Afghanistan: What Can We Achieve?
Cohen, Michael A.
POLITICS ABROAD Afghanistan: What Can We Achieve? MICHAEL A. COHEN The U.S. war in Afghanistan started off with rousing optimism in the fall of 2001, but by the end of the decade has devolved...
...There are others who would rather wait out the United States and NATO and want to keep fighting and hunkering down in Pakistan...
...This will likely mean that the U.S...
...Second, the U.S...
...operations...
...Michael A. Cohen, a senior fellow at the American Security Project, blogs about Afghanistan at www.democrac-yarsenal.org...
...Fifth and most important, the United States will need to restate its commitment to Afghan security, the viability of the current Afghan state, territorial integrity of the country, and— as unpalatable as it may seem—the Karzai government...
...As has been the case for most of its history, it will rely, in some measure, on the largesse of others...
...war in Afghanistan started off with rousing optimism in the fall of 2001, but by the end of the decade has devolved into a quagmire for U. S. troops and potential disaster for the Afghan people...
...officials turned to Afghan militias to fight the final battle against the remnants of al Qaeda at the terrorist group's redoubt at Tora Bora...
...An Agenda for U.S...
...In the nearterm, the United States and NATO might be able to clear some areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan, which is the current focus of U.S...
...Finally, there is a difficult regional component as well: Pakistan will not countenance a political deal that doesn't protect its interests, give it a say in Afghanistan's future, and minimize Indian influence in the country...
...The candidate who had promised during the 2008 presidential campaign to devote more resources to the "good" war in Afghanistan became a president who piled more bad decisions upon past ones...
...Fighting The Good War When Barack Obama took office in January 2009, things were going to be different...
...First, they must lend their support to political negotiations—and in particular support a UN mandate for an independent, non-U.S...
...approach to the war seems to be based on the notion that they can pummel Taliban fighters into submission and eventual "compromise" in political negotiations...
...We need to take the fight more aggressively and for a greater duration to the Taliban...
...And after more than nine years of war, few good options remain on the table...
...Efforts must be made to consolidate support—and target Taliban groups—in the parts of the country where Taliban support is more tenuous and reversible...
...But there are others who believe that momentum is on their side, and that a Taliban return to power is possible (although there is some question as to whether that is even the primary goal of the movement...
...Local Afghan and NGO officials said that once peaceful districts have increasingly become off-limits, and that security across the region has declined in the past year...
...But imposing a solution that guarantees that the rights of women—and others—are protected in Afghanistan, while a noble fight, is likely a losing battle...
...None of these steps will be easy—and in some cases, they will require an outlay of significant political capital by Obama...
...Next came the disastrous choice at the Bonn Conference in 2001 to create one of the most centralized political systems in the world for post-Taliban Afghanistan, rather than a decentralized federal system in the tradition of Afghan governance...
...This was a recurring refrain during my own recent trip to northern Afghanistan...
...He cannot afford to let it pass him or the United States by...
...Fourth, the United States can play perhaps the most direct and important diplomatic role in corralling regional support for a political agreement...
...There is little indication that the strategy being executed now will be any more successful than those that have failed in the past...
...At the same time, non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan, such as the Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, are deeply fearful of a political deal with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban...
...It's high time for the United States to recognize its own limitations in Afghanistan and seek a solution that is not perfect but that is realistic and achievable...
...military...
...No matter who is in power in Kabul, it is difficult to imagine that this unequal situation will change radically any time soon...
...The goal here would be to lay the groundwork for a political environment that will strengthen the country's anti-Taliban forces for when the United States leaves...
...But there are clear and obvious dangers in such an approach...
...For all the efforts to stabilize the southern city of Kandahar, ANSO estimates that there are as many as 4,000 Taliban fighters in the city...
...From a civil society perspective, many groups in Afghanistan have reason to be wary of a deal with the Taliban, particularly women, who could see their limited freedoms in post-Taliban Afghanistan further constrained...
...Between July and September of 2010, Taliban attacks increased by 59 percent, compared with the same period in 2009...
...Of secondary concern would likely be the viability of military bases such as Forward Operating Base Chapman in eastern Afghanistan, which allows the United States to maintain military pressure on al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan...
...Moreover, the more focus the United States places on the South and East, the greater the risk that the Taliban will continue to make political inroads in the North and West, where it is increasingly making alliances with non-Pashtun groups, in effect nationalizing the insurgency...
...In fact, according to a recent report from the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the surge in troops has had little impact on the insurgency, which it described as "maturing" and "ascendant...
...Right now, U.S...
...There are a number of measures it could take: • Delisting insurgent leaders from UN sanctions lists and also Special Operations kill and capture lists • Releasing detained insurgent fighters • Negotiating local cease fires • Promoting agreements between the Taliban and the NGOs to allow these groups to operate more effectively in "red areas" (a process that is already taking place informally) These steps should be predicated, in part, on Taliban reciprocal measures, such as ceasefire agreements or an end to attacks on civilian targets...
...blood and treasure at a pace far greater than its relationship to actual U.S...
...Recognizing Pakistan's nuclear program and pledging U.S...
...and NATO operations in Afghanistan are focused too directly on using military force to "slow the momentum" of the Taliban insurgency...
...Then came the calamitous U.S...
...policy going forward...
...and while near-term hopes for such reconciliation are dim, it should remain a focus of U.S...
...policymakers...
...There are some who believe now—when the Taliban is at its strongest military point—is the best time to make a deal with the Karzai government...
...This doesn't mean endless war in the Hindu Kush, but an enduring focus on Afghanistan's economic and political future...
...Further fighting may encourage the Taliban to bide its time, as time is running out for the United States...
...Former Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who has already engaged in discussions with all parties, seems an obvious and inspired choice...
...Third, the United States must make it a priority to leave Afghanistan in as potentially a stable form as possible...
...The moment cries for leadership and a demand that the nation's generals get with the president's program...
...decision to go to war in Iraq, which diverted time, resources, and attention from Afghanistan...
...and Western financial, and potentially military, commitment to Afghanistan will continue for many years, possibly permanently...
...There are almost certainly elements in the Taliban leadership that are tired of nine years of war, tired of Pakistani manipulation, and tired of living in exile...
...Ironically, it is the United States—and in particular its military leadership—that represents one of the key stumbling blocks...
...If there is evidence that the Taliban and the Afghan government are interested in negotiations, then the United States should jump on the opportunity...
...In addition, as the United States kills Taliban mid-level commanders who receive guidance from the leadership in Pakistan today, there is the risk of such commanders being replaced by more radical and less controllable fighters tomorrow...
...After nine years of the West's making poor decisions, Obama has a rare opportunity to make a right one...
...Indeed, it is worth noting that a year after extolling the importance of a counter-insurgency strategy focused on "protecting the population," military leaders have returned to a metric they once scorned—namely, publicizing body counts of enemy insurgents...
...and the failure of U.S...
...Picking the least worse one—which protects U.S...
...The third and perhaps most important reason is that the Taliban will want to enter negotiations from a position of relative strength...
...The litany of mistakes began in the first months of military engagement, when U.S...
...Moreover, demands by the United States that the Taliban surrender its weapons and pledge to recognize the Afghan Constitution are misguided and unrealistic—and tangential to direct U.S...
...Although the United States should promote fundamental human rights in Afghanistan, it should understand the limitations of such an approach...
...Making sure the Pakistanis are on board will be essential to the success of any political negotiation...
...So long as these redline conditions for the United States are addressed, the outlines of a political deal to guide Afghanistan's future, whether it's a power-sharing arrangement or a decentralized governance structure that apportions more power to regional powerbrokers, should be the decision of the Afghans and Afghans alone...
...policymakers—either with carrots or sticks—to push for a Pakistani crackdown on Afghan Taliban safe havens in their midst...
...NATO's decision in 2002 to maintain foreign security forces in and around Kabul rather than disperse them throughout the country was another crucial missed opportunity that contributed to the country's deteriorating security situation and to the later reemergence of the Taliban...
...Paradoxically, rapprochement between India and Pakistan would help stabilize Afghanistan over the long term...
...Although there is indication that U.S...
...Instead, the president and his advisers must choose from a set of worst-case scenarios...
...military must focus less on taking the fight to the Taliban and more on confidence-building measures to move the process of political negotiation forward...
...It is a mind-numbing tale of failure that has brought the United States and NATO to a painful decision point about the war in Afghanistan...
...troops and a shift in mission from population-centric counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism and stabilization...
...This may include pressuring Pakistan to in turn pressure the Afghan Taliban to accept a deal that falls short of its ultimate goals...
...The primary interest of the United States vis-a-vis Afghanistan is that the terrorist group cannot re-establish a safe haven in the country...
...policymakers would like to see a liberal democracy take root in Afghanistan, such a goal is not realistic and runs counter to what remains a fundamentally conservative and traditionally patriarchal society...
...the lack of appropriate and effective aid resources for improving infrastructure and the rural economy...
...As much as U.S...
...As one European diplomat recently quoted by Matthew Waldman noted about the United States, "They don't compromise, their model is winning . . . they have a radically different perception of what a political solution means...
...But the hold-and-build part of the counter-insurgency equation will not be sustainable, particularly as there are few Afghan forces to hold cleared areas...
...The United States needs and wants to leave Afghanistan, but a run to the exits will clearly destabilize the country...
...mediator...
...He has acceded to the U. S. military's request for approximately 50,000 additional troops since January 2009 and tacitly endorsed its preference for a counter-insurgency strategy, the limitations of which have been laid bare over the past year...
...interests while, one hopes, stabilizing Afghanistan—must be the focus of U.S...
...For all its twists and turns, it has had one striking constant—nearly every decision made by Western policymakers and Afghan leaders in fighting it has been the wrong one...
...But the alternative is far worse: ignominious withdrawal or miring the country more deeply in the conflict that is sapping U.S...
...national security—al Qaeda...
...The first is the likelihood that even stepped-up U.S...
...Departure How, then, should the United States proceed...
...The second problem is that there is a divide among various Taliban leaders...
...They must realize that it is time to move beyond the U.S...
...Special Operations forces are wreaking havoc with Taliban leadership cadres, there is less indication that the Taliban's ability to cause mayhem has decreased significantly...
...Ultimately, the United States would be better off focusing its political agenda on the one issue that is most basic to U.S...
...The choice of the ineffectual and indecisive Hamid Karzai as the country's first president compounded this error, as did the decision to exclude the Taliban from having any say in the country's future...
...Military efforts should be expanded in the increasingly vulnerable North rather than the lost cause South and East...
...interests...
...Other mistakes would follow: the focus on poppy eradication, which drove countless ordinary Afghans into the arms of the Taliban...
...Obama has wrongly and dangerously referred to the fight in Afghanistan as a "vital national interest" of the United States and, even worse, argued that the war is necessary to defeat, disrupt, and dismantle al Qaeda, even though the terrorist group has not had any verifiable presence in Afghanistan since 2002...
...After all, there is no evidence that Afghanistan has the capacity to maintain itself as a self-sufficient country...
...forces...
...But these are not insurmountable obstacles, and there is embryonic interest in all corners of the region—even among extremist groups— to proceed with political talks...
...military's dreams of winning in Afghanistan and focus instead on best preparing the country for a partial drawdown of U.S...
...interests...
...This means continuing to focus on creating an Afghan security force capable of preventing a Taliban takeover of the country...
...Every effort must be made to ensure that even after the United States withdraws, Afghanistan is not left a hollow shell...
...For example, during a recent trip to the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif I saw perhaps a dozen women out of hundreds who were not wearing a burka, and this in a city where Taliban influence is almost nonexistent...
...Political, not Military, Strategy The shift in strategy must begin with a shift in the mindset of the U.S...
...Paradoxically, weakening the Taliban may run counter to U.S...
...At the same time, efforts to improve governance and promote economic development must continue...
...In September, when reports surfaced of preliminary talks between Taliban leaders and Karzai, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell threw cold water on the potential breakthrough, saying, "The secretary of defense believes we still need to make more progress with regards to security on the ground...
...and NATO attacks will not seriously weaken the insurgency, particularly as it continues to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan...
...Perhaps more effective would be an effort to ensure that Afghan civil society groups have a seat at the table during any peace negotiations so that their voices are heard...
...At the very least, they should take steps to seed the ground for such a possibility Political Reconciliation Political reconciliation in Afghanistan will not be easy to achieve...
...and working with India to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan, while at the same time minimizing its influence in the country's affairs...
...Winning" in Afghanistan is no longer in the cards, if it ever was...
...The potential for civil war over a political arrangement between Karzai and the Taliban, while unlikely, is still a possibility...
...In the once-peaceful North, ANSO reports that a third of the region's provinces have had significant jumps in violence...
...Osama bin Laden and many of his top lieutenants were cornered at the cave complex along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, but were able to escape to safe havens in Pakistan—a failure that, according to a recent Senate report, laid "the foundation for today's protracted Afghan insurgency and inflame[ed] the internal strife now endangering Pakistan...
...support for a civilian nuclear initiative could go a long way toward ensuring greater Pakistani cooperation on issues related to Afghanistan...
...That begins with laying the groundwork for a political strategy to spur reconciliation between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents...
...The Taliban insurgency has gained momentum across the country at the same time that falling support for the war at home will constrain the president's ability to sustain a long-term military commitment...
...The United States needs to empower the former group but risks emboldening the latter, who will ask why the Taliban should trust the Americans and enter into negotiations when they are regularly being pounded by U.S...
...interests, which should be focused on disengaging from the conflict...
Vol. 58 • January 2011 • No. 1
