail forecast the possibility of an Egyptian offensive based on crossing the Canal...
...Herzog provides a detailed description and a penetrating analysis of Israel's defense policy and of the country's military development in the post-1967 period, and — albeit less comprehensively — does the same for the Arab side...
...Indeed, he does not hesitate to point out its weaknesses and failures...
...Israeli strategy is covered accurately: the early decision to send Peled's division to the North, the decision in the South first to blunt Egyptian attempts at widening the bridgehead, then to wait for the destruction of the advancing Armor, and only then to begin the counter-offensive...
...They claim, for instance, that even in retrospect the war had few clear-cut reference points...
...A version of this chapter appears earlier in this issue of moment...
...the first truce, and the second, and so forth...
...it is still central to Israel's army, twenty-seven years and four wars later...
...indeed, a catalogue was compiled which listed all the lessons the 1967 war had taught, as well as the practical steps which were to be taken in order to deal with them...
...There is also a competent discussion of the Sinai Campaign of 1956, and of its lessons: the importance of operational control, the use of armor and air force, flexibility in adapting plans to changing combat situations, the importance of high technical standards...
...For better or for worse, to be interested in Israel means to be interested in its army...
...The book is written for the lay reader, and deserves to be read widely...
...The discussion of structure is followed by a chronology of military development, including an excellent analysis of the post-1947 decline in combat performance, and the later reversal of the decline by Moshe Dayan...
...Thus, while it is true that the Army rested on its laurels after 1967, there was to be a full atonement: the Army won its most brilliant victory in 1973,alas,at a bitterly heavy price...
...Nor can I agree with the author's definition of the Syrian offensive as a "gigantic decoy" for the Egyptian Canal-crossing operation...
...During the Yom Kippur War, he headed the Intelligence Branch of the Israel Defense Force, and he was Israel's chief negotiator at Km...
...For it is that army which has made possible the establishment and the continuing existence of a renewed, independent Jewish state in the land of the forefathers...
...Ed.] Herzog also explains how the experience of 1967 led to an over-reliance on air power (to compensate for numerical disparity) and on Intelligence (to provide early warning, thereby permitting the timely mobilization and deployment of reserve units...
...The story of the air war, as is well known, is the story of the effectiveness of the Syrian and especially the Egyptian air defense...
...after Yom Kippur of 1973, there was bitter disappointment, severe and often exaggerated criticism...
...The surprise itself was a critical element in the planning, so much so that Egyptian and Syrian troops were themselves unaware of the plans for war until the order to attack was given...
...This, in turn, raises the question of Intelligence...
...in some instances they were expelled by local commanders, though this does not seem to have been official Haganah policy...
...Whether for budgetary reasons (as in the case of not replacing half-track personnel carriers with fully-tracked ones), or because of infighting between the advocates of various schools of thought, or because of sheer carelessness and lack of discipline, there was inadequate follow-through...
...I am not in full agreement with the authors' treatment of the 1948 War...
...Previously, he was a member of the Israeli Cabinet, where he served as Minister of Information...
...As one who served in the British Army, I can attest to the difference...
...The authors begin with an explanation of the historical, social, political and ideological origins of the Army...
...The lessons were learned...
...the fatal delay in deciding to evacuate the strong points along the canal...
...The Israeli Army, which traces Israel's military experience from its origins to the 1973 victory, provides a more balanced view, offers a perspective sufficiently broad for the reader to arrive at a sound and thoughtful conclusion and leads to a judgment that is, on balance, highly favorable to the Army...
...For the Yom Kippur War tarnished, Aharon Yariv is a member of Israel's Knesset...
...The authors suggest that Dayan had a "collapse assumption," that he believed the combined power of the 300 tanks and the air force would itself be sufficient to cause the collapse of the crossing forces, without help from the reserve units...
...Israel's preparations were based on the assumption that the 300 tanks located in the forward zone could, together with air support, contain the Egyptian thrust long enough to permit the mobilization and deployment of the reserve divisions...
...Unfortunately, the authors neglect the role of Intelligence in 1967...
...the 15th of May, when the British withdrawal was completed and the Arab invasion begun...
...In fascinating detail, Herzog shows how Egypt did not merely "prepare for war," but actually prepared for this particular war, with each soldier trained and re-trained in the execution of his specific task...
...Herzog contends that, "in contradiction to all military logic," the Bar-Lev Line's purpose as a defense system became confused with its role as a warning system...
...But what happened was actually somewhat different...
...And this is an important contribution, for while few wars have been so amply reported, the full story of the war has remained largely unknown...
...In describing the "New Army" (the reconstruction of the Israeli Army after the War of Independence), due weight is given to Ben Gurion's important decision to disband the Irgun, LEHI, and later, the Palmach, thereby insuring proper civilian control over the Army...
...But the real problem was not a confusion of purpose...
...It is not only a good book, but a timely one...
...Yet the authors overstate the case when they suggest that the decision was to "construct a British-style officer corps...
...While the book is uneven in spots, with a few inaccuracies, and does not go very deeply into the political side of the war, its last chapter, on lessons and implications, touches on all the important failures and problems which became evident during the war...
...There was, in fact, a serious effort to analyze the lessons of that war...
Vol. 1 • October 1975 • No. 4
