The Rapid Deployment Farce

...The Army divisions are the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and the 24th Mechanized...

...The Navy would retain all sealift and naval support tasks, including convoy escort, command and communications, shore bombardment, and air superiority and interdiction missions...

...Current plans call for an increase in the RDF to over 300,000 men, including 100,000 reservists...

...In examining possible opposition in the Middle East, one finds that Iran has about 400 operable tanks...

...The logistics crunch, however, calls into question the possibility of transporting and maintaining these troops overseas...

...It must be prepared to fight a variety of opponents, ranging from poorly armed local militias to well-trained Soviet or Soviet-client forces, and under diverse conditions, be they desert, mountain, jungle, or city...

...Roland and Stinger, mobile, lightweight suface-to-air-missiles...

...It is just as clear, however, that the Carter administration promoted the RDF as a panacea for all the blunder and pusillanimity of the past four years, claiming for it powers and abilities far beyond those of a military unit of its size...

...a new tactical transport aircraft, AMST...

...punitive expeditions...

...Lastly, to fight this sort of war would require a form of training totally different from that now provided by the Army: Skill and initiative must be instilled among the low-command echelons, for those occasions when junior officers cannot defer to the high command for instructions...

...Mere possession of an instrument of force, however, will not by itself reverse more than a decade of indecision and vacillation in foreign policy...

...Moreover, the Mideast orientation presumes both the likelihood of Soviet opposition, and also the predominance of tank warfare, which has led to overemphasis on anti-tank capabilities, and neglect of jungle, mountain, and urban fighting...

...and offensive intervention...

...But if we are victorious, we will, at a stroke, recoup most of the prestige lost since the Vietnam War...

...In this sort of warfare, the ability to fight head-to-head battles is secondary...

...General P.X...

...This, of course, runs counter to American experience and inclination...

...Military production cannot be increased, nor can the command structure and mentality of the armed forces be changed overnight...

...What the Reagan administration must do, then, is to use the RDF boldly when appropriate...

...Only one forward supply dump has been established (at Diego Garcia), and it can service only four battalions and four squadrons of aircraft...

...All are currently in critically short supply, rendering logistics the key problem of the RDF...

...These included a flotilla of 14 Roll-on/Roll-off transport ships for the rapid loading and movement of tanks and other heavy equipment...

...If necessary, the RDF could even be dropped in the path of a Soviet invasion, halting it in its tracks for the same reason...

...To begin with, the administration made no attempt to improve the combat readiness of the units assigned to the RDF...

...Forgoing attempts to destroy the enemy's combat assets incrementally, it rather should concentrate on the enemy's ability to fight effectively, by paralyzing his command structure through rapid movement and attacks on his supply lines and communications...

...All C-5A's must receive service-life extensions...

...This would help break the ossified mindset of the American officer corps, and bring creative, inventive officers to prominence...

...As critical as these issues are, at this point they remain academic, for the Carter administration never took the quick and effective action necessary to develop the RDF into anything beyond a token force...

...They lack armor, and (unlike Soviet airborne divisions) have little organic transport which can be delivered by aircraft...

...umbrella headquarters is unsound...

...Army divisions and one Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB...

...And with the total number of American ground troops in the Middle East today a paltry 1800, small wonder that increasing attention has turned to the Rapid Deployment Force...

...A small, symbolic RDF would be in no position to deter a Soviet invasion, since no force this size could possibly block all lines of a large-scale troop movement...

...If the Reagan administration adopts a proposal similar to this, the RDF could be battle ready in less than two years...

...Syria, 2,000...

...Existing ground, air, and naval units are being earmarked for RDF service, and will be controlled in wartime by the RDF Headquarters, based at MacDill AFB near Tampa, Florida...

...Only about 60 C-5A and 200 C-41 heavy transport aircraft are available...

...The first argues for a small, lightly armed force the main purpose of which would be deterrence...

...denial missions...

...satisfying this would require the total resources of the Military Aircraft Command (MAC), as well as a greater number of naval provision ships than are available...

...stand-up "battles are to be avoided, not courted...

...Napoleon President-elect Reagan has made the enlargement and reform of the American military establishment one of the highest priorities of his administration...

...morale would be improved by the Corps' characteristic solidarity...

...units composing the force have little contact with it, except during exercises and actual operations...

...infantry division requires nearly 1,200 tons of supplies per day, the requisites of the RDF, including all ancillary services (aviation, medical, naval, logistical, etc...

...a new heavy cargo aircraft, CX...

...seizure of facilities or resource centers...

...This philosophy was favored-in theory, at least-by the Carter administration...

...The administration also projected weapons systems particularly well suited for the RDF: a new light tank, the Light Mobile Protected Weapon System...

...when (the Carter) administration took office, there was no Rapid Deployment Force whatsoever...

...Only in this way can the besieged fundaments of American foreign policy be retrieved.ments of American foreign policy be retrieved...

...Finally, the RDF must be composed of units capable of defeating a well-equipped enemy, without dependence on the mountains of supplies traditionally required by conventional forces...

...None of this, however, rules out ancillary roles for the Army, Navy, and Air Force...

...lint even more must be done to improve the combat readiness of this proposed RDF, largely by reversing the cutbacks of the Carter administration...

...To exploit its off-runway capability, the AV-8B must be deployed by the Marine Corps...

...The applicability of Marine Corps doctrine to light infantry tactics would simplify training and logistics, in which emphasis is placed on maneuverability rather than attrition...

...In the event of conflict, most of the heavy equipment would have to be sealifted, extending the deployment period to more than 100 days...

...Vjur failure stems as much from the conception and composition of the RDF as from the unwillingness of the Carter administration to develop it...

...Many of these systems have been delayed, deferred, or simply cancelled...

...Finally, the Marines' light infantry and armor characteristics are more compatible with sea and air transport than are traditional units...

...Carter and Brown failed to realize that air and seapower alone are inadequate for decisive intervention in a land war...

...The FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates-perhaps the most economical and successful ever-were cut from a planned 72 to only 54, and the eight foreign-built container ships never purchased...

...Current plans for the RDF call for 110,000 men-three U.S...

...and new lightweight artillery pieces...

...It matters little that a force this size would be easily outgunned, even by regional opponents, for deployment of a symbolic force of American troops would deter Soviet intervention by raising the possibility of a superpower confrontation...

...they lack the tactical mobility to fight fluid battles of maneuver, and must rely on set piece battles and firepower tactics on both offense and defense...

...Finally, heavy assault helicopters of the CH-53 family are needed, as are both a modern amphibious assault tank or landing craft and a new light, wheeled armored vehicle...

...The 82nd and 101st are designed to be transported by air...

...The Marine Amphibious Brigade, at 16,500 men, is larger than most U.S...

...The unorthodox techniques of Unit 101 subsequently percolated through the entire Israeli army, resulting in phenomenal military success...

...JL he RDF, or Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, to give its proper designation, is planned currently as a four-service force capable of deployment anywhere on the globe within four to six weeks...

...Specialization for the Middle East has diminished the utility of the RDF, leaving it capable of little more than seize-and-hold, seize-and-deny, and blocking-type actions...

...the RDF enjoys none of these...

...Iraq, 2,000...

...If fully deployed, the RDF would field only 270 tanks...

...What must happen is clear...

...to do with it...

...All three are "straight leg" (unmechanized) units...

...Because the Marine Corps' particular need for the AV-8B is not shared by other branches of the armed services, it fell afoul of Secretary Brown's desire for commonality, and so has been neglected...

...the MAB has not yet been specified...

...In so doing, what should the new administration keep in mind...

...Kelly, USMC, commander of the RDF, admitted that his command had been seriously impaired by a shortage of men, equipment, and supplies, (Secretary Brown's statements to the contrary notwithstanding...

...Competing for influence in determining the size and composition of the RDF are two schools...

...Thus the tendency is to increase the size of the force until it is too large to move quickly or to handle strictly local opposition, all the while remaining too small to deal with a determined Soviet attack without immediate reinforcement from the continental United States, Europe, or elsewhere...

...It is, however, imperative that such changes occur, for American security interests are continuously and precipitously threatened by the instability of nations which supply our raw materials...

...The Army relies on superior American firepower, fire-control systems, and precision-guided munitions to inflict casualties on the enemy at a highly favorable ratio...

...We are spending lots of money on it...

...Obviously, such a lightly armed force would be overcome quickly were it to employ traditional attrition tactics...

...getting there is the problem...

...Many critics will scream to the heavens about the waste of money, but let us not forget that the most expensive thing in the world is a second-rate army...

...each year Congress tried to restore it...

...Because the average U.S...

...The Reagan administration should lay out the entire RDF program in detail, and appropriations should be voted for the whole package to ensure that we are not left straddling the fence with only a portion of the program...

...This requires near parity of numbers, secure communications, and an ample supply of heavy weapons and ammunition...

...Additionally, because "relational-maneuver" tactics are applicable to the entire American military, the RDF could serve as both proving ground and example for the entire armed forces...

...But while Carter gave, so did he take away...

...The opposing school dismisses such talk as dangerous nonsense...

...AMST was cancelled and CX deferred...

...new anti-tank guided weapons...

...Thomas Ross, Defense Department Spokesman Against greatly superior forces it is possible to win a battle, but hardly a war...

...General Volney F. Warner, commander of the 82nd Airborne (which is also the fast reaction force, ostensibly ready within 48 hours) has raised doubts about the ability of the RDF to survive at its present force levels...

...Carter's skill at ordering new systems, and then quietly eliminating them, caused the President to appear to be supporting greater military spending, when in fact the total impact of his policies had just the opposite effect...

...Although the division is capable of mobile offensive and defensive operations, it is unlikely to undertake them, given the Army's firepower-attrition tactics...

...strategic mobility in general and that of the RDF in particular...

...light and heavy mortars and multiple rocket launchers take the place of towed or self-propelled guns and howitzers...

...active defense...

...The Soviets would bypass or overrun and destroy the RDF so quickly, that the President would be faced with a fait accompli, forcing him to accept either American defeat or escalation to battlefield or strategic nuclear weapons...

...Smaller than line divisions, and deficient in heavy weapons, these units are less able than conventional infantry divisions to sustain casualties or fight prolonged battles...

...Army divisions...

...The Soviet Union can be expected to field several thousand tanks from its divisions along the Iranian border...

...At various points throughout his administration, President Carter announced programs designed to enhance U.S...

...Again, the RDF will often have to fight badly outnumbered for extended periods, rendering attrition-based tactics too expensive in men and supplies to succeed...

...It will achieve this not through weight of armor and firepower, but through dispersion, speed, and skilled reactions to terrain and local conditions...

...The Army would be indispensable in providing a portion of the RDF with paratrooper training, and the Air Force would be responsible for strategic and tactical airlift as well as air superiority and interdiction missions once airfields were either secured or constructed...

...Each year Brown tried to have the program cancelled...

...For all these reasons, the RDF must develop a high degree of tactical mobility...

...Dithering and incompetence have left the RDF languishing mostly on paper, with no capability, except that of the "too-little, too-late" variety...

...Perhaps most important is the enlargement of the strategic sea and airlift forces...

...Unfortunately, the CRAF program is behind schedule, and activating the Reserve Fleet would take time id give advance notice of our intentions...

...the performance capability of the force remains unproven...

...These brigades would be grouped into divisional task forces for particular missions, like the Israeli Ugda of 1967...

...Roland and Stinger were dropped, even though no comparable system exists to protect RDF troops from low-level air attack...

...Thus, the RDF is (and will be for the immediate future) so riddled with inadequacies and doubts, that its effectiveness is both unsatisfactory and unknowable...

...Contrary to the currently advocated multi-service scheme (one suspects that no branch of the military wanted to be left out of the anticipated funding bonanza), the bulk of the RDF mission should be turned over to the Marine Corps...

...purchase of eight foreign-built, 33-knot container ships (which can move an entire infantry division, including all its equipment, from the continental United States to the Persian Gulf in 14 days...

...As if inadequacies in hardware weren't serious enough, the RDF is plagued by difficulties in two further areas: supply and training...

...In addition to the myriad practical obstacles to the implementation of the RDF, there exists a fundamental bias in political attitude: Military strategists concerned with the RDF are (quite understandably) fixated on the Middle East, and so have failed to prepare the force for the diverse arenas in which it could conceivably be employed...

...This Headquarters has no peacetime control over units slated for it, and must request permission for their use from the respective parent services...

...These are the only aircraft in our current inventory which can carry tanks, cranes, and other heavy equipment...

...The Iran-Iraq war has continued for over two months, and now threatens to spill over into other parts of the Persian Gulf, leading experts to question whether the United States is able to intervene effectively in the region to secure the West's supply of crude...

...pacification...

...Instead of heavy tank units, we can use available light, wheeled armored cars...

...Thus, the RDF simply does not have enough support ships to maintain naval forces on station under wartime conditions, nor does it possess the escort ships necessary to protect convoys to the war zone...

...Finally, no major training operations involving all RDF units have been undertaken...

...The RDF component forces would be permanent, uniformly trained, and beholden to a single commander...

...These missions assume middle- to high-intensity warfare, and are not well suited to the low-intensity threats which the RDF might have to face elsewhere on the globe...

...Its implementation of the RDF, however, as administered by Robert Komer (the architect of the pacification schemes used in Vietnam under Johnson) reflects views closer to those of the symbolic RDF school, as the evidence presented will demonstrate...

...Far better, this school believes, to have a large, combat-ready RDF capable of defeating any opponent, or at least of holding a beachhead until reinforcements arrive...

...service-life extension for the C-5A...

...Instead, new units should be created with an organization emphasizing specialization and flexibility...

...The 24th Mechanized is a fully mobile division, with 216 tanks, armored personnel carrier (APC) mounted infantry, and self-propelled artillery...

...The best structure would be a corps of independent light-armored infantry brigades, supported by a variety of light-armored, anti-tank, engineer, and other specialist units...

...the AV-8B Advanced Harrier, the Vertical Takeoff/Landing attack airplane needed by the Marine Corps (the importance of the ability to operate without runways should be obvious...

...Thus, opponents of a heavy RDF are correct in assuming that it would be impossible for a three- or four-division force to hold out until the arrival of reinforcements...

...holding actions...

...and the UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter...

...The RDF should therefore be a highly mobile force using "relational-maneuver" tactics...

...Ships from the Reserve (mothball) Fleet, and commercial aircraft from the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) could alleviate these shortages...

...Enhanced sea and airlift capabilities along with a forward stockpiling of supplies in regional locations would compensate for any loss of strategic mobility...

...As formulated in the Army's Operations Manual, FM 100-5, attrition pits strength against strength, in a series of grinding frontal engagements...

...Even in this day of wonder weapons, war in the end boils down to the grunt-the poor, bloody infantryman who must go in, root out the enemy, and hold the ground until the politicians decide what Stuart L. Koehl and Stephen P. Glick are practicing research analysts for a Washington-based defense consulting firm and frequent contributors to The American Spectator...

...CX must be funded and developed, or the C-5 placed back in production...

...Yet to overcome the neglect and mismanagement of the last fifteen years will require a tremendous expenditure over a long period-at least four, and more likely, eight, years...

...Assuredly, selection of units from all four services advances flexibility, but this is outweighed by the problems of command, doctrine, training, and administration (painfully revealed in Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian Rescue Mission).* The idea of an 'See the authors' "Why the Rescue Failed" in the July 1980 issue of The American Spectator...

...only the 82nd Airborne is close to being combat ready...

...many of these are undergoing repair and modernization, or are required for previous commitments...

...The RDF mission is similar to traditional Marine assignments: The Marines have their own tactical air groups, trained to operate in close cooperation with Marine ground troops...

...The establishment of the RDF in the absence of clear declarations of our intent to use it will emasculate it as a deterrent force (although, as stated, deterrence is not its only object...

...As suggested, the RDF must be versatile...

...We have created one...

...In response, heavy force proponents have designed even larger RDF's, placing their hopes in esoteric weapon systems which exist only on the drawing board...

...Proof of this can be found in Israel's experience with Unit 101, a force similar to the RDF established in 1954...

...It must be able to undertake "quick and dirty" commando raids...

...By implication, the RDF must be administratively, logistically, and operationally self-contained, composed of units sharing a common doctrine and training, under an experienced and permanent command...

...The Reagan administration must unambiguously announce the nation's RDF policy, and must protect both its own credibility and America's integrity by employing the force in all the promised situations...

...The basic assumption behind both the heavy (war-fighting) and symbolic RDF philosophies is the traditional American tactic of attrition...

...Our' retiring President and his Secretary of Defense insisted throughout the presidential campaign that we remained neutral in that conflict out of choice, but that we also had adequate air and naval forces in the area to fight, if necessary...

...For smaller missions, special battalion and brigade task forces could be assembled from the entire corps...

...and administration would be smoothed by a relatively simple reorganization of one or two 49,000-man Marine Amphibious Forces to fit the structure required by the RDF...

...and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, LVTC (X...

...Fuel and ammunition requirements are reduced, while the tactical and strategic mobility of the force are improved...

...would amount to 6,000 tons per day...

...To allow high-speed sealift of the entire RDF, more RO-RO and amphibious assault ships must be acquired, and those eight foreign-built container ships purchased...

...Carter's appropriations also call for the reduction of Blackhawk helicopters from 1107 to 491 over the next three years...

...Hence, the fundamental conceptual error was the selection of units from different services to operate together under an umbrella command aimed at one theatre of operations-Europe...

...America's strategic requirements make the need for the RDF unquestioned...

...The administration eliminated two of three Roll-on/Roll-off ships from this year's appropriation, and cut back on funds required to extend the service life of the C-5A...

...The Reagan administration now has the opportunity both to redesign and actually implement the RDF...

...It is a heavy infantry unit, with only one tank battalion, little organic transport, and less artillery than a full division...

...Additionally, the administration stated that it would augment regional stockpiles of munitions, supplies, and spare parts for the RDF (mostly at Diego Garcia...

...The RDF has been assigned no specific aviation, naval, or supply units, nor has it any inherent air or sealift capabilities...

...To those who regard the RDF as window dressing, this will come as a rude surprise...

...and South Yemen, 300...

...When the enemy commander and his units can no longer communicate, their coordination is destroyed and the army ceases to exist...