Can we defend Europe & the Gulf with conventional arms?

...Second, efforts now underway to improve overall combat readiness should be continued...

...As a result SoViet supply arteries would be dotted with scores of choke points -- places where the artery could be destroyed or blocked...

...Third, West European ground forces should be armed more heavily...

...By one estimate all the trucks from more than 55 Soviet army divisions (one-third of the mobilized Soviet army) would be required to support a Soviet invasion force of seven divisions in Iran, assuming no trucks break down or are destroyed in fighting...

...These points are examined in our longer analysis in International Security and Eagle Defiant...

...STEPHEN W VAN EVERA has lectured in politics at Princeton University...

...In fact, American forces could probably halt the Soviets short of the oilfields, chiefly because a Soviet attack would require an enormous transportation and logistics effort, which probably lies beyond Soviet capabilities...

...Publicly available information is spotty, so estimates of our current capabilities must be tentative -- partly because the government has not published much useful information about military balances...

...The "teeth-to-tail" ratio still seems too low...

...In short, pessimistic estimates are more common, but they are based on sketchier information and less comprehensive analysis...

...First, American weapons design practices need adjustment...

...in wartime the Soviets canno~be sure whether the Poles and Czechs will fight with them, sit the war out, or even fight against them...

...Third, although the Soviets are much closer to the Gulf oilfields than is the United States, each mile the Soviets must travel is much harder to traverse...

...Frequently the military also demands that one weapon be capable of pel,orming several missions...

...The odds clearly favor the Pact only if NATO delays mobilization more than a week after receiving warning...

...In addition, this administration has done even less than its predecessors to make basic defense information available to the public, and its publications have been even more misleading...

...but appearances are misleading, for three reasons...

...As with the European balance, pessimistic estimates of the Gulf conventional balances do not fully utilize available data, or they rest on dubious factual or political assumptions...

...Pressing ahead with CRAF is a better idea...

...In the short run, Reagan programs will improve this situation by increasing fuel and ammunition stocks and improvin~ training and maintenance...

...The advantage of the defender also favors NATO...

...Restructuring West European reserves should be at the top of the NATO agenda...

...First, the United States has invested more money in mobility equipment (transport aircraft and amphibious assault ships, aircraft carders, airmobile and seamobile forces), which partially offsets greater Soviet proximity...

...If Warsaw Pact forces perform a little better than best evidence suggests they will, or if NATO forces perform worse than expected, or if NATO leaders fail to mobilize NATO forces promptly after they receive warning of a Pact mobilization, then Pact forces can win the battle...

...Gold-plated equipment also makes the readiness problem worse, because its use and maintenance requires scarce, expensive, highly skilled manpower and greater quantities of more costly spare parts...

...As a rule, attackers require substantial material superiority for success -between three- and two-to-one in the theater of war.* But the Pact probably cannot gain enough superiority unless NATO mobilizes late...

...Proximity would seem to give the Soviets the upper hand...

...Commonweal: 10 p REDICTIONS about the Persian Gulf oilfields, like those pessimistic predictions concerning Europe, do not make full use of available information...

...Moreover, this firepower ratio may undercount NATO firepower because it omits some NATO weapons held as replacements for combat losses, leaves out some German reserve units, and ignores NATO's greater investment in divisional command, control, and intelligence hardware and staff, which increase the effectiveness of NATO firepower...

...Other estimates overlook Soviet weaknesses, such as the unreliability of East European armies...

...Soviet army divisions are structured for war in Europe, with its many railroads...

...If NATO waits several days and then mobilizes, the balance in favor of the Pact would briefly exceed one-and-one-half-to-one but still would not reach twoto-one in favor of the Pact...

...With regard to American forces for Europe, five reforms should take priority...

...If we assume the United States receives and uses thirty days of warning, then American forces have ninety days to prepare the defense of Khuzestan...

...If they attack from Afghanistan they must pass over the fierce, desolate Khorassan desert and the Zagros...

...One result of th~ Reagan buildup, in fact, may eventually be a new readiness crisis...

...NATO forces are now close to speed, and could be brought up to speed, without a large spending increase, by improving NATO force structure and procurement practices...

...By another estimate almost all the trucks in the Soviet army might be required...

...The Soviets probably lack sufficient logistics and support, while we have too much...

...In short, public alarm about American capabilities to achieve basic missions seems exaggerated...

...Soviet invasion forces must move 850 miles overland to reach the Iranian oil fields in Khuzestan province in southwest Iran...

...If so, NATO might find itself without enough ground forces...

...The United States stands a good chance in the Gulf because Soviet forces could not gain decisive material superiority in the battle area...

...Overall, the administration is moving toward a force that is too complex...

...Because the Pact attack is canalized by this geography, NATO can focus its defensive efforts, and Pact forces are compressed to the point * These ratios represent a best estimate for average situations...

...Second, the allies' war reserve stocks - - ammunition, parts, and replacement equipment - - are much lower than those maintained by the United States...

...I III MOST OF THE POPULAR ASSUMPTIONS ARE UNREALISTIC @ Can we defend Europe & the Gulf with conventional arms...

...Moreover, these airborne units could not be easily resupplied by air in the meantime, because Soviet fighter aircraft probably lack the range to provide adequate air cover over southern Iran from bases in the Soviet Union or Afghanistan, and the Soviets probably could not quickly seize, secure, and prepare enough air bases in Iran suitable for modern fighter aircraft...

...To deploy comparable numbers of weapons, the Israelis and West Europeans use only 30,000-35,000 soldiers and the Soviet Union only 22,000-25,000...

...In contrast, the Soviets have imposed Soviet arms on all their Pact armies...

...Nevertheless, the best evidence indicates that these missions are not beyond the capacity of current U.S.-NATO forces...

...As a result NATO armies cannot easily feed on one another's supplies, a limitation that undercuts their wartime flexibility...

...Bul in the long run, Reagan programs will make the readiness problem worse, since Reagan forces are so gold-plated they will be even harder to operate and maintain...

...As a result, any airborne divisions dropped into southern Iran would have to hold off American and Iranian counterattacks for weeks while the Soviets readied their ground invasion force in the southern Soviet Union...

...With all the geographical barriers, Soviet movements in Iran would be exceptionally vulnerable to delaying action by American airstrikes, commando raids, or attacks by Iranian guerrillas on the scores of choke points between Khuzestan and Russia...

...More important, the Reagan emphasis on counterforce~ conventional offense, and intervention seems inconsistent with containment and raises the risk that a conventional conflict will escalate to a general thermonuclear war...

...These air strikes could be flown from aircraft carders, by land-based aircraft that could be moved to the Mideast after warning is received, or by B-52s based on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, on Guam in the Pacific, or even in the U.S...

...13 January 1984:13...

...In short, NATO forces cannot promise victory with the level of confidence that NATO leaders should demand, but they seem more likely to win than to lose...

...Fourth, NATO and Japan should pay their airlines to develop cargoconvertible CRAFs...

...This article is excerpted from a chapter entitled "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," by Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, copyright _9 1983 from the book, Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothschild, reprinted by permission of Little, Brown and Company...

...Lord Robert Salisbury once remarked, concerning British fears that Russia would sweep through Afghanistan into India: "A great deal of misapprehension arises from the popular use of maps on a small scale...

...The mistakes made by the Reagan administration began with public confusion about facts of history, hardware, and strategy...

...Clearing up this confusion is the first step toward better defense policy...

...Most published estimates of the European balance are admittedly more pessimistic than ours, but they fail to fully utilize available information...

...Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig warned in 1982 that the United States must "triple the size of its armed forces and put its economy on a war footing" before NATO could defend Europe successfully...

...But overall the odds favor NATO, if NATO leaders mobilize their forces quickly once they receive warning and if Pact forces demonstrate no surprising margin of strength over NATO forces...

...Then it would fall back to a level close to the pre-mobilization ratio...

...Instead, Pact forces would be confined by geography to a narrow area until they penetrated deep in Germany...

...NATO suffers some unique weaknesses, but these are roughly counterbalanced by unique Pact handicaps...

...First, trained West European military reserve manpower should be organized into reserve units, to fill the need for extra forces that can be held back from the front to cope with a possible Warsaw Pact armored breakthrough...

...American pilots have more combat experience, they fly more hours, and their training is more realistic...

...If these factors were included, the Pact advantage might disappear...

...BARRY R. POSEN & STEPHEN W., VAN EVERA T HE COMMON ASSUMPTION holds that Warsaw Pact conventional forces could quickly overrun Western Europe in a conventional war...

...As a result, these divisions are designed to operate no farther than 100 miles from a railhead, so they normally include relatively few trucks...

...Instead, their judgment of NATO's weakness is supported by unrepresentative statistics and by conclusions based on unduly pessimistic political and factual assumptions...

...Congress likes to fund glamorous new weapons systems but neglects maintenance for older systems...

...If so, American forces have more than enough firepower to win...

...Later the United States could bring in much bigger forces by sea...

...Moreover, NATO could be substantially strengthened without a major military build up, if NATO forces are reformed along the lines outlined below...

...The NATO allies and Japan should be better prepared to defend themselves, since this frees American military power for the Persian Gulf...

...These efforts should continue...

...Likewise, American fears that the Soviets could sweep through Iran spring from dismissal of geographic and military realities...

...This happens because the military often demands state-of-the-art in the technology it buys -- for instance, the world's first gas turbine engine to make the new M1 tank the fastest in the world...

...In general, NATO forces in Europe are not significantly outnumbered and may even hold the advantage in overall military capability...

...Some 45 percent of Pact standing ground forces in Europe are East European, a circumstance that greatly complicates Soviet planning...

...The blockage could not be bypassed or easily repaired...

...More American equipment should be pre-positioned on ships, in Australia, or at the American Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean...

...If Gulf governments do not want a visible American presence, pre-positioning could take the form of extra stocks and equipment for the Gulf states' armies, which Western forces could use in an emergency...

...Although NATO forces could not crush Pact attackers decisively, they probably could deny the Soviets a quick victory and thereby turn the conflict into a long war of attrition...

...8, No...

...In the meantime, the United States could move stibstantial forces into the Gulf to greet Soviet attackers -perhaps 500 land- and sea-based tactical fighters, the 82nd Airborne Division, and two Marine brigades within two or three weeks...

...Third, more military equipment should be pre-positioned ir Europe...

...Unfortunately, the Reagan "defense program moves in the direction of more, rather than fewer gold-plated systems -more fancy F-14 and F-15 aircraft, more elaborate SSN-688 "Los Angeles" class nuclear attack submarines, and more nuclear aircraft carrier task forces and their complex Aegis air defense cruisers...

...But such an airborne strike seems even more likely to fail than a ground assault, because the Soviets could not assemble the trucks their ground forces require without giving away the surprise which an "airborne grab" would require...

...Defense Secretary Weinberger warned that American forces were "incapable of stopping an assault on Western oil supplies," while one prominent defense analyst proclaimed that Iran "may be inherently indefensible," We question the conventional wisdom in regard both to Western Europe and to the Persian Gulf...

...A Warsaw Pact attack would be likely to fail because Pact forces probably lack the superiority in firepower and manpower they would need to overcome the natural advantage held by the defender, and to compensate for the obstacles that West German geography could pose to an aggressor...

...German forests, mountains, and other obstacles limit the Pact to four possible attack routes: the North German plain, the Hof Corridor (toward Stuttgart), the Fulda Gap (toward Frankfurt), and the Gbttingen Corridor (toward the Ruhr...

...They Should be increased...

...But the basic direction of Reagan's defense policy seems mistaken...

...Total 13 January 1984:9 NATO tactical aircraft in Europe have triple the aggregate payload of Pact aircraft at distances of 100 miles, and seven times the payload of Pact aircraft at distances of 200 miles, according to the latest available data...

...although they remain weaker than prudence requires...

...NATO fighters are more sophisticated, NATO has better "battle-management" systems (the AWACS aircraft), and NATO pilots are better than Pact pilots...

...Even though the Soviets are much nearer, the United States can probably bring as much firepower to bear in the Persian Gulf theater as can the Soviets...

...S OME Westerners suggest that the Soviets might mount a surprise airborne attack on Iran, seizing key airfields and other facilities with airborne units and holding them until Soviet ground forces could follow up, instead of mounting a prepared ground assault...

...NATO troops can "cross the T" -- chew up forward Pact units serially -- while other Pact units sit idly in the rear, since the Pact will not have room in the narrow channels to bring all its units forward at once...

...Insofar as the administration seems to have a grand strategy, it appears to incorporate requirements for fighting wars of every kind, all at once - - global conventional war against an unspecified range of adversaries, offensive conventional operations against the Soviet homeland, and a victorious nuclear war against the Soviets.* Press accounts suggest that Reagan defense planners believe they cannot achieve this strategy without another enormous military buildup once the current one is completed...

...Pre-positioning permits the United States to sent reinforcements to Europe more quickly, since less equipmenl must be moved across the Atlantic...

...This would increase the potential speed of American reinforcement in Europe and also free American military aircraft capabilities if a simultaneous crisis arose, for example, in the Persian Gulf...

...Finally, Washington should quietly discuss pre-positioning equipment in the Persian Gulf states...

...A cargo-convertible"CRAF" (civilian reserve air fleet) is muct cheaper than buying a purpose-built military transport aircraft The Reagan administration is trying to move forward witl~ Commonweal: 12 CRAF modifications, but the airline industry has not been cooperative...

...The Marines and Army airborne and airmobile units should be better equipped for armored war, with light armored vehicles...

...Again, aggregate firepower estimates, geographic factors, movement tables, interdiction rates, and warning estimates are usually missing...

...These weaknesses are best alleviated by reforming current forces rather than spending more across the board...

...G ERMAN T~RRAIN further complicates a Pact attack...

...It is possible, though not likely, that the Pact could achieve local successes against some NATO forces with less than a three-to-one advantage at the point of attack...

...Latest figures indicate they have only half as many major weapons per thousand men as Soviet and American units...

...This armada could not be assembled quickly or discreetly...

...As a result NATO would gain valuable advance warning if the Soviets chose to invade...

...The war would not unfold like the Get'man attack on France in 1940, when the Germans burst into open plains, ideal tank country, after crossing the Meuse...

...Iranian forces could also slow down Soviet forces and disrupt Soviet supply lines, especially if they organized in advance for guerrilla war...

...As a result, the whole buildup proceeds with no clear definition of its purpose, no way to judge its necessity, no criteria to judge whether new forces are meeting real needs or leaving real needs unmet, and no logical stopping point...

...NATO's seven European armies have not standardized their weapons, so ammunition, spare parts, and communications gear are not fully interchangeable...

...An overwhelming Pact firepower advantage, for example, is suggested by focusing on subcategories of weapons in which the Pact has the lead...

...T HE REAGAN administration deserves credit for its efforts to increase short-term military readiness, to rationalize procurement with multi-year contracts, to restructure American forces for Persian Gulf defense, and to improve strategic command, control, communications, and intelligence apparatus (C3I...

...The United States still "gold-plates" too much equipment: it passes over cheaper, simpler designs in favor of expensive, complex ones that are only marginally more capable...

...These facts are overlooked because press accounts stress Pact advantages in unrepresentative subcategories, such as numbers of tanks or artillery or planes, where the Pact does have an advantage (150, 180, and 15 percent respectively...

...This reflects the much greater carrying power of NATO aircraft...

...Four programs should take priority...

...Such comparisons ignore NATO quality advantages (NATO planes, artillery, and anti-tank weapons and ordnance are better than those of the Pact) and categories in which NATO leads (major warships, helicopters...

...Finally, the administration deserves criticism for sowing the defense debate with confusion...

...I, issue of International Security...

...NATO planes should also be superior in air-to-air combat...

...As a result, the Soviets probably could not defend their transport 13 January 1984:11 aircraft over southern Iran against American fighters, leaving their airborne units stranded...

...Its refusal to specify the strategy that requires such a buildup deprives Congress and the public of the tools they need to analyze defense policy...

...They must amass tens of thousands of trucks in the Caucasus, to supply Soviet divisions advancing into Iran, because Soviet forces near Iran do not have enough trucks...

...Furthermore, the Pact trails NATO in tactical power...

...The 1983 and 1984 Defense Department Annual Reports to the Congress omit basic data contained in previous annual reports and, instead, are filled with alarming charts that imply American weakness but do not clarify where weaknesses really lie...

...This strengthens the United States in Europe and the Persian Gulf because American airlift and sealift forces are freed for use in the Middh East...

...Some analysts estimate that the last 5 percent of performance in American equipment often results in a 50 percent cost increase...

...There are, however, some historical cases of successful armored assaults by attackers who enjoyed less than a three-to-one force ratio...

...In sum, a Soviet "airborne grab" against southern Iran seems even harder than a Soviet ground attack...

...Instead, misleading statistics are combined with unduly pessimistic political assumption: e.g., that the Gulf states refuse American help or cooperate with Soviet invaders, or that the United States loses simply because it lacks the will to fight, or that the American mission is to defend only northern Iran, which would be much harder than defending the southern oilfields, or that American leaders would simply fail to heed the warning they receive...

...The Committee on the Present Danger notes "a near consensus on the inadequacy of present NATO forces to defend Western Europe successfully with conventional arms...

...Overall, Air Force Director of Plans General James Ahmann has testified, NATO fighter forces are "superior to the Warsaw Pact" and could achieve "very favorable aircraft exchange ratios" against Pact fighters...

...At the same time, however, the administration plans an expensive new air transport, the C5N...

...Key data required for a thorough assessment are missing from their analyses: aggregate firepower estimates for the forces on both sides, terrain factors, and estimates of troop movement and interdiction rates...

...By one estimate, American air strikes and helicopter infantry teams working in the Zagros Mountains could slow the Soviet advance toward Khuzestan by sixty days...

...A LTHOUGH American capabilities are widely underestimated, American forces nevertheless suffer some real shortcomings...

...Defense matters are not too complex for lay persons to understand...

...These requirements can drive costs up dramatically...

...Civilian wide-body passenger jets'can be modified a' modest cost to serve as military cargo planes in wartime...

...Moreover, the United States can probably bring more airpower to bear in Khuzestan than can the Soviets, giving the United States a net firepower advantage...

...This gold-plating leaves the United States without enough equipment in areas where quantity matters more than quality...

...where they cannot fight efficiently...

...so the Navy's new F-18 fighter must be a superior air-to-air fighter and a superior ground attack aircraft...

...In this time the United States can move enough ground forces to Khuzestan to equal the firepower of Soviet divisions coming through the Zagros...

...Soviet forces invading the Gulf would be fighting hundreds of miles from any fUnctioning railroad, requiring an enormous additional complement of trucks to ferry supplies on Iranian roads...

...A NATO F-4 Phantom carries 16,000 pounds, while a Soviet MiG-27 carries only 6,600 pounds...

...These preparations would give NATO at least one month's warning...

...In the mountains these roads cross bridges, run through tunnels, cling to the sides of countless gorges, and wind beneath overhanging cliffs...

...A LLIED REFORMS and improvements would do even more to strengthen European defense than would American reforms...

...Public confusion about the basic facts of defense - - including an administration's basic goals and strategy - - is a major American national security problem...

...A revised version of the chapter appeared in the Summer 1983, Vol...

...The same concept applies to fighter aircraft: the mor~ basing facilities are built in Europe in peacetime, the les., equipment must be moved in wartime...

...Conventional wisdom also holds that American forces could not block a Soviet seizure of the Iranian oil fields, or even the Saudi Arabian oil fields, withou t using nuclear weapons...

...Still others neglect the advantage of fighting on the defense...

...One columnist suggested that American forces "could never be a match for the Soviet juggernaut across the Iranian border...

...As a result, much American military equipment is nol ready for action on short notice...

...This possibility is one of the uncertainties against which the reforms suggested below are designed to buffer...

...An American combat division with all its support personnel includes roughly 48,000 troops...

...Finally, Washington should consider shifting more Army manpower from support to combat roles...

...The defense of the Gulf is an allied problem: Washington should demand an allied effort...

...This distance is too great for the Soviets so American airpower could probably continue striking these choke points even if they were overrun by advancing Soviet forces...

...If they attack from the Soviet Union, they must cross two formidable mountain ranges: those along the Iranian northern tier, and the Zagros Mountains, which separate Khuzestan from central Iran...

...Western capabilities in the Persian Gulf should also be tailored more specifically for Persian Gulf contingencies...

...Only a handful of roads cross the northern mountains, and only four roads and one railroad span the Zagros...

...Today many of these reserves are used inefficiently, as individual replacements for casualties in unit~ already in action...

...Second, the Soviets have not tailored their military to invade the Persian Gulf, so their forces are not ready to attack on short notice...

...Overall, as one analyst notes, "the invasion of Iran would be an exceedingly low confidence affair for the Soviets...

...To begin with Europe, NATO conventional forces there are in fact substantially stronger than these gloomy views suggest, BARRY R. POSEN i$ a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow...

...Otherwise European forces will collapse early in the war, nullifying thepurpose of American stocks...

...Moreover, three of these channels run the width of Germany, so attacking Soviet forces cannot spread out even if they break through NATO front-line defenses...

...In fact, NATO can maintain force ratios close to the pre-mobilization ratio if NATO mobilizes simultaneously with the Pact...

...Before the Soviets attack, they must assemble and test a command and control apparatus in Transcaucasia, which would make telltale radio noises...

...Sometimes the number of Soviet divisions promptly available is exaggerated...

...In both Europe and the Persian Gulf, relatively inexpensive reforms can make current forces more capable...

...American allies should also be prepared to move t.~eir own forces into the Gulf if the need arises...

...But this advantage is offset by the fact that Pact forces are less reliable than NATO forces...

...The Pact has only a slender manpower and material advantage in Central Europe -- between 15 and 20 percent in total manpower, and 20 percent in total ground firepower (i.e., firepower in all NATO and Pact army formations available in Central Europe...

...Fourth, the United States should move faster to ready its, civilian airlines to transport military equipment and supplies ir wartime...

...Emphasis should fall on selective spending increases, aimed at solving defined problems, or on structural adjustments...