EDITORIAL
THE LEBANON INVASION Events in the Middle East crash over one another Hke waves in a storm, each building behind the last, then submerging it. Sadat's peace initiative was sinking beneath the...
...It is also unrealistic, for it is inconceivable that Egypt or any other Arab nation will accept as a negotiating starting point an ideological position measurably tougher than that of the previous Israeli government...
...Certainly the operation was a strategic success...
...Even worse was loose talk by others of "revenge...
...No impression could be more unfair to Israel, nor more unfounded so far as the facts are concerned...
...All nations claim the right of self-defense against such forces, though they may not always choose to exercise it or only exercise it when, as in this case, a dramatic conflict makes their situation clear to the world...
...Then the anticipated confrontation between Begin and Carter was suddenly swept aside by the bloody Al Fatah raid...
...Jewish community, which for some time has...
...At least a few things can be said...
...Yet Israel could do this to itself, not only by shortsighted decisions with respect to Lebanon—a decision, for instance, to maintain a permanent or semi-permanent military presence there...
...It can hurt itself as much or more by persisting in the hard line it has adopted in the negotiations with Cairo...
...Sadat's peace initiative was sinking beneath the issue of Israeli policy toward the West Bank...
...For this reason, Washington is well advised to place Begin under pressure to see UN Resolution 242, if not as Washington would like, then at least the way the former Israel government did...
...On the negative side there is no doubt but that the Israeli invasion has added another difficulty to the strained peace negotiations with Egypt...
...The edge of the conflict shifted again—from military strikes to political jockeying, jockeying between America and Tel Aviv, Israelis and Israelis, Americans and Americans, Tel Aviv and Cairo...
...The instinctual adoption of force did nothing to reinforce hope that a more pacific attitude had descended on Tel Aviv...
...The temptation to linger until the area is further secured will be strong for Israel, but territory has become Israel's Tar Baby, entrapping it politically even as it holds out the doubtful promise of military security...
...And although the Carter administration was careful not to intrude on the invasion decision nor criticize it once placed into execution, the invasion may also have added to the strain between the Carter and Begin governments, if only by pointing up the warrior disposition residing yet within Begin...
...But—and this is important—to pressure Begin is not to diminish commitment or concern for Israel...
...Bringing pressure on Begin is not going to help Carter's popularity in the U.S...
...Hard upon that came the stony confrontation between Begin and Carter, and some would add between the administration and the organized U.S...
...The PLO has suffered a major military setback, whatever its claims to the contrary...
...Already there is a subtle shift in American opinion —more sensed than documentable—that makes Israel the sole impediment to peace in the Middle East...
...Is it possible to weave together the outrage provoked by the PLO raid, the distress and sorrow stirred by the consequences of Israel's invasion, and the fine calculations demanded by the political pressures and counterpressures into anything resembling a clarifying and peace-making attitude...
...To urge flexibility on Begin seems in fact the best service one friend could do another at this difficult moment...
...Any judgment on the proportionality of the Israeli response must Commonweal: 227 be made in the context of the underlying, protracted struggle between Israel and the PLO...
...Menachem Begin did not serve his cause well when he spoke of punishment, no matter how understandable the Israeli's emotional response...
...Stunned by that event, the world has only slowly been assessing the Israeli response of a massive sweep into southern Lebanon...
...The intransigence of Begin, specifically in his interpretation of UN Resolution 242 relating to territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, is disheartening...
...been nervous about his Mid-East policy...
...First, the invasion of Lebanon cannot be judged in terms of the PLO raid alone...
...It would be a tragic irony if Israel, by some tactless actions of its own, put itself under the cloud that belongs over the PLO and its backers...
...In addition sensitivities appear to have been quickened in some Middle East quarters to the problem of the PLO's existence in Lebanon...
...His interpretation is unfounded...
...The raid was not an isolated event, but the expression of a hostile force occupying neighboring territory...
...If Lebanon does not have the strength to act effectively in imposing a control over the PLO, then Syria, which has 30,000 soldiers stationed in the country, does and may be disposed to, if only for its own self-interests...
...Israel can at least reduce this impression by getting out of the invasion area as fast as possible and leaving to the UN peacekeeping force the responsibility for insuring that southern Lebanon is not returned to a staging area for military and terrorist strikes...
...A number of Jewish leaders are known to be privately alarmed over the hard-line positions taken by the Begin government in response to the Egyptian peace initiative...
...Jewish community...
Vol. 105 • April 1978 • No. 8
