Morality and War: A Reply
Levin, Leonard
In his article "Moral Judgment in Time of War" (DisSENT, May-June 1967) Michael Walzer has stated the case well for the need of a moral judgment applicable within the context of war. I...
...For a start, one could easily list three major weaknesses of rule-ethics as applied to war: (1) The same verbal rule can allow ever greater actual destruction as the technology of warfare progresses indefinitely with time...
...New rules are needed—that is clear...
...In his article "Moral Judgment in Time of War" (DisSENT, May-June 1967) Michael Walzer has stated the case well for the need of a moral judgment applicable within the context of war...
...The moment one is fighting one forgets to ask whether the war is justified, and the "morality of war" is immediately declared in effect, permitting anti-combatant violence and restricted devastation...
...On the field of battle we need rules...
...Atomistic analysis of moral situations is generally much more difficult than applying rules to them...
...I do not suggest that the general in the field be called upon to use his "moral discretion" on the spur of the moment to decide whether the defense of freedom justifies decimating another village...
...The general is understandably preoccupied with "military necessity" to the exclusion of moral considerations...
...No doubt, we can "effect present change" in this instance only by appealing to currently accepted standards of licit and illicit conduct in war...
...from another standpoint, it is an accommodation with immorality and a partial justification of it—psychologically, if not logically...
...that, however, should not preclude the other approach for the armchair strategist-judge...
...What it amounts to is that someone can be obeying a set of rules while he acts immorally, and so can avoid even the slightest feeling of guilt...
...From a certain standpoint, "morality in war" is a necessary check on man's destructive impulses...
...3) "The tensions and ambiguities implicit in the very idea of morality in the midst of war are all too easy to ignore" (Walzer's last paragraph)—and perhaps the second most destructive fallacy in history (second only to the Crusader's rationale) is to suppose that because some act is permitted by the rules of war, it is therefore right...
...I think we shall be facing that problem soon, at the rate we are going...
...And if there is, how would it apply to the problems we raise...
...Honorable is the shibboleth...
...It just happened, one got dragged in, or an "incident" exploded a tense situation into a major conflagration...
...The absurdity of this is clear—I am sure Mr...
...I think, though, that his argument is incomplete inasmuch as it concentrates on the standpoint of rule-ethics and does not explore the possibility of an approach closer to situational ethics or what I would prefer to call moral atomism...
...It is likely that with the decline of religion the consensus on rule-ethics in general is weakening considerably, though it is highly unlikely that it will ever "die...
...There is another standard—more truly moral, I would say—transcending these conventions...
...No...
...And because it "happened" that way, it is now "right" or "honorable" to kill "only" young men in uniform and not middle-aged women, for instance...
...2) Rules depend on consensus—a rule once discarded for convenience's sake (or "for necessity's sake") is dead, whereas "wanton destruction," for instance, is an objective term no matter who has practiced it or approved of it last year or before...
...I would insist, though, that only from a fundamental, atomistic moral position can we appreciate that absurdity and consider dealing with it positively...
...A more serious threat to rule-ethics in war is that the consensus is shattered once a major power or two break a rule with impunity, and then some other basis for moral condemnation must be found to avert total chaos...
...Walzer will grant this, just as I will grant that there is no ready escape from the reality of it except by total political and moral abdication...
...the other individually, by their likely concrete consequences, creative and destructive...
...Or is there...
...If any reasons are to be found for keeping the destruction at a constant level, the rules we now have can no longer provide such reasons...
...That is why we need generalized prohibitions to check certain kinds of action...
...But both the moral inspiration of these rules, and the moral deterrence which would have to restrain us until such rules are agreed upon, would have to come from a more basic notion of morality than rule-ethics provides...
...The one approach judges acts categorically by their conformity to categories or rules...
...But we must be on our guard against seeing in these rules more than there actually is...
...Did one ask before that moment whether it would be right to fight...
Vol. 14 • September 1967 • No. 5
