The Public Policy/Trick or Treaty
Courter, Jim
THE PUBLIC POLICY TRICK OR TREATY by Jim Courter Last June, when faced with the question of what to do about Soviet violations of the SALT II treaty, the Administration decided not to decide....
...The treaty will stop SDI, which aims to develop defenses for our population, allies, and military forces, dead in its tracks...
...As late as 1967, Alexei Kosygin had given a ringing endorsement to the concept: "Defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race," he said, "but constitute a factor preventing the death of people...
...Actual Soviet behavior since 1972 showed that the Soviets never abandoned these doctrines, and the buildup in offensive and defensive arms proceeded apace...
...When the ABM treaty was signed, the Soviets were outspending the U.S...
...Had the Soviets accepted the logic of the ABM treaty, they would have had to abandon the major tenets of their strategic thinking, which favored strong offensive forces coupled with strategic defenses in a war-fighting, war-winning strategy...
...in ABM capability in 1972, but not 22 because they didn't want or believe in ABM systems...
...House of Representatives...
...At Geneva or at the 1987 five-year review of the ABM treaty, we should press the Soviets for treaty revisions to permit phased deployments of defenses, starting with near-term defenses of retaliatory forces such as missile fields, air and submarine bases, and strategic command centers...
...Rather than slowing these deployments in response to the ABM ban, the Soviets deployed three new multiple warhead missiles, two new submarine-launched missile systems, and the Backfire bomber between 1972 and the signing of the SALT II treaty in 1979...
...During this period, the U.S...
...But in this case, it is the Strategic Defense Initiative's defensive systems, not offensive weapons, that will be blocked by the treaty...
...The Soviets are likely to reject this idea, especially in this stage of the Geneva talks, where they have been attempting to press the Administration, through the allies and Congress, to stop SDI...
...A presidential announcement to this effect might not be received happily, but it is a truth that must be told, and it is a truth without which it will be increasingly difficult to maintain public support for SDI...
...Besides, having developed and deployed ABM missiles and radars, and having undertaken an SDI-like program of advanced technical research, the Soviets will prefer to continue their efforts while keeping ours under ABM treaty restraints...
...or our allies...
...Today's Soviet defensive programs include air defense, ABM radars and interceptor missiles, and advanced research on laser, particle beam, and directed energy weapons...
...But we were wrong on all three counts...
...in strategic defense by a factor of five...
...Maybe an antimissile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill but to preserve human lives...
...It will do this at the end of the Jim Courter represents New Jersey's TWelfth District in the US...
...And indeed it should be...
...But even if the Soviet compliance record were perfect, the treaty would still merit revision or abrogation...
...A new pressure group, the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, has already been formed to lead the charge...
...The Soviets defend the Moscow area with such a system∔the world's only operational ABM system∔while the U.S...
...Instead, the President will await a November 15 Pentagon report outlining options for a policy that responds to violations of SALT II and other agreements...
...Protection of these assets would add a great deal to deterrence and stability by raising the cost and undermining the military rationale of a Soviet first-strike surprise attack against the U.S...
...made no similar deployments, canceled the B-l bomber, and took the ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota out of operation...
...Predictions of Soviet restraint in offensive weapons fared no better...
...W» hat should be done...
...The Nixon Administration had three main selling points for the treaty when it was brought to the Senate...
...Like SALT II, it has been violated by the Soviets, and it will put the brakes on U.S...
...The Soviets lagged behind the U.S...
...Some Administration officials have hinted that continued U.S...
...Simply put, it has failed to fulfill any of the strategic purposes it was designed to serve when it was approved with the SALT I agreement by the Senate in 1972...
...It allows each side to defend one site only, with ground radars and 100 or fewer surface-to-air missiles...
...A hese violations, taken together with the long list of Soviet violations of arms control agreements, give us ample reason to abrogate the ABM treaty...
...In May 1972 the Soviet journal Kommunist stated that Soviet policy "is directed toward creating and maintaining military superiority...
...Second, it was to give both sides reason to stop the offensive arms race, since the forces they had on hand would be sufficient for deterrence in an environment of mutual vulnerability...
...Unlike SALT II, the ABM treaty was ratified, so it is actually U.S...
...To those who have been briefed on the full range of the Soviets' current ABM activities, the President's report that they "may be" pursuing territorial defense is quite an understatement...
...The failure of de'tente as a means of stopping Soviet expansion is a matter of historical fact, and the record shows that the Soviets did not share the ABM treaty's strategic assumptions...
...We should hope for a less ambiguous policy when we decide on the future of the ABM Treaty of 1972...
...Also in 1972, a Soviet text proclaimed: "It is disorienting to think that there can be no winners in a nuclear war...
...adherence to the ABM treaty is an open question...
...As Henry Kissinger put it at that time, Soviet arms control cooperation would not have come about "unless it had been part of a larger decision to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation and steadily evolving confidence...
...To modify or abrogate the ABM treaty will cost the President some political capital, but it will be well spent...
...We are saddled by a treaty that was based on questionable assumptions in 1972, and has been undermined by Soviet actions ever since...
...The doctrine was there for all to see...
...We even tried in 1983 to convene a special session of a U.S.Soviet commission to resolve a growing list of Soviet violations, but the Soviets refused to attend...
...Today, our choice is not whether to preserve the ABM treaty, but whether to comply with its terms while the Soviets violate them...
...Area defenses to protect population could be deployed once they are developed...
...The Senate accepted this rationale in 1972, believing that the Soviets shared our hopeful view of the benefits of banning defensive systems...
...The American people should also be told that their government is determined to press ahead into a new era of nuclear stability, in which we no longer let deterrence rest on the dubious idea that it is safe to be vulnerable, but somehow dangerous to-be defended...
...decided in 1976 to stop operating the ABM system we had defending a missile field in North Dakota...
...First, it was to serve strategic stability since both sides would refrain from building defenses and remain vulnerable to nuclear attack...
...This policy is in character for an Administration that campaigned in 1980 against a "fatally flawed" SALT II treaty but decided to adhere to it in 1981, and has done so ever since...
...Rather, they lacked the necessary technology, especially in radar and computers...
...The best choice would be to modify the treaty...
...But any assault on the treaty, which is held sacrosanct by the arms control establishment, will draw heavy political opposition both here and abroad...
...The facts are that the arms control treaties of the 1970s have not worked, and our land-based missiles are less secure today than they were before the SALT process began...
...Soviet doctrines of active and passive defense, through disarming first strikes and homeland defense measures, were also abundant in their military literature, substantiating the firm Soviet belief in the survivability of a nuclear war...
...The treaty stands in the way of SDI, which offers a more effective means of providing American security∔one that need not depend on Soviet good faith...
...Even Henry Kissinger, architect of the ABM/SALT I package, now says that the treaty has been overtaken by new technology, new strategic realities, and the Soviet buildup, and counsels against "the perpetuation of total vulnerability...
...This will leave us with three choices: modify the treaty, abrogate it, or abandon SDI...
...The ABM treaty is designed to prevent, development of territorial defenses against nuclear missiles...
...decade when we are ready to cross the threshold from experimental research of technical concepts to testing of actual components of a system to stop nuclear missiles in flight...
...In the meantime, we continue privately to press for correction of Soviet violations, as we have been doing for years...
...He reported in unequivocal terms that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a treaty violation∔a conclusion that is now shared even by leading critics of the Administration∔and he outlined two other areas of potential Soviet ABM violations...
...military programs needed to meet a growing Soviet threat...
...Third, the treaty was viewed as an integral part of detente, in which U.S.-Soviet tensions were to be managed, our interests would converge, and Soviet global ambitions would be tempered in a new cooperative relationship...
...We can join the Soviets in the pursuit of defensive systems or hold to our policy of deliberate vulnerability while the Soviets move ever closer to an effective defense against nuclear missiles...
...By 1980, their effort was twenty-five times the size of ours, in large part because our own effort had been severely reduced...
...Extensive Soviet missile defense efforts have been well documented: The President told Congress on February 1 that "the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory...
Vol. 18 • November 1985 • No. 11
