Verse

...Since each new client will be a humiliation to the United States, this policy discredits American security guarantees and will induce the western allies to accommodate the Soviets without overt military threats...

...Once the exogenous country invests a client regime with time, prestige, money, military expenditure, and advisors, it becomes increasingly difficult to play a free hand...

...The United States can encourage these self-correcting tendencies with its own low key policy...

...The Russian-backed Ethiopian government came to power largely because of the tar-baby problems the U.S...

...Conversely, individuals not addicted to air strikes, quick reaction forces, or blockades at the first whisper of Soviet involvement are condemned to be "soft-headed...

...The thrust of my analysis has been that independent regimes seeking stability will seek to avoid undue Soviet domination and seek expanded diplomatic, trade, and educational contacts with the West, especially if the cost to them is lower than Soviet help...

...In both Angola and Ethiopia, more aid is being sought and aid has steadily increased due to the pressures of protracted and often unsuccessful conflict...

...Ronald Reagan has recently refined this to "appeasement, vacillation and aimlessness," and chafing politicians, political commentators and even reformed appeasers like Henry Kissinger have joined in this outburst of creative historical reconstruction...

...The tar baby trap begins with the corruption which pervades developing societies and which settles in eddies around arms expenditures and large investments...

...The money along with military expenditures must be diverted from the ailing Soviet agricultural and consumer economy and brings limited rewards...

...If absolutely Commonweal: 370 necessary some forms of direct intervention might take place but problems with the CIA aside, a strategy of unpublicized aid to indigenous groups is far superior to overt militarization of a state...

...There is also the rather sad example where the Soviet "friend" Libya arms Eritrean guerrillas who fight the Soviet-armed Cubans and Ethiopians who in turn fight the Soviet-armed and trained Somali troops...

...In Ethiopia the Dergue, in spite of its cruelty, possesses a fair degree of legitimacy among the peasants and soldiers because of its domestic reform...

...Land reform and the provision of basic services are viewed as counter-productive to 20 June 1980: 369 the Chicago-minded advisory cliques of these countries and not compatible with the perceived interests of the old elites...

...The Soviet clients do not possess a sterling record of economic successes...

...Once the Soviets enter into a country such as Afghanistan, it is almost impossible to avoid complete domination by the Russians...

...The Soviet-supported clients often earn a patina of legitimacy which makes repression tolerable and creates an enduring backbone of support...

...However, a lower profile for the United States in many countries, its advocacy of human rights and more sophisticated transnational corporate strategies which emphasize local control deprive the Russians of obvious targets...

...This self-correcting response will minimize Soviet gains in most countries...

...Since each new client will be a humiliation to the J. PATRICK DOBEL is a Fellow at the National Humanities Institute, University of Chicago and assistant professor of political science, University of Michigan, Dearborn...

...On the other hand, no astute third world leader can ignore the truckling of the East Europeans, the reduction of Cubans to Soviet janissaries and the direct invasion and game of musical governments in Afghanistan...

...A slow and careful disengagement from brittle or illegitimate oligarchical or military regimes follows as a corollary...

...Additionally, as the Soviets lose leverage the regimes can ignore with some impunity Russian advice regarding domestic reform...

...rather they now desire to do nothing less than direct the internal shape of foreign societies and be able to enforce an economic stoppage against the western world...

...Zambia and other front-line states pushed a Zimbabwe compromise partially to remove Soviet guerrilla influence from their soil...

...The present costs of Soviet friendship, never a free ride, are now much higher...

...IVEN THE PROBLEMS of client states, a hard-nosed realist G might well ask, "Why bother with them...

...The tar baby corruption goes far deeper than morale costs or local economic corruption...

...The Russians must inject money, weapons, advisors and either their own troops or surrogates to maintain the friendly regime...

...High-level United States demands polarize countries and ruin the attempt to present the United States as an alternative compatible with reforms and nationalism...

...Russian-backed regimes in Angola, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia reflect prior American patterns: city garrisons, incessant airpower, napalm, gas, and periodic sweeps of the countryside...

...The answers for the Soviets have already been provided...

...These tactics waste the land, decimate the population, create hordes of refugees and sow the seeds of enduring hatred of the Russians...

...If this hypothesis about Soviet intentions is correct, then the the West...

...Verifiable increases in Soviet influence in a country should be assessed on three grounds...

...I began this analysis with the acceptance of some controversial and harsh assessments of Soviet intentions, assessments which I do not believe are necessarily true...

...Somalia's defection after Russian ascension in Ethiopia and the revulsion of the Islamic world after the Afghanistan invasion provide such opportunities...

...If there is one lesson both third world countries and the transnational corporations have learned, it is that Marxists, Socialists, liberal democrats and probably the devil can all strike mutually profitable bargains with the transnationals...

...The Soviets must deal with the labyrinthine disputes between Syria and Iraq or the Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya...

...had with the Haile Selassie regime, and with the exception of domestic reform the Dergue is pursuing policies in Ogaden and Eritrea similar to those of the previous government...

...Someday the Munich analogy will die a well-deserved death, but today it lives on, a perpetual indictment of low key, diplomacy-oriented foreign policy such as that of the Carter administration...

...In Angola, the Cubans are notorious for their extensive black market operations and unwillingness to fight, while looting and discipline breakdowns are common in Afghanistan...

...The CIA estimates that the Soviet-bloc economic aid to third world countries rose from $800 million in 1977 to $5.2 billion in 1978...

...United States willingness to work with Zimbabwe guerrillas and the halting efforts to seek rapproachment with Nicaragua fit this profile...

...The terms of political discourse have changed so quickly that I would like to explore a seldom mentioned thesis which might serve as a corrective to the radical preference for a remilitarized posture...

...Countries which become obvious Soviet puppets will suffer a loss of nationalist legitimacy and be vulnerable to western countermeasures...

...Aid to guerrillas in Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan could enormously increase the cost of Soviet intervention with minimal loss to the United States...

...20 June 1980: 371...

...Sometimes the group alignment might overlay ethnic divisions and complicate the violence as in Ethiopia where Russia supports the Dergue against the Eritreans and Somalis...

...Nation building" is fraught with incesCommonweal: 368 sant levels of civil war and smoldering repression...

...Mozambique with an AK47 etched on its flag has refused Soviet demands for naval base rights and is seeking expanded western contacts...

...Russians no longer seek to take advantage of trouble spots and exploit United States weakness...

...the next question is "Can the Soviets gain the leverage they seek...

...The economic, military and human costs go up proportionately as they lose independent leverage and become hostage to the ambitions of their client...

...Soviet clients will generate multiple forms of regional, cultural, ethnic, economic, and nationalist opposition...

...The Soviets can also intimidate or conquer lands contiguous to them...

...The maxim assumes that a reasonable doubt can exist as to whether a Russian involvement necessarily endangers the United States...

...Rap-proachment with local corruption saps the morale of advisors and engenders Russian cynicism and contempt towards the client people which leads to resentment in the population...

...The human rights ban on Somoza and the attempt to extricate America from the Shah are clear cases...

...Its users imply that only a more aggressive military posture reflects a "realistic" view of the geo-political realities of a manichean world...

...Only in countries contiguous to the USSR will the Russians have the potential of substantial and stable gain...

...The renascent Soviet interest has increased the Soviet share of development costs...

...The crescendo has become more shrill under the combined influence of the presidential campaign and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan...

...They will become vulnerable to a number of low key and covert tactics, sometimes drawn from the Soviet's own handbook, which can maximize the Soviet cost and minimize the gain...

...Even in Afghanistan, one of the main reasons for the virulence of the fundamentalist Moslem reaction stems from the heavy-handed imposition of social and land' reform by the earlier Taraki regime...

...The Congo Brazzaville, third on the list of Soviet aid to Africa, has opened negotiations for trade credits with the West, and the People's Republic of Mozambique is actively seeking to promote more trade with the West...

...As the United States has learned, these externally armed and trained regimes utilize excessive levels of airpower and disproportionate violence which does little to create enduring ties of loyalty to the central government...

...And third, does the pattern of Soviet influence radically change the tacitly accepted rules of international behavior and conflict limitation...

...The reluctance of Kenya or the Emirates to supply the United States with bases suggests the great costs to domestic legitimacy posed by foreign bases...

...Titanic sums of money— money which up until now the parsimonious Soviets have been extremely reluctant to spend— need to be transferred to the third world...

...Once a sufficient number of clients control the pressure points on the arteries of trade, the Russians can interdict the flow of vital resources to the western world and deny increasingly important third world markets to the mature capitalist economies of the West...

...The failure of last-ditch efforts to mediate the Nicaraguan revolution revealed the fatal weaknesses of the tar baby trap and the lack of leverage which can cost a patron state in the end...

...The Russians make the most inroads where regimes are forced to rely exclusively on them by western intransigence as in Cuba or where a government is faced with intense domestic problems such as Ethiopia...

...In making these evaluations it should be remembered that the United States rhetoric that all America seeks is self-determination, economic progress, reasonable investment and trade climate and non-alignment is perfectly real...

...This type of commitment will bring the Russians in direct conflict with the forces of nationalism which it exploited so well over the last two decades...

...Basically, I want to suggest that the low key, diplomacy-oriented strategy coupled with appropriate covert tactics can be strongly defended on "hard-nosed" geo-political grounds even if we accept worst case assumptions about Soviet hegemonic intentions...

...The United States could take a leaf from the Soviet strategy of the last two decades and align with legitimate nationalist forces to support wars of national liberation against Soviet-dominated regimes...

...Over the long run, the self-interest of states and the forces of nationalism will frustrate them with careful help from United States policy...

...Self-interested countries will turn to the West and transnationals on their own accord...

...The grandiose corruption of Sukarno in Indonesia and Nkrumah in Ghana should stand as object lessons to the Russians...

...After the first land and social reforms, regimes often bog down in economic mires caused by internal inefficiencies, production bottlenecks, corruption, vacillating world markets, lack of adequate technologies and overreliance upon a Soviet-inspired industrialization model...

...Most importantly it must prove that it can live with reform-minded nationalist regimes...

...The United States failed consistently to nudge such regimes towards even minimal reforms...

...Soviet troops are now dying regularly in Afghanistan in part because after an unsanctioned coup, Hafizullah Amin ignored moderate Russian suggestions and embarked on a disastrous policy which pulled the Soviets into the quagmire faster and deeper than they had planned...

...Without such hard work an abiding legitimacy cannot exist and the more reliant on the Soviets, the greater the temptation to bypass politics in favor of repression...

...The patron will be unable to extricate itself from a floundering state and when it tries to reshape the situation, it simply gets sucked in deeper and harder, losing all independent leverage...

...The ruling clique of the client state can play diplomatic judo and use its own weakness and need to throw the Soviets into harder commitments than originally envisioned...

...Far-flung and highly visible United States military bases and western support for client regimes in their internal and external repression and wars aggravated nationalist hatred of the West...

...The Soviets have generally been able to exploit local nationalism because of the colonial heritage and the revolutionary indictment of neo-colonial puppets which were willing to sell resources and national heritages to the West with minimum benefit for the population as a whole...

...By embarking on an activist policy, Russia is on the defensive inside each client state and poses a more overt threat to independent-minded nations than the United States...

...Domestic reform can help overcome the tar baby problem, and the Soviets have generally been more successful in this area than the United States because they have aided successful revolutionary regimes which begin with a mandate for sweeping domestic change...

...Besides the cost of violence, the client commitment requires large sums of money to build up the infrastructure of a country...

...The costs to the Russians begin with their involvement in indigenous violence...

...If the USSR is seriously seeking a worldwide network of client states, my suggestion is, "When in doubt, let the Russians do it...

...To direct internal development, ensure pliant allies and gain forward military bases will involve a significant and destabilizing Russian presence in the form of highly visible bases, military and economic presence and influence over decision-making far more obvious than a simple desire to abet policies which embarrass or harass the West...

...Second, will the Soviet influence make the indigenous populace substantially worse off...

...The Russian problem with nationalism will be aggravated by the economic ills which will naturally befall any government...

...As a regime relies more on external support it will lose its incentives to undertake domestic reform and the hard task of political accommodation with domestic groups...

...New expenditures will open new horizons for entrepreneurs to siphon off vast sums...

...The worst case scenario for the third world can with certain variations be briefly summarized: The primordial Soviet desire for hegemony unfolds in the omnipresent attempt to use fifth columns and surrogates to dominate the third world...

...The United States has been more vulnerable to the tar baby effect because of its alliances with oligarchies or technocratic military regimes which rely on private investment, high growth rates, and a trickle-down effect...

...All clients tend toward stagnation and brittle repression and such pressures will wear off the patina of legitimacy...

...First, will the new level of influence plausibly hurt vital United States or allied security or economic interests...

...Few third world countries escape such webs of intrigue and violence, and the Russians would be ensnared in Byzantine dilemmas which can pave the way for quick and petulant changes of allegiance on the part of the client states...

...Stuck by previous commitments, the relations between the Russians and their clients will resemble those of a tar baby...

...Even in light of these, learning from attempts to maintain a much lighter form of hegemony than that imputed to the Soviets, one can conclude with rigorous geo-political consistency: If the Soviets have embarked on a world girding strategy, let them try...

...Successful land reform and the extension of education and basic services to the entire population create bonds of enduring legitimacy...

...Each intervention of Russia also poses opportunities for creative diplomacy to take advantage of cleavages and mistrust which it generates...

...A decade ago the Russians wore out their welcome in Egypt with their demands, and recently Nigeria invited most of its Soviet military advisors to leave while reopening trade negotiations with the West...

...it also reflects the enduring truth that client states, unless based upon commitment, reform, and provisions for basic need, become hollow shells of terror and greed...

...They are wading into the economic and political quagmires which beset the cultivation of client states by the United States in the fifties and sixties...

...Given the proven reliability of the transnational corporations to adapt to various regimes and maintain the flow of resources under all conditions (witness their functioning during the Iranian revolution or the fact that the pro-Soviet regime in Angola protects western oil investments from pro-western UNITA forces) the actual level of internal influence needed by the United States is much lower than that imputed to the Soviet Union...

...But aid to indigenous rebels or low-keyed diplomacy and economic aid are far more preferable than overt militarization of the area...

...If the issues of domestic dissent do not commit the Soviets to massive military investments with their clients, then unending feuds with neighboring countries will involve the Soviets in both external military conflict and thankless efforts at mediating among clients...

...The Russians are now and will continue to be gamely engaged in building bases and abetting internal repression of domestic dissent all over the world...

...They will try to avoid the Soviet net...

...Close proximity to the Soviet Union requires an extremely sophisticated nationalist strategy to both be friends with the Soviets and maintain contacts with the West as Iraq has tried...

...The influence required by the purported Soviet strategy will either undermine the legitimacy of regimes which become closely aligned with them or bring the Russians into direct conflict with legitimate nationalist regimes...

...Countries can gain jobs, capital, and technology without ceding nearly the degree of overt political influence sought by the Soviets...

...Alignment with a modernizing regime will often require supporting one group against others and entail complicity in internal repression...