Defense Policy in the 1970s
Schneider, William Jr.
To Be or Not to Be Defense Policies In The 1970s William Schneider Jr. The body politic of the United States is emerging from one of the more bitter struggles over defense policy in this century....
...President from behaving firmly in a political crisis in which U.S...
...To illustrate this position a device commonly employed in the analysis of alternative public policies will be employed known as the scenario...
...The more representative case concerns the nation which maintains armed forces organized to conform to some defense policy which in turn supports politically determined foreign policy objectives...
...defense policies to support those objectives...
...The Soviets launch a coordinated attack of SS-9s and submarine launched ballistic missiles on U.S...
...The Soviets on the other hand retain a residual force of over 800 of the smaller SS-11 MIRV type ICBMs for the purposes of threatening U. S. cities should the United States attempt to retaliate...
...The United States requires defense policy that will enable the President to support such objectives...
...Two Soviet armored divisions and supporting logistics units move into East Berlin in an attempt to quell widely scattered and spontaneous resistance...
...He has three hours to send the remaining airborne B-52s to their assigned targets or recall them to emergency bases within the United States...
...We need not accept the "worst case" arguments posed by the Secretary of Defense, but merely recognize the technological improvements to the Soviet strategic forces, add malevolent intentions on the part of Soviet leaders, and extrapolate the effects of budget cuts on the effectiveness of U. S. forces through 1975...
...At a lower order of priority, but still necessary if primary U. S. foreign policy objectives are to be adequately supported, is a structuring of U.S...
...The Soviet Union outnumbers the United States in total force megatonnage by about a factor of four...
...The Soviet SS-9 force has reached the number of 350, but each has been equipped with a technologically advanced MIRV warhead package of six warheads per missile...
...The third class of commitments might be characterised as gratuitous commitments...
...Some Conclusions We can conclude that U. S. defense policy is not adequate to support those foreign policy objectives widely shared by most Americans...
...The basis for this policy change appears to be the "Nixon Doctrine" which seeks to maintain alliance relationships, whether explicit or implicit, with those nations whose security, it can be argued, is at least important if not vital to the security of the United States...
...The reasons for this failure have been both doctrinal and budgetary...
...general purpose" or conventional military forces need to be highly mobile (many foreign bases are likely to be less secure in the Seventies then they have been in earlier years), professional (maximize volunteers and minimize conscripts), and elite...
...The mechanism for fulfilling these commitments is the supplying of logistics and advisory services to such Allies, with the formal commitment of U. S. forces only done as a last resort...
...This scenario should suggest that U. S. forces likely to be in existence by 1975 are not, in many plausible circumstances, capable of supporting the foreign policy objectives which are shared by an extremely wide consensus of the U. S. population...
...The reason for doing so is that international disputes are the only conspicuous example of a case where agreements made under duress are considered internationally binding...
...The defense of Allies as well as the defense of the territory of the United States almost certainly require strategic nuclear forces...
...Such a state of relative perceptions about the international balance of forces would, in most cases, be sufficient to deter a U.S...
...President in 1975 will face the Soviets with the brash confidence that President Kennedy was able to face Premier Khruschev with in 1962 over the deployment of a few Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba...
...Because of severe budget cuts in the early Seventies, the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, the B-l manned bomber and various improvements to the Minuteman and Poseidon ballistic missiles have not been completed (and will not be completed until the late Seventies or early Eighties...
...There is a very broad consensus to the effect that the United States should maintain sufficient forces to guarantee its own territorial security...
...Less than one month after Ulbricht's death, the world's two largest military alliances are ready for war...
...In an effort to stave off what the Soviets believe to be an inevitable attempt to make a show of force in the Berlin situation, Warsaw Pact nations launch a preemptive first strike against NATO airfields, supply depots, command and control centers, and other critical military facilities employing modern "Foxbat" strike aircraft and mobile short range ballistic missiles with high explosive warheads...
...With tensions increasing, the Soviet Union mobilizes the Warsaw Pact which has been on "maneuvers" since the East German crisis began...
...strategic forces to a level capable of sustaining U.S...
...The defense policy that appears to be "in the works" for the Seventies involves a reduction in "gratuitous commitments," or at least the means by which- such gratuitous commitments are supported...
...It will be argued here that defense policies pursued during the Sixties have made it extremely difficult for the President of the United States to support those objectives...
...With an air of tension, NATO forces execute war mobilization aiming at complete force readiness within thirty days...
...The Soviet premier presents the U. S. ambassador in Moscow with an ultimatum ordering U. S. troops in Berlin to cease giving aid to escaping East Germans, and demanding that West German police turn over illegal immigrants (i.e., "escapees") to Soviet authorities...
...Nuclear forces whether tactical or strategic would be of relatively little direct consequence with respect to such commitments...
...The attack on U. S. ICBMs is highly successful because they are undefended and the Soviet SS-9 MIRVs outnumber them by about two to one...
...strategic forces are inadequate to support foreign policy objectives...
...This is simply stating that a nation with such a policy will take no action involving the use of force should its foreign policy objectives conflict with those of another state...
...The only force that is apparently intact is the fleet of 31 Poseidon type submarine launch ballistic missile carrying submarines now on station at various points around the Soviet Union...
...That is, the connection to U.S...
...NATO doctrine worked out over a period of more than twenty years calls for the employment of nuclear weapons under circumstances of a massive Soviet attack...
...The United States lacks none of the necessary resources, technological, fiscal or manpower, to support these objectives...
...So critical was his role in the affairs of the German Democratic Republic that the party machinery was thrown into complete chaos by his death...
...In order to prevent reinforcement of the U. S. garrison, the highway access and air corridors are declared closed by Soviet officials...
...technology to those characteristics, the magnitude of Soviet strategic forces are such that a substantial increment of budgetary support is required without delay to build up U.S...
...One-half of the B-52 fleet is destroyed because many were caught on the ground due to the difficulties of maintaining a twenty-year-old aircraft...
...During the Sixties a twenty-year consensus that the United States should retain commitments of all three types began to weaken...
...foreign policy objectives and the defense policy designed to support it is of sufficient importance that the issues raised should be carefully studied...
...Greeley, which is totally destroyed in the attack...
...In addition, tactical nuclear forces and perhaps general purpose forces are also required to support foreign policy objectives which result from commitments to defend selected Allies and the territory of the United States...
...This is true for the nation with the most belligerent objectives...
...Traditionally, Americans have had little interest in foreign policy, and even less interest in defense policy because of the fact that circumstances, usually crisis preparedness, has enabled the United States to be virtually undisturbed by the most tumultuous of foreign disturbances...
...There is, of course, the trivial case of the nation which supports no mechanism (i.e., armed forces) to support its foreign policy objectives...
...This means sustained strategic force budgets of from twenty to thirty billion dollars per year merely to meet the minimum requirements of U-S...
...funding of strategic forces has fallen from about one-third of total defense expenditures to as low as ten per cent (in fiscal year 1969) of total expenditures...
...Scattered resistance, suppressed under the Ulbricht regime, begins to spring up so that the new ruling committee makes suppression of "counter revolutionaires" its top priority...
...Because of the ill-prepared character of NATO defenses, the Soviet strike is highly successful destroying two-thirds of the NATO tactical air force, and one-third of NATO's heavy artillery...
...The President, conscious of steadily reinforced U. S. commitments, both to NATO and West Germany, over a twenty- five year period, rejects the Soviet ultimatum out-of-hand and warns of "drastic consequences" if the Soviets do not immediately reopen land and air routes to West Berlin...
...The most important would be the con-stitutional commitment to preserve the republic which implies maintatining sufficient forces to insure the political and territorial intergrity of the United States...
...The United States, of course, does not have the benefit of "Screwdriver inspection" of Soviet forces so it does not know in detail the composition of such forces, but by adding to what we do know about the gross characteristics of Soviet forces and applying well known U.S...
...News of the appearance of Soviet armored units leads to mass attempts to escape to West Berlin...
...Efforts at suppression are inept, simply raising the tempo of unrest...
...The Soviet prime minister warns NATO countries that the soviet Union cannot "stand idly by" while NATO forces mobilize for war...
...Faced with the growing problem of spontaneous unrest in various areas of East Germany, the Soviet forces are determined to suppress unrest in the Berlin area so it cannot become a symbol of successful unrest...
...In May 1975, a 1975 Nightmare Scenario, East German Prime Minister, Walter Ulbricht, dies suddenly...
...The attack is highly successful...
...Although there probably still exists a majority sentiment in favor of maintaining "gratuitous" commitments, there is undoubtedly considerable debate over which gratuitous commitments we should accept...
...Every nation has a defense policy...
...A free people must maintain adequate forces...
...In his address on U.S...
...The President is left, at the conclusion of the attack with the following state of affairs...
...The chaos is only temporarily quieted by selection of a committee to rule the Communist nation...
...It is unlikely that the U.S...
...Nevertheless, the internal debate in the sixties over the course of U.S...
...It is for this reason that our defense policy in the Seventies deserves serious examination...
...general purpose forces so they serve as a credible support mechanism for the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine...
...foreign policy...
...bomber bases, U. S. submarine bases, and U. S. ICBM bases...
...defense policy-defense of the territorial and political integrity of the United States- the most immediate requirements are for upgrading U. S. strategic forces...
...For such a role, however, a relatively small (e.g., 750 thousand men) army possessing high mobility and professional expertise would be required...
...Holes are blown in the "Berlin Wall" at numerous places with homemade explosives, and it becomes apparent that scores if not hundreds of East German citizens are escaping to West Berlin to prevent such escapes, Soviet armored forces engage in "hot pursuit" of escaping East Germans into West Berlin precipitating daily skirmishes between Soviet forces and elements of the 6,000 man U. S. garrison in West Berlin...
...The U. S. strategic forces consist of 500 Minuteman-III ICBMs with three MIRV warheads each, and 500 Minuteman-II ICBMs with a single one-megaton warhead each, 250 aging B-52 heavy bombers, and 41 Polaris/ Poseidon nuclear power submarines...
...The second class of commitments could be defined as commitments to Allies whose security is sufficiently important, that a loss of a particular Ally to a hostile power could jeopardize the ability of the President of the United States to carry out the first class of commitments...
...This attack is executed without warning primarily employing airdropped nuclear weapons from the remaining tactical aircraft on European soil with an assist from carrier-based aircraft in the Sixth Fleet...
...We are spending less than $10 billion in fiscal year 1970...
...Faced with the possibility of a revolution, the ruling committee of the German Democratic Republic calls for the assistance of the sixteen Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany...
...One need not accept the stark possibility of intercontinental nuclear warfare between the U.S...
...strategic forces on alert...
...Although most of the rhetoric associated with the ongoing debate on defense policy has focused on the gratuitous commitments of the United States, perhaps much more deserving of attention is given the broad consensus for the defense of selected Allies and the territorial defense of the United States that we examine the adequacy and appropriateness of existing U.S...
...foreign policy objectives were challenged by Soviet forces or the threat thereof...
...and Soviet leaders in an intense crisis such as the Berlin Crisis posed in the above scenario...
...This should include deployment of ballistic missile defenses for both strategic forces and population centers, enhanced air defenses against the threat of manned bombers, and expansion of our strategic attack forces so that they can fulfill what is known as the "Brass Rule"-a reasonable requirement stating that U.S...
...We might consider that there are three classes of potential U.S...
...This dispute, however, has by no means been the most acrimonious or divisive...
...Though an aging man, his rule had been law in the German Democratic Republic for over two decades...
...The focal point of dissent is East Berlin...
...forces, when they have been needed, have always been mustered in time to save a deteriorating foreign situation from influencing the daily lives of U. S. citizens quite unlike the matter in which tumultuous foreign disturbances have effected the daily lives of many Europeans for nearly all of this century...
...They have been doctrinal in the sense that U. S. objectives in arms control, defense planning, and related areas have tended to make the territorial and political integrity of the United States far more vulnerable than it need be (given U. S. capabilities and technological ability) while simultaneously weakening the credibility of our commitments to key Allies...
...The United States begins a crisis mobilization, calling up reserves, deploying ships to sea, and placing U.S...
...and the Soviet Union to arrive at the conclusion that U.S...
...In absolute terms, the United States was spending approximately $15 billion for strategic forces in the Fifties, an amount which would correspond to $30 to $35 billion in 1970 dollars...
...The internal debate over the War of 1812 for example was so severe that the New England states threatened to secede from the Union...
...This is not to suggest that, even over a few years, this situation is beyond repair...
...Although it is well known that Soviet doctrine comes down strongly on the side of "preemptive attacks" as a way of minimizing an opponent's initial superiority, NATO forces have been so weakened by isolationist pressure within the U.S...
...The highest priority should be allocated to strategic forces...
...In view of the circumstances, the President is left with no choice but to recall the B-52s to their bases, and accept the Soviet ultimatum in Europe...
...In an effort to deter the United States from the further use of nuclear weapons, a single Soviet SS-11 ICBM equipped with four MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles) warheads is fired in a "demonstration attack" against four widely separated military targets in Alaska including the major U. S. military facility in Alaska, Ft...
...There is a somewhat smaller but still overwhelming majority in favor of maintaining alliance relationships with selected Allies...
...Fearing the loss of "bargaining power" in the Berlin crisis, the Soviets seek to execute a "surgical" preemptive attack against U. S. strategic forces so that the United States will be effectively disarmed...
...foreign policy objectives of maintaining the territorial and political integrity of the United States, and defending selected allies from the threat of nuclear warfare are to be maintained, U. S. defense policy must be changed, and changed soon...
...Our strategic forces in no way-even at current force levels of both the Unites States and the Soviet Union-meet the requirements of the Brass Rule...
...during the Sixties, that NATO forces are ill-prepared for the mobilization...
...security may be symbolic, or the motivation for accepting the commitments might be Isreal or Cambodia, or some may argue, Vietnam...
...foreign policy for the Seventies, President Nixon has stated it is to be his intention to "harmonize U. S. commitments and capabilities (18 February 1970...
...Under this doctrine, the only forces required are the so-called general purpose or conventional forces...
...foreign policy objectives...
...Such a nation must also maintain the appropriate philosophical predisposition to employ forces that will support its national foreign policy objectives...
...collateral damage" (i.e., damage to nearby non-military targets) is substantial...
...If we are to support what I have described as "gratuitous commitments" - even on a more limited basis than in the Fifties - in the hope of minimizing world disorders, such as localized violence by either indigenous Communists or externally supported Communists, the U.S...
...Some Implications for Defense Policy This gloomy scenario is nonetheless plausible...
...The scenario is simply a device for testing the plausibility of assumptions and conclusions by substituting plausible events for actual experience...
...Because of the depleted character of NATO forces, including U. S. forces in Europe, the President authorizes the employment of tactical nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact military targets in Eastern Europe, but not including the Soviet Union...
...One need only consider the perceptions of both U.S...
...For example, Nazi Germany's surrender at the end of World War II is considered by all parties, including Germany, to be internationally binding although the surrender was signed under duress, i.e., the force of arms of the victorious allied armies...
...With regard to the highest priority of U.S...
...It should be understood however, that if U.S...
...commitments...
...strategic forces should be designed and maintained at a level sufficient to inflict as much damage on an opponent as the opponent is able to inflict on the United States...
...We may be coming into an era during the Seventies in which the failure to sustain an appropriate defense policy could result in a situation where the demands of foreign policy could have a daily impact on the routine lives of every American...
...The question to be resolved then in the normal case is what foreign policy objectives should be pursued, and what defense policy is appropriate towards the pursuit of those objectives...
...However, the President is faced with the fact that the Soviets now only possess an ABM system, but their anti-aircraft missies may well have a capability against ballistic missiles because of the fact they were tied into the Soviet "space radar net" in the early Seventies...
Vol. 4 • April 1971 • No. 5
