Just-war doctrine Why it failed in Iraq

...For while all the foregoing questions were asked in the case of Iraq, none was answered satisfactorily...

...In employing force, is there a reasonable prospect of success...

...If force is used, will it dampen the level of violence and diminish the propensity of those against whom it is used (as well as others) to engage in further aggression...

...If resort to war, therefore, promises to feed anger, resentment, and the desire for retribution, thereby precipitating higher levels of militarism, danger, violence, and destruction, it is both morally and strategically unsound...

...Do they demonstrate an adequate, if not sophisticated, understanding of the nature and uses of power (as distinct from mere force...

...It would be fatuous, of course, to suggest that not invading Iraq would have led, ipso facto, to a diminution of terrorism elsewhere...

...Since ultimate authority in a democratic republic such as ours ostensibly resides in the people acting through their elected representatives, does a presidential decision to commit troops to Iraq (or elsewhere) abetted by the acquiescence of a supine Congress that abrogates its constitutional responsibility for declaring war, constitute proper authority...

...Second, does the use of force minimize provocation and escalation...

...Gregory D. Foster is a professor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., where he previously has served as George C. Marshall Professor and J. Carl-ton Ward Distinguished Professor and Director of Research...

...The subject will not go away, but only grow in importance because of the inextricable link between moral propriety and strategic effectiveness...

...Traditionally, just-war doctrine has offered a number of familiar considerations for determining the justifiability of resorting to war and the attendant propriety of one's actions in the actual conduct of war: Is there sufficient cause to justify going to war...

...Much print and air space was given to debating the applicability of these criteria to the war in Iraq...

...So, friendly casualties on the battlefield-which have been and were expected to be small against a totally overmatched foe-become the predominant surrogate measure of success, regardless of what else is or isn't accomplished strategically...

...Thus, the principle of discrimination is a worthy ideal that has once again been lost in the "reality" of war...

...Since UN resolutions, economic sanctions, arms inspections, diplomacy, and associated forms of threat and intimidation failed to work, it is not clear whether the resort to force against Iraq was a measured last resort or an impetuous first resort...

...The speciousness of this assumption lies in the fact that deterrence, even at its cold-war conceptual zenith, was never more than an empirically suspect, imperfectly verifiable living experiment...

...policymakers today, the application of just-war doctrine warrants greater scrutiny and skepticism than ever before...

...Most discussion has tended, characteristically, to revolve around classical just-war precepts-moral injunctions that may not be up to the task of tethering the chauvinistic bellicosity of regimes such as ours...

...Is the resort to force, and the employment of particular means, proportional to the situation at hand, the stakes involved, the ends sought, and the danger or harm posed...

...Since intentions are inherently elusive and thus prime grist for government "spin," it also isn't clear whether the decision to invade Iraq-preventively or preemptively- was motivated by a legitimate desire to remove the justifying causes of the war or by less-than-legitimate ulterior motives (securing oil at the behest of moneyed political interests, seeking restitution for the lost honor of the elder President Bush, diverting attention from other pressing national issues, or bolstering presidential reelection prospects...

...Since there is much general sympathy for the view that evil (personified by the likes of Saddam Hussein) deserves no mercy, and since overwhelming force is a commonly accepted norm for waging war decisively, the principle of proportionality was as meaningless in this war as it has been in practice throughout most of modern memory...

...To wit: • Since the Bush administration invoked timeworn claims of self-defense and imminent danger to justify the war, it is important to examine Iraq's dubious ability to project force beyond its own borders, as well as the country's purely speculative links to Al Qaeda (and thus to the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on the United States...

...Does the use of force represent a last resort after all other reasonable means have been exhausted...

...We are left to ponder whether the mere presence of a tyrannical dictator (even one with hostile intentions), suspected weapons of mass destruction, and unfulfilled UN mandates constitute a truly just cause for the preemptive use of force...

...The commonplace, largely unquestioned, rationalization the Bush administration presented for attacking Iraq was that such action was necessary to deter would-be aggressors...

...Policymakers who knowingly resort to war against such foes, when the probability of disproportionate, indiscriminate retaliation is so high, are taking a morally irresponsible position that could well produce the most extreme form of injustice to one's own people...

...The views expressed here are his own.ed here are his own...

...If the possession of nuclear weapons can't deter nonnuclear aggression, why should we think high-intensity conventional warfare against other states will dissuade non-state actors (individuals and groups) from employing an almost infinite array of unconventional violence on their own terms...

...Do they possess a coherent strategic vision that frames their actions...

...Do the means employed discriminate sufficiently between combatants and noncombatants to minimize harm to the latter...

...Do they appreciate the extended, frequently hidden political, economic, and social consequences of their actions...

...The third and most important question for just-war doctrine today is this: Does the use of force minimize the prospects of retaliatory harm against one's own innocent civilians...

...It would be no less fatuous to conclude that the invasion of Iraq, in and of itself, is or will be the sole cause of future terrorist acts...

...If just-war doctrine is to play a meaningful role in the deliberations that surround such concerns, it must pose new questions that force policymakers to provide more compelling answers in justifying any future resort to war...

...Or is it likely to have the opposite effect...

...Absent such strategic acumen and the intellectual proficiency to judge and be held accountable for the larger effects and implications of military action, those at the pinnacle of power lack proper moral standing and authority to commit forces to war legitimately...

...Are they measured and rational, rather than extravagant, in allocating vital national resources...

...The Bush administration having dropped ominous hints about extending the war to Syria and Iran, ethical concerns about such behavior assume added saliency...

...The war in Iraq can only accentuate concerns about the ethics of war...

...Given the war-making penchant of U.S...

...Is the use of force backed by the right intentions...

...Since Washington's true aims in Iraq have, by political design, been vague and changing, there is no definitive way to judge success-either prospectively or retrospectively...

...Even if these well-established precepts were not fraught with ambiguity and subject to manipulation, classical just-war doctrine simply doesn't ask three crucial questions that demand to be answered in light of contemporary conditions...

...First, are the authorities charged with responsibility for committing forces to war strategically competent...

...Nonetheless, there is a convincing logic that attacks by the United States against Arabs and Muslims (provoked or not) will be seen as imperialistic arrogance run amok, will reinforce grievances (real or imagined), and will feed a persistent hunger for revenge targeted at America's most pronounced vulnerability-its civilian population...

...This latest round of analysis has only reaffirmed that these precepts, rather than offering clear guides to action (or inaction), can be vague and subject to manipulation...

...That, of course, is exactly what politicians want: to be able to proclaim success and deny failure on their own terms...

...Does the decision to resort to force emanate from proper authority...

...Is their grasp of the world cosmopolitan and global, rather than provincial and ethnocentric...

...Finally, since there is so much orchestrated hype about the supposedly pinpoint accuracy of precision-guided munitions, since there is little way to know how much an adversary has intermingled military facilities with civilian populations, and since there are no readily available independent public means of assessing civilian casualties outside government control, there is no objective basis for distinguishing discriminate from indiscriminate violence...

...More than any other consideration, this question reflects both the general nature of what has been infelicitously labeled "asymmetric warfare" and the particular foes we face and might face in the Middle East...

...If the aftermath of Iraq is representative (witness the bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco), such adversaries are not likely to engage our armed forces directly, but instead to respond in delayed, indirect fashion by undertaking or supporting future terrorist attacks on innocent civilians in the United States and abroad...