The Benefits from Helsinki
Clark, Donald L.
Donald L. Clark The Benefits from Helsinki Can Time, the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jackson, George Ball, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn all agree on something and still be wrong? The members of...
...From MBFR we expected a concrete and significant act of detente to develop—actual mutual reductions of military forces at the point where East meets West...
...But once at the conference, the U.S...
...Russia had signed a four-power treaty thatcleared up problems over Berlin...
...True, it was not an earth-shaking event, but in American terms it was never meant to be one...
...Three years $20...
...Perhaps we do not want MBFR as much as we did in 1973...
...But are we really ready to free Latvia by military intervention...
...But in the era of nuclear parity, peaceful means of changing borders was the only viable option open to East or West, both before CSCE and after...
...There remained the question of military forces, and this was to become the real impetus for CSCE, or at least for American participation...
...These statements strike me as being quite consistent with the traditional aims of American foreign policy...
...There remained the question of military forces, and this was to become the real impetus for CSCE, or at least for American participation...
...If the U.S...
...I do not mean to imply that there were no problems with CSCE...
...The Soviet objectives in CSCE were also fairly limited...
...From MBFR we expected a concrete and significant act of detente to develop—actual mutual reductions of military forces at the point where East meets West...
...It is not and was never meant to be enforceable...
...Western objectives for CSCE—pageantry, stimulus for MBFR, the fact that it was becoming difficult to object to the conference—were therefore limited...
...For the U.S...
...The Soviets fought the "human contact" issue at every point during negotiations and gave ground only grudgingly...
...Indeed, I think the United States may have made a serious mistake in the course of negotiations, a mistake which has gone relatively unnoticed by the critics...
...Since the Soviets were sponsoring a CSCE call, and since the first big summit was abuilding, the logical diplomatic linkage became obvious and was forged...
...The Agreement and the Criticisms Under careful examination, the CSCE agreement clearly makes no wild claims...
...Most of our allies were reluctant partners in MBFR anyhow...
...Remember what I said about the American strategy to use CSCE in order to get MBFR...
...I suspect, however, that if they considered the victory so hollow they wouldn't have fought against it so hard...
...For the critics have concentrated single-mindedly on the legitimacy accorded the postwar borders...
...The United States and Western Europe said as much...
...The Soviets had originally proposed the conference in the hopes it would give legitimacy to the post-World War II borders...
...What is the point in talking about security and cooperation, we asked, if the Soviets show no willingness to reduce their forces in Central Europe, if they refuse to recognize Western rights in Berlin, and if they do not allow much trade and travel between East and West...
...Western objectives for CSCE—pageantry, stimulus for MBFR, the fact that it was becoming difficult to object to the conference—were therefore limited...
...What loss can it be to admit that...
...It is not and was never meant to be enforceable...
...What is the point in talking about security and cooperation, we asked, if the Soviets show no willingness to reduce their forces in Central Europe, if they refuse to recognize Western rights in Berlin, and if they do not allow much trade and travel between East and West...
...Two years $15...
...The members of this diverse group all think that the recent Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was a best a farce and more likely a Soviet victory and an American defeat...
...Our political culture badly needs an alternative perspective to the standard positions of the Left and the Right, and I think The Alternative is more and more being true to its name in developing such a perspective...
...Western businessmen were now able to sell their wares in the Comecon countries, and though movement was still restricted for citizens of those countries, Westerners could travel much more freely behind the Iron Curtain...
...Administration leaders, strongly supported by the military, felt that troop reductions would do less harm and be far more palatable to our allies if they were accompanied by balanced Soviet reductions...
...Norman Podhoretz THE ALTERNATIVE, Post Office Box 877, Bloomington, Indiana 47401 Enclosed is $ Please enter a ^ new ^ renewal subscription to The Alternative for: ^ One year $8...
...there are costs to be paid in any agreement between parties...
...In a strange bit of logic, the critics claim that the agreement takes away from the West options to unite Germany or free enslaved nations, but on the other hand, where the agreement says something the West wants, like "human contact" or non-interference in others' affairs, they scoff and say the agreement is meaningless...
...At first, it worked very well, and the preliminary conferences for CSCE and MBFR both began and terminated at the same time...
...Remember what I said about the American strategy to use CSCE in order to get MBFR...
...Indeed, I think the United States may have made a serious mistake in the course of negotiations, a mistake which has gone relatively unnoticed by the critics...
...and our allies decided to make the most of whatever bargaining power was available...
...Even on the issues of the borders, the Soviets did not attain their full objectives...
...If the U.S...
...And finally, many Western European leaders began to itch for some diplomatic pageantry of the sort CSCE would provide...
...Our political culture badly needs an alternative perspective to the standard positions of the Left and the Right, and I think The Alternative is more and more being true to its name in developing such a perspective...
...The Western Europeans latched on to an American idea of pushing agreements to increase the flow of ideas and human contact between East and West...
...I frankly think that the chance to meet with European leaders was sufficient grounds for President Ford to sign the document...
...efforts and expectations about CSCE...
...Russia had signed a four-power treaty thatcleared up problems over Berlin...
...The Soviets now said they would accept American and Canadian participation in the conference...
...Congress launched its strongest attack yet on the American overseas force structure, and the Administration did not know how long it could hold off the Congressional imposition of unilateral force reductions, especially in Europe...
...instead, according to the Helsinki agree-ment borders may he changed by negotiation...
...Even on the issues of the borders, the Soviets did not attain their full objectives...
...By 1973 it had become much more difficult to object to Soviet proposals...
...expected CSCE to deal mostly with words and phrases...
...were willing to invade Lithuania or support the next Hungarian uprising with something more than the rhetoric of last time, then the critics would be fair in their criticism...
...This linkage is important and it goes far to explain U.S...
...And besides, how would we have looked as the one holdout in 35 to oppose a document that encourages security and cooperation, that calls for limits on the use of force while permitting peaceful change, and that commits the Soviets—no matter how imperfectly—to a crack in the Iron Curtain...
...For the critics have concentrated single-mindedly on the legitimacy accorded the postwar borders...
...You can't have it both ways...
...Most of our allies were reluctant partners in MBFR anyhow...
...CSCE was by no means a shellacking of the West by the East...
...I contend that the Conference served American interests better than its critics have supposed...
...and our allies decided to make the most of whatever bargaining power was available...
...CSCE, as its critics point out, was a Soviet idea, and when the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact satellites began suggesting an all-European conference about ten years ago, the idea was clearly not in American and Western European interests...
...Yet our President is criticized for signing it while their leader is lauded beyond belief...
...For the U.S...
...But once at the conference, the U.S...
...were willing to invade Lithuania or support the next Hungarian uprising with something more than the rhetoric of last time, then the critics would be fair in their criticism...
...What loss can it be to admit that...
...The Soviets had originally proposed the conference in the hopes it would give legitimacy to the post-World War II borders...
...Moreover, I contend that the "human contact" provisions of the agreement are not entirely meaningless...
...and our allies it will be easy to adhere to but for the Communists, not so...
...force reductions has diminished...
...Thus, we began pushing for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Conference, MBFR...
...I contend that the Conference served American interests better than its critics have supposed...
...CSCE, as its critics point out, was a Soviet idea, and when the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact satellites began suggesting an all-European conference about ten years ago, the idea was clearly not in American and Western European interests...
...They wanted the postwar borders to be permanent, with no exceptions...
...CSCE, as its critics poin...
...The Soviets fought the "human contact" issue at every point during negotiations and gave ground only grudgingly...
...Moreover, I contend that the "human contact" provisions of the agreement are not entirely meaningless...
...But if our government still does want mutual force reductions in Europe, it blew its best opportunity to get them...
...In 1973 the U.S...
...This linkage is important and it goes far to explain U.S...
...On the other hand, the U.S...
...Since the Soviets were sponsoring a CSCE call, and since the first big summit was abuilding, the logical diplomatic linkage became obvious and was forged...
...instead, according to the Helsinki agree-ment borders may he changed by negotiation...
...Furthermore, since the security of Western Europe is so closely tied to the NATO alliance, our European allies objected to Soviet proposals for a purely European conference, without full American and Canadian participation...
...would now support a CSCE if the Soviets would also come to MBFR...
...And yet, all things considered, I don't think CSCE was as disastrous an affair as has been made out...
...In 1973 the U.S...
...The U.S...
...True, it was not an earth-shaking event, but in American terms it was never meant to be one...
...The Agreement and the Criticisms Under careful examination, the CSCE agreement clearly makes no wild claims...
...The need for this legitimacy, however, has been much less important in the last few years, for the Soviet treaty with West Germany had ratified the German-Polish border, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia had once 22 The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 again demonstrated the powerlessness of the West to do anything about such borders...
...At first, it worked very well, and the preliminary conferences for CSCE and MBFR both began and terminated at the same time...
...and our allies it will be easy to adhere to but for the Communists, not so...
...They considered it an odious proposal and even made it clear that it would prove a hollow victory for the West if we insisted on broad rights...
...The members of this diverse group all think that the recent Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was a best a farce and more likely a Soviet victory and an American defeat...
...The Western Europeans latched on to an American idea of pushing agreements to increase the flow of ideas and human contact between East and West...
...expected CSCE to deal mostly with words and phrases...
...You can't have it both ways...
...Instead, it is a document of guidance, understanding, and commitment...
...The primary Soviet aim for CSCE in the last few years has been pageantry, in accordance with their view that "looks are more important than deeds," and in the hopes that Brezhnev would bask in the limelight as the creator of a major conference...
...And yet, all things considered, I don't think CSCE was as disastrous an affair as has been made out...
...The primary Soviet aim for CSCE in the last few years has been pageantry, in accordance with their view that "looks are more important than deeds," and in the hopes that Brezhnev would bask in the limelight as the creator of a major conference...
...Stripped of the adjectives and diplomatic tone, its most important clauses state that the signatories (1) foreswear interference in the internal affairs of each other, (2) foreswear the use of force or threats of force to settle differences, (3) accept the post-World War II boundaries and promise to revise them only by negotiation and peaceful means, (4) are encouraged to pre-announce certain military maneuvers and movements near borders and invite military observers to them, (5) will attempt to increase trade and scientific cocperation, and (6) will allow increased flow of people and ideas...
...efforts and expectations about CSCE...
...Thus, we began pushing for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Conference, MBFR...
...And finally, many Western European leaders began to itch for some diplomatic pageantry of the sort CSCE would provide...
...The Soviet objectives in CSCE were also fairly limited...
...I do not mean to imply that there were no problems with CSCE...
...They considered it an odious proposal and even made it clear that it would prove a hollow victory for the West if we insisted on broad rights...
...In a strange bit of logic, the critics claim that the agreement takes away from the West options to unite Germany or free enslaved nations, but on the other hand, where the agreement says something the West wants, like "human contact" or non-interference in others' affairs, they scoff and say the agreement is meaningless...
...And besides, how would we have looked as the one holdout in 35 to oppose a document that encourages security and cooperation, that calls for limits on the use of force while permitting peaceful change, and that commits the Soviets—no matter how imperfectly—to a crack in the Iron Curtain...
...But are we really ready to free Latvia by military intervention...
...Indeed, I suspect that many of those who criticize the agreement most strenuously have actually not read it...
...The West German government considers the agreement a success, and yet the borders issue has more significance for it than for any other Western participant...
...Please print) Name Address City State Zip The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 23 Donald L. Clark The Benefits from Helsinki Can Time, the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jackson, George Ball, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn all agree on something and still be wrong...
...But if our government still does want mutual force reductions in Europe, it blew its best opportunity to get them...
...The members of this diverse group all think that the recent Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was a best a farce and more likely a Soviet victory and an American defeat...
...force reductions has diminished...
...Norman Podhoretz THE ALTERNATIVE, Post Office Box 877, Bloomington, Indiana 47401 Enclosed is $ Please enter a ^ new ^ renewal subscription to The Alternative for: ^ One year $8...
...The Soviets now said they would accept American and Canadian participation in the conference...
...They wanted the postwar borders to be permanent, with no exceptions...
...Stripped of the adjectives and diplomatic tone, its most important clauses state that the signatories (1) foreswear interference in the internal affairs of each other, (2) foreswear the use of force or threats of force to settle differences, (3) accept the post-World War II boundaries and promise to revise them only by negotiation and peaceful means, (4) are encouraged to pre-announce certain military maneuvers and movements near borders and invite military observers to them, (5) will attempt to increase trade and scientific cocperation, and (6) will allow increased flow of people and ideas...
...The U.S...
...In other words, we failed to use our leverage in CSCE to keep the momentum of MBFR going...
...Western businessmen were now able to sell their wares in the Comecon countries, and though movement was still restricted for citizens of those countries, Westerners could travel much more freely behind the Iron Curtain...
...Yet our President is criticized for signing it while their leader is lauded beyond belief...
...Perhaps we do not want MBFR as much as we did in 1973...
...What does it actually say...
...There have been a Vietnam debacle, a Portugal, and renewed hostilities in the Middle East since then, and obviously internal pressure for U.S...
...These statements strike me as being quite consistent with the traditional aims of American foreign policy...
...Instead, it is a document of guidance, understanding, and commitment...
...I suspect, however, that if they considered the victory so hollow they wouldn't have fought against it so hard...
...would now support a CSCE if the Soviets would also come to MBFR...
...There have been a Vietnam debacle, a Portugal, and renewed hostilities in the Middle East since then, and obviously internal pressure for U.S...
...Indeed, I suspect that many of those who criticize the agreement most strenuously have actually not read it...
...But in the era of nuclear parity, peaceful means of changing borders was the only viable option open to East or West, both before CSCE and after...
...The need for this legitimacy, however, has been much less important in the last few years, for the Soviet treaty with West Germany had ratified the German-Polish border, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia had once 22 The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 again demonstrated the powerlessness of the West to do anything about such borders...
...The United States and Western Europe said as much...
...I contend that the Conference served American interests better than its critics have supposed...
...The U.S...
...In other words, we failed to use our leverage in CSCE to keep the momentum of MBFR going...
...We will simply treat it like Yalta and interpret it our way," they said...
...Administration leaders, strongly supported by the military, felt that troop reductions would do less harm and be far more palatable to our allies if they were accompanied by balanced Soviet reductions...
...planned to be a positive force in CSCE mainly to encourage positive Soviet action in MBFR...
...We will simply treat it like Yalta and interpret it our way," they said...
...But now that CSCE is over, we still have yet to reach Phase I of MBFR...
...By 1973 it had become much more difficult to object to Soviet proposals...
...What does it actually say...
...The U.S...
...Furthermore, since the security of Western Europe is so closely tied to the NATO alliance, our European allies objected to Soviet proposals for a purely European conference, without full American and Canadian participation...
...planned to be a positive force in CSCE mainly to encourage positive Soviet action in MBFR...
...Two years $15...
...Three years $20...
...But now that CSCE is over, we still have yet to reach Phase I of MBFR...
...there are costs to be paid in any agreement between parties...
...I frankly think that the chance to meet with European leaders was sufficient grounds for President Ford to sign the document...
...Congress launched its strongest attack yet on the American overseas force structure, and the Administration did not know how long it could hold off the Congressional imposition of unilateral force reductions, especially in Europe...
...CSCE was by no means a shellacking of the West by the East...
...On the other hand, the U.S...
...Please print) Name Address City State Zip The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 23 Donald L. Clark The Benefits from Helsinki Can Time, the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jackson, George Ball, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn all agree on something and still be wrong...
...The West German government considers the agreement a success, and yet the borders issue has more significance for it than for any other Western participant...
Vol. 9 • December 1975 • No. 3
