Defeat of a dictator:
Bouvier, Virginia M
EDITORIALS DEFEAT OF A DICTATOR WHY PINOCHET GOT THE NO The votes are in and the dictator lost by 43 percent to 55 percent. Nonetheless, Chilean spin specialists are trying to portray General...
...In addition, the paternalistic nature of government housing and assistance programs was often humiliating and inappropriate for recipients who were accustomed to greater participation in program design and implementation...
...VIRGINIA M. BOUVIER...
...He thought he would win...
...One such Pinochet supporter reportedly was approached to assume Fernandez's post, but declined when Pinochet told him he would not tolerate negotiations with the opposition...
...On the one hand, local authorities made no bones about lobbying openly for the "Yes" campaign-buying votes with offers of free gifts, such as rice, sugar, lodgings, transportation, and even free medical care...
...His government enjoyed a near monopoly on media, especially television, which allowed it to discredit opposition leaders, frighten viewers about a return to a dark and violent past, and publicize as real growth Chile's economic recovery from a depression in the early 1980s...
...First, it flaunted a bit too heavily an economic recovery which most Chileans feel has yet to benefit them personally...
...If Pinochet insists on being the presidential candidate, the right may present several candidates, in which case the presidency would be decided in a runoff, probably in the opposition's favor...
...But General Pinochet's military math did not work at the polls...
...It was, after all, his show...
...The No coalition has reached consensus on many key issues, while the "Yes" campaign is on the threshold of crisis...
...Only in the ninth region of Araucania did the "Yes" win decisively...
...While these issues may be put off temporarily for the sake of unity in the upcoming elections, they still require future attention...
...No Chilean political sector has the support that President Pinochet enjoys now...
...Third, the government discounted the opposition's ability to present a united front...
...As if its aggressive public relations campaign were not enough, inducements and fear were a major part of Pinochet's campaign, particularly in small rural communities...
...A return to Chile's democratic traditions is by no means secure...
...The "No" supporters, however, will also expect responsiveness to their social concerns- especially regarding human rights and the unfair distribution of economic benefits...
...The three major parties which supported Pinochet in the plebiscite, however, have split with the dictator and are calling for a new consensus candidate on the right...
...Ten of Chile's twelve largely rural regions, including the heavily militarized southern zone of Coyhaique, gave majorities to the "No" vote...
...Fourth, opposition efforts to convince voters that their ballots would be secret may have undercut threats and inducements by local government authorities, especially prevalent in the rural areas...
...in the neighboring region of Ay sen, the ' 'Yes'' squeaked by with a 49 percent to 48 percent lead...
...On October 14, leaders of the sixteen parties which formed the "No" campaign agreed to name a single presidential candidate in the multicandidate presidential and congressional elections to be held before December 1989...
...These threats were not idle...
...On the other hand, fifteen years of persistent human rights violations, even during the campaign, should have quieted the dictator's opponents...
...Minister Fernandez's reminder that the opposition vote should be divided by sixteen has its ironic twist...
...Just over half of the women voters-a key target audience for the television opted for the "No," contrary to the government's expectation that it had the women's vote in the bag...
...In addition, military and municipal authorities threatened to lay off "No" supporters from their jobs and take away their housing and food subsidies...
...Nonetheless, Chilean spin specialists are trying to portray General Augusto Pinochet's defeat in the October 5 plebiscite as a victory...
...Ricardo Lagos, head of the opposition Party for Democracy, told members of a delegation in which I participated that dozens of unionists were summarily fired after they attended a "No" rally in a small northern town...
...Chileans used the plebiscite as an opportunity to turn a fragile mechanism designed to prolong and legitimize an anachronistic dictatorship into an expression of popular will...
...Sixteen political parties, representing a wide spectrum of views, united to call for Pinochet's defeat at the polls...
...Polling data from the progovernment Center for Public Studies shows that 72 percent of the "No" voters were motivated by economic factors...
...Two small, armed guerrilla groups had declared a truce until after the referendum...
...The rest of the votes must be divided by sixteen, because the "Command for the No-Vote" included sixteen parties...
...Finally, the unprecedented voter turnout rate of 97 percent suggests that, even after fifteen years, Chileans place a high value on electoral participation...
...The government appears to have miscalculated on a number of fronts...
...Some sectors of the right are also calling for the resignation of Fernandez, who headed the "Yes" campaign...
...On national television, Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez proclaimed, "The immense majority of Chileans are with the president...
...The 1980 Constitution assures Pinochet and the military an ongoing role in national politics beyond the anticipated 1989 elections...
...Accordingly, the "No" achieved its strongest support (around 70 percent) in the poor neighborhoods of Santiago...
...Second, the government's monopoly of the media for the past fifteen years may have hit the saturation point, detracting from its effectiveness during the campaign period...
...Given all of the above factors, why then did Pinochet fail to secure a majority...
...The opposition, allotted less than seven hours' television time during the campaign, countered much of the government's propaganda with its own upbeat spots...
...39 percent by concern over human-rights violations...
...The Communist party reversed an earlier decision to boycott the general's stacked deck and was also campaigning for a "No" vote...
...Yet the "No" win may well have undercut Pinochet's civilian support base enough to secure some constitutional and political changes...
...Although he secured a surprising two-fifths of the vote, the general had pulled out the stops and failed to get enough votes to continue as president for eight more years...
Vol. 115 • November 1988 • No. 19
