A Palestinian State: Thinking the Unthinkable: Not So Bad
HELLER, MARK A.
TWO VIEWS A PALESTINIAN STATE Thinking the Unthinkable Not So Bad says Mark Heller Perhaps the most astonishing thing of all about the intifada (the Palestinian uprising) is that it has failed...
...West Bank and Gaza Palestinians would be freed of Israeli occupation...
...Of course, it is possible to reject this explanation or to wish the obstacle away...
...Arguing the relative merits of these alternatives may still provide mental stimulation, but both proposals are political dead-ends, prescriptions for perpetuation of the status quo...
...Otherwise Israelis would not continue to debate the merits of autonomy and the Jordanian option, which no Palestinian or Jordanian leaders have proposed either...
...In other words, the PLO would approve an Israeli-Jordanian settlement only if there were a prior understanding that Jordan was going to negotiate about territory on the PLO's behalf...
...These provisions fall into four categories: The first is diplomatic...
...Decisive action, they argue, would convince the Palestinians to accept their fate and stop resisting Israeli rule...
...The most common threat to domestic stability is the absence of a coherent political community...
...The Palestinians have communicated what they reject but not what they would accept, and certainly not what they will give in return...
...The PLO's declared "strategy of stages"—first reverse the results of 1967, then reverse the results of 1948—simply reinforces the suspicion of Palestinian irredentism, which occasional individual statements of more benign intent do little to dispel...
...Many Israelis are attracted to King Hussein because they perceive him to be a sober, moderate, proWestern statesman, the personification of a stable regime that bears no intrinsic or historical animosity towards Israel and indeed shares its interest in containing Palestinian nationalism...
...After all, neither the spontaneous outbursts of West Bank and Gaza residents nor the ambiguities and contradictions of the PLO have ever conveyed a message that Israelis can easily understand^ much less accept...
...This conclusion rests on two other assumptions: Palestinian duplicity— they might agree to peace but they wouldn't really mean it—and/or Palestinian incompetence—they might mean peace but they wouldn't be able to honor their commitments...
...However, it is illusory and selfdefeating to demand perfection in issues of peace and security...
...for historical reasons, it is simply more prominent, hence less likely to provoke post-settlement grievances than any other boundary that might be proposed or imposed...
...In fact, internal instability and conflict—caused by opposition in the West Bank and Gaza and inflamed by outside support—might be so great that the Jordanian government would be forced to agree to Palestinian secession...
...Moreover, once the Palestinians have their own government, their decision-making calculus will be completely changed...
...The alienation of East Bank Palestinians could even lead to the end of Hashemite rule in Amman itself...
...And a large pool of underemployed university graduates would reinforce the state's* technical competence...
...Consequently, Israel's major political parties have focused instead on negotiated alternatives to the status quo...
...But this hardly makes for a political upheaval...
...Such provisions would include limitations on the size, equipment and deployment of Palestinian military forces, consistent with internal security needs, as well as procedures for verification, monitoring and early warning...
...All these gains would be jeopardized by an adventurous policy...
...This logic contributed to the 1982 invasion • of Lebanon...
...Nevertheless, the legacy of prolonged Palestinian-Israeli animosity does mean that the possibility of subsequent breakdown must be taken into account...
...By the criterion of economic self-sufficiency, a Palestinian state would clearly not qualify as viable, but neither would most other functioning states, including Israel itself...
...Of course, it is not clear whether such a settlement can actually be achieved...
...Probably the most threatening aspect of a Palestinian state to most Israelis is Palestinian irredentism...
...Likud remains committed to an agreement based on Palestinian autonomy, as propounded by Menachem Begin more than ten years ago...
...Even for West Bank and Gaza residents, the "liberation" of these territories would constitute, at best, only partial satisfaction of their national aspirations...
...Still, these Israelis concede that Palestinian hostility to the Jordanian option is widespread and that this (along with inter-Arab constraints) prevents King Hussein from consummating the settlement he is presumed so devoutly to desire...
...Contrary to the prevailing consensus, this alternative is therefore more promising—less bad— for Israel than the only other real alternative: continued stalemate...
...According to this view, a peace agreement would be entered into with so many mental reservations that it would be virtually worthless...
...But even if we assume that the Palestinians (and the Arab system) could be initially defied, the immediate result would be the addition of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians (perhaps as many as 1.5 million, depending on which territories were transferred) to those already in the Jordanian polity...
...Moreover, Palestinian social structure, while hardly egalitarian, is not so highly stratified that it encourages socio-economic or religious extremism...
...Hussein's behavior suggests that he appreciates this risk...
...Without legitimation of his actions by the PLO, Hussein would be ill-equipped to counter censure (and worse) from other quarters in the Arab world...
...Given the virulence and divisions in public discourse in Israel, it might seem strange to think of consensus...
...Prudence requires that any agreement include provisions to minimize this risk and maximize Israel's ability to deal with breakdown should it occur...
...The mere reiteration of possible risks cannot reliably guide policy...
...But if orthodox thinking is not challenged, the status quo that nobody wants is what we will get...
...This political stolidity almost certainly means that the current intifada, like all previous phases of the Palestinian struggle since the creation of the British Mandate, will bear no fruit other than a fleeting sense of self-gratification...
...If Palestinian moderates could just be liberated from the threat of terrorism (through elimination of the PLO), they argue, then an agreement on autonomy could be reached...
...Even Israelis prepared to compromise on Jewish historical-religious claims to the land fear that a Palestinian state would quickly become a new confrontation state, one that would act to subvert Israeli Arabs, tolerate or sponsor terrorism, and eventually launch a major military action, either alone or as the vanguard of a coordinated Arab assault against Israel in its reduced boundaries...
...Since 1967, there has never been much confidence that the status could remain quo forever...
...In short, none of the dangers attributed to a settlement involving the creation of a Palestinian state is inevitable, and most are not even likely.* This does not necessarily mean that the relations between Israel and a Palestinian state would be marked by great warmth and affection...
...These assumptions have been elevated, through endless repetition by leaders and citizens alike, to the status of conventional wisdom...
...Moreover, this commitment would have to have active ratification by other Arab states, in the form of bilateral peace agreements with Israel, and undertakings to provide economic support for the new Palestinian state and to cooperate in liquidating potentially disruptive vestiges of the conflict, e.g., by closing down refugee camps and disbanding UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency...
...Moreover, what might have been defensible as an act of enlightened self-interest in 1967 would now inevitably be interpreted as a reward to Arab tenacity and would therefore encourage further belligerence...
...Obviously, a special regime for Jerusalem would be required...
...It has done nothing to change the terms of the debate about what that alternative should be...
...The ideological basis is the institutional commitment of the PLO, since its formation in 1964, to the "total liberation" of all of Palestine...
...What would have happened [in the - Gaza Strip in the absence of our withdrawal)' Those 300,000 residents know that the entire Arab world stands behind them, and that behind the Arab world they enjoy the declared political sympathy of the whole world "During the few months when we controlled Gaza, we thought we might be able to maintain order there . but it was clear that remaining in Gaza, while the entire world condemns us—and knowing that terrorism would develop and that we would be forced to crush such terrorism-all this would have been inconsistent with our capacity and vital needs "We clearly had the power to oppress terrorism, but the question is whether we would have been prepared to use this power for such op'pressioa "In this respect, we are no better and no worse off than the British...
...The Likud and Labor proposals are politically sterile because, for all their differences, they are identical in one crucial respect: Their objective is to circumvent or suppress the national aspirations of the Palestinians...
...But it is difficult to understand the reasons for assuming that this must be so...
...Thus, there is no intrinsic political reason why a Palestinian regime should face massive challenges to its authority, either on the basic issue of peace or on other questions of social policy...
...Nevertheless, this is at best only a partial explanation...
...Israeli partisans of the Jordanian option also insist that the PLO perverts Palestinian public opinion by suppressing pro-Jordanian sentiment in the West Bank and Gaza...
...Palestinians might nevertheless decide to pursue a self-destructive course of confrontation with Israel, but it is far more likely that fear of losing what they had already achieved—even if this fell short of the ultimate Palestinian vision—would be the decisive factor in Palestinian decision-making...
...In these circumstances, it would be very difficult for Jordan to honor whatever peace agreement it had made with Israel in return for the territories, and almost as difficult to enforce its authority against Palestinian resistance in these territories...
...In principle, there are two types of alternatives to the status quo—those that Israel can undertake unilaterally and those that require agreement with an Arab partner...
...Advocates of unilateral annexation, on the other hand, argue that Israel has encouraged the Palestinians to demand separation by Israeli failure to rule it out...
...Even to its few advocates, the status quo recommended itself faute de mieux (lesser of the evils), as a temporary arrangement pending the achievement of some less objectionable alternative...
...Supporters of the Jordanian option in Israel are sustained by the hope either that Hussein will somehow gain PLO approval for a deal with Israel, or that he will summon up the courage to act without PLO approval...
...An independent state would do little to relieve the frustration of Palestinian refugees driven by the vision of a return to the paradise they are convinced they lost in 1948...
...A more reasonable criterion for "viability" would be a state's overall ability to generate the resources needed to satisfy the minimal needs of its people...
...Palestinian politicians would have the power and trappings of state office...
...Fear of Palestinian duplicity stems from a conviction that Palestinian hostility to the existence of Israel is unremitting and irreconcilable, and that this hostility would not only persist unabated after a negotiated settlement, but would be translated into active policy...
...Promises of autonomy or federal status would not suffice...
...Requirements based on these expectations could clearly be met on two conditions: That access to the Israeli labor market for Palestinian workers be preserved, and that foreign assistance on the order of 81.1 billion over a five-year period be made available...
...And our military authorities would have had to shoot terrorists on a daily basis "We would not have been able to withstand this For the state of Israel, such reality would have become a catastrophe, although—with great difficulties—we might have been able to sustain ourselves [for some timel But who knows what might have happened if this reality would have extended for a long period of time The state would not have been able to withstand this...
...Only then can we judge-whether the status quo implicit in the current Israeli consensus is truly preferable...
...The first type has two variations—unilateral withdrawal and unilateral annexation...
...More than 20 years of accumulated experience—autonomy negotiations with Egypt, efforts to engage West Bank and Gaza dignitaries, secret talks with Jordan and abortive Hussein-Arafat negotiations—have demonstrated that there are no partners—no Arab interlocutors—for these alternatives...
...Given Israel's need for workers and the obvious interest the United States, Israel and several oil-rich Arab states have in Palestinian stability and regional peace, these conditions could easily be satisfied...
...If we lost our moral existential justice, in the eyes of the Jewish people and the world at large, Israel would not survive...
...Finally, the new state apparatus would have available a trained cadre of administrators with experience in the service of other Arab governments, in local governmental and voluntary institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, and in the PLO bureaucracy...
...The central assumption, from which all other projected consequences flow, is that peace involving a Palestinian state would be false, fragile and short-lived...
...It is tempting, and not altogether unwarranted, to attribute both the rigidity of Israeli analysis and the prolongation of political paralysis to the Palestinians...
...But for those willing to entertain the idea of1 'land for peace," the exclusion of a Palestinian state is explained by their assumptions about the expected behavior of the state and the character of the peace...
...And Labor still pursues some bilateral or multilateral variant of the so-called "Jordanian option," the centerpiece of its policy since 1967...
...Advocates of autonomy are convinced that the Palestinian ' 'silent majority" actually accepts the merits of autonomy and refrains from endorsing it only because of PLO intimidation...
...However reluctantly the Palestinians might agree to this, it would still be an act of historic proportions, an explicit renunciation of Palestinian absolutism that would provide the ideological, and hence, the political rationale for coexistence with Israel— not only for Palestinians but also for other Arab states...
...The next category of provisions is military...
...The Palestinians' conscious purpose would be to continue the conflict—or at least to renew it at the first available opportunity—in keeping with the inevitably irredentist character of any Palestinian state...
...The third category of provisions is spatial...
...The historical basis for this suspicion is a long tradition of Palestinian maximalism, stretching back to the earliest days of the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine...
...A Palestinian state might ultimately be too unstable to enforce a policy of peaceful co-existence with Israel on domestic opponents, or to resist the attempts of other states who might want to use this new state as a springboard for attacking Israel...
...Another fear is that a Palestinian state would be unable to follow a policy of peaceful co-existence with Israel even if its leaders wanted to...
...Many of these would be outraged by Hussein's "betrayal," as would many among the Palestinian' majority on the East Bank...
...By this criterion, a Palestinian state would clearly not qualify as viable, but neither would most other functioning states, including Israel itself...
...The "non-viability" of a Palestinian state is more often asserted than demonstrated...
...It is time to question those assumptions...
...The final category is temporal...
...capable of speaking authoritatively on behalf of the Palestinians, the PLO...
...Accordingly, the Palestinian option, meaning a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, may well be outside the Israeli consensus simply because no one has offered Israel a deal on this basis...
...In short, domestic instability resulting from these challenges would almost immediately render any Palestinian regime incapable of controlling elements hostile to the peace and might well compel it to resuscitate the conflict with Israel, if only to distract attention from domestic troubles that threatened its own survival...
...Government by force—one which does not rest on the free will of the governed—assumes inevitably a logic of its own...
...There is no doubt that most Palestinians would prefer a world in which Israel did not exist...
...Feldman cited a number of passages from Ben Gurion's writings Among them The use of force by powerful states-even when initially propelled by worthy objectives—naturally turns from a means to an end . Many conquerors indeed provided the peoples they ruled with improved government and a higher culture...
...In short, a Palestinian state is rejected in Israel not because it cannot be, but because it should not be...
...Nevertheless, most Israeli voters and the great majority of the political leadership oppose unilateral annexation because of the likelihood that it would provoke more local violence, an Arab military response and painful international sanctions...
...At the same time, the Palestinian state would constitute a discrete and vulnerable target for Israeli counter-measures—ranging from economic sanctions, such as restrictions on Palestinian workers coming into Israel or restrictions on transit rights through Israel, including transit rights between the West Bank and Gaza, to retaliatory military operations of varying severity, including termination of the new state's hard-won independence...
...But at this point, all that can be said with certainty is that it is the only negotiated alternative to the status quo whose feasibility has yet to be disproved by experience...
...This projection ignores the effects of a peace settlement and the existence of a Palestinian state on the psychological context of decisionmaking and on the calculus of Palestinian policy...
...Some estimate must be made of the probability that these dangers will indeed materialize, of the consequences if they do materialize, and of the possible safeguards against them...
...But the situation would radically change with the establishment of a Palestinian state...
...No sensible person will deny that these risks exist...
...None of their demands, including that of a Palestinian state, has been presented as part of an explicit political formula containing something of value for Israel as well...
...The actual behavior of a Palestinian state will inevitably be conditioned by the psychological context of a formal Palestinian-Israeli peace, as well as by the anticipated consequences—'the costs and benefits—of various courses of action...
...Palestinian acceptance of a peace agreement with Israel would mean formal recognition of Israel's legitimacy...
...Israel's circumstances permit it only to choose among alternatives that are all unappealing in varying degrees...
...Thus, there is little reason to expect that peace would be overwhelmed by Palestinian revisionism caused by economic distress...
...Skeptics will contemptuously dismiss such an act as mere symbolism...
...There is therefore a significant risk that the eventual outcome of an ' 'anti-Palestinian" Jordanian settlement would be a Palestinian state, at least on the West Bank and perhaps on both banks, but a Palestinian state which would have undertaken no recognition of Israel or commitments to it in return for independence...
...many such offers have been made—and refused—since Hussein's 1972 United Arab Kingdom plan...
...David Ben-Gurion, The Eternity of Israel, p 25J On April 4, 1957, Ben-Gunon, then Israel's prime minister and minister of defense met with senior officers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Under pressure from the Soviet Union and particularly the United States, Israel had agreed to withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza Strip following the 1956 Sinai campaign Most of the IDF officers were anguished by what seemed to them an Israeli retreat, taking place without sufficient assurances that the war's objectives had been met and that peace would prevail In particular, they were worried about the implications of the IDFs withdrawal from the Gaza Strip Here is what Ben-Gunon told the IDF officers...
...Such ideas have gained increasing support within Israel in recent years...
...In any event, "courage" of this sort by Hussein would mean a settlement intended to subject any territories gained to Jordanian rule...
...Such a settlement would obviously not be ideal from Israel's viewpoint (nor from that of the Palestinians...
...And the intifada has done nothing to change their preferences...
...The a priori assumption that stability would be precluded for economic reasons is equally unsubstantiated...
...to Jordan would come under Palestinian rule...
...Palestinians everywhere would enjoy the psychological satisfaction of national normality...
...The settlement would also have to provide for the military What Would Ben-Gurion Have Said...
...that this immigration would take place over a five-year transition period, and that Palestinian standards of living would not be adversely affected by independence, i. e., that per capita income in the West Bank and Gaza would at least remain at its current level...
...Thus, any settlement would have to include an explicit, unambiguous Palestinian commitment to peace and to the renunciation of all further claims against Israel...
...In fact, the term "viability" is rarely even defined— perhaps because there is no workable definition—but it is often implicitly equated with economic self-sufficiency...
...Fear of Palestinian hostility (and censure by other Arab states) is the reason for Jordan's refusal to acquiesce in the Jordanian option...
...True, the uprising has heightened public awareness of the risks and costs that were always inherent in military occupation...
...Nevertheless, the mere reiteration of possible risks cannot reliably guide policy...
...Israeli confidence in the durability of a settlement involving a Palestinian state would be greatly enhanced if its various provisions, including the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces, were implemented over a transition period of, say, five yean...
...In short, it is assumed that a Palestinian state would involve an unreasonable risk that Israel would ultimately be left with neither land nor peace...
...Thus, the traditional debate persists, as does the status quo...
...Unilateral withdrawal would relieve Israel of the burdens of occupation, but it would also deprive Israel of the geo-military advantages of Judea and Samaria while providing no offsetting benefits in the form of Arab political concessions...
...The hope of eliminating Israel might well continue to be widely shared among Palestinians, but it would be of urgent and immediate concern only to a few...
...This assumption proceeds from the expectation that a Palestinian state would be subject to severe political strains from within because of ideological conflicts, as well as personal, regional and class-based rivalries, and also that it would be incapable of satisfying the minimal economic needs of its people...
...This commitment would have to be undertaken by the only representative * For a more detailed analysis of the pros and cons, see Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983...
...The other possibility for the Jordanian option is that Hussein might act without PLO approval...
...The PLO, which embodies the Palestinian national cause, could not endorse an Israeli-Jordanian settlement that appeared to be aimed at containing Palestinian nationalism unless the PLO believed that any territory transferred by Israel...
...These provisions should focus on eliminating the Palestinian question as a prod to Arab-Israeli conflict...
...It is difficult to understand why this would be preferable to a Palestinian state with an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement...
...The purpose of the military provisions would be to prevent a Palestinian state from hampering Israel's ability to respond quickly to a military threat by other Arab states...
...In their present circumstances—landless, powerless, facing Israeli refusal even to consider the Palestinian option—most Palestinian constituencies feel they have little to lose, and'the Palestinian national movement as a whole has nothing to lose from an anti-Israel struggle for maximalist objectives...
...But there has always been widespread agreement, at least on the things to which Israel will not agree: No return to the pre-1967 borders, no negotiation with the PLO and no Palestinian state...
...The same response, on a massive scale, is proposed by some as a solution to the "demographic problem," i.e., the implications for the national character of Israel posed by the absorption of large numbers of Arabs...
...What the British could not afford to do in Palestine and what they could not afford to do in India—we also could not possibly afford "We would have sat in the midst of a sea—a small and narrow sea—but nevertheless a sea of hostility and terrorism...
...But a Palestinian state would not be vulnerable to this threat...
...Nor is there the slightest reason to expect that the designated partners for autonomy deals or Jordanian options, who have consistently and adamantly refused to play in the past, will suddenly come forward now or in the foreseeable future...
...And it is within the confines of these "three no's" that debate—especially within the national unity government—still takes place...
...A settlement involving a Palestinian state—with the kinds of safeguards discussed here—would relieve Israel of the debilitating political, military, material and moral burdens of occupation, it would imply a low probability of subsequent breakdown, and it would provide Israel with sufficient capacity to deal with unanticipated consequences...
...But it is worth finding out...
...The specter of a warlike Palestinian state guided only by a determination to destroy Israel is a linear projection of the past into the future...
...This would mean that fulfillment of the Jordanian option would ultimately bring about a Palestinian state without an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement...
...This estimate must also be compared with the probable dangers inherent in the alternatives...
...This objective explains Palestinian hostility to autonomy plans and to the Jordanian option...
...The tenacity of Israeli advocates of the Jordanian option suggests that they do not...
...But apart from this, only minor adjustments to the 1949 ceasefire lines would be necessary...
...The second widespread assumption is that even if a Palestinian state were sincerely committed to nonbelligerent relations with Israel, it would be incapable of sustaining such a posture for very long...
...no one argues the virtues of the status quo any more...
...No one seems to have thought through the implications for Israel if either of these hopes were to be fulfilled...
...maintaining government [under such conditions] is impossible without means of oppression, and the desire to maintain control eventually subordinates all other requirements...
...Of course, it may be that a peace settlement involving a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is just as unattainable as an agreement based on autonomy or the Jordanian option...
...But the fact is that the Palestinians themselves have acknowledged its irreversible political impact: Despite the potential diplomatic rewards, the Palestinians have thus far refused to make the essential verbal concessions in advance of any recognition of Israel's legitimacy precisely because they fear that recognizing Israel will set off a process of psychological demobilization that would make it impossible thereafter to revive Palestinian or Arab enthusiasm for a renewed struggle in pursuit of objectives not yet achieved...
...For those Israelis who refuse territorial concessions under any circumstances, why it should not be is self-evident...
...Although some radical secular and fundamentalist forces exist—and tend to flourish in particularly frustrating times—the bulk of Palestinians appear to identify with the bourgeois nationalism represented by Yasir Arafat...
...Some estimate must be made of the probability that these dangers will indeed materialize...
...The intifada has merely made the search for an alternative more urgent...
...And even other Arab countries would be relieved of the disruptive impact of Palestinian statelessness...
...None of the dangers attributed to a settlement involving the creation of a Palestinian state is inevitable, and most are not even likely...
...The sociological basis is the fact that most Palestinians abroad and most PLO leaders trace their personal origins not to the West Bank and Gaza, but to towns and villages in pre-1967 Israel...
...Of course, it is possible to stipulate the kind of material or subjective requirements that no state could meet...
...Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between abstract preference and policy...
...A serious projection of requirements, however, should be derived from reasonable expectations: That the number of Palestinians moving from elsewhere to a Palestinian state would be about 850,000...
...What would David Ben-Gurion have said if he were here today' That was one of the questions raised at a talk last summer for Middle East specialists at the Wood-row Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC The speaker was Dr Shai Feldman of Tel Aviv University's Jaf-fee Center for Strategic Studies...
...The basis for this hope has not been elaborated, although it presumably involves a combination of territorial bait and the prospect of political cover by the superpowers and/or an international conference...
...And the reason for Israel's longstanding unwillingness to explore the Palestinian option is fear of success, rdther than fear of failure...
...But history does not know of a single case where such 'benign' conquest did not eventually turn to oppression and subjugation...
...Both the Likud and Labor proposals are politically sterile because their objective is to circumvent or suppress the national aspirations of the Palestinians...
...TWO VIEWS A PALESTINIAN STATE Thinking the Unthinkable Not So Bad says Mark Heller Perhaps the most astonishing thing of all about the intifada (the Palestinian uprising) is that it has failed to shatter the Israeli consensus opposing a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza...
...Its value lies in its unique salience...
...The so-called Green Line does not reflect any particular geographic, demographic or topographic logic...
...Ben-Gurion, Dis-tinchon and Purpose, pp 293-294) Not So Bad continued from page 46 neutrality of the Palestinian state...
...But even if the new state failed to perform economically up to this level, the failure would be unlikely to result in despair so bitter and widespread as to produce a political upheaval...
...correctness based on treaty provisions and self-interest is probably the most that can be expected, and all that Israel really requires...
...that is, that a Palestinian state would not be "viable...
...those who refuse would be subject to deportation...
...its population would be overwhelmingly Sunni Moslem and it would suffer from none of the ethnic, religious or linguistic fragmentation that challenges social peace and even the basic legitimacy of so many other states...
...Possibly, this would have destroyed us, not militarily but morally—and in my opinion our morality conditions our very existence...
Vol. 13 • September 1988 • No. 6
