Missile Control-Hope or Chimera?

...These new weapons, once produced and deployed, would also mean a destabilizing of the nuclear power position of both the United States and the Soviet Union...

...are now prepared to enter into arms-control negotiations on the premise that the outlook for success is greatest when the parties are in relative balance...

...policy had been directed to amassing majorities to prevent the Soviet Union from winning political victories...

...The nonproliferation treaty is to some extent an example of the first type—limiting the part of the world where nuclear weapons can be produced or possessed...

...T T HE UNITED STATES possesses 1,710 longrange land-based and sea-based offensive missiles...

...But if members of Congres are beginning to consider a freeze on the further production and deployment of MIRV's and Poseidon, with the consequent threat to Air Force and Navy interests, the debate is likely to change...

...arms control is a delicate issue of national security, and there are many agencies in the executive branch of government which must participate in its formulation...

...The failure to hold United States-Soviet missile talks between September 1968 and January 1969 is not only unfortunate...

...and Soviet military officials, so that the level of confidence gained at the diplomatic and scientific levels might in time be transferred to the military sphere...

...Although the opposition to the ABM lost each time, an important educational process continued to spread doubts about the wisdom of going ahead with deployment plans...

...I I N LATE 1966 the United States suggested to the Soviet Union that negotiations begin on limiting the deployment of antiballistic missiles...

...The MIRV's (technically the initials stand for multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles) might contain many individual warheads to be sent en masse on a mission of destruction...

...policy toward the Soviet Union, it probably bodes well for the potential success not only for arms control negotiations but also for talks in the political realm, despite the be moaning of this development by some pes simists and strong anti-Communists...

...In the Soviet Union there is an unmistakable interest in a mutual slowing-down of the arms race...

...If the deployment freeze includes a freeze on the number of ballistic missiles on submarines, the satellite inspection system may have to be supplemented by other verification measures, perhaps by some kind of reporting system as to the number, size, and approximate location of submarines...

...For example, it would be desirable if the freeze could go into effect before there is further deployment of ABM's on both sides, before the United States moves ahead of the Soviet Union in the strategic offensive field by deploying BETTY GOETZ LALL MIRV's, and before the Soviet Union goes too far in perfecting its fractional orbitingbomb system whereby missiles can be placed in orbit briefly and then released to descend down to earth on a mission of destruction...

...Both the United States and the Soviet Union talk (but do not yet act) as though they want to negotiate limitations on strategic offensive and defensive weapons...

...Executive branch...

...The Congressional challenge of the proposed antiballistic missile system was undertaken on several occasions during 1968 when various appropriation bills came before Senate...

...Once it was decided not to negotiate until after the change in administrations, the result was certain to be a protracted delay...

...now, for the first time since World War II a possible majority in Congress may be urging the Administration to go slowly in deploying a new weapons system, partly because this may endanger forthcoming arms control negotiations...

...There is great urgency for a favorable conclusion of the negotiations...

...they are mainly the MIRV's, a nuclear warhead with multiple nuclear explosive parts, each being targeted separately...

...A simple freeze on deployment can be verified without undue intrusion on Soviet or U.S...

...Verification by satellite may be sufficient, but in this case the Executive branch will have to release more information than it has to date about the capbility of the U.S...

...For such an agreement the verification requirements would be greater, and the on-site inspection problem might again emerge...

...plus about 500 long-range bombers...

...The various treaties designating Antarctica a weapons-free area and stipulating that no weapons of mass destruction be stationed in outer space are examples of arms control before weapons have been installed...

...And his industrial superior and his military clients in the Pentagon urge him to use his creative talents lest the U.S...

...The partial test-ban treaty is an example of another successful type of agreement, in which the major powers have exhausted most of the benefits they can derive from the acts to be controlled by agreement, and hence they are prepared to stabilize development in the area...

...the ABM is its only important strategic mission...

...For example, it took from 1958 to 1963 to negotiate the partial testban treaty, and from 1962 to 1968 to negotiate the nonproliferation treaty...

...others are payload of the delivery vehicle, its accuracy in landing on target, avoidance of defensive missiles by means of penetration aids and other devices, and the density and location of population and industrial facilities...

...In the past, both sides usually approached negotiations so differently that months and years went by before the positions narrowed sufficiently to permit serious negotiations...

...Numbers are but one factor in the strategic balance...

...This meeting was to take place in late August 1968, but on August 21, 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, producing a convulsive reaction throughout the world...

...Obviously, President Nixon and his new appointees want to develop their own position, and this means that the whole internal negotiating process within the government has had to be cranked into motion once again, so as to reach a new consensus on a negotiating position...

...The Air Force, with its large numbers of strategic offensive weapons (the Minutemen particularly and its proposed modernization program to equip them with MIRV's), and the Navy, with its several hundred Polaris missiles which now are being replaced with Poseidon missiles (similar to MIRV's) are not in the forefront of the ABM struggle...

...Unofficially, at Pugwash (the conference of scientists held once or twice a year with physical, biological, and social scientists from the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries), Soviet scientists said this was an interesting proposal but that the time was not yet ripe for negotiation...

...They seem content to leave the publicizing of such information up to U.S...

...He shifted from defense of cities to defense of offensive land-based strategic weapons, but his statement implied a slower pace of deployment around missile sites than the previously projected pace around cities...

...Since it may take three to seven years, at a rough estimate, before weapons conceived become weapons deployed, the development process goes ahead almost without regard to the political and military situation of any given moment...

...seem to desire the same type of agreement in limiting the arms race...

...The most interesting question in this discussion is whether the U.S...

...Deterrence is now based on the United States' ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even after absorbing a first strike...

...neither can destroy the other without itself being destroyed...

...The Pentagon is not united in wishing to preserve the ABM...

...Each side has enough power to destroy most of the population and industrial capacity of the other, even after absorbing a first strike by the other on its own territory...

...For once weapons are developed and money has been invested in their eventual production and deployment, it is immensely difficult to halt or subject them to negotiation in an arms-control agreement...

...Finally, the proposed treaty under discussion at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference to prohibit mass-destruction weapons in the sea bed is an attempt to remove another environment from the arms race...

...No sooner has one weapons system been placed into production when others appear on the drawing boards of military and industrial developers...

...The Senators also are reluctant to pay the multiple billion-dollar cost of the system, particularly in view of its questionable effectiveness...

...For the next few years, U.S...

...Finally, and perhaps most important, to deploy the Sentinel system during negotiations for a freeze in deployment may jeopardize prospects for agreement...

...For, even while they continue, both sides are likely to pursue their weapons development programs and if one side gains an advantage this could endanger the success of even continuance of the negotiations...

...In this sense, the arms race would go on...

...IN 1964, AT A TIME when disarmament negotiations between the two superpowers were all but dead, the United States proposed a freeze on the production and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missiles (long-range bombers, long-range land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and antiballistic missiles) . The freeze was intended by the U.S...

...The widespread opposition to seeing the Executive branch go ahead with further preparations for the deployment of a so-called thin antiballistic missile system, the Sentinel, is an example of the change in Congressional attitudes...

...They look for improvements in accuracy, in destructive capacity relative to weight of warhead, and in ability to penetrate another nation's defenses...

...To bring this about, the government will have to revise its present strategy of deterrence...

...and the U.S.S.R...

...Such discussions must be carefully prepared...

...but the difficulty their position presents lies in their refusal to release information on the progress of BETTY GOETZ LALL their own system...

...The spirit of such an arms-control agreement as I have described, however, should pave the way for a production freeze and later an attempt to reduce the number of strategic missiles on both sides...

...If this were so, it would indicate another departure from past policy...

...An arms-control agreement would attempt to freeze the strategic "balance...

...proposal...

...Previously, the United States had proceeded from the premise that it must have a clear superiority of military power before it can enter into negotiations and expect success from them...

...But before improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union reach this point, there is likely to be ample time for decisions about deploying such an ABM system...

...but he was subjected to tremendous pressure, evidently from Western European capitals, to postpone a Summit...

...It could be tragic...

...After having weathered over the past seven years several serious confrontations with the United States on four continents, there is now a recognition at some high Soviet policy levels that it is in the long-range interest of the Soviet Union to evolve peaceful relations with the United States...

...and the U.S.S.R...

...By its nature, the arms race contains a certain momentum...

...and the Galosh system began in 1962 which has been slowed down...

...In the U.S...

...and in the U.S.S.R...

...What that meant was then not completely clear...

...The reluctance of the Soviet Union to accept inspection on its territory continues, and so the United States, by proposing a simple deployment freeze as a first step, may be able to avoid the requirement of on-site inspection...

...therefore, both countries are now seeking to determine whether an arms-control agreement at least to freeze deployment and perhaps production of strategic offensive and defensive weapons may be possible...

...If both sides agreed to freeze their deployment of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, this would be about the simplest kind of agreement to execute...

...It is safe to conclude that in this case, because the military stakes are high, it took a long time to develop a U.S...

...To be able to inflict such destruction on over half the population and two-thirds of the industrial capacity of the U.S.S.R., the U.S...

...Some strategic offensive weapons are in a comparable situation...

...the suggested number ranges from 100-150 strategic delivery vehicles...

...mainly the military and some in high party posts) who hold out against inspection under any conditions...

...Seldom have so many members of the Senate become so informed about a weapons system, its effectiveness, and its relationship to foreign policy, such as the potential of arms-control agreements...

...To negotiate from a comparative balance of military power rather than a position of superior military strength, could mean that the United States now accepts the Soviet Union as an equal in world politics...

...Sentinel system would have placed missiles around some 15 cities to guard against ICBM's dispatched from the Soviet Union or China, and this would be supplemented by a Spartan missile system in the outlying areas of the country to knock out incoming missiles outside the admosphere, thus preventing radioactive fallout from raining down on the local population...

...A good proportion of the Senate and a growing number in the House believe this system is certainly ineffective against the Soviet Union and possibly against China when that country may be deploying offensive missiles in the mid1.970s...

...Intelligence and the U.S...

...Since he cannot know, he goes ahead with his design...

...Another reason why at least a minimal agreement might be reachable is the change in the climate within both countries...

...Nevertheless, the U.S...

...Both the policy-makers in the U.S...

...And in the United Nations U.S...

...territory...

...These discussions were to pave the way for detailed negotiation at the ambassadorial MISSILE CONTROL—HOPE OR CHIMERA...

...Once the office of the Joint Chiefs receives a proposal, it must in turn send it for review to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and certain other special offices...

...Secretary Clifford said the Galosh had about the same capabilities as the old Nike-Zeus which was abandoned...

...This is indeed a favorable development...

...The Soviets may be right...

...and technical levels...

...However, this stability is tenuous...

...The United States responded in early 1967...

...Should subsequent agreements provide for reductions in the existing arsenal of these weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union, a point might be reached where neither side could inflict unacceptable damage because the number of weapons needed to do this would be destroyed...

...Such a process may take anywhere from a month to a year...

...Previously, the containment policy of the United States was designed to prevent the encroachment of Soviet influence anywhere in the world...

...and the U.S.S.R., the confidence gained would permit such additional arms control...

...The MISSILE CONTROL—HOPE OR CHIMERA...

...satellite inspection system...

...Deterrence against an attack is thus said to be maintained...

...No new offensive or defensive missiles could be deployed...

...The next question is whether the two nuclear giants will have the wisdom to negotiate properly with less powerful countries...

...While it is not certain that the positions of the two countries are close enough to make an agreement possible within a year or two, the need to preserve and freeze the balance before it is undone by weapons developments may act as a spur to successful negotiations...

...To summarize: if the negotiations for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapons eventually succeed, this could in turn improve the prospects for later agreements for a production stoppage and still later for reductions of stockpiles...

...fall behind the U.S.S.R., and now maybe even behind China...

...F F OR YEARS the Congress has been pictured as being against negotiating with the Soviet Union...

...Whether this is so will require careful observation of Army deployment activities...

...The Soviet Union also rejected this proposal on the ground that offensive weapons were more dangerous than defensive ones and, therefore, negotiations would have to include both types of weapons...

...Senate to consent to ratification of an arms-control treaty that does not provide for on-site inspection...

...Some Russians have gone as far as to suggest a series of meetings between U.S...

...A main reason for the present great interest today in an agreement to prevent the further production and deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABM) is that this weapons' system has not yet been produced and effectively deployed...

...But with the instability of the world political situation, it would not be at all inconceivable that a new crisis will be used by one or the other side as a pretext for postponing negotiations...

...Advocates of the ABM are seemingly assisted by pointing to the presence of some kind of an antiballistic system around Leningrad and Moscow...

...The final decision as to the content of the U.S...

...but what it probably meant—and subsequent events reinforce this interpretation— is that the Soviet Union was far behind the United States in strategic offensive missile strength (neither side had done much with the production and deployment of defensive weapons systems except in the antiaircraft field), and, when the Soviets would catch up with the United States, the time would be ripe for negotiation...

...and Soviet weapons experts affirm that a relatively stable situation has been reached...

...Once President Johnson reluctantly decided that a Summit Conference was out, he refused to sanction any meeting at a lower level...

...The United States and the Soviet Union were to begin their discussions in the form of a Summit Conference between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin in Geneva...

...NOT SINCE the early days of 1946, be fore the Cold War became a reality, has the climate for controlling the nuclear arms race been so propitious...

...negotiators to curtail the arms race and improve the climate of international relations, so that later reductions in existing stockpiles of these weapons could be realized...

...Let us recall that President Kennedy in 1961 actually entered into negotiations with the Soviets for a nuclear test-ban agreement two months after he took office...

...Each of these agencies prepares its own position on the ACDA proposal, and then negotiations within the government take place...

...President Johnson had wanted to pursue his Summit Conference regardless of the invasion, arguing that a limit on the strategic arms race was necessary despite the Soviet aggression...

...Officially, Soviet negotiators said that the proposal was not comprehensive enough (general and complete disarmament was still the goal, they argued, and at least there should be reductions in weapons if the United States was going to be allowed to send inspectors to the Soviet Union...

...The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency must devise a preliminary position, which is then sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, various State Department bureaus, the Atomic Energy Commission, the President's Science and National Security advisers, and the Central Intelligence Agency...

...gain an advantage and upset the precarious balance...

...Russians state unofficially that increased confidence between the two superpowers would help to overcome the opposition of those in the U.S.S.R...

...Today, U.S...

...But Senator Cooper, in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1969, reminded Secretary of Defense Laird that the Soviet system was not considered by U.S...

...intelligence recorded a steady build-up of Soviet offensive strategic strength, not unlike what the United States had started in 1961...

...position is made by the President...

...maintains a large fleet of relatively invulnerable strategic nuclear delivery vehicles...

...Hence, there now seems to be an opportunity for progress in this aspect of arms control before decisions become irrevocable and the momentum for deployment too powerful to stop...

...There is some faint hope that if a freeze on deployment works and if the international atmosphere is not heated up by political crises involving the U.S...

...The main advocate of ABM is the Army...

...position...

...are in a kind of strategic balance...

...military and scientific experts to be much good: that these were the ABM systems that have been deployed: the Leningrad system which has been dismantled as obsolete...

...But the Russians never warmed up to the U.S...

...The thoroughness with which senators of the opposition presented its case almost silenced those senators who advocated deployment, but a significant aspect of the latter's concern relates to the Army's effort to preserve its primary strategic mission...

...Unfortunately, President Nixon in his March 14 statement took the advice of those who feel that a complete halt in deployment plans would hurt the defensive system and would not jeopardize negotiations...

...But it is just this long lead-time, from the conception of modem weapons to their deployment on land or on submarines, which helps create the momentum of weapons deployment...

...The Soviet Union in a sense affirmed this dim view of its system when it appealed, on March 13, 1969, to the United States not to move too fast lest the U.S...

...it accepted the Soviet modification of its suggestion and was prepared to agree that both types of weapons be the subject of negotiations, but it was not until 1968 that the two countries set a date for opening negotiations...

...If these are the emerging bases of U.S...

...At the lower end of the range an argument can be made for the installation of an antiballistic missile system to protect the remaining missiles, and that such a decision would be a substitute for the present concept of deterrence...

...By now it is clear that of all the types of arms-control agreements two are the most successful—and one more so than the other...

...The most successful arms control agreement is one controlling weapons before they have been developed, or controlling a particular environment before weapons have been deployed in it...

...the Tallinin system which in the best judgment of the intelligence is not an antiballistic-missile system but an antiaircraft system...

...A simple deployment freeze would still permit research, development, and even production of strategic offensive and defensive delivery vehicles...

...a significant change of view has emerged in Congress...

...What does this apparent simultaneous willingness signify...

...There is no consensus among weapons experts as to what this level would be...

...If an expert in 1969 is exploring on his drawing board the weapons to be deployed in 1973, how can he anticipate whether the BETTY GOETZ LALL international political climate will be good or bad four years later...

...It must do this in order to persuade two-thirds of the U.S...

...The Soviet Union now has about 945 longrange offensive missiles, 125 sea-based missiles, and 150 long-range bombers...

...It is a pity that the President could not have used his statement as an opportunity to announce when his Administration would be prepared to enter into missile talks with the Russians...

...hopefully, this can be done by a watch-dog committee appointed by Congress...