THE FUTURE OF THE POLISH WINTER

...Could the Soviet Union permit such a solution...

...politics is more complicated than this alternative suggests...

...Was there, theoretically, any possible agreement and community of interests among these three actors...

...The French example demonstrates that a counterrevolutionary regime necessarily introduces some of the same changes that had been demanded by the revolutionaries, although in a milder form and without a populist, grass-roots input...

...hence an unusual liberalism (compared to the neighboring Communist countries and also to the prerevolutionary era) in such areas as the press and publications...

...So we come to the third actor: Solidarity...

...The internal logic of this process will generate restraints upon the scope of political power...

...But there are no good reasons to think that the party will always be hostile to limited democracy...

...No rational analysis can ignore this reality: now and for the foreseeable future the U.S.S.R...

...Or it could mean at least more independence for particular enterprises and a relaxation of the party's grip on the economy...

...By the same token, the interest of Solidarity did not lie in a total incapacitation of the party...

...The great majority of Poles were neither cynics nor madmen...

...Yet this reality does not necessarily mean that the revolution was from the beginning doomed to failure...

...Martial law brought an end to such hopes...

...The 16 months of revolutionary euphoria in Poland—sandwiched between the Gdansk accords of August 31, 1980 that gave rise to the first independent trade unions in a Communist country and the proclamation of martial law on December 13, 1981—seem now a long, long time ago...

...And Solidarity, with the self-reinforcing mechanism of escalating demands, could not as it seemed (and did not want to) slow down the revolutionary process...

...So, at this stage, no one was in control...

...The tragedy of Poland lies in the fact that it could not go all the way, either...

...Perhaps my speculations are based on a primary error: the assumption that a revolution can limit itself...

...and the Soviet Union, which considers Poland one of its satellites, but also allows it some degree of autonomy...

...The Communist system leads to a merging of economic and political arenas...

...It may help us to answer the question, What went wrong...

...Now if the present counterrevolutionary government in Poland perceives this fundamental threat to the system, it will be bound to try to disconnect politics and economics...

...And it is a judgment of its objective interest rather than its good will that constitutes the source of my qualified optimism...

...The feeling that deep structural reforms of the economy are necessary is very widespread, and even if these are merely bureaucratic, sooner or later they must bring some modernization to the economy...

...Were this to happen, it would be the long-term result of the workers' revolution of 1980-81...

...But—apart from the romantic view that any revolt against oppression is justified regardless of its chances of success and the cynical view that Polish turmoil might be useful in the struggle of the superpowers—was there any room for a view at once constructive and realistic...

...After the French Revolution came the counterrevolution of the Thermidor, which opened the way for Napoleon, and he, in turn, blazed the way first for a restored and then for a constitutional monarchy...

...The condition of success was that each of our three main actors would see at least some self-interest in maintaining, or at least in tolerating, a freer society...

...From among the many projects that emerged in Poland, the limited-democratic scenario seems to have been the most viable one...

...from now on, nothing will be as it was...

...There were many ways in which Polish life could deteriorate dramatically as a result of a more extensive Sovietization...

...Not because the party was so powerful...

...this sense of freedom is one of the victories of Solidarity...

...Hence the major threat is seen as marches, rallies, underground union activities, and so on, rather than oppositional intellectual activities...

...It enjoys a certain autonomy in fields that are of vital importance for the everyday life of Poles...

...There are those who never doubted that the end would come, in the form of either internal repression or Soviet intervention...

...But errors in predictions may be instructive...

...what it wants is not to be challenged openly...

...This is the case, in particular, with the intellectuals...

...Poles "on the street" are preoccupied with everyday problems of survival in the face of an economic crisis without precedent in modern European history...

...It is more Machiavellian than Stalinist in that it avoids random terror (with few exceptions...

...But even he, with his charisma and political skills, and with the strong backing of the church, could no longer control the movement's development...

...To begin with, there were significant groups in the Polish party that supported a limited democratization...

...People are no longer afraid of speaking against the government...

...In practical terms, this could mean a reprivatization of some industry (which in Poland is unlikely, although a NEP-like program for small industry is not to be excluded...

...They believed that, behind the convulsive struggle between Solidarity and the Polish Communist party, the pattern of a new society was emerging that would ultimately be acceptable to the Soviet Union and would at the same time be recognized as democratic by the Poles themselves...

...The party could not give what it did not have in the first place...

...They operate in a new stage of historical development...

...The party's orthodoxy considered the reformists as traitors, while Solidarity treated the entire party indiscriminately as its enemy and did not want to negotiate with any of its segments...

...True, it would have to pay a heavy price in terms of lost privileges, but it would gain, for the first time, some legitimacy...

...Solidarity, expressing the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Poles...

...and this in turn requires limiting the power of the party...

...The scope of autonomy may be broadened if the Soviets do not perceive it as a direct threat—vide political freedom in Finland or economic reform in Hungary...

...So aren't we now in a deadlock—if the party stays, there is no democracy, while if the party goes, the Soviet Union comes...

...By this I mean that it takes only the measures necessary for its main good, which is to prevent future revolutionary changes, rather than to reshape society in behalf of an ideology...

...It is by no means certain that Jaruzelski's group will continue its pragmatic line (so far, it has been very inconsistent, in this regard anyway, and some of its repressive actions contradict my analysis...

...The gains of the Polish August and of 1981, without precedent in Communist history, would constitute in themselves a magnificent progress...

...This was not possible in any case, because the Soviet Union could prevent it...

...The party reformists found themselves in a vacuum...

...The claim that the achievements of 1980 could not be maintained because they did not fit the Communist model disregards the fact that there already were, and had been for decades, things in Polish society that did not fit the Communist model...

...This required a lot of good will on the part of the Soviet Union and the Polish CP—and they did not display this good will...

...It is simply not true that, since Poland was to some extent under Soviet control, any change could only be for the better...

...But what about the Polish Communists...

...It only imposed constraints on how far it could go...

...Cromwell's Revolution was followed by Charles II and James II, but they, historically, opened the way to the Glorious Revolution and parliamentary government...

...The collapse of the party would lead inevitably to military intervention...

...Re-Stalinization would necessarily provoke a new revolutionary spasm sooner or later...

...It knows that it can't be loved...

...The reason why industrial conflict in Poland is so crucial is clear: any 86 industrial conflict automatically becomes a conflict with the system of political power...

...they would not challenge the basic foreign policy dictated by the strategic division of Europe...

...It envisaged a social contract between the Communist party and all the other social forces —such as independent trade unions, professional organizations, local associations, factory self-management councils...

...But if Soviet leaders concluded that there was no other way in which Poland would be (a) controlled by the Communists with regard to the main strategic aspects of power, and (b) remain a relatively stable country, then it is likely that they would have accepted the new situation...

...in 1981 the party was weak, disintegrated, humiliated...

...Is everything lost...

...If anyone doubts this, he need only compare Poland with Lithuania, the Ukraine, or even Czechoslovakia and East Germany...

...A considerable degree of academic and cultural freedom, frequent contacts with the West, a powerful church enjoying broad liberty of religious activities, private agriculture—these features do not fit the classical model of a Communist society...

...And to consider the chances of future democratization in Poland...

...has the means and the will to control the situation in Poland—at least to some extent...

...It could not give up power since it held power because of Soviet domination and not because of a popular vote...

...Counterrevolutionaries are usually no fools: they realize that what has happened cannot be undone...

...The party would have a dominant role in Parliament and government (thus, restraints on democratic elections) but this would be limited to certain areas, in particular foreign policy and military strategy...

...Not really...

...I believe that, rationally speaking, it could, although certainly with little satisfaction on its part...

...The political system, in which the party would dominate (owing to geopolitical requirements), would be surrounded and controlled by a network of independent organizations with an important say on relevant social issues...

...We know that Lech Walesa was critical of the radical strategy of challenging the government and that he urged Solidarity in late 1981 to slow down the escalation of its demands...

...From what I have said it is clear that the objective interest of Solidarity did not lie in a total collapse of Communist rule in Poland...

...They could be preserved, I believe, so long as none of the three actors perceived them as a threat to its very existence...

...Nevertheless, some transformations are now irreversible...

...No wonder...

...There were a lot of things that could have been gained after August 1980 (and actually were gained), but there were also a lot of things that could have been lost...

...no authoritarian regime abandons its power and privileges out of good will...

...On the contrary...

...A complex system of guarantees would be worked out: guarantees for the society that the party would not abuse its role by trying to restrict liberty of association, personal freedoms, and so on, and guarantees that a more democratic Poland would not constitute a threat to what the Soviet Union considers its strategic interests in Europe...

...The record of the post-martial-law period suggests that the government of General Jaruzelski is more pragmatic than ideological...

...The social unrest that proved to be fatal to the successive regimes of Bierut, Gomulka, and Gierek had its source in the working class of the shipyards, mines, and factories of Silesia, Gdansk, Poznan, and so on...

...Each would be happy with the destruction of the other, and that was what, at the end, the party achieved...

...This pragmatism dictates a deliberate "divide and rule" policy, which entails some concessions to groups that are perceived as particularly influential and not too dangerous...

...This was possible, but it would only serve to warn the Soviet Union that it had to intervene more directly since it could no longer rely on its comrades in Poland...

...Russia will therefore have to tolerate, sooner or later, a more liberal system of government in Poland...

...Judging by the present public mood in Poland, this does not seem imminent...

...they fail to turn back the clock of history...

...And, finally, Solidarity's interest did not lie in removing all power from the party through, say, democratic elections...

...Some skeptics advocated antigovernment actions even without believing they would bring any positive transformation...

...The two domestic actors, Solidarity and the party, were in direct opposition...

...Realists" say the catastrophe was inevitable...

...There are limits to the Soviets' tolerance for experiments in their zone of control, but these are not fixed forever...

...It also explains why it was important to avoid any pretext that would allow the Soviet Union to intervene militarily...

...And, let me stress, this development was to a large degree provoked by the party, which, after the purge of its own reformists, took a more and more negative attitude toward Solidarity, refusing to consider seriously any political reforms, including those concerning the mass media, local councils, social control over the national economy...

...Millions of Poles, involved in the great movement of Solidarity, believed that a compromise between democratic aspiration and realpolitik was possible...

...all it could do was to say "no...

...It counts on quiet resignation while representing itself as the "lesser evil...

...On the side of hope, the present counterrevolutionary regime will have to introduce economic reforms if it wants to avoid future revolutionary outbursts...

...This applies both to the spontaneously established structures of rank-and-file members and to some local leaders (in Gdansk, Poznan, and Cracow...

...The events of 1981 did not develop in accord with this limited-democracy scenario...

...Another great achievement of the revolution of August 1980: fear of the authorities, so paralyzing before 1980, is no longer there...

...And a further achievement: the Soviet Union is probably persuaded once and for all that Poland cannot be governed by the same authoritarian means as the Soviet Union itself...

...Still, the greatest obstacle to a future democratization of Poland may come from social apathy...

...It follows Machiavelli's recommendations to the Prince about the selective, purposeful, and concentrated use of repression...

...I, for one, believed that this scenario was the only viable option for democratic transformation in Po83 land...

...This, in turn, offers a chance of liberating gradually some social space from direct political control...

...If it were to force the party to give up some of its power and at the same time convince it that its existence was not threatened, Solidarity had to be very patient, keenly aware of the ways in which its interests were coupled with the existence of the party...

...General Jaruzelski can suppress the opposition, disband free trade unions, and eliminate freedom of the press...

...The party was weak...

...But this point works both ways...

...but he will not be able to restore totally the situation before 1980...

...Today the Poles are told that they have to learn to "live with reality" and that the Solidarity period was just a dream, beautiful but unreal, like all dreams...

...At first blush, the answer would be no...

...These reforms will require decentralization and, hence, relaxation of party control over the economy and society...

...These groups were ultimately defeated because they found no social 84 support...

...Was it doomed to failure...

...The Polish revolutionary situation involved, roughly, three main actors: the party, representing the power elite of Poland...

...Skeptics outside Poland who supported Solidarity but doubted its chances of success perceived it as one more asset in the global confrontation with the Soviet Union...

...The counterrevolutionary government is a mixed bag of dangers and hopes...

...They argued that any protest movement, even if doomed to failure, was important for keeping the Polish spirit alive, in the tradition of the great uprisings of the 19th century...

...it becomes nervous when people take to the streets...

...But the leaders of the underground, dissenting intellectuals, and also observers abroad who had watched Solidarity with sympathy ask themselves: Could it have worked at all...

...I hope that this is the case with the Polish 85 counterrevolution too...

...Nor is it certain that the political elite will resist the temptation of reStalinization—an option that, in the long run, would be contrary to its rational self-interest...

...For it would be a condition of the social contract that none of the main actors would aim at the total destruction of the other...

...Could Poland gain the degree of freedom that I have sketched out above...

...Perhaps this is what any revolution is about: it cannot stop half-way...

...If, however, the government chooses to follow the policy of counterrevolutionary pragmatism, then a process of decentralization, disconnecting the economy from politics, seems the only viable option...

...It helps us understand the hypothetical conditions of success for the Polish revolution, and also the sources of its ultimate defeat...

...If not, what went wrong...

...The major reason is that the goal of the Polish elite—to prevent social unrest—is inherently linked to decentralizing and "depoliticizing" the economy...

...If Poland is not a sovereign nation, still, it is a nation...

...A good deal of progress in history comes through unsuccessful revolutions and through counterrevolutions that are, in a sense, also unsuccessful...

...This is perhaps a characteristic of the military mentality: significance is attached only to external manifestations of ideas, not to ideas themselves...

...After all, with China, Afghanistan, ethnic problems at home, leadership transitions, and permanent economic disaster, troubles in Poland are the last thing they want...

...Among the most important dangers, there is the prospect of social disintegration, the loss of the new solidarity generated by Solidarity...

...Now we know that the three actors did not meet on common ground...

...Limited democracy would protect the Communists against cyclical waves of social unrest...

...The party could destroy Solidarity, but Solidarity could not destroy the party...

...Major achievements of the Polish August have been lost (free trade unions, autonomous universities, the emerging self-management of enterprises, and more...

...This will happen not merely because any economic reform in Poland will tend to follow the Hungarian (market) model...

...But the party could not be destroyed for the simple reason that its rule was backed by Soviet domination...

...Where power over the worker is not merely economic but also political, the workers' protest is inevitably directed against the political system...

...The regime is nonideological also in that it is not very interested in what people think and say...