Symposium

...military capabilities, regional influence, and diplomatic leverage are effectively reduced by the grinding conflict in Iraq, making the prospect of a second simultaneous conflagration in the Middle East both politically and militarily untenable...

...arrogance and intransigence...

...By talking to Tehran now, Washington can pave the way for both domestic and international support in the event that the time for talks ultimately runs out...

...If talks prove unproductive, having done its part and made a genuine attempt at fruitful discussions, the United States is justified in walking away...

...THE PROSPECT of a nuclear-armed Iran— bent on regional domination, aggressive toward Israel, and hostile to the United States—is as serious a threat as the United States has confronted in recent decades...

...The United States would not need to change its position on the acceptability of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, but rather agree simply to meet with no strings attached or concessions implied...

...Although the Bush administration has on occasion resisted direct talks, claiming that they risk undermining multiparty negotiations underway, there's no contradiction between bilateral talks and multilateral diplomacy...

...UN representatives spend much of their time in one-on-one discussions with other delegations...

...policy is that as long as Tehran declines to suspend uranium enrichment, direct talks are off-limits...

...There's also little to suggest that direct talks between countries with competing worldviews and strategic objectives will bear fruit...

...The reasons for spurning face-to-face negotiations are clear enough...

...A blanket policy of willingness to meet bilaterally with any nation and without preconditions would blunt the perception that, in particular situations, willingness to talk reflects a weakening of the U.S...

...Because of their freewheeling and private character, such sessions can jostle loose ostensibly rigid positions...

...After the intelligence failure in Iraq, standards of proof are high, and policymakers in Washington and in capitals abroad will demand more certainty before taking aggressive action...

...For now, containing the threat posed by Iran will center on diplomatic measures aimed at dissuading the Iranian regime from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, sustaining international unity in opposition to Tehran's weapons program, and preventing escalation of the conflict to a point where force is the sole remaining option...

...position...

...A reversal of this policy would yield the opposite effect—countering perceptions of U.S...

...Estimates differ and are inconclusive...

...All effective multilateral negotiation processes are filled with bilateral sidebars, where much of the hard work happens...

...Second, U.S...

...50 n DISSENT / Winter 2007...

...Ahmadinejad seems bent on positioning Iran as a power with global stature, and going toe-to-toe with Washington could advance that aspiration...

...Rather than singling out Iran, this should be done as part of a broader shift toward willingness to talk to just about any nation on matters of mutual concern...

...Agreeing to talk does not mean agreeing to talk endlessly...

...In this context, questions will arise about whether Washington is right to refuse direct talks with the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad...

...DISSENT / Winter 2007 n 49 IRAN Although talking to Tehran will not end the brewing nuclear standoff, it could advance Washington's goal of keeping a lid on it long enough for more appealing policy alternatives to ripen...

...For at least two key reasons, that threat will not be directly confronted with force in the short term...

...The policy will amount to a carefully calibrated, hands-on holding pattern designed to draw out the problem to a point where it can be solved diplomatically and politically or where circumstances have changed to make the use of force feasible...

...Assuming Iran marches toward nuclear weapons development, but confrontation is deferred to a time when intelligence estimates are more conclusive and Washington is militarily and politically more up to the task of confrontation, attention at home and abroad will inevitably turn to whether means short of force were fully exhausted...

...THE CURRENT refusal of the United States to talk directly to Iran, North Korea, and others allows these regimes to paint the United States as the obstacle to diplomacy, feeding perceptions that it is unilateralist and lacks respect for the views of others...

...SUZANNE NOSSEL is a senior fellow at the Security and Peace Institute, a joint initiative of the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation, and a founder of the democracyarsenal.org weblog...

...After all, the United States and Iran do communicate regularly through foreign intermediaries and the media, such that each knows the other's bottom line...

...Even where no common ground is found, direct talks can expose vulnerabilities and motivations in ways that are easier to hide in more public forums...

...We would talk not because we thought talks would be fruitful, or because we necessarily credit what the other party would say, but rather because we followed a policy of readiness to hear others out, regardless of the repugnance of their views...

...First, there are genuine questions about how close Iran is to nuclear weapons capabilities...

...He has thumbed his nose at serious offers by the United States, Europe, China, and Russia to strike a bargain for economic and political rewards in return for nuclear safeguards...

...In engaging directly with such a leader, the United States risks dignifying and publicizing his cause...

...Talking to Tehran is neither a solution to the crisis in itself, nor is it particularly likely to lead to one...

...Ahmadinejad is a sworn enemy of Israel and a Holocaust denier...

...Current U.S...