SALT: the case against
Reid, James F.
and relying on nuclear weapons of limited destructiveness may increase both the likelihood that such weapons will be used and the likelihood that a general nuclear exchange would result from such...
...Their rejection must be a principled one...
...Isn't the fact that we have the ability to destroy the Soviet Union many times over and that they have the same ability versus us all that matters...
...supported Communist activity in Portugal (a NATO country...
...The issue of whether the SALT II accords should be ratified by the Senate occupies center stage, not only in the Senate itself but to a considerable degree in the country as a whole...
...Fortunately, it is not necessary to do so, because what the treaty does and does not do is largely agreed upon...
...They do not yield certain predictions about what will in fact happen if we develop defensive systems or if we make deep cuts in existing weapons systems...
...Should this Soviet first strike take place, we would face the choice of acceding to the attack, with all that that would imply, or unleashing our bombers and sea-launched missiles on the cities of the Soviet Union, with the certainty of having our cities destroyed in return...
...It was clear, however, that they had sufficient doubt of our willingness to respond forcefully to make the attempt...
...There is no limit on improvements in the accuracy of ballistic missiles...
...As it turned out, the Soviets were guilty of a serious misperception...
...It is impossible to engage here in a detailed analysis of this complex treaty...
...It would be hard to be against areal arms control treaty, but this treaty makes such a slight contribution to arms control 9 that it is easy to justify trading offthe slight controlling effect it might have in light of the dangers of ratification as I have outlined them...
...But why...
...Ratification of SALT II means acceptance of this imbalance and is thus a sign of weakness, and in the context of Carter's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . other gaffes and the post- 1972 trend referred to above, it could be the fatal one...
...The Soviet reaction to this proposal provides the most important piece of evidence for my interpretation of their behavior...
...A SALT II would be necessary...
...All must work to put an end tothe arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally indeed but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees...
...There are two factors at work in successful nuclear deterrence...
...But it is not enough for the Senate to reject this treaty...
...And most importantly it called for a reduction from 308 to 150 in the number of Soviet very heavy ICBMs--the only weapons in their arsenal capable of giving them a f'u~tstrike counterforce capability...
...And so SALT II must be judged on other grounds--grounds which include a consideration of the effect of ratifying the treaty on the legitimate interests of the United States, as well as a consideration of the role that it might play in reducing the destructiveness of a future war...
...Senate, in other words, must tell our president that his instincts as of 1977 were right...
...While the United States was delaying or canceling such weapons.systems as the B-1 bomber, the MX mobile missile, the Trident submarine, and the neutron bomb in order either to "not poison the SALT process" or to avoid wasting money on systems which SALT II would presumably make unnecessary, the Soviets were going full speed ahead...
...Soviet political writings state quite openly that their notion of detente is not that it is a means tO peace, but rather a relatively peaceful means to an increase in Soviet/socialist influence...
...and in that sense it could be said to have a braking effect...
...That treaty was hailed in the same manner, interestingly, as SALT II has been--as putting a brake on the arms race...
...The contrast to the Soviets very different response to trouble in their sphere of influence--in Hungary in 1956--must have been particularly compelling...
...Graham Allison's review of the evidence and of other commentaries in his classic Essence of Decision: Commonweal: 686Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971) gives credence to my interpretation, in particular, his pp...
...This perspective might be considered particularly instructive since three out of the four countries visited are formal allies of the United States and the other, Indonesia, currrnfly maintains fairly close relations with Washington even in the absence of formal security ties...
...Every supporter of this treaty I have come across concedes that it does little for arms control by itself...
...The SALT talks then are in effect something of an abstracCommonweal: 688...
...During a recent tour of the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand I had occasion to lecture on security matters generally and SALT more specifically before a wide variety of audiences (the lectures were sponsored by the United States International Communication Agency...
...The safest ways out of the morally perplexing situation of deterrence are those that the superpowers can travel together...
...Historical analogies rarely settle arguments, since they are usually drawn to support a point already made and since contrary analogies can always be offered...
...Nonetheless, to conclude that the exhortations to peace of John Paul II and others necessitate support for any particular political agreement that goes...
...But how can we, as Christians, be against an arms control treaty...
...But more importantly, we must take great care that they perceive us as being willing to use the horrible force we possess should it become necessary...
...SALT II has taken seven years to negotiate...
...The chief action that was responsible for their misperception was our inaction or lack of effective action at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961...
...Third, unilateral deep cuts in weapons systems or perceived inferiority in one's destructive potential may encourage the other side to aggressive actions which increase the likelihood of a general nuclear exchange...
...In this century there have been two different mutes to general war...
...Our failure to take a similarly political approach to the SALT negotiations has allowed the Soviets to attain the superiority they now possess...
...the attempt to quiet Saudi Arabian concern about our non-support of the Shah by sending a contingent of F-15s on a visit to their capital, unarmed...
...It does unequivocally condemn total war...
...Christian social teaching demands that peace be an important objective of states...
...The attitude expressed might be summarized as follows: "Certainly we know that controlling nuclear arms is important...
...The Soviet reaction was to reject the new framework out of hand...
...I never cease to be amazed at the number of otherwise intelligent people that make this claim, for it is certainly false...
...I findit hard to imagine that an American president would make the latter choice...
...morally most significant cut, namely renouncing an assured capacity to destroy the other society, could be profoundly destabilizing...
...To appreciate the very real danger I am talking about we need only learn the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis...
...When Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 he decided that, rather than continue to pursue an agreement that would at most make a marginal contribution to the "braking" of the arms race, he would try for an agreement that would call a virtual halt to the race itself...
...And so, after two more years of plodding we have arrived at SALT II...
...Negotiations are not to be conducted to end a war or resolve other conflict situations...
...SALT II specifically received a virtually unanimous vote of confidence...
...It is unwise to become alarmist about the extent of the compromising of the American position in the world...
...The chief reason for supporting it seems to be that it is an intrinsic part of a mystical "SALT process" which will be endangered if this treaty is rejected...
...The kind of response to danger that we seem to be in the habit of making is symbolized by President Carter's sending of an aircraft carder from the Far East to the Persian Gulf area at the height of the Iranian crisis as a show of strength, and then the canceling of the order when it was halfway there...
...But what led the Soviets to the decision to go ahead...
...But there is little that we can do about it directly...
...During the seven-year SALT negotiations both the Soviets 7 December 1979:685and the Americans were continuing the arms buildup, but that is where the similarity ends...
...in Melbourne who asked what role Australia had played in the SALT negotiations...
...A "no" vote accompanied by a statement of principles by those so voting, or to be 7 December 1979:687followed immediately by an explanatory resolution would be preferable...
...Without the resolution of the political and ideological issues that divide the two giants, even well-intentioned unilateral efforts to achieve deep cuts in arms levels are destabilizing and are more likely to provoke truculence than imitation...
...I am not engaging in science fiction here...
...Clearly it was our words and actions, or more specifically the words and actions of President Kennedy that gave them false hope...
...But it has not done so...
...But the treaty does not stop the arms race...
...We don't currently have the theater capability to resist such an effort...
...On the other hand as a practical matter we know that the Americans and Russians are basically concerned with each other and aren't much interested in our opinions or needs...
...I I I I I I II II IIIIII calling on nations to halt the arms race, and prophesying that if mankind does not undergo conversion nuclear destruction could be the result...
...The final text of Vatican H's Pastoral Constitution The Church in the Modern Worm contains no explicit teaching on the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons...
...Yes, the image of JFK must have been of a president to whom peace was a greater objective than national security...
...It seems to me that the only people who could deny this are those that believe that the leaders of "imperialist" America are the only ones capable of international manipulation for selfish purposes...
...What troubles many even more than the "tally sheet," however, is that the United States has (particularly under our current weak president, who just might be president through 1984) telegraphed the message that we are unwilling to take action to prevent future Soviet moves that could be far more dangerous than anything we have seen to this point...
...Participating in these sessions were high-ranking military officers, members of Parliament, foreign ministry officials, journalists, and academics as well as simply what might be called "concerned citizens...
...Was the introduction of missiles into Cuba, considering the theater and strategic nuclear superiority we had, much less dangerous...
...Since the defensive strength of any nation is thought to depend on its capacity for immediate retaliation, the stockpiling of arms which grows from year to year serves . . . as a deterrent to potential attackers...
...and relying on nuclear weapons of limited destructiveness may increase both the likelihood that such weapons will be used and the likelihood that a general nuclear exchange would result from such use...
...Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once observed, u I "Whenever peace--conceived as the avoidance of war--has been the primary objective of a power.., the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community...
...Their error in judgment brought the world closer than it has ever been to, the brink of nuclear war, as President Kennedy blockaded Cuba so no more missiles could enter, and threatened war if those that were already there were not removed...
...They know h~w our system works...
...But what led them to their misperception...
...For while we were talking and voluntarily limiting our arms buildup, the Soviets were building weapons of such destructive power (the SS-lgs) that when, in short order, they become only a little more accurate they will be able to destroy ninety percent of our land-based ICBMs, while we will have no such first-strike counterforce ability relative to their miSsiles...
...The situation of deterrence, while dangerous and morally inadequate, is a kind of temporary shelter from those forces that would otherwise lead the superpowers into war with each other...
...Only in the 1990s will our ICBMs again become invulnerable with the MX system...
...The fast is the route to World War I, the route of a military buildup and a naval arms race with complex relationships between dominant powers and allied client states...
...If the treaty, for instance, helps to reduce the danger of general nuclear war, this is of interest to all...
...But they wouldn't do anything that dangerous, would they...
...T HE COUNTERFORCE capability the Soviets have relative to our land-based ICBMs is an element of significant military imbalance, whether it is likely to be exploited directly or not...
...I find it hard to fathom this notion...
...Many people look upon this as the most effective way known at the present time for maintining some sort of peace among nations...
...If they aren't serious about arms control, that would be tragic...
...50-56...
...Guidelines were agreed upon at Vladivostok in December 1974...
...and, of course, China...
...My basic argument is that the ratification of SALT II would constitute a meek acceptance of the counterforce advantage which the treaty allows to the Soviets, and that they would perceive this acceptance of inequality in the context of other acts of presidential weakness--as proof of a national lack of will to resist...
...The invasion was obviously Americaninstigated...
...The U.S...
...But it is surely plausible to think that both routes, the route of increased armaments andthe route of unilateral arms reductions, involve real dangers, given the nature and scope of the hostility and I I I suspicion between the Soviet Union and the United States...
...I have given reasons to suggest that the Soviets are in a condition where they could be easily tempted to rash action...
...Measures short of that would be equivocal and could well increase the likelihood of nuclear war without significantly lessening its destructiveness...
...In the questions that developed during the lecture period and in informal discussions afterwards I was presented with an interesting and in some ways strikingly different perspective on SALT from that | i A. GARRETT is Director of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of lnlernational Studies in California...
...but if humanity is not to be subjected to great risks for questionable benefits, the superpowers must move from this shelter together.It is my Own belief that in the SALT II agreement, despite its many shortcomings, they are be'ginning to do so, I I II I I II C;p IT WILL TRANSMIT A SIGN OF WEAKNESS SALT: the case against JAMES F. REID B/~III~IAR IS HEI.L...
...The real danger is that our certification of this imbalance would be one more sign of weakness which could very easily create a perception of our will power sufficient to tempt them to aggression in Europe or the oil-rich Persian Gulf, for example...
...For example, the treaty prevents the deployment of ground or sea-launched cruise missiles with a range over 600 kilometers, and hans weapons of mass destruction on the seabed...
...o a P a c i f i c view STEPHEN A. GARRE W E ARE NOW in the midst of one of the most seminal foreign policy debates of the century...
...And so it is most appropriate that we find leaders of all faiths i I i JAMES F. REID is an...
...My belief is that ratification of this treaty in the present political context Would endanger the United States and, if anything, make an American-Soviet conflict more, not less likely...
...A change in the treaty by the Senate could have the worst possible result--a resumption of more elongated negotiations that would be futile attempts to salvage a flawed treaty and would tempt our president to further unilateral acts of restraint...
...And unquestionably the very factof American acceptance of this act would have greatly reduced our power and influence in Europe and elsewhere...
...The attitude was that it might not be a panacea for all the world's ills, but it was certainly better than nothing...
...Moreover, unlike the stance taken by many in the United States, there was a propensity to accept almost as a matter of faith that the Carter administration would not have agreed to SALT II unless it was convinced that it was a reasonable agreement and more specifically was verifiable...
...They are no more equivalent than fear and trust, than bellicosity and appeasement...
...And when Khrushchev met JFK face-to-face at the Vienna Summit Conference, he confmned in his own mind all of his impressions of the man's weakness...
...The Soviets will have the military superiority I have referred to very shortly...
...John Spanier, in his American Foreign Policy Since Worm War H, 7th ed...
...It must do for him what he didn't have the courage to do for himself...
...State leaders and all who share the burdens of public administration have the duty to defend the interests of their people and to conduct such matters with a deep sense of responsibility...
...In addition to his inaction with reference to Cuba in 1961, his failure to do more than to protest the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961--a serious violation of the Four Power Accords--could have been interpreted that way...
...If they are serious about arms control they will consent to resume negotiations on a new basis, such as Carter's 1977 proposals...
...The Council is also quite clear in stating that an end to the arms race must be Sought, hut most importantly for my argument, states explicitly that disarmament must be mutual, not unilateral...
...Several points stand out...
...In a purely military sense the Soviets would have been able to have their intermediate range missiles function asICBMs by means of their location...
...Most significantly, in an action which can have no justification in the context of a defense-deterrence strategy, they have developed the SS-18 as a counterforce weapon as described above...
...This clich6 has always been underW stood as a poetic way to describe the many differ9 9 ent forms of horror that accompany war, But as applied to thermonuclear war it would be far closer to a description of the literal truth--for a country that was the target of a full-scale nuclear attack wouldknow the kind of hitherto unexperienced fire, destruction and chaos that are the essence of the biblical imagery of hell...
...The Council even speaks of nuclear weapons as playing a positive role in this effort...
...It would have forbidden the modernization or replacement of ICBMs and the development and deployment of mobile ICBMs, and enforced this ban by limiting the flight-testing of ICBMs to six per year--a limit whose violation could be easily observed...
...which we may have in the United States...
...Yet when it faced failure, we decided to let it fail...
...To be able to judge whether or not ratification of SALT II would be in the interest of the United States, we need to look at it in the context of AmeriCan-Soviet relations since SALT I was signed in 1972...
...What would we do if Soviet perception of our weakness led them to seize the Iranian oilfields...
...But the nature of the Soviet state and the character of its behavior even after the death of Stalin show that there is no moral merit in one-sided concessions that enhance its power or that reward its tendency to probe areas of Western weakness and indecisiveness...
...ISsALT:REjECTION REALLY POSSIBLE...
...No event of this significance is interpretexi in the same manner by all historians...
...They have stimulated the Middle East War of 1973...
...There is the fact that the Soviets have continued their efforts to destabilize various areas contrary to our interests and the interest of peace...
...These paradoxes are hypothetical claims about adversary reactions in a future that is schematically indicated but not described in detail...
...The claim seems to be that any hiatus in arms control talks between the superpowers would beper se disastrous...
...His proposal of March 1977, if it had been accepted and translated into treaty form, might have done that...
...150-55, argues even more specifically as I do...
...Thomas in Minnesota...
...Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitCommonweal: 684ants is a crime against God and man . . . . ") But this document makes it clear that, even in the nuclear age, it is legitimate for a nation to pursue its interest...
...It does not demand that it be the.only objective, even in the nuclear era...
...It should not be our lasting abode...
...And we find a clear parallel in their stated view of negotiations...
...Senate ratification of this radically unequal treaty will transmit a signal of weakness...
...the diminishing appeal of the state ideology...
...He joins Edward Luttwak in concluding that "the result is a fatal combination of operational optimism in the near term.., with strategic pessimism for the long term...
...Because the treaty places no limits on the number of very heavy Soviet ICBIVls, the status quo that is frozen is one that is inherently unequal...
...And so we have the strange case of an arms control treaty which could easily have a greater chance of causing war than securing peace...
...The message here was that our president was weak-willed enough to fail to do what was necessary to achieve a major natural objective, so weak-willed that he would not follow through when we were already committed--when our prestige was on the line...
...are responsible for Cuban intervention in Africa and the Middle East...
...Even if he doesn't, there's not much we could do about it...
...Each side would be limited to 2400 missiles plus bombers, and only 1320 of these delivery systems could be MIRVed...
...Certainly we must have sufficient nuclear strength so that we have the ability to wreak destruction on the Soviets should they attack us...
...All we can hope is that Carter knows what he's doing...
...But among those who assume that the Soviet introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba in 1962 was a rational act there is much agreement on the cause of that action...
...Yet the Soviets' long-term future, as George Will points out, "is clouded by economic stagnation...
...by the name "arms control'" would be to make a fundamental error...
...But negotiations throughout 1975 and 1976 were not able to produce a treaty from the guidelines...
...and because there is no limit on the number of tests of ballistic missiles, doubt has arisen as to the treaty's verifiability...
...When I first presem this need to my students, the typical response is to ask how the Soviets could possibly doubt our response should we be attacked...
...One could argue this way if the church had absolutely condemned the very possession of nuclear arms...
...The second is the route to World War II, the route of concessions to dictatorial regimes and abortive efforts at disarmament...
...This is not to claim that they are morally or politically equivalent...
...Unlike SALT I these called for some qualitative limits...
...As it turned out, his impressions were misimpressions, but people and nations act on the basis of impressions and perceptions not on the basis of "objective reality...
...Both routes led to international catastrophe, and both provide warnings that participants in the current debate are fond of appealing to...
...The treaty does place limits on some escalations of the arms race that the superpowers could theoretically engage in...
...In reality, of course, the SALT negotiations impact to a greater or lesser degree on every nation in the global system...
...It froze at the number the offensive missiles each side then possessed...
...Surely they must have known we could not afford to let this act go unchallenged --for the very reason that it would have the effect that I have described...
...This support for SALT II, however, seemed at times to be somewhat ritualistic, rather like an expression of confidence in motherhood and apple pie...
...What about overkill...
...and ultimately by the tepid nature of the president's response to the Soviet presence in Cuba--a response that was not inherently weak but that was clearly insufficient in relation to the importance previously attached to that presence...
...It does not claim that the existence of nuclear weapons negates the long-declared right of states to act for their own defense...
...The message was clear--the only course acceptable to the Soviets was to continue to plod ahead on the basis of the 1 974 guidelines...
...Some of his speeches (as is the case with the speeches of all modem American presidents) could certainly have been interpreted that way...
...But even accepting the view that the treaty creates a limited freeze on weapons development, a severe problem remains...
...The fact is that audiences in all four countries clearly felt themselves to be almost totally irrelevant to the actual SALT process...
...With the possible exception of discussion of our NATO allies and the People's Republic of China, however, there has been relatively little written in this country as to how other nations of importance to the United States actually view the SALT II treaty...
...As a result, the Soviet leadership will be "under a powerful pressure to exploit its 'window' of military advantage in the 1980s, in order to avert the bleak future awaiting it in the 1990s...
...It called for more significant limits on the total /2 ROTtICU number of delivery vehicles and the number of them that could be MIRVed than were contained in the 1974 guidelines...
...New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp...
...Without Senate ratification there is no treaty...
...And its most important provisions incorporate the Vladivostok limits and supplement them by banning any increase in ICBM size or the number of warheads that they currently carry...
...But what difference does all this make...
...But when, as now, they have the ability to destroy our land-based ICBM force in a first strike, they might well doubt our response in the case of an attack targeted only on that force...
...When we add to this the consideration that this treaty makes a very minimal contribution to arms control, the choice becomes as clear as choices in this realm can be: the Senate should engage in a principled and clearly explained rejection of this treaty...
...When I answered candidly that I wasn't aware of any significant role, he nodded and smiled a bit cynically, evidently anticipating that would be the answer...
...But they serve to remind us that initially attractive moves may have unsuspected consequences and that even in moving away from mutual deterrence, we may be exposing ourselves to new dangers...
...assistant professor of political science at the College of St...
...It is perhaps inevitable that the SALT debate as conducted in the United States so far has been rather ethnocentric, as if the one issue that really mattered was how SALT II would affect the overall American position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union...
...The benefits to be gained from getting away with such an act were significant...
...This somewhat melancholy approach was perhaps best caught in a question raised by a Liberal Party M.P...
...encouraged the North Vietnamese in violating the 1973 Peace Accords resulting in the "loss" of Vietnam...
...Fortunately, it appears likely that, at this time at least, the Soviets have sufficient doubt as to the choice we would make as not to make the attempt...
...The point to be made, again, would be that we cannot accept a treaty which allows the Soviets weapons which enable them to threaten a significant element of our deterrent force, but that we are ready to enter into serious negotiations as soon as they indicate a willingness to abandon such weapons, and such a strategy...
...It may be morally more creditable to err by making charitable and optimistic misjudgments about one's adversaries than by always believing the worst about their intentions...
...They may eventually result in that, but their purpose is to weaken the enemy, to cause him to slacken his efforts...
...This can best be accomplished, it would seem to me, not by attaching reservations or amendments which would cause the Soviets to reject the treaty, but by a simple"no" vote...
...With very few exceptions there was strong support for American attempts at achieving a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union...
...T HE UNITED STATES has been snookered...
...Neither in previous eras or now does it demand that we put ourselves at the mercy of the ruthless...
...but because it placed no restrictions on qualitative improvements such as the MIRVing of missiles or improvements in missile accuracy it was referred to as an "Interim Agreemem...
...There are aspects of recent American-Soviet relations other than arms limitations negotiations that are relevant as contextual considerations for SALT II...
...and have been partly responsible for a reduction of American power and influence in the crucial Middle East-Persian Gulf region...
...Would we bomb Moscow...
Vol. 106 • December 1979 • No. 22
