Correspondence
CORRESPONDENCE ___ (Continued from page 2) 27, 1986 Interim Restraints Decision alleges that the administration views SALT II as "fit to be trampled underfoot." Not so. The problem has...
...force modernization during this period nor Soviet retirement of over a thousand missiles in order to stay within SALT limits...
...insistence on reaching parity in tested ASAT systems, that verification or definition might pose serious problems for a ban...
...But leaving aside these omissions and granting (as did our editorial) the flawed nature of SALT II, the questions remain: Would the situation have been worse without the agreement...
...is pursuing such a framework, the United States has pledged not to deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union, nor will we deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than do the Soviets...
...Will it be worse now...
...But such debate must begin with an accurate representation of the policies and the facts...
...Deployment of the Trident II SLBM is not scheduled until 1989...
...Likewise, our point about the ABM treaty's "original spirit," which was based on Schelling's account, is not rebutted by noting that, as it turned out, the defense system the treaty permitted each nation was used by the Soviets (but not by the U.S...
...Soviet violation of the crucial SALT II ban on the deployment of more than one new ICBM has exacerbated this situation...
...Our second editorial argued that the administration's announced intention to abandon SALT II was counterproductive and augured ill for arms control...
...In between these very limited strikes on our main points, Mr...
...he recognizes neither significant U.S...
...was withdrawing obsolescent ones...
...Our June 6 editorial, for example, discussed widely voiced appeals for "Rethinking Arms Control...
...The first ten MX missiles were not scheduled to become operational until late 1986...
...We could pursue other points that Mr...
...Murphy raises, about the likelihood of a negotiated deployment of SDI, for example...
...While the U.S...
...Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The editors reply: We appreciate Mr...
...We also regret, however, that in a rush to defend his agency and his administration in every particular and to discredit any source of criticism, he has skirted both the editorials' main points and the spirit in which they were written...
...It was not until six years later that we began to deploy the B-1...
...Moreover, now the opportunity exists for agreements which for the first time significantly reduce nuclear weapons...
...Indeed, one wonders how you can possibly argue that "to abandon SALT is to forsake what little restraint the superpowers have observed in respect to strategic weapons in the last decade," and that "the proof of the constraint is considerable, undeniable in terms of rocket launchers and the number of nuclear warheads alone...
...In our view, neither the MX policy nor the SDI "revolution" that the administration has launched reflects a primary concern with avoiding destabilizing systems...
...Murphy's letter, written before Reykjavik, constitutes a lawyer's brief much more than a convincing response...
...The SALT framework wasn't working...
...The U.S...
...Much of what Mr...
...systems long deployed...
...Nor were we unaware, in challenging U.S...
...We listed the bishops' letter as one among a series of pressures on this administration over the course of its first term...
...As Mr...
...If the Soviet Union will join the U.S...
...That is why the number of Soviet strategic ballistic missile warheads increased by 50 percent over that period, while the number of such U.S...
...It would be better, however, to focus on the main lines of our concern: whether the administration (or its critics, for that matter) has a coherent approach to arms control, and whether the administration, faced with real possibilities, has the will to bring them to fruition...
...Murphy ascribes to Commonweal was, in fact, a discussion of arguments made by Thomas C. Schelling, whose criticism challenged the arms control theories not only of the present administration but of the three administrations preceding it and of many peace activists as well...
...The problem has been that SALT II did not lead to mutual restraint in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but rather a massive increase in the deployment of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear systems, compared to a modest modernization of U.S...
...The U.S.," we wrote, "might argue against restricting ASATs on the basis of other reasons...
...Murphy takes issue on a number of subordinate ones...
...Murphy's narrow response is to contend that this administration, unlike its predecessors, alone escapes Schilling's strictures, a position that evidently did not convince Schelling himself, whose article in Foreign Affairs appeared in 1985...
...warheads actually declined...
...The fact that the administration urged deep cuts before the letter was actually published hardly demonstrates that the extended process of drafting the letter had no impact on the administration in other respects, nor does it rebut our real point, that the administration's pursuit of arms control has appeared uncertain apart from prodding by Congress, the freeze movement, etc...
...In the wake of Reykjavik, these questions are being asked even more widely...
...It was providing an illusion of restraint, not the reality...
...The fact that the Reagan administration has concerned itself with the character as well as the numbers of Soviet weapons falls far short of the notion of a coherent arms control policy built on "reciprocal vulnerability" that Schelling proposed and we discussed...
...Murphy knows, such appeals have been made from within as well as outside the Reagan administration...
...That is why the president has called upon the Soviets to join us in establishing a new framework of genuine mutual restraint as we attempt to negotiate an agreement...
...Murphy does not address this point...
...In contrast, Soviet production lines for stragegic weapons have remained "hot...
...delays in adding to strategic arsenals after 1979...
...signed SALT II on June 18, 1979...
...Our editorial — and the CIA — pointed out the Soviets' capacity to add warheads in the near future much more quickly than the U.S...
...His figures are selective...
...in establishing a framework of mutual restraint, and bargain constructively in Geneva, we can see this opportunity fulfilled...
...MATTHEW F. MURPHY U.S...
...Murphy replies, "the SALT framework wasn't working," and cites Soviet vigor and U.S...
...Informed debate of arms control policy is useful and even necessary...
...THE EDITORS 16 January 1987: 27...
...Overall, since 1979 under SALT II Soviet strategic warheads have almost doubled in number...
...That is why from the signing of SALT II in June 1979 to December 1982 the Soviet Union was adding stragetic weapons to its inventory while the U.S...
...Murphy's readi26: Commonweal ness to respond to our arms-control editorials, and we regret our delay in getting his response into an issue...
...he directly attributes developments to the "SALT II framework" that have independent causes...
...to defend a city...
Vol. 114 • January 1987 • No. 1
