A Note On South East Asia
P ., S.
Our fact-oriented Administration might consider the folIowing facts in evaluating its interventionist policy in South East Asia (Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand): • Since 1954 we have spent...
...This does not refer to constitutions or formal democratic procedures (Diem has thousands of political prisoners in his jails...
...Or precisely the policy followed by the administration to date...
...There must be no end of confidential reports and papers which document them in details not accessible to us...
...it grew to a few hundred technicians and experts...
...Go to it, dear friend," he seemed to say to President Kennedy during a recent tour of Roumania...
...You will find it has no bottom, and—this seemed particularly to amuse Khrushchev—wait until you attempt to extricate yourself...
...which Asian country actively threatened by Communism has effective democratic and popular institutions...
...We began with a few dozen military advisers in South East Asia...
...Perhaps the moment has come, suggests Reinhold Niebuhr in the New Leader (May 28, 1962), for an "agonizing reappraisal" of our Asian policies...
...Niebuhr, while not explicitly giving an affirmative answer to his question and hesitating to draw any conclusion if his answer is "yes," limits himself to framing a series of basic questions...
...The obvious difficulty of this game of limited retaliation, apart from the danger of escalation, is that it leads nowhere...
...If we reverse Mao Tse-tung's dictum that Communist guerrillas can only "swim" in friendly waters, we understand that only hostile waters will eject them...
...If the Communists advance in northern Laos, we redress the balance with Marines, etc...
...The irony of Nikita Khrushchev complacently discussing America's deep involvement in South East Asia is surely lost on no one...
...Since these people reject the "Win with Diem" slogan of the Administration, his fate is grim...
...In other words, let us find out the "facts" which, in turn, reveal the power relations and forces in operation and we then act accordingly...
...Not one...
...But more important is to examine the questions raised by Niebuhr...
...the territorial integrity of this peaceful country...
...Our unconditional commitment to unpopular regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand is duplicated in South Korea, the Philippines, Formosa etc...
...But we at least ought to begin by asking for their removal from the jails of Diem and Chiang Kai-shek...
...The results, in terms of democratic social and economic progress, are minuscule...
...or as Khrushchev put it, how do you withdraw...
...whether it has not been a mistake to commit our prestige unqualifiedly to the defense of [such nations as Ngo Dinh Diem's SouthVietnam...
...the elite of South Vietnam, for example, will come to life only if such an atmosphere should be establish...
...Our fact-oriented Administration might consider the folIowing facts in evaluating its interventionist policy in South East Asia (Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand): • Since 1954 we have spent over $2.5 billion (by the end of this year it will be $3 billion) in economic and military aid to the government of Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam...
...one of the most pressing issues in United States foreign affairs is to determine when we must and can support the less than ideal democracies scattered throughout the world...
...2) Democracy: Contrary to what the sceptics say, we would contend that while democracy cannot guarantee victory over Communism, Russian or Chinese style, it alone offers the possibility of even a decent fight...
...The establishment of a face-saving, "neutral" Laos of the Three Princes—proclaimed to have always been our basic policy in that country —finds that, in order to bolster up the agreement, the indefinite presence of our Marine forces in neighboring Thailand is indispensable...
...For one thing, it would be helpful at least to get these things known and admitted...
...3) Realism: Many people, including some well placed in the new Administration, know these simple truths...
...We now have over 11,000 men in the area (7,000 ground forces in Thailand), with a steady additional flow coming in...
...And where the U. S. does decide to support such nations, it has to determine how much it can interfere in their internal life in order to create economic and social conditions which will make democracy available...
...Niebuhr judges something that hasn't yet been tried...
...It need hardly be added that a successful arming of the peasantry in the Asiatic world is part of the agrarian revolution which, varying as it must from country to country and region to region, is a problem far beyond the comprehension or grasp of our Pentagon...
...The facts, it would seem, dictate caution, limited objectives and involvement, political sophistication and discernment...
...Is not "democracy" a luxury that only advanced, non-Asian nations can afford...
...It is to Niebuhr's credit that he attempts to look at fundamentals...
...Get deeper and deeper into that quagmire...
...Any number of comparable and equally compelling facts can be produced...
...After expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars in a few years' time, with the added presence of hundreds of American military technicians of the toughest fiber, 5,000 Royal Laotian troops under U. S. command and leadership were driven out of Northern Laos at the first sight of advancing Communist forces...
...TIMES, June 14, 1962...
...It would be a starting point for us to see both our limitations and what—modestly—might conceivably be accomplished by helping those in the countries we want to save who, in their turn and in ways far more perceptive than ours, have grasped the relation between the struggle for free democratic social, political and economic institutions and the struggle to prevent engulfment by Communism...
...At best we influence, not determine events...
...In the end, it was the utter indifference and apathy of the Laotians (due, by the way, not to their "Buddhism" but to their political remoteness from the forces operating) which brought about the new doubtfully "neutral" Laos...
...Since 1951, we have given over $500 million in aid (80 per cent of it military) to Thailand, and have built up for Thailand an Army, Navy and Air Force of 120,000 men...
...We cannot do that at length here, but some preliminary notes may be of use: 1) Modesty:What the United States does in the South East Asian crises is not, never has been and never will be decisive...
...N.Y...
...The one consistent policy which the Administration has developed is the erection of battlelines throughout Asia...
...commit larger forces and resources...
...Similarly, it is the fact that thousands of the South Vietnamese elite, politically sophisticated people, are sitting on their hands and maintaining a strictly hostile attitude toward the Diem regime which will decide its future...
...Where was this force when it came to insuring, in the words of President Kennedy...
...But he does not advance beyond raising questions which, in turn, are so formulated as to suggest he is at best sceptical about democracy in the countries he discusses and, apparently, thinks a "play-it-by-ear" policy from one country to the next is about all one can do...
...Thanks to the stepped-up military and economic activity of the new Administration, our commitment to these governments is firmer than under the last Administration, since our "stake" in their survival is that much greater...
...If they want to dance, they should go elsewhere in Asia...
...whether we have been mistaken in investing our moral prestige in Asia [in attempting to shore up a series of questionable leaders...
...Finally...
...INVITATION TO THE DANCE "The Americans did not come here to dance but to help us," said the wife of President Ngo Dinh Diem's brother and chief political adviser...
...It means essentially two things: (1) Popular democratic institutions from top to bottom, from village councils to the highest court, which exist in an atmosphere of free discussion and debate...
...2) The training, mobilization and arming of the village-peasant masses...
...You will find that task the most impossible of all...
Vol. 9 • July 1962 • No. 3
