No-win scenarios in an Indian-Pakistani war
Bajpai, Kanti
SINCE THE EVENTS of September 11, 2001, many in India have argued that if the United States can justify its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of combating terrorism, destroying...
...These options at least have the advantage of being morally justifiable because they will not target innocent civilians...
...If Indian fire is inaccurate, it risks hitting innocent civilians, which would be both morally corrosive and diplomatically counterproductive...
...India too is strong, but the question is whether or not a potentially expensive operation would serve much purpose...
...This new Indian thinking challenges the Pakistani conviction that its nuclear weapons protect it from Indian retaliation...
...But a naval blockade raises a number of difficulties...
...Grabbing and then holding a swath of territory on the Pakistani side of Kashmir or in Pakistan proper is by no means easy...
...However, these are even more dangerous and immoral ventures, and most of my critique of the lesser options will apply even more acutely to them...
...Beyond these passive defenses, the Indian army would run into Pakistan's active defenses—its armor and regular infantry units...
...Going after Pakistan militarily will either be ineffective or extremely dangerous...
...Even if this is not the case and they do exert themselves on Pakistan, they may not have much influence in a fast-deteriorating military situation...
...HOW PERSUASIVE are these Indian suppositions...
...Some reports suggest that Pakistan has the nuclear lead in terms of deliverable weapons (even though India has more fissile material...
...In any case, the Pakistanis can camouflage, harden, and move these facilities and targets, thereby rendering the Indian campaign ineffective...
...An invading Indian force would have to get past densely mined Pakistani forward positions...
...The second reason is a calculation that the nuclear powers, especially the United States, would not allow either country, but Pakistan above all, to use nuclear weapons...
...Indian special forces could attain all three, but we should be cautious...
...The bad news is that if India succeeded in making a breakthrough, Pakistan might unleash its nuclear weapons at Indian troop formations or Indian cities in order to halt Pakistan's military collapse...
...Many Indian troops are deployed for internal security duties, particularly in Kashmir and the Northeast, and it would be stretching them dangerously to draw their numbers down significantly...
...Instead of a naval campaign, India could do what it does best militarily—or at least what it is most predisposed to do—which is to go to war on land, in the plains of Punjab and Sindh...
...The general point that emerges from these thought experiments is that much may be ventured, at great risk, for very small gains...
...special- forces attacks against terrorist camps...
...Ironically, the recent American intervention in Afghanistan has freed Pakistani resources for other theaters, including Kashmir, even as Islamabad deals with domestic disturbances...
...Second, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could draw in other nuclearweapon states...
...In Kashmir, difficulties of terrain would make it a tough operation to mount and sustain...
...KANTI BAJPAI is professor of international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi...
...This sounds like an attractive option at a purely military-strategic level, but the problem with it is twofold...
...What about the various military actions to which India could resort...
...It is unlikely that Indian forces have the requisite capabilities...
...Indian units that cross the line would also run into Pakistani fire, and casualties might be heavy...
...What if Islamabad simply shrugs off the loss of territory even as it battles to get it back and continues the terrorism campaign...
...Let's look at each of the options...
...In short, the Indian attack would be a very hard slog, and the war might just turn into a stalemate marked by mutual attrition...
...The idea behind it would be, once again, to punish Pakistan for its support of terrorism and to offer it a trade—return of territory for the end of terrorism...
...Everything depends on how Pakistan perceives Indian military goals once the fighting begins...
...Indian external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha is reported to have said, "India has a much better case to go for preemptive action" against Pakistan than the United States had in Iraq...
...Contrary to what most Indians and even more foreigners imagine, India does not have a substantial lead in conventional forces on its western border...
...The capture and destruction of Indian units caught on the Pakistani side would be a public relations disaster if not a serious military reverse...
...The tide might turn in India's favor if the air force achieved a rapid and decisive victory in the skies...
...The success of remote fire of this kind, either from the air or from ground artillery, depends on intelligence and accuracy of targeting...
...And it would antagonize many of Pakistan's trading partners, including the major economic and military powers important to India...
...war on terrorism—retaliation and preemption—in South Asia...
...One way of expanding the conflict is by a naval blockade or other naval actions along the Pakistani coast...
...While there is no doubt that Pakistan does sponsor terrorism in India, the simple truth is that Pakistan is not as weak as Afghanistan or Iraq, and India is not as strong as the United States...
...And yet, Indian anger notwithstanding, military action against Pakistan would be both ineffective and dangerous...
...This would be a moral and strategic catastrophe for liberal democratic India...
...And that's the good news...
...There are probably two reasons for the new Indian thinking on limited war...
...Third, American troops on the ground in Pakistan since September 11 would be trapped in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan...
...It could become the object of international sanctions, whereas it has profited—and could profit further— if those sanctions were directed against Pakistan...
...Some military ventures will gain India little in terms of stopping terrorism even if they succeed...
...SINCE THE EVENTS of September 11, 2001, many in India have argued that if the United States can justify its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of combating terrorism, destroying weapons of mass destruction, and changing regimes, then India is justified in attacking Pakistan...
...For one thing, it could cause great suffering among Pakistani civilians...
...Finally, in regard to Pakistan, the United States and other nuclear powers do not want a Muslim state using nuclear weapons at a time when other Muslim countries are in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction...
...After all, the ultimate threat from the nuclear powers would be to do to Pakistan what India was in the process of doing anyway, namely, punishing it militarily...
...The Indian air force and army could launch a series of strikes against terrorist camps and Pakistani military targets...
...Imagine that Pakistan appeals to China for help after using nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional attack...
...In short, India would join Pakistan as a terrorist state...
...There are, roughly, seven options: fomenting terrorism in Pakistan...
...All these would be directed primarily at destroying terrorist facilities in the Pakistani side of Kashmir, thereby reducing the incidence of terrorism...
...Pakistan can only be dissuaded from continuing its subconventional warfare, in this view, by the threat of military punishment...
...A naval campaign could involve a blockade of Karachi harbor, crippling Pakistan's trade, destruction of Pakistani military and merchant shipping, and destruction of the Gwadar naval base, which the Pakistanis are currently expanding (with Chinese help...
...These include hot pursuit, special-forces raids, and air and artillery strikes...
...Faced with the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia, they might choose to wash their hands of both India and Pakistan and bend their energies to avoid being dragged into the conflict...
...In Pakistan proper, the prospects are even more daunting, as the Pakistani forces are much stronger there, with considerable armor to back them...
...Surely Washington must do everything it can to avoid such a situation, including stopping Pakistan from starting a nuclear crisis in the first place...
...If it concludes that Indian objectives go beyond mere punishment, it might well feel that it has to use nuclear weapons, that it is better to go down fighting than to surrender or be conquered...
...Few people, however, would predict that this could be achieved...
...Is there any reason to believe that Pakistani leaders today are more sensitive to internal violence than they were in the past...
...and a serious military push into Pakistani territory...
...Others could gain it a lot but have little chance of success...
...The Indian army combined with the air force could invade Punjab or Sindh or both in the kind of "final conflict" that the Indian prime minister frighteningly referred to in one of his speeches during the crisis of 2002...
...First, the nuclear powers are determined to preserve the nuclear taboo and in particular to stop anyone outside the nuclear five (the United States, United Kingdom, DISSENT / Summer 2003 n 23 POLITICS ABROAD France, Russia, and China) from using nuclear weapons...
...But these attacks probably would not achieve a great deal...
...India signaled the possibility of naval operations when it sent a flotilla of ships into the Arabian Sea in the summer of 2002...
...India would then be faced with the choice of calling off the pursuit or escalating the engagement...
...This is the only way, they believe, to respond to Pakistan's strategy of sub-conventional war fare—terrorism, and, as in 1999, incursions across the line of control in Kashmir...
...The costs of war would probably be much greater than the costs of the uneasy, flawed, and vio POLITICS ABROAD lent peace that exists today...
...First of all, it is unclear that India can raise the stakes at every level of violence...
...air and artillery strikes against terrorist facilities...
...As we noted earlier, Pakistan is not afraid to fight on several fronts simultaneously...
...The United States urges both China and Russia to stay out of the fight but finds that Beijing and Moscow are unable to stand on the sidelines...
...To the extent that India has the whip hand, Pakistan's threat to use nuclear weapons against a punitive Indian strike would be neutralized...
...Hot pursuit strikes would involve Indian troops' crossing the line of control in chase of terrorists...
...The most important consideration here is whether India has superiority at the nuclear level—this is essential if one is to play the game of escalation dominance...
...India would then have to decide whether to extend this kind of salami-slicing to other sectors or to expand the scale of operations...
...Moreover, and this is crucial in terms of effectiveness, one or two successes will do little to reduce the tempo of terrorism...
...If anything would truly hurt Pakistan, it is the loss of territory in its heartland...
...Indian thinking on the subject is not available in cold print but quite likely rests on the following kinds of arguments...
...Clearly, this would be unacceptable to Washington...
...Given the secrecy of the two nuclear programs, it is hard to say...
...Nor did it stop Pakistan from prosecuting a civil war in Afghanistan and from ousting the Soviet forces...
...Whatever the truth of these reports, Indian nuclear superiority is not an established fact...
...They depend, critically, on surprise, stealth, and speed...
...An attack against 26 n DISSENT / Summer 2003 Gwadar is much more attractive, but how would that work to stop Pakistan's terror campaign...
...it is also an issue of statecraft...
...Air and artillery fire against the terrorist camps or even against Pakistani military units is another plausible option...
...A large Indian naval presence over a long period of time would get in the way of the American fleet that is positioned in the area as part of the campaign in Afghanistan...
...In the history of warfare, the number of special operations that have gone wrong may well outnumber the ones that have succeeded...
...Ever since the Kargil War of 1999, influential Indian strategists have argued that India should be prepared to fight "limited war under nuclear conditions," that is, military operations of a limited conventional nature...
...Next, there would be canals and ditches, and, most likely, more mines...
...hot pursuit of terrorists...
...Satellite imagery, air reconnaissance, specialized radar, modern locating systems, and precision-guided munitions are just some of the requisites for a bombardment campaign against terrorist facilities and Pakistani military targets...
...Ethno-religious violence in Pakistan has been ferocious since at least the 1980s, and no province and city has been left unscathed...
...Each of these, too, is fraught with risks...
...The massacre of more than twenty Hindu men, women, and children in Nadimarg, Kashmir, in late March 2003, renewed calls for sterner action against Pakistan...
...A country, and a government, that thinks it is on the verge of dismemberment and defeat is not likely to be swayed by threats from the international community...
...Faced with the prospect of Chinese involvement, India turns to Russia...
...For one thing, going by past experience, Pakistan is not likely to be stopped from interfer POLITICS ABROAD ing in its neighbors' affairs by its own internal instabilities...
...Indian complaints will carry little moral weight if India itself supports terrorism...
...24 n DISSENT / Summer 2003 Nor can we count on the nuclear powers' restraining Pakistan...
...Finally, a flotilla would be vulnerable to Pakistani air and naval retaliation, in particular by its submarines and the deadly Exocet and Harpoon missiles with which its ships are equipped...
...Whatever the United States can or can't, should or shouldn't, do, India's response to terrorism has to be different, and it is mere casuistry to claim that New Delhi should emulate Washington's methods...
...The first is the belief that India, with its bigger nuclear forces, has "escalation dominance" and can up the ante at every level of violence...
...The Indian air force, as also the Indian navy, could, in addition, mount strikes against other Pakistani targets— dams, cities, and military targets...
...Does India have escalation dominance, and will this stop Pakistan from using nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional strike...
...This would lead not only to diplomatic friction with the United States, but would also risk the two navies' physically blundering into one another...
...THIS IS A MILITARY fantasy at best and a nightmare at worst...
...DISSENT / Summer 2003 n 27...
...Islamabad would be dissuaded from resorting to nuclear weapons by the fear of massive retaliation...
...First, some strategists argue that India should do to Pakistan what Pakistan has been doing to it for the past fifteen years: it should encourage internal dissent and violence...
...Most of these limits apply as well to raids by special forces, which also have their own difficulties...
...Their military effectiveness, however, is questionable...
...One could argue that international pressure at such a crucial moment would only deepen Pakistan's sense of desperation and push it further toward the suicidal brink...
...But this did not stop Islamabad from mounting anti-Indian rebellions in both Punjab and Kashmir in the 1980s and 1990s...
...a naval blockade or bombardment of Pakistani ports...
...Yet others spell catastrophe...
...Furthermore, even if India has nuclear superiority, the logic of escalation dominance may be invalid—Pakistan may not be deterred from raising the level of violence...
...Finally, India could opt for a much more ambitious set of punitive actions against Pakistan: conquering and holding a slice of Pakistani territory, a naval blockade or action, and a serious military push into Pakistani Punjab DISSENT / Summer 2003 n 25 POLITICS ABROAD and Sindh...
...In the global war against terrorism, India would be part of the problem rather than part of the solution...
...Indian troops would probably kill some terrorists and temporarily destroy training and base facilities...
...The sup ply of terrorists is large enough, however, and Pakistan could rebuild and relocate the affected facilities fast enough, so that India would have to repeat the attacks, perhaps deeper into Pakistani-held territory, thus making its forces more vulnerable to counter attacks...
...A set of thought experiments will show that none of India's military options is very good...
...This list is not exhaustive...
...SECOND, AND more important, in contemplating the destabilization of Pakistan, India must consider whether such actions are compatible with its public and long-standing complaint that Pakistan is a terrorist state...
...Indian forces are deployed along the northern border with China and cannot be reduced much further in that sector...
...Destabilizing Pakistan is not just a moral issue...
...conquering and holding a slice of Pakistani territory...
...In short, there are great dangers in applying the doctrines associated with the U.S...
...Leaving aside the contentious matter of escalation dominance and the role of the nuclear powers, there is the crucial question of whether or not any kind of limited war could be effective in reducing the terrorist threat and Pakistan's support of it...
Vol. 50 • July 2003 • No. 3
