ARMS CONTROL: REALITY AND MIRAGE
Adams, Gordon
AUGUST 15, 1986 As we move toward the 1986 elections, the prospect of a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement has become simultaneously more visible and more of a mirage. The sense of progress has...
...By 1989, the visible mirage may have given us a small step toward arms control...
...The American position was volatile, moving from relatively positive signals in January 1986 (especially about European intermediate forces) to diplomatic cold shoulders to Soviet proposals that would link offensive reductions with restrictions on the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") programs and would have both nations join in the testing moratorium...
...a continued arms control stalemate will increase the pressure for further such actions over the next two years...
...The next wave is on its way...
...The ebb and flow of administration activity on arms control seems to respond more to congressional politics than to international opportunity...
...BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE "REAL" PROGRESS on arms control, however, Congress is also likely to intrude even more into the policy arena, especially if the Democrats win control of the Senate...
...The possibilities now include: An intermediate nuclear force agreement, with the U.S...
...Even these could be sidetracked or highly limited because of the influence in the Department of Defense of dedicated opponents of arms control...
...pulling out some or all of its cruise and Pershing II missiles, the French and British freezing their nuclear forces at a specified level after completion of their current modernization plans, and the Soviets withdrawing and destroying some or all of their SS-20 missiles...
...Lou Cannon, "Weinberger Warns Against SDI Tradeoff," Washington Post, July 22, 1986...
...Yet there are also strong indications that much of this apparent progress could be a mirage, with severe limits— set largely by domestic politics—on the degree to which current promises could become real agreements...
...testing of antisatellite weapons against a fixed object in space, as long as the Soviets continued their own moratorium on ASAT testing...
...The arms control agenda has not seemed so promising since "detente" in the 1970s...
...The sense of progress has been heightened by a rapid exchange of letters and public statements between President Reagan and Soviet party leader Gorbachev, by sudden U.S.–Soviet meetings on nuclear testing and the SALT II limits, and by renewed discussions about a second summit meeting...
...The White House appears increasingly concerned about what history will say of Ronald Reagan...
...compliance with SALT II...
...Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the leading administration skeptic with respect to Soviet intentions, has acknowledged that the Soviets "want and need an arms reduction agreement...
...It is unusual for the Congress to play such a role...
...The Star Wars program will be at the heart of the argument over the buildup, though support for a large SDI program is waning...
...Then talks took place over testing, SALT II, and a second summit...
...The urgent need for reform in the Soviet economy and the costs of the arms race are key elements in the Soviet desire for progress...
...Advantage, Weinberger– Perle...
...THE RECENT FLURRY of activity followed a difficult, even tendentious six months, which saw the Soviets fill airwaves, newspapers, and diplomatic in boxes with comprehensive proposals for steep reductions in offensive weapons, an extension of their testing moratorium, and calls for positive American responses to Soviet initiatives...
...Actually, prospects are modestly good for a limited agreement: on European forces and confidence building measures or on a statement of principles for a broader agreement...
...The administration may also seek to create hope about arms control during the fall 1986 electoral season...
...An agreement on conventional forces in Eu396 rope, including mutual notification and observance of troop movements or troop reductions in both alliances...
...Even General Daniel Graham, director of the pro-SDI advocacy group High Frontier, now agrees that the current Strategic Defense Initiative plan is more integral to deterrence than it is an alternative to it...
...There have been major shifts in the nature of the Star Wars program...
...In the Congress, defense budgets will be constrained (thanks to $640 toilet seats and the federal deficit), but the strategic buildup will not slow appreciably...
...Both sides appear to have left plenty of room for negotiation and lots of things to negotiate about...
...An agreement on chemical weapons dealing with verification of the destruction of existing stocks or even prohibiting new production and deployment...
...The current U.S...
...Such efforts were mounted in 1986 on a testing moratorium and on staying within the SALT II limits...
...Genuine arms control remains hostage to internal politics in the Reagan administration...
...As debate over the defense budget in Congress rolled into high gear, however, the administration's policies turned more positive, with welcoming presidential rhetoric and a sudden willingness to talk with the Soviets (outside the Geneva framework) on testing and SALT II...
...One step forward and one step back, the protagonists have danced around a genuine negotiation...
...In 1985, Congress legislated a moratorium on U.S...
...A general agreement on offensive forces, with both sides cutting their land-based missile forces and agreeing to restrain new sea-based forces...
...There are significant underlying reasons for this change: • Clearly the Soviets are anxious to cut a deal...
...When Gorbachev proposed a comprehensive package in January 1986, the initial American response looked open...
...It will also have left us with less security at the level of strategic nuclear arms than we had at the start of the decade and a far more complex arms control problem for the next administration...
...The Star Wars program continues, in any case, to drive the arms race, with the Soviets adding warheads and systems to foil that defense, as the U.S...
...398...
...will do in return...
...agenda for the talks on testing did not include a test ban, it focused on verification of ongoing tests and tying reduced testing to deep cuts in offensive weapons, further delaying the testing issue...
...program is now virtually complete: B-1 bombers, air-launched cruise missiles on B-52 bombers, the Trident I submarines and missiles, the first fifty MX missiles in silos, and sea-launched cruise missiles aboard Navy vessels...
...Technologies that emphasize early interception of adversary missiles are slowly being superseded by an emphasis on technologies that are ground-based and designed for terminal interception...
...With only two more years to go, the desire to leave a presidential legacy of peacemaking seems to be growing...
...While the U.S.–Soviet arms control agenda is full, so are their strategic arsenals, in fact, increasingly so...
...Advantage, Shultz–Nitze...
...position leading to the end of U.S...
...Each step toward progress, moreover, contains a poison pill: the U.S...
...Arms control is not the leading issue in 1986, but with the control of the Senate hanging in the balance, the administration scarcely wants to let the Democrats seize this issue to advantage...
...Was it accidental that the administration agreed to discuss SALT II, testing, and the link between offensive reductions and Star Wars just as amendments and funding in the defense budget relating to these questions were being debated in Congress...
...WILL THE "VISIBLE MIRAGE" bring us arms control...
...An even broader agreement, in which deep offensive reductions are tied to restraints on strategic defenses—limits on research and development, mutual acceptance of a limited interpretation of the 1972 ABM treaty (with revisions), and/or an agreement to abide by that treaty for some time into the future...
...What was once Strobe Talbott's "war of the two Richards" (Perle v. Burt) has become the Weinberger (and Perle) v. Shultz (and Nitze) war...
...behind the scenes its opponents worked to toughen the U.S...
...Finally, the Paul Nitze rationale for SDI (that it must be "cost effective at the margin," i.e., the Soviets should not be able to overcome SDI more cheaply than it costs to build and deploy the system) is being replaced by an "affordability" doctrine (that we should build what 397 we can "afford," whatever the cost to the Soviets of overcoming it...
...strategic programs have been the first priority of the Weinberger budgets: stealth bombers, the Midgetman missile, a new air-launched cruise missile, the Trident II sub and missile, and, above all, the Star Wars program...
...The astrodome rationale has begun to erode and is being replaced by a site defense argument, which is an integral part of counterforce and deterrence thinking...
Vol. 33 • September 1986 • No. 4
