Cold Dawn

...In what we call the real world, framed in the minutes of our daily lives, real time does grow shorter...

...The question thus remains: what advantages did Nixon and Kissinger perceive for the United States in the SALT agreements...

...Neither does he cou,~Jent on the relationship between the U.S...

...You're right in the middle...

...But it's different now and there isn't as much time...

...Finally, his analysis of the inter- and intra-agency bargaining which accompanies the development of every American negotiating position and invariably damages that position, often quite gravely, deserves serious study...

...The agreenmnts, Mr...

...Oh, there wor 9 "talking pictures ~ for the older ixnmigrants, who had arrived too late to learn to read with ease the w~rds imprinted on the screen...

...McNarmra (and, as Newhouse reminds us, by Napoleon), even if he substitutes for it the equally ingenuous Kissinger view which holds that arms races stern from the '~inexorable march of technology...

...Talking pictures...

...This 'offer too was quickly spurned...

...It is even possible that the Soviets are planning a technological leap forward to a defensive system based on such devices as the highenergy laser, not neces__~rily banned by the ABM Treaty...

...SALT did not in any way avert a furti~er Soviet acctmmlation of strategic weapons, nor is our security guaranteed by any notable American advantages in warhead or submarine technology...

...Ki~inger has said, were constructing 250 ICBMs and 128 sea-latmched missiles a year, and by 1977 would have deployed over 2500 of the former and 1340 of the latter (on ninety boats) if not halted by the agreement...

...IN HIS PERCu;I~rlVE analysis of the impact of the 1972 strategic arms agreements upon the global military balance, the British scholar John Erickson observed that "mere than one Soviet strategist and military planner these days must be still rubbing his eyes in order to make sure that he is not, after all, dreaming...

...And things should always be just about perfect at the halfway point--you've just left a good flight with pretty, happy stewardesses, stiff drinks, and that completely easy feeling that comes perhaps only on a long flight---you're in the damned thing, everything has been ripped out of your hands, you're not responsible for a damned thing, and you taste the booze and you taste your cigarettes, and things you haven't thought about for years---the good happy thing~ ~come rushing back...

...Since the Russians resolutely stuck to their basic viewpoint---an insistence on a substantial margin of nunmrical superiority--it was inevitable that the results of the '~mrgaining" would be unfavorable to American interests...

...But we learn to live for the pauses, during which we stretch time out so that the possibilities that seemed so real in so many taverns a few years ago seem as real as ever...

...Our dri~ng assumption," he argues, ~ms been that arms control negotiations are a uniquely cooperative process, wherein compromLRe is a mutual objective and negotiation a non-zero-sum game where both sides stand to gain muttmlly and equally . . . . The Soviet Union, however, seems clearly to have regarded SALT as another cerrq~etitive endeavor, where the objective is unilateral advantage and where one can gain at the expense of the other" (~_nternational Negotiations," Hearings before the SubcoJJcu~ittee on National Security and International Operations, Part 7, July 25, 1972, p. 200...

...The Soviets, Mr...

...But it was not for us, not only because we could rem~ but because we could not afford to enter a movie palace where the admission was ten cents (for adults) and a nickel (each) for minors between five end twelve...

...There are good ones, however...

...Rather, it signaled the abandonment by the United States of its promising ABM systern...

...Co/z/ Dawn is several books in one...

...a one-tin~ st~lAut of history named Henry A. Kissinger has also warned us that "the danger to the equilibrium is never demonstrated until it is already overturned" (A World Restored [1964 ecL], p. 163...

...Kissinger in particular in defense of the accords...

...Newhouse recounts in depressing detail this stream of American retreats, unmatched by any countorconcessions from the SOviets, although he never identifies them as such...

...Newhouse, also a self-confessed MADman, makes no attempt to evaluate this ammn~tion...

...Both the numerical and the size restrictions contained in SALT are thus dead letters---and, let me repeat, the Administration knew when SALT was signed that they wore ineffectual obstacles to further upgrading of the Soviet missile force...

...ignored is the possibility that the SOviets may have decided to acquire at least a partial damage-limiting capability (i.e., a capacity to limit the amount of destruction which ~the United States could wreak upon Soviet society should deterrence fall) based on a n ability to destroy a large portion of America's own strategic force in a preemptive blow...

...such a peature, he argues, would be "provocative" to the Soviets and might overly stimulate the arms race...

...Congress would appropriate funds to construct an American NCA site, and the Soviets' "Galosh" system affords at least limited protection for 300 ICBM silos emplaced near Moscow...

...Ten years ago, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the prospect of permanent strategic inferiority must have appeared depressingly real to the SoVIets...

...The throwweight of a missile, of course, affects the size and n ~ of warheads it can carry...

...The Soviets had completed only 25 SSBNs by May 1972, with 17 to 23 more under construction, and were Rddlng boats at the rate of 8 or 9 per year;, even had they continued to build submarines at that rate (they haven't), they could have deployed no mere than 65 by 1977--merely three more than l~ffi,cfitted by the SALT agreement...

...Thus it once again becomes clear, as I have arguel at length elsewhere from a different perspective (see ~ NLxon Doctrine and the Primacy of Ddtente," Interco//eg/a~ Rev/ew, IX [Spring, 1974], forthcoming), that ddtente is I x ~ the wellspring and the ultimate goal of the Nixon Ach~nistration's entire foreign and military policy...

...There, on Clinton Street, there was a conveffi~vd theater where, in the box on stage-right, was ensconced a gentle~q~ interlocutor who read the men's portion of the silent dialogue, while a woman, stage-left, spoke the wc~ls Clara Kimh~l Young poured Imseionately into the ear of Francis X. I ~ n The accents'were sufficiently inflected to mal~p _9 understanding the strange language almost completely intelligible...

...We sucked in the words onthe Silver Screen: We held our breath when the dark villainc ".hey were always " ~ a r t h y , " a dirty word in our y o ~ caught up with Pauline whose perils were our perils, but whose plight would have been augmented had we not been able, in a trice, to match words to action which is what reading is all about...

...Professor Erickson believes that the rrm~ive post-1964 Russian military buildup has in large measure been motivated by a desire to avoid the foreign policy implications implicit in acceptance of a MAD posture (see Erickson, op...

...He appears to reject the oversimplified "acti0n-reaction" theory of the arms race, so beloved by Mr...

...Initially the American delegation proposed a "freeze in place" on offensive and defensive landbased missiles, which would have left the United States with a small ICBM margin and a protective force of twelve ABM installations (assuming funding by Congress) compared with one for the USSR When the Soviets rejected this position, we suggested that both sides be limited to 1710 strategic launchers (then, as now, the American total...

...But at O'Hare you're in between, and for that brief moment you space things out, and once again there's plenty of time, time to do yourself over, time to do the things you know you were meant to do...

...Available evidence indicates, for example, that Recretary Kissinger himself is a MADnmn, although the record is not ~ without its ambiguities...

...This means not only that the USSR will have a rapid reload and retire capability, enabling them to deploy two or mere missiles per silo...

...Kissinger) he has attacked the "asmu~ destruction" p ~ t u r e for its lack of flexibility, asking whether he ought to be restricted to responding to a nuclear attack--presumably meaning an attack directe~J primarily at U.S...

...c/t., pp...

...You're in between flights, and the best part is still ahead...

...Neither does he ~allenge the final argument for SAL...

...it will also permit them to increase sulmtantially the size and thus thethrow-weight of their rni~iles by eliminating the need for protective shielding in the launchex...

...Like the American delegation, Newhouse is unable to accept the probability that the Soviets entered the SALT negotiations deliberately seeking to gain strategic advantage over the United States...

...were admitted for a half a dime, the more affluent proffering three cents to the skinniest runt on the street pleading, ~Who's got three...

...Airport bars are generally lousy--especially those in New York and Washington--plastickyfurnishings, overpriced stingy drinks, indifferent bartenders...

...reaction, in Newhouse's disarming phraseology, was to accept the fact that any agreemont would have to ~grant Moscow...

...Nearly all commentators on SALT who do not belong to the assured destruction school of nuclear strategy have rendered similar judgments...

...And for a moment or two, it's nice to think so...

...Kissinger to be false when he first articulated it...

...He writes knowledgeably concerning certain aspects of the American negotiating style, calling particular attention to our difficul, ty in maintaining requisite firmness and consistency when bargaining with the Soviets...

...Not surprisingly, these allegations have been denied by the secretary, and other reports suggest that Raymond Garthoff of the State Department, formerly senior advisor to the American delegation, was Newhouse's primary source of "closely held" information...

...And this is quite A nRrt from the counterforce capability already extant in their SS-9 force...

...They're in temporary suspension and totally relaxed, for O'Hare is usually the halfway point for serious travelers...

...In the scholarly writings which first brought him academic fame in the middle and late fifties, he quite directly identified himself with the ~mite deterrence" school of nuclear strategy, whose members believed that the maintenance of a stable military balance between the superpowers would be a relatively easy task once each had acquired an invulnerable second-strike force...

...But until this year the President had not seriously attempted to persuade Congress to appropriate funds for the kinds of hardtarget weapons which would provide other options...

...Newhouse's account is nonetheless most valuable for what it reveals without intending to do so...

...his account is replete with ~whodunit" motifs and other conceits mere appropriate to a writer of suspense fiction, and suffers as well from tedious overuse of theological metaphors...

...Recently, I spent a few hours in the bar in the airport at Albany, New York...

...in rapid sequence we then retreated from most of our earlier defined "collateral restraints" designed to assure compliance with the agreement, abandoned our insistence that mobile missiles be outlawed, and dropped our demand for a clear definition of what constitutes a "heavy missile...

...The Russians had been developing a 4000-nautical mile range SLBM since early 1971, and they began deploying it on their newly designed ~T)elta" submarines in mid-1972...

...Furthermore, due to a highly significant Soviet advance in launching technology--which Newhonse suggests Washington was aware of as early as April 1971--the agreementdoes not prevent the Soviets from ~ddlng additional ICBMs to their arsenal in any event, nor does it forestall bubstantial increases in the 18 The Alternative June-September 1974 throw-weight of their rni~iles...

...The viability of MAD ultinmtely rests on the belief that deterrence will never fail...

...xi-xii...

...no one either within or outside the governn~nt was anticipating further large-scale Russian deployment of landbased missiles...

...it did not escape into a vague And abashed, sometimes brazen illiteracy where it is used to to begin a nonsentence which usually ends with the nonw~cl %n": =IAke I said marL" Our books were read/n@ books--novels ,for boys, yes...

...Thus, the uninitiated will discover the logic of deterrence, basic strategic concepts such as counterforce and countervalue, and such superficially arcane acronyms as MIRV, NCA, BMD, ABM, and MAD, all explained with reasonable clarity and occasionally with wit...

...other Adrniniatration such as Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Ikld, 81nrmed at the maaaive nnd continuing Soviet military buildup since SALT I, are increasingly doubtful...

...So far Nixon and...

...lead in warhead technology and the longer range of our sea=launched missiles as further proof that SALT has not endangered America's strategic position...

...Attention is also drawn to the time constraints placed upon the American SALT delegation by the President's insistence that an agreement be ready for signing at the Moscow Summit...

...That's how it is at O'Hare...

...the "definitive" account of the SALT negotiations, an assertion which is empirically difficult to challenge inasmuch as it remains up to now the only account...

...Newhouse's analysis is marred as well by a persistent effort to interpret Soviet attitudes and behavior in the most favorable way possible, and from an astonishing ignorance of Russia's military doctrine...

...that whatever their technical deficiencies the accords are worthy of support because they contribute to ddtente, and that ddtente, in turn, will in the last analysis ensure their viability...

...At least they did on the lower East Side...

...Newhouse's gratuitous assertion that the Soviet military build up has been accompanied by ~no formal strategic doctrine" is thus simply f a l ~ as even a cursory review of the available literature demonstrates...

...This may partially explain his failure to examine critically the various arguments offered by Administration spokesmen and by Mr...

...We had to or we would have been denied the greatest pleasure provided by the entertaining media of our rime'the "silents...

...and, with what even Newhouse concedes was unseemly haste, our s~cend offer was...

...In the process, he makes several points worth p:oting...

...The sublimit of 318 placed on Soviet deployment of heavy migqile launchers has been singled out for particular praise, on grounds that it rendered impossible or at least substantially delayed Soviet m:quisition of a significant firststrike capability, Administration spokesmen have also cited the U.S...

...a si~hle edge in strategic missiles," and a series-of new initiatives was proffered on that basis...

...It wasn't much of place, but it reminded me of other airport bars in which I'd waited for someone or something...

...This new ability to launch missiles with accurate multiple and independently t a r g e t ~ warheads, when combined with the cold-launch technique and the basically larger size (and thus threw-weight) of the new missiles, will within a few years enable the Soviets to deploy even medium-sized cotmterforce ICBI~ with the capacity to hit U.S...

...and for Wlxon and 'Ki~mingor, this assurance in turn ultlrrmtely restson theunshakeable conviction that ddtente is a reality...

...that glowed with promise...

...SALT did not halt or even retard the arms race, at least on the Soviet side...

...In any event, Newhouse does provide us with an absorbing--if clearly partial and incomplete glimpse into the development of the American negotiating positions and the manner in which concord with the Soviets was finally achieved...

...I~uncher damage is avoided in the case of sea-launched mi~iles' by use of a compressed gas ejection system, which expels the missile from the tube prior to ignition, but the number of missiles which a submarine can deploy is limited in any event by the size of the boat...

...Beyond that, Newhouse's volume is a history of An~rican strategic thinking over the last decade, tracing U.S.-Soviet military relations--and the origin of the strategic arms negotiations--from the early sixties to the present, with often perceptive insights into the views on American nuclear strategy which wore held by principal figures during that period...

...cit., p. 205, and cf...

...Brennan's testimony on SALT before the Senate CommiRee on Foreig n P, elntions, relriuted in ConA~es...

...The best one is the large upstairs lounge at O'Hare, where the drinks are very good, surprisingly cheap, and the bartenders, cut in the Daley mold, unusually friendly...

...failure to persuade the Soviets to meet'us at least one-quarter of the way, and the American negotiating style itself...

...s/ona/Recor~ June 30, 1972, p. S 10967...

...The story of SALT is at core a story of retreat--a virtually unbroken retreat by the United States from every proposal offered and every position taken during the course of the negotiations...

...And when the place is right and the drinks are right and the talk is right, there's just as much time as there used to be...

...Since SALT, moreover, the Soviets have t~ko.n a giant step toward perfecting MIRV technology in a series of tests involving a whole new generation of long-range missi1~ a development which the Administration had been predicting for several years prior to February 1972...

...Cont -y to widespread ng, the SALT accords do not restrict the number of missiles _~_~ side may deploy, but only the nu~ of tauncher~ i.e., siles or mxbmarine missile tubeS...

...The latter~s views on the proper military posture for the ~ were found somewhat wanting during the Cuban missile crisis, and were subsequently rejected by Soviet military and political leaders alike...

...The drinkers at the bar--the good ones--have learned how very important it is to parcel out time, and they appreciate the central beauty of air travel...

...In particular, it is essential that we discover how and why the United States came to concede nmnerical superiority to the USSR in the principal instruments of modern w a r . John Newhouse's Co/d Dawrr The Story of SALT*is clearly the best place to begin an inquiry into the diplomatic process which begat the Moscow accords...

...Newhouse notes in one of his more analytical moments that an arms control agreement may be either stabilizing or destabilizing, depending on the motives of the parties...

...but novels all the same...

...Of particular interest is his analysis of Robert McNanmra, who set the SALT talks in motion, he argues, to head off .public pressure for deployment of a broad-coverage ballisticmissile defense system...

...Andno one was more ~ in t ~ resard than AJger with _9 whose heroes we easily identified" Ph//the PZdd~r, The ~rand/~y...

...today, mirabile dictu, after the lapse of a single decade the USSR is "not only guaranteed parity with the United States but also accorded the possibility of eventual superiority" (Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," Strateg/c Review, I [Spring, 1973, Special Supplement], p. ix...

...In each of his annual State of the World messages (apparently drafted by Mr...

...Equally disingenuous have been the Administrations arguments in defense of the SALT provisions concerning seal a ~ e d systems...

...Even in the ABM provisions the Russians gained the advantage: thei~ was never any possibili~ that...

...deployment of MIRV and ABM...

...Now, however, the Soviets have developed a "cold-latmch" technology, similar to that utilized in missile-firing submarines, for use with their ICBMs...

...Kiminger's trust in the Soviet coua~itment to detente unshaken...

...We read full-length books (not comic books) that tingled with excitement,--Frank Merriwell, Nick CsDcter--or the books by Horatio Alger, Jr...

...Kissinger stated during the congressional briefing, ~must be seen as a political event of some m a g n i t u d e . . , any country which contemplat0s a hupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy a broad political relationJJ~ip...

...uteman silos...

...As Professor William Van Cleave, formerly an advisor to the U.S...

...military targeto by "ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaught~ of Americans" (1970 R~port, p. 122...

...Who's got threeT' He had to be skinny or he'd never be able to share the narrow seat provided by an aggrandizing entertainment entrepreneur...

...The Soviet leadership, he believes, agreed to enter arms limitation talks in 1968 in order to curb the rising power of their own military bureaucracy, rather than to avert U.S...

...This d i s t i r ~ o n has usually been thought to possess little significance: ignition of the missile and other effects of the launching pcocoss normally result in heavy damage to the inside of the silo, meanir~ that only one missile could be launched per silo (at least during a reasonably short war...

...That argument too is false, and once again was known by Mr...

...The Administration cx~d therefore adopt the SALT agreement with enthusiaswr c.nd employ false arguments concerning the present and future military balance in defending it--because NLxon and Kie~inger believe, in accordance with the dictates of the MAD strategy, that only at some vague and undefined level do weapons disparities between the tWD powers assume military or political significance...

...As I have indicated, there is no reason to doubt that the Administration---Secretary Kiesinger in particular--is awm-e of the above considerations...

...Russian ~ese for an ABM freeze is taken as evidence that they, like the United States, believe that a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD), in which the populous cities of each side are intentionally left vulnerable to nuclear devastation by the other, is the most stable strategic state...

...Kissinger himself released top-secret data to Newhouse, including transcripts of cables relaying instructions from Washington to the American negotiating team...

...NLxon's views are nmre ambivalent...

...Prior to the signing of the accords, Administration sources were predicting both publicly and privately that Soviet ICBM launcher deployment would level off at 1600 or so, enabling the USSR to cencentrate its efforts on warhead accuracy, MIRV, and other qualitative irrb _9 provemonts...

...in fact, it .is well known that on several occasions the Administration decided not to go ahead with a hard-target warhead program as a gratuitous gesture of goodwill to the Soviets...

...Finally, Co/d Dawn is a highly dramatized account of the SALT negotiations thenmelves, coupled with an obviou~ Mthough seldom directly statei--defense of the results...

...Yes, years before the ~alkiea" down upon us to shatter the blessed silence that enveloped us, our elders went to their kind of movies that ~t~Jked...

...counterforce strategies impossible for both sides...

...As close st~dents of Soviet military thought (for example, .John Erickson, Thomas W. Wolfe, and William Schneider) have pointed out, there is in Russian strategic doctrine no equivalent of ~assu~ destructiorL" Indeed, mutual assured ~ o n is precisely the strategic state in which the Soviets fo~md themsolves towards the close of the Khrushchev era...

...Why, in a word, did SALT happen...

...O'Hare is the crossroads, and the people at the bar come from'Hartford, Dallas, Phoenix, Anchorage...

...To be sure, in one sense the former statement is true: Co/d Dawn is clearly an "insider's" account, based on leaks from one or mere of those now-proverbial "sources close to the negotiations...

...Newhouse even concedes--unfortunately without elaboration or adequate analysis---4hat a condition of "rough parity" is not without its dangers for the West, and that in the wake of the concessions granted to the USSR at SALT I the United States has little leverage or The Alternative June-September 1974 17 bargaining power to exploit in the followon negotiations now under way...

...Horatio Alger and Garry Wills A Wz LEARNED TO READ early on New York's East Side...

...In short, the nonpolitical argun~nts supporting SALT I, which attempt to explain away the numerical imbalances in the accords by an elaborate analysis of the weapons systems allowed both sides, are for the most part scar~lously false...

...Once again, the Soviets were intransigent, and by now Kissinger had become persuaded that their objective was superiority in numbers Of offensive missiles...

...indeed, the unremitting Soviet milif~ry buildup over the past eighteen months has given rise in some quarters to fears that the Soviets may attain useable military predominance over the West by 1980...

...the ~ Mr...

...We were, mcet of us, tiny fiddlers, f u t u ~ Seschas, Tcechas, l~schas, Yasdms, and if not that, we were almost all of us "errand boy~ I was one, and the one book which I ~ mn~t~ in my present library of a th~m~nd volumes on philosophy, politics, art, and literature, m A]gees ~ ~randt~ywhieh be#m the way a book should--with the setting defined aud the hero introduced in the first sentence: ~ Brent was ploaai~j through the snow in the direction of the house where he lived with his step-mother and her son, when a snow-ball, moist and hard, struck him just below his ear with stinging ~ . ~ This is not.the way books earnmrksd for 20 The Alternative June-September 1974...

...The accords, therefore, "limited" the Soviets to apprexinmtely the maximum number of sealaunched missiles which they could have constructed in any event, l~nally, the 62 to 44 dispexity in SSBNs permitted the USSR by SALT has been justified by the shorter range of the Russian SLBMs and the lack of Soviet access to overseas bases...

...Americans have been: repeatedly urged to avoid contemplating the numerical advantages guaranteed the Soviets, and to refl~ct instead on our likely fate in the absence of the treaty...

...Yes, two boys (we never took girls along, Gloria Stoinem, so eat your heart out...

...To ascertain the answer one must leave Newhouse and scrutinize the more basic Administration views on military and foreign policy...

...In addition, SALT formally registexed acceptanco by the United States of a significant Soviet advantage in strategic w~mpor~ ~n advantage certain to increase ~ l y in the f u t u r e . The potential political consequences of the accords in Europe and elsewhere have yet to be carefully ~n~lyzed, but the possibility that the Soviets will be able to translate their military gains into political advantage as well cannot be denied...

...Though such views may be considered excessively pessimistic, few would todag assert that the United States emerged triumphant from the HelsinkiVienna bargaining;, it is thus imperative that we extract the relevant lessons from SALT I and apply them to current and future negotiations with the Soviet Union...

...Ki~dnger has explained, requires three SSBNs to every two of ours to maintain an equal number on station...

...u r ~ r such conditions, he argued, disparities in the actual numbers of missiles possessed by each side would normally be unimportant...

...Additionally, i t allowed only two missile defense sites, one protecting the national capital area (NCA) and the other protecting an ICBM field...

...To the extent that the Administration has rested its defense of the accords upon these arguments, it has deliberately deceived the ~can people...

...Serious students have been repelled by the novelized style into which Newhouse frequently lapses, especially when chronicling the progress toward agreement in late 1971 and early 1972...

...In any event, Soviet strategic thinking during the past decade has emphasized the need for bothcounterforce and countervalue options...

...Kissinger to be false from the start...

...stalemate in round three of SALT is attributed to disagreements within the Soviet delegation, rather than to a calculated stall allowing further l~ssian missile deploymonts...

...The runt had to be able to read, too, without mouthing the words too loud and i n t o r r t ~ Our reveries as VC'il)iAm Farnmn--no stereotype he of a William S. Hart or even a latter John Wayne--tracked down the villain on Zano Greys "purple sage...

...It remains to be seen whether the damage to the strategic equilibrium wrought by SALT I will fie rectified or reinforced by SALT H. James E. Dornan, Jr...

...These were real books, fullbodied books, with full-bodied sentences...

...Thus we assessed proposals not primarily in terms of their ultimate impact upon the military balance, but in terms of what we believed the Soviets might accept: negotiability was the principal criterion which shaped the successive U.S.positions...

...His menograph has been acclaimed, in fact, as *New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1973, $7.95...

...SALT delegation, has emphasized, the United States remains "politically ndive" in its approach to bargaining with the Soviet...

...replaced by the famous "August 4th" proposal, which basically contemplated a freeze at a higher level for both sides, at approximately 1900 launchers...

...indeed, there have been reports from other such "sources" that Mr...

...All of this seems designed to persuade the reader that he is being allowed a brief look into a very secret world, whose mysteries he cannot fathom and whose decisions he must not presun~ to challenge...

...For mere than a decade he has rejected the view that nuclear weapons are useable for political The Alternative June-September 1974 19 ~ ; his solution to the dilemma implicit in the "amurei destruction" strategy is the develolmmnt of a subsulmtantial limited-war capability by the NATO alli~ n 0 e . Mr...

...Later, of course, it ends, for the price you pay as a solitary air traveler is getting there...

...Although in The Necessity for Choice (1960), he expressed concern for the allegedly irr~nding "missile gap," he vigorously attacked those who argued that to achieve stable deterrence the United States should acquire at least a limited counterforce capability...

...indeed, while defendi~ the accords during his post,SALT congressional briefing, Kissinger emphasized that the primary strategic result of the agreements was to ensure the mutual vulnerability of each power, and expressed his hope that SALT II w~dd produce an agreement that w~ald rrm...

...Careful analysis reveals, however, that these arguments are essentially false, and were known by Mr...

...In this literature the .word ~like" was either a verb or a prepceitior~ a word fixed in space...

...For the general reader it may serve as an introduction to the revived debate over the proper nuclear strategy for the United States, written by an articulate proponent of one school of thought in that debate...

...The final treaty, of course, timited beth sides to the strategic launchers either completed or asserted to be under construction as of mi'd-1972, thereby affording the Russians a three to two numerical advantage...

...Moreover, the SALT process itself provides a vital clue to t h e NrLXon.Kissinger nuclear strategy:, as Professor Van Cleave and Donald G. Brenhen both have observed, in formulating American negotiating positions no serious consideration was" given to any alternative other than a MAD posture (see Van Cleave~ op...

...The dialogue flashed acroes the screen as rapidly as the shadow-n~imes flitted before our eyes as we watched Pearl White elude the villains in forty-episode serials in our twu-for-a-nickel movies...

...For us the twv-for-a-nickel movie h~mse on Houston Street was what we could (more or less) afford, and what we desirecL _I~_ ~ng, like eating, grows with the al~ petite...

...They talk easily, with that special sort of subdued euphoria that characterizes people who travel frequently by air...

...we are thus unable to protect our mi~iles end thereby enhance deterrence in the face d a growing Soviet counterforce capability, or to protect our population should deterrence fail...