The Strategic Balance and the Future of Freedom

Jackson, Senator Henry M.

16 The A l t e r n a t i v e November, 1971 The Soviet Union, for example, has recently introduced the MIG-23 Foxhat into Egypt's already formidable arsenal. This is an aircraft which...

...I speak of the F-4 Phantom which until recently the Israelis had also counted upon to maintain their air superiority...
...Furthermore, the Soviets have deployed a massive system of air defense which would be arrayed against any reduced numbers of U.S...
...The simple fact is that we do not have the capability of launching a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union...
...Threat to Polaris-Poseidon The third element of our deterrent, the forty-one Polaris-Poseidon submarines, has not escaped Soviet developments that raise doubt about its long-term survivability...
...The Soviets have tended to concentrate their efforts in a few wellknown areas to the U.S...
...Looking ahead, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that our interests and those of our friends and allies would suffer in a strategic environment in which the American power position was widely questioned, even though the Soviet Union may not have achieved a clear preponderance...
...We know this...
...And they press this proposal while refusing to agree to limit their offensive build-up - - and in spite of the fact that our defensive weapons add nothing to our capacity to launch a disarming first strike against them...
...The growing obsolescence of its combat vessels, the abandonment of NATO bases along North Africa, the rapid expansion of modern Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, and the deployment of Soviet fighter, bomber and reconnaissance squadrons at air bases in Egypt, L~ya and Algeria are reducing to the vanishing point the effectiveness of the Sixth Fleet as an instrument of American policy...
...Although the strategy of caution is currently being employed in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America, we can anticipate trends toward opportunity in these regions also...
...We wanted to permit no doubt as to the certainty and severity of our response in the event that an attack against us should be contemplated - - or made...
...Leonard Schapiro, one of Great Britain's most respected Soviet scholars, puts the matter this way...
...We do not yet know exactly what the new system is, but we know it involves missiles not less destructive than the 25 megaton SS-9 and it could mean missiles that are far more destructive than the SS-9...
...Most recently, there is the disturbing evidence of Soviet construction of a new offensive missile system eqt/al and perhaps superior to the SS-9 capability...
...Thus, the effectiveness of our bomber fleet as a d~terrent can be seriously downgraded...
...At that time the Soviets had about 150 long-range bombers, less than 100 SLBMs, and about 250 ICBMs...
...Security by William R. Kintuer and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr...
...Morevoer, the discussion surrounding this proposal may help to illuminate the nature of Soviet strategic objectives...
...An agreement limited to defense only, far from slowing the arms race, would actually accelerate it...
...This huge research and development program, carried out by a country with a gross national product only half our own, gives some sense of the dynamism and direction of the Soviet military effort...
...Kintner and Pfaltzgraff make a useful contribution to the analysis of the Soviet military buildup by suggesting three alternative hypotheses of Soviet intent: strategies of "'opportunity," _9 'caution," and "condominium...
...It is one of the sad ironies of negotiations such as these that efforts to hasten them may have the effect of encouraging delay and inflexibility on the other side...
...I see scant evidence to support such a sunny forecast concerning our relations with Moscow...
...4) Neither side would deploy a population defending ABM...
...To fail in the job of strategic defense is to fail in all our aspirations for better housing, health, welfare, education and the environment...
...But eighteen months is less than a third of the time it took to negotiate the testban treaty...
...If present trends continue the Soviets will achieve a preponderance of strategic power that will leave our security impaired by doubt and uncertainty and our friends and allies exposed and vulnerable...
...Thus the more anxious we appear to buy an agreement, the higher the asking price...
...Thus while the Soviets are gaining and will soon exceed us in missile weaponry at sea, we have already fallen distinctly behind them on land...
...The 'strategy of caution" implies that the Soviets would attempt to replace U.S...
...By mid-1971, the Soviets are expected to have operational more than twenty Y Class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and they are producing them at the rate of about eight a year...
...The work of Erickson and KintnerPfaltzgraff significantly improve ore" understanding of the importance of "And reported in such works as A. Chayes and J. Weisner, ABM: An Evalue.t~n el the Der to Deploy an Anti Ballistic Missle System, (New York, Harper and Row, 1969...
...this same period the actual destructive power of the U.S...
...Even before the improvement in its relative power position, Soviet leaders periodically pressed a policy of "opportunistic expansion...
...If present trends continue there will be an increasing risk of miscalculation of the sort that could result in w a r . Facing this prospect, the prime question is: What should the United States do about it...
...By permitting us to deploy defenses to protect our Minuteman silos we would be able to counter any likely qualitative upgrading of the current Soviet offensive forces...
...Moreover, the Russians have an ability to deploy between 60 and 70 of these huge new missiles this year...
...My own view is that we will not emerge from the SALT talks with a very comprehensive agreement unless we and the Soviets succeed in arriving at some common understanding as to the nature and objectives of slrategic nuclear forces...
...Our deterrent force is only as persuasive as its ability to survive a first strike in sufficient numbers, and to respond effectively...
...I believe we ought to consider a partial, interim agreement with the U.S.S.R...
...Vigorous Soviet R & D Effort Finally, some facts about the Soviet research and development program need attention...
...I believe that those urging acceptance of the Soviet proposal have things exactly backwards...
...Under such circumstances, should they press their advantage - - and I see no logical reason why they would not - - we would be forced to deploy new offensive systems of our own...
...Enough said...
...Moreover, it should calm any possible Soviet concern that we might be increasing the offensive potential of our forces so as to threaten the security of their deterrent...
...Under this proposal the United States would be prohibited from defending its Minuteman missiles with the Safeguard, or any other, ABM system...
...It does suggest to me that they will be better equipped to pursue the tactics they have employed ever since World War II - - confrontation and negotiation together as partners in advancing their interests...
...Other people are saying that we should accept the Soviet proposal at the SALT talks for an "ABMs only" agreement...
...To believe otherwise requires one to place his faith in nothing more tangible than a dream of Soviet self-restraint...
...Because the simple, quite inescapable fact is that unless action is taken to modernize and reinforce the Sixth Fleet...
...It will be irrelevant that the United States is committed to the survival of the State of Israel, or that the United States opposes a Russian hegemony in the Middle East, because in a showdown the United States will have no choice but to back down...
...When he finds one unlocked - - in he goes...
...The Disappearance of the Sixth Fleet But this isn't the only problem now facing the Sixth Fleet...
...If our compulsive antimilitarism is not soon brouth to heel, we will find that American foreign policy objectives will have become irrelevant because we will be without the means of implementing them...
...Moreover, the Soviets are making a massive research and development effort to improve their detection capability of our nuclear submarines...
...In spite of the obvious importance of having such knowledge, we really know very little about Soviet strategic doctrine...
...This is especially disturbing because the chief means of defense of the Polaris force is its ability to remain hidden under the seas...
...disadvantage-strategic nuclear forces and naval forces...
...If they can be detected they will have lost much of their protective value...
...3) Both countries would retain the freedom to assure the survivability of their strategic land-based forces so long (continued on page 20) 20 The A l t e r n a t i v e November, 1971 JACKSON (continued from page 18) as they did not add to their offensive potential...
...Caught in all the current cross-fire about "hawks" and "doves," too many politicians are acquiring the protective habits of the ostrich...
...The Soviets may relish the prospect that in future crisis encounters, we, and not they, 'will back down and accept diplomatic defeat...
...The massive Soviet weapons build-up does not suggest to me that with greater strength they will be more wary of confrontations...
...All that is needed for them to develop the capability to destroy Minuteman is an accurate MIRV device - - something well within Soviet technological capabilities...
...This proposal comes at a time when the Soviets are deploying new offensive weapons capable of attacking our Minuteman missiles - - the very heart of our strategic deterrent...
...On the contrary, the hopes of those who predicted the Soviet build-up was tapering off have been bitterly disappointed - - several times...
...By preventing the deployment of ABM systems for the purpose of defending populated areas - - thick city defenses - - we would diminish the necessity for deploying MIRVs on our Minuteman force...
...Yet it is typical of the blinders worn by so many in and out of the Congress today that there are active attempts to scuttle the F-14 Tomcat which is the only aircraft competitive with the Foxbat which we are in a position to deliver to the Navy at a reasonably early date...
...And once we begin backing down under pressure here and there around the globe, we will court the disaster of a third world war, because aggressive nations seem inevitably to overestimate the readiness of free men to retreat...
...A mix provides insurance that a technological breakthrough against serious failures of performance of any one element due to unexpected circumstances, such as unanticipated weapons effects or insufficient prior warning...
...as the numbers and strength of Soviet weapons of all kinds, nuclear and non-nuclear as well, increase, so one should expect them to become bolder in their policy and more prepared to take risks...
...But this would tie our defensive hand while permitting Moscow to continue deploying mammoth offensive missiles - - the very weapons that could be aimed at destroying our capacity to strike back...
...The author's assessment of Soviet capabilities and behavior lead them to the grim conclusion that: "The Soviet Union has begun to follow the strategy of opportunity increasingly, particularly in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean areas...
...Contrary to the yearly reiterated theory that Secretary McNamara advanced in his annual defense Posture Statement':' to the effect that every U.S...
...Moreover, the element of uncertainty in crisis encounters could become much more severe...
...This seems a long time to a world impatient for signs of progress...
...This was the lesson of the first and second world wars...
...It has been suggested recently that we ought to accept the Soviet proposal on the understanding that we and they would continue thereafter to negotiate limits on offensive forces...
...Would it not serve the peace and security of both to lay down their swords - - and keep the shields to discourage rearmament...
...For the purpose of retaliation the Soviets have available more than 900 SS-11 and SS-13 missiles similar to our Minuteman and perfectly adequate as a deterrent force...
...that would at once have the effect of slowing the strategic arms competition and adding to the immediate security of the strategic balance...
...I believe that this country is rich enough in moral and material resources to provide for the security of our people and resolve our domestic problems as well...
...One would look for such increased Soviet boldness especially in those areas that are without formal defensive ties with the United States, for it is in such areas that the Soviets would be tempted to conclude that the risk of a direct confrontation (perhaps escalating to the nuclear level) is not great...
...Thus a large fraction of the bomber force would be vulnerable to desiruction before it could become airborne...
...In other words, we must first give up our ABM system in return for which the Russians would agree merely to more talk about their offensive deployments...
...While that latter study hypothesizes trends in and the implications of Soviet military buildup, Erickson examines the Soviet buildup to deduce the character of Soviet strategy with regard to the evidence we have about Soviet force deployments and strategic doctrine...
...But the capacity of our strategic force to survive is now coming into question...
...By contrast, however, the Soviets are deploying weapons with characteristics that can be adapted to the purpose of attacking our Minuteman silos...
...The threat to our bombers arises from the extremely short flight time from a submerged submarine off our coasts to our bomber bases...
...forces has been continually decreased, while the Soviets' destructive power has greatly increased until the total megatonnage that the Soviets could deliver against U.S...
...It would diminish the pressure that we are now under to press ahead with new offensive nuclear systems of our own...
...Even here, however, the Soviets could in time overtake us since their missile forces have considerably greater payload capacity than ours...
...I would hope, therefore, that such a proposal would be vigorously pressed at the SALT talks...
...Their best effort in 1950 consisted of a massive conventional force to threaten Europe, while relying on political warfare to attenuate any political advantages which the U.S...
...Unfortunately, the U.S.-soviet strategic balance, which made the SALT talks possible, is increasingly threatened by the developing Soviet capability to attack and destroy our deterrent...
...In the past few years, the Soviet economy has become sufficiently large to support a defense establishment roughly equal in size to our own...
...The Soviet Navy can now deploy long-range missiles in submarines hidden underwater along our Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Gulf of Mexico...
...Thus new elements of risk and turbulence will be introduced into international relations, enhancing the dangers in crisis situations...
...At the same time they are developing more advanced nuclear submarines - - including attack submarines that are faster than our own Polaris-types...
...They now operate on a continuing basis in the Mediterranean, in the Indian Ocean and periodically in the Caribbean...
...If two armies, each armed with swords and shields wish to disarm, does it make sense to lay down the shields and keep the swords...
...Khrushchev's backdown in the 1962 Cuban missile adventure is a classic case in point...
...The central fact is that the Soviet Union has continued to support, at great cost;,' a comprehensive, forward-moving program of strategic and conventional weapons procurement that is not slowing down...
...American Enterprise Institute, $3.00 Soviet Military Power by John Eriekson Royal United Service Institute, $3.09 Since the unmistakable details of the broad-based Soviet military buildup since 1968 emerged, there has been an increasing number of books, monographs, and articles by~prolessional and academic defense specialists examining the character of Soviet efforts...
...We are not engaged in programs that could develop that capability...
...This is an aircraft which can outshoot and outmaneuver anything the Israells have, and we can do nothing about it because we simply have nothing in our existing military inventory which can challenge the Foxbat...
...The strategic budget is a small fraction of the defense budget and an even smaller fraction of our gross national product...
...The Strategic Balance And The Future of Freedom Senator Henry M. Jackson The following is a speech by Senator Henry M. Jackson, a member oi the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, explaining~ his concern over America's weakening defense capability...
...That one percent is an essential investment...
...With these forces built around attack and cruise-missile submarines, surface ships armed with shipto-ship missiles, and land-based naval bombers, Moscow has a formidable capacity to attack our carrier forces and disrupt our sea lines of communication - - and this Soviet capacity continues to grow...
...How would an agreement on our part to leave our deterrent unprotected increase the Soviets' interest in doing later what they are evidently unprepared to do now: halt their offensive build-up...
...Attack Carrier Forces I should add that the Soviet Navy's general purpose forces are no longer just for coastal defense...
...The United States is slipping...
...Indeed, to the Kremlin, confrontation tactics are "bargaining" as much as formal talk can be, and the Soviets are experts at deeds and displays to influence the outcome of a negotiation...
...Nothing in the arms control area comes quickly or easily...
...Kitner and Pfaltzgraff, both of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania have set forth in compact fashion, the dimensions of Soviet military growth...
...Since the SS-9 has characteristics that could be well adapted to destroy hardened missile silos in a first strike, but is not at all an efficient weapon for retaliation against cities, one is tempted to conclude that the Soviets are not really committed to deterrence only...
...In the last twelve months, the Soviets have conducted extensive tests of various new ABM components, including advanced improved ABM radars...
...For such nations, there can be no peace unless they have the power and the will to defend.it...
...Unfortunately what was once true is no longer so...
...It would genuinely add to the security of both countries...
...The relentless Soviet strategic and naval build-up poses a serious threat not to just one, but to all three of the elements of our strategic deterrent - - ICBMs, bombers and Polaris-Poseidon...
...Their 8S-9 missiles can carry several warheads, each of sufficient yield to destroy a U.S...
...At the same time we could continue to deploy the very much mvialler warheads of the MIRVed Poseidon missile on our Polaris submarines so as to increase the effectiveness of our sea-based deterrent...
...The Soviets would be free to forge ahead with deployment of more offensive weapons while we would be prevented from countering with a defense...
...From the belief that we have been doing too little to solve our domestic problems - - a view that I share with many in this country - - it is all too easy to pass to a belief that what we spend on defense is wasted...
...might seek to employ stemming from its nuclear arsenal...
...bombers that survived a missile bombardment and did manage to reach the borders of the Soviet Union...
...Over...
...One final word: The United States is experiencing a wave of hostility to the military at the moment, a hostility that makes fair and objective discussion of defense issues a difficult thing to achieve...
...The motto of the Kremlin today is very likely: "No more Cubas...
...Military Trends:Implications for U.S...
...and unless we are able to develop and deliver to Israel weapons which can challenge those which the Soviets can provide to the Arab states, we will find our Mideast options foreclosed...
...to balance theirs...
...Erickson suggests in effect, that the model which best describes Soviet military behavior is that they do "'the best they can...
...Two recent studies - - without question, among the best yet available - - specify the trends in Soviet military power, and assess its implications...
...It is remarkable to me that in the face of Soviet refusal to limit its offensive missile force - - a position that must raise doubts about their intentions - - some Americans are arguing that we should assume their good will and move to limit our defenses...
...When the Soviets have the much longer range missile they have been actively testing, they will be able to do this from either ocean...
...Beyond that, if present trends in the strategic balance continue, we could find ourselves in a situation that encouraged Soviet brinkmanship with a resulting risk of accident, miscalculation and nuclear War...
...So long as we live in a world in which some nations feel a compulsion to dominate others, we have no choice but to maintain those levels of defense which are essential to our survival...
...Without time - - without a pause in the offense momentum - - our_ best efforts to negotiate a comprehensive agreement may be overtaken by the pace of events...
...and that the Soviet buildup has far exceeded the requirements of any plausible defense objective that had heretofore been attributed to the Soviets...
...By stationing these Yankee Class submarines off our coasts, each capable of submerged launching of sixteen ballistic missiles with an estimated range of 1300 nautical miles, the Soviets can blanket practically the entire United S~ates...
...Most Americans believe that the military balance leans heavily in our favor, and that in strategic nuclear weapons we have unchallenged supremacy...
...For more than two decades a central objective of American defense policy has been to prevent a noclear warby deterring any potential adversary from launching a first strike against us...
...Professor John Erickson has produced a scholarly work of the first rank that proves to be a useful complement to the Kintner-Pfaltzgraff study...
...Today the United States bomber force is less than 600, our sub-lannched missiles have numbered 656 for four years, and our land-based missiles have totaled 1054 for four years...
...This adverse shift in the strategic equation can hardly help having farreaching effects upon world politics...
...And if they do deploy 70 of the new missiles they would be adding in this one year alone more megatoanage (or destructive power) than the United States has in its entire land-based Minuteman ICBM system...
...Such a program would greatly increase the security of our strategic forces...
...In this situation, we would be prudent to assume that the Soviet leadership will be more vigorous in the assertion of what it regards as Soviet interests, and will ae18 The Alternative November, 1971 cept greater risks in order to advance them, thus introducing harder Soviet bargaining at the conference table and new elements of danger and turbulence into international affairs...
...The massive Soviet R & D effort on of: fensive and defensive nuclear systems has continued to increase for the past several years...
...Threat to ICBM Minuteman Force We have watched the number of Soviet ICBMs climb steadily Since 1966, in spite of four years of American restraint: our total ICBMs is 1054 compared to the Soviet total of over 1440, which includes 300 of the mammoth 25 megaton SS-9s now operational or under construction...
...The more powerful and threatening Hitler became, the more rational many British leaders in particular found him to be...
...During this time the Soviet bomber force has remained about constant, but their submarine missile force has grown to almost 400 launchers and is expected to overtake ours in two to three years...
...Our nuclear submarines are potentially vulnerable to Soviet /mclear attack and cruise-missile submarines, of which the Soviets now have over sixty, and are producing at the rate of six to eight a year...
...attempt to capture the strategic advantage would only be matched by a Soviet build-up to achieve "parity," Soviet military thinking follows a much different line of reasoning...
...There are, of course, ongoing debates within the defense community as to where the net qualitative advantage for this or that weapon system lies...
...And we could do this without in any way adding to our capacity to strike the Soviet deterrent...
...And this of course applies to the primary aircraft utilized by the Sixth Fleet for its own defense and for suppo~,t of ground operations...
...Some bargain...
...The Changing Strategic Equation In the space of five years --from 1966 to 1971 - - the overall strategic balance has moved markedly in favor of the Soviet Union...
...The studies often produced ambiguous conclusions because the public data could be interpreted in several ways as late as 1969...
...We must not be intimidated by our own impatience, either to embark upon new strategic programs prematurely or to accept an unsound early agreement in the idle hope that it will lead eventually to a genuinely stabilizing one...
...In past Soviet probings the strategic equation has set limits to the extent of the risks that Moscow was willing to run...
...I believe the American people today are confident that the United States is overwhelmingly superior in military power...
...Soviet Strategic Aims and SALT For nearly a year and a half now we and the Soviets have been meeting in Vienna and Helsinki to discuss the limitation of strategic arms...
...In accord with this policy we have foresworn development of a capacity to wage preemptive war...
...Some may urge that we move to an immediate offensive build-up of our own...
...But the Soviets are increasing their capacity to pose a serious threat not to just one but to all three elements of our strategic force...
...2) The Soviet Union would immediately halt the deployment of new ICBM launchers and missiles including those now under construction...
...We have deliberately deployed a strategic missile force, land and sea based, with extremely low-yield warheads - - warheads that are wholly inadequate for the purpose of attacking Russian missile silos...
...There is no reason they should, but this will be their interpretation...
...Professor Robert Byrnes recently made this pertinent comment: "I would assume that some Americans will find the Russians more reasonable as they become more powerful...
...With the exception of a few categories of military strength, there is an unambiguous Soviet quantitative advantage over the United States...
...The number of offensive missile test-firings has likewise increased substantially...
...When one attempts to make some sort of aggregated calculation however, as to how the United States might fare in a military confrontation in an area of mutual vital interest, it is an extremely difficult task to formulate a theory of how the United States can support its foreign policy objectives by military force in such-a crisis...
...The Soviet Union has proposed that we limit defensive weapons only...
...What possible justification is there for the Soviets to delay further the negotiatio n of serious limitations of offensive weapons...
...Those are the elements of an expanding arms competition which we should be bonding every effort to avoid rather than create...
...It seems to me that the risks involved in proposing such an interim agreement for an initial period of one year are minimal...
...SALT: A New Initiative The arms race must be brought under control at the SALT talks...
...It is for this reason that I view as unacceptable and even ominous the Soviet demand for an agreement (1) preventing the defense of our deterrent but (2) permitting them to continue deploying offensive missiles...
...When one digests the disparate information concerning the vast scope of the Soviet military buildup, it is clear that the whole of the separate .elements is greater than the sum of its parts...
...And the Soviets know this too...
...Their best effort in 1971 is considerably more formidable...
...The advantage of halting the deployment of Soviet offensive weapons would be real, immediate, and stabilizing...
...silo...
...Although we have posited condominium as a logical alternative to Soviet expansionism, it is unlikely that the Soviets are committed to this choice other than as a transitory tactic...
...About one percent of the goods and services we will produce this year is allocated to the procurement, maintenance and operation of our strategic deterrent...
...Threat to SAC Bomber Force The growth of the Soviet submarine force poses a severe threat.to the second element of our land-based deterrent, the SAC bomber force...
...I have likened the Soviet Union in its foreign relations to a burglar walking down a hotel corridor, trying the doorhandles...
...Specifically, I have proposed a mutual U.S.-Soviet agreement for an initial period of one year providing the following: (1) The United States would immediately halt the deployment of Minuteman III missiles with their MIRV warheads...
...The Soviets now have the largest and most modern submarine building yards in the world, giving them several times the nuclear submarine construction capacity possessed by the United States...
...A Bolder Soviet Union The Administration has made the claim that we are leaving an "era of confrontation" and entering an "era of negotiation...
...A foretaste of the future could be the brazen and contemptuous Soviet violation of the American initiated stand-still agreement in the Mideast, in the summer of 1970, a violation executed from the very day of the agreement's signature, and encouraged, I might add, by the agitated efforts of some high Washington officials to turn their backs...
...Only the "strategy of condominium" would be likely to lead to reduced tensions and a lower probability of political or military confrontation...
...But this is a prescription for heating up the costly, offensive arms competition, not cooling it down...
...We have built a mix of strategic forces - - land-based and scabased - - so that the exposure of any one element to neutralization or destruction wouM not negate the entire deterrent...
...Even some opponents of our protective defense systems - - like the ABM - - suggest a better alternative is more offensive systems - - like Minuteman or ULMS...
...We need to buy more time for SALT to succeed...
...The continued Soviet deployment of their mammoth offensive missiles is a forbidding fact that places our ICBMs at great risk-unless we continue to deploy ABM defenses around our Minuteman silos and take other prudent measures for their security...
...You know, this happened in the 1930s...
...To counter the dangerous shift in the strategic balance we require first a forthright and unvarnished assessment of some unpalatable military and political facts...
...We have deliberately sought a defensive, deterrent, secondstrike posture - - relying on a protected nuclear capacity to launch an overwhelming retaliatory strike against a nuclear aggressor...
...We could expect Soviet intransigence in negotiations, and efforts at blackmail and intimidation across a broad range of foreign policy issues, with a consequent rise in the incidence of dangerous situations...
...And the Soviet land-based-intercontinental force has risen to over 1440 operational launchers - - with more on the way...
...In 1966 we had more than 700 long-range bombers, about 600 submarine launched ballistic-missiles, and more than 900 Minuteman intercontinental ballisticmissiles...
...Great nations are not allowed the luxury of retiring from the world...
...It is unacceptable because it would diminish our security, and ominous because if the Soviet Union is truly committed to a policy of deterrence only, they should welcome our interest in limiting offenses and treat with indifference our investment to defend our deterrent...
...A more confident Soviet Union can be expected to throw its weight around more vigorously on behalf of its great power interests, and to raise its bargaining price at the negotiating table...
...The only strategic area in which we are staying ahead is in the number of individual warheads, and we are doing that only by going to small-yieM multiples...
...While they develop their offensive advantage, we both agree to talk about it...
...Since that time, the conclusions of virtually every competent defense analyst has been that the Soviet obsession with defense is singular...
...Now, however, the Kremlin can be confident of overall nuclear equality with the United States - - and it is ahead of us in some nuclear weapons area - - and it can count on a growing capacity to project naval forces and other elements of its military power into many parts of the world...
...the Soviet Union derives increasing confidence from the sheer quantity and size of the weapons which it possesses...
...Such success as we have had in past arms control negotiations has been the product of care, deliberation, and, above all unremitting patience...
...targets is several times our own...
...It is a lesson which we will forget at our mortal peril, Military forces are not a luxury but a necessity...
...Threat to U.S...
...However, in trouble spots like the Middle East, where the Soviets have already invested vast sums of military and economic aid, supplied sophisticated weapons, sent military personnel and t~ken losses in combat, local instabilities are vastly aggravated with a considerable risk of great power confrontation...
...The overall strategic balance is tilting in favor of Moscow...
...I have in mind an interim agreement that would freeze the deployment of additional land-based offensive weapons in both the United States and Soviet Union - - and it would do so at once...
...The A l t e r n a t i v e November, 1971 17 The United States has been relying on a mix of strategic forces - - ICBMs, bombers, and Polaris-Poseidon missiles - - in order to maintain confidence in our strategic deterrent and to assure against it being neutralized or destroyed...
...The hard fact is that if we are not to be pushed into a whole new buiM-up of strategic offensive weapons, then we must give our most urgent attention to two priorities: (1) The protection of our deterrent forces, (2) The achievement of an arms control agreement on offensive and defensive nuclear systems that will stabilize the strategic balance and not upset it further in Moscow's favor...
...If the Soviets were to employ this strategy, they would seek local rather than global objectives, and would prefer a partner relationship with the United States rather than an adversary relationship...
...influence short of" means likely to lead to confrontation...

Vol. 5 • November 1971 • No. 2


 
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