Wielding Alignments

David, Steven R.

"Wielding Alignments" A new exclusivity will appear to free an alliance policy that is otherwise paralyzed by the competing claims of America's friends. And it may prove particularly attractive to those most eager to...

...Much more active than their Western counterparts, the East Germans have taken the lead in penetrating and controlling the upper echelons of several Third World governments...
...The process of arms transfer must be streamlined to eliminate many of the timeconsuming and irrelevant checks...
...Weapons produced solely for export should be encouraged (if we are going to transfer arms to the Third World they should fit existing defense needs too...
...17 22 THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR NOVEMBER 1980...
...Yet to preoc- cupy ourselves with this problem, however much the behavior of our allies may urge it on us, is to miss the real problem we confront...
...Would they have made a difference...
...Together with their skilled use of proxies, this has given the Soviets a crisis intervention capability that, in the eyes of most Third World leaders, is unmatched by the United States...
...Greater cooperation with allied intelligence agencies, especially in keeping track of opposition groups, should be encouraged (the Israeli intelligence establishment was much better informed than the United States about the coming Irania n revolution...
...A more frequent and manageable threat to Third World rulers is caused by conflict directed against a regime...
...For these elites no need is greater or more pressing than the need to stay in power...
...What's more, if the Soviets can maintain influence in enough countries they will be able to control regional security to the point where anti-Soviet governments and realignments towards the West will become a thing of the past...
...When lsmait, however, proved uncooperative in the Russian attempt to develop closer ties with North Yemen (in .the wake of the ineffective American effort to provide security assistance), the Soviets apparently helped to depose him...
...Unfortunately, we are no better at 20 THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR NOVEMBER 1980 protecting leaders against coups...
...The need to provide for survival follows from the nature of the Third World, where nearly all countries are run by dictatorial regimes in which the significant foreign policy questions are decided by a single Steven R. David is a research fellow in the National Security Studies Program at Harvard University...
...In these situations speed is most critical, not numbers or armor...
...In reaction to recent setbacks in the Third World, Soviet policies today are designed not merely to protect a Third World leader, but rather to prevent him from straying from a pro-Soviet path...
...The coming decade is virtuallycertain to bring increased American-Soviet competi- tion for influence in the Third World...
...If the United States fails to provide for the short-term survival of our friends in tile Third World, all the longterm planning and good intentions won't be doing them--or us--any good...
...The Soviet knowledge of its edge in this critical area guarantees that many regimes will be facing just this need...
...With a Somali victory imminent, it was clear that weaponry alone would not be enough...
...If it is felt, however, that the Soviet Union is in a better position than the United States to protect friendly regimes, the ability of the United States to promote and maintain pro-American alignments will be undermined...
...Furthermore, the United States under certain conditions might want to consider direct action against the proxies themselves, such as a blodkade of Cuba...
...These lead times make it impossible for a leadership to turn to a new supplier when war is imminent or underway unless the new patron can provide the manpower to operate the new arms...
...Americans of both left and right will be uncomfortable, and more, with the independence of strong allies, but the independence of weak allies will be something else again...
...The new Ethiopian leaders resented the United States for having allowed their archenemy Somalia to achieve with Soviet help what they regarded as military superiority...
...When Rubay showed signs of becoming too close to pro-American Saudi Arabia, the Soviets, according to many observers, along with the East Germans and Cubans, assisted in 1979 in his overthrow and execution, replacing him with a dedicated Marxist, Abdul Fattah Ismail...
...These attitudes have been that the Third World is essentially a peaceful place with sovereign governments willing and able to deal with any problems that might arise, that conflicts are strictly regional affairs to be settieo without U.S...
...weapons with their sophisticated electronics and computers generally out-perform their Soviet counterparts...
...It was in this context that the Cuban intervention proved decisive...
...The explanation for these seemingly contradictory assertions lies in the sales figures, which include support and service costs that often have only an indirect link with the arms themselves (and make up a far greater proportion of American transactions than they do with the Soviets...
...In addition, U.S...
...How complacent would we be about a twenty-year Russian presence in Saudi Arabia...
...On the ba~ , of U.S...
...How well the United States does in this struggle will depend greatly on its success in convincing Third World regimes to adopt a pro-Western or--at the very least--a non-aligned posture...
...A stronger Gei'many may be the best lure, in fact, for revived French partic- ipation in NATO--particularly for the Four Power Directorate already said to be functioning informally...
...When one speaks of a Third World state aligned with a superpower, one is really referring to the chosen orientation of a certain individual or group of individuals...
...Understandably, the latest South Yemeni leader, Nasser Muhammad, has gone out of his way to demonstrate loyalty to the Russians...
...To enable Third World nationals to use these arms, the United States should develop expanded and more rapid training programs, especially in those relatively simple" weapons that often decide Third World conflicts...
...The Soviet use of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia amply demonstrated the power of competent proxies to decide the outcome of a conflict...
...In a sense, then, the success of the United States in the Third World will depend on how well we can manipulate and satisfy two of the most basic human desires--the drive for power and the fear of death...
...For example, on the average a regime can purchase five MiG 21s for the price of a single F-5 (variation in models and equipment can move the ratio up or down...
...Only, perhaps, when American support for Pakistan is beyond America on War and Diplomacy...
...If the United States can demon-strate an ability and willingness to protect the leadership of those regimes it hopes to attract, it will enhance its ~nfluence in the Third World...
...In a given year the Russians produce approximately six times as many tanks, three times as many armored personnel carriers, eight times the artillery pieces, and twice the combat aircraft as does the United States...
...Since 1953, Ethiopia's military had depended on the United States as its main source of weapons...
...For the armed forces of the Third World what is critical is not whether the American F-15 jet and XM-1 tank are superior to the Soviet MiG 25 and T-80, but whether reliable, usable weapons exist in the field and which side has more of them...
...Nor can the United States evade its obligations by hoping the Soviets will eventually be forced out of the countries in which they have become involved...
...As is now well known, the United States helped to restore the Shah to his throne in Iran in 1953, and in 1960 rapid American action succeeded in preserving Halle Selassie's position in Ethiopia in the face of an attempted coup...
...For the most part the Cubans have been subordinate to the East Germans in this area, with most of their activities restricted to providing bodyguards for individual leaders (such as Mengistu in Ethiopia and the late Nero in Angola...
...Presently, the East German State Securirv Service (SSD) has advisors in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, and probably Libya...
...The Third World is not peaceful, outside forces are and will continue to be critical in determining regional disputes, and as important as economic developmental needs are for Third World leaders, they are clearly secondary to their concerns for political and physical survival...
...Ethiopia) without arms and alienated others (e.g...
...Perhaps this consideration contributed to North Yemen's subsequent appeal for renewed ties with the Soviets...
...The fact that the Russians have succeeded in being invited into any country at all is a reflection of the desperation many of these leaders must feel...
...Thus when the United States builds a school in Saudi Arabia for military officers, the cost of that school and the roads leading to it are all counted as an arms sale...
...The Russians also maintain a significant edge over the United States thanks to their greater skill in using proxies...
...Even though the Soviets have in recent years widened their lead in arms transfers to the Third World, it has been suggested that the higher quality of American arms still leaves the United States as the preferred security patron...
...Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the United States promoted long-term political and economic development that would lead to the establishment of liberal democracies as the best way to insure the survival of pro-Western regimes...
...In response, President Carter declared his first arms transfer emergency...
...This huge pool of weapons is enhanced by the Soviet proclivity (duplicated in their nuclear weapons programs) to stockpile older weapons regardless of age...
...These questions were possibly answered two years later when an American attempt to prop up a friendly regime in North Yemen proved ineffective...
...After all, for the countries that matter most (such as Saudi Arabia) the United States will surely overcome any institutional or ethical constraints to insure the survival of Pro-American regimes...
...Sadly, these views correspond little with reality...
...In countries where the leadership is suspected of anti-Soviet feelings and no pro-Moscow "progressive" party exists, the East Germans hav.e been busy behind the scenes urging the creation of such a party or making contacts with opposition groups that might provide more "correct" leadership, in the future...
...As a high intelligence official recently remarked, it...
...The Soviet Union was eventually expelled from Egypt, but only after a period of 20 years, during which time their influence caused us numerous headaches...
...Competition among U.S...
...individual or at most by a small group...
...In the area of military assistance several policies would be welcome...
...Halle Selassie's inability to contain the Eritrean rebellion was one of the reasons for his downfall...
...The details of the confrontation aside, however, Third World regimes could not escape the conclusion that had the conflict continued, it would have confirmed the impotence of American assistance...
...Getting them and their German henchmen out of Third World countries will be increasingly difftcult in the future...
...The United States will be able to earn the confidence of its allies only by increasing their confidence in themselves...
...Britain and France will feel this pressure still more...
...Unfortunately, since most Third World conflicts are fought with older, "obsolescent" equipment, this American advantage often proves illusory...
...On the average the Russians deliver their arms in one-half the time of the United States, according to an unclassified CIA report...
...government statistics, it has been asserted that despite th e Soviet advantage in stocks of arms, the United States is by far the largest seller of arms to the Third World (comprising about half of worldwide sales compared to less than one-third for the Soviet Union...
...SPECTATOR NOVEMBER 1980 World leaders, revolution has been by far the most studied...
...Nor is Mengistu unique in his fear of the Soviets...
...This power, if we do not ignore the possibility, can moderate the hostility of allies...
...This type of action, however, has been rare, and, with American intelligence under ever increasing constraints, it is likely to become even more infrequent...
...Sudan and North Yemen) by forcing them to turn to an uncooperative Saudi Arabia for financing...
...By contrast, American military personnel are still complaining about the need to strip combat forces in Europe to resupply Israel in 1973...
...More direct and even apparently exclusive ties with one state can enhance ties with others...
...By the time a favorable decision is reached (if THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR NOVEMBER 1980 19 indeed it ever is), it is very often too late...
...Confronted with a situation in which conflict or the threat of conflict is endemic, where institu- tional means of succession are often lacking, and where loss of power can mean loss of life (as the recent fate of Liberia's chief of state sogruesomely reminded us), it is not surprising that Third World leaders are intensely concerned with defending their position...
...Consequently, they turned to the Russians for aid in coping with Somalia as well as with other threats...
...Would we have sent arms quickly enough...
...Essentially, however, the problem is a good deal simpler...
...In most cases, at any rate, the long-term alternative of a stable, liberal government simply does not exist...
...reaction would have been ifa Soviet-trained Ethiopian army had turned to the United States for assistance in the middle of a conflict...
...In addition, the United States should establish links with lower-ranking officers (most coups begin with or are supported by the military) to avoid the "leapfrogging" of junior personnel m power over the heads of their pro-American superiors (as in Libya and Ethiopia...
...is better to move a battalion of U.S...
...Even if it is accepted that the Soviets have several advantages when it comes to protecting friendly Third World regimes, many would ask whether this is truly a matter for concern...
...Issues of ideology, trade, aid, and image can all affect the choices Third World countries make...
...In the summer of 1977, the Somalis, realizing that the Ethiopians were now caught between suppliers, and fearing for their own long-term security in the wake of the new Russian preference for Ethiopia, seized the opportunity to strike at the Ethiopians to settle their long-standing irredentist claims...
...The United States is generally considered to be superior to the Soviet Union in its training programs, supply of spare parts, and maintenance of arms after delivery...
...Finally, we must make it clear to leaders that if deposed, despite our efforts, they can be assured of securing asylum in the United States...
...A foreign power might invade a state with the express purpose of removing the regime in that state (as Tanzania did with Idi Amin) or an outside power's successful attack might create conditions favorable for a coup (as when Nasser seized power from King Farouk following Egypt's disastrous campaign against Israel ) . Major conflict can also originate within the state itself...
...And it may prove particularly attractive to those most eager to unshackle American power, whatever must be sacri- ficed in relationships with other countires...
...Moreover, as suggested above, the Soviets have begun to learn from their mistakes...
...This does not mean that the United States should simply back any anti-Soviet or pro-Western leadership, without first considering the character of the regime, its importance to American interests, and the type of support demanded...
...True, the United States has not been totally inept in protecting regimes from internal challenges...
...If they fell under hostile control, Western economic and national security interests would suffer even if, in the long run, alternative sources of supplies could be developed...
...How then can the United States better protect the leadership of Third World countries...
...For vital countries such as Saudi Arabia the United States must maintain the ability to project American troops quickly into the capital to foil any coup attempt...
...Finally, the United States must make it clear to the Soviets that massive interventions in regional conflicts will cost them in other areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship...
...It is the East German domination of internal security in Third World countries, however, that is giving the Soviets unprecedented control over Third World leaders...
...In these conditions, the United States must demonstrate to these leaders that they can now rid themselves of Soviet involvement without suffering the fate of~their predecessors...
...Even if the United States succeeds in preserving the tenure of friendly leaders, it must still grapple with fundamental problems such as determining which regimes are worthy of its support, the amount and type of assistance to be provided, and the manner in which these regimes respond and adapt to change in the Third World...
...Moreover, in most cases, it would be unrealistic to expect American support to require direct U.S...
...Since we exist in a bipolar world (in terms of military power), for the United States simply to concede most of the world to Soviet domination because of a lack of direct interest would be a cowardly and, in the end, a disastrous policy...
...Across the Red Sea from Ethiopia, in South Yemen (also called the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) the Soviets have clearly demonstrated the will and capability to use threats in molding regimes to their liking...
...Aside from the overall benefits proxies can provide for a threatened regime, they have proved absolutely essential for any leadership seeking to change military suppliers in the midst of a conflict...
...Freedom of action, to be sure, is also freedom to oppose us...
...When Soviet advisors in the North refused to help, the North Yemenis appealed to the United States for assistance...
...allies, in other words, need not stymie a policy designed to strengthen them...
...Still less should the .9 United States be daunted by the thought that in enhancing their power the United States will also enhance their indepen- dence...
...No one has suggested that the United States has vital interests in North Yemen, but its defection to the Soviets could have a profound impact on Saudi Arabia...
...In order to provide leaders with greater protection against coups, the United States must first enhance its foreign and covert intelligence capabilities...
...What's more, the Russians have demonstrated a greater willingness to discount prices for political purposes...
...Unfortunately, surrounded by Cuban bodyguards and with both his regular and secret police forces under East German control, Mengistu is unlikely ever to risk this course of action...
...For countries previously in the Soviet sphere of influence that turn to the West in the midst of a conflict, the United States must have proxies available, such as Pakistanis, South Koreans, or Egyptians, to provide for immediate defense...
...Military bases in the country, foreign aid,-or influence with key groups do not ensure the safety of any government, as the United States learned in Libya and Ethiopia (and the Soviets in Somalia and Egypt...
...Small wonder, then, that a high-ranking African official recently remarked that no leadership in Africa is now prepared openly to defy the Russians...
...What's more, the United States lacks a strong capability to influence the elite politics in which most coups originate...
...Although its armed forces had been Soviet-trained since 1962, North Yemen had shown signs of seeking closer relations with the West, beginning with its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 1972 and continuing because of Soviet support for South Yemen...
...Furthermore, the Russians enjoy a relatively unfettered political process of arms transfer, which allows them to implement decisions rapidly and massively...
...The Soviet capability and willingness to transfer large amounts of appropriate arms to the Third World become even more attractive when one considers price...
...An examination of the recent Ethiopian and Yemeni conflicts--both of which began when one Side was in the process of changing arms suppliers--illustrates the importance of proxies and the Soviet superiority in this area...
...This is not because Third World leaders are any more ambitious or megalo- maniac than their Western counterparts, but because the threats they face carry much graver consequences...
...If the Soviets wish to extend their influence to the rest of the world, why not let them, especially since experience has demonstrated that any such gains might very well be short-lived...
...In this area, as with military .assistance, it is the Soviets who are developing the more effective policies...
...Thus if the United States is to attract proWestern leaders, it must convince them that the United States will provide the assistance necessary to defend their borders...
...This becomes particularly clear when one bears in mind that most Third World forces are often ill prepared to fight a major engagement with modern weapons...
...Putting aside for a moment the possibility that supplying arms and promoting peace may be mutually compatible, it is useful to realize that the Soviet Union leads the United States in actual transfers of weapons...
...Of all the causes for the fall of Third THE AMERICAN...
...His argument for suspending normal procedures was the immediate North Yemeni need to stave off the South Yemeni assault, thereby preserving the wavering pro-Western regime of North Yemen and, quieting Saudi fears...
...This enables the Russians to transfer massive amounts of arms without drawing on stocks used by Soviet forces...
...advisors (despite the "ugly American" reputation) are usually much better received than their Russian counterparts...
...Steven R. David WIELDING ALIGNMENTS Adjusting to the reality of the Third World...
...The demand for scarce resources, the growth of Soviet military capabilities, an d instability in the Third World itself will all contribute to greater superpower confrontations and threats to American interests...
...The Russians reacted with a massive shipment of arms to Ethiopia (amounting to approximately $I billion or three times what the Ethiopians received from the United States in 25 years) which, although impressive, ~vas virtually useless to the American-trained Ethiopian forces...
...The invasion proved to be a stunning success as the Somalis by September nearly captured the ancient Ethiopian provincial capital of Harrar...
...If Harrar had fallen the Ethiopian leadership--and the Soviet position in Ethiopia--woul d have collapsed...
...This is not to suggest that the recommendations put forth above are a substitute for effective long-term policies...
...The Soviet actions in South Yemen, bolstered by its behavior in Afghanistan (where the Soviets set a new standard by personally executing-a Third World leader and his family), have sent chilling sensations through the bones of Third World leaders...
...Given the fact that it took the West several centuries to develop such governments, we have no reason to aban- don our hopes for the Third World--in the long run...
...tion, the United States should develop a capability to produce and stockpile spare _parts for Soviet weaponrv to enable a state that is in the process of switching sides to continue to use Russian arms...
...Transported directly to the battle front by the Soviets (who also served as commanders), the Cuban troops (who eventually numbered 17,000) stemmed the Somali advance and, in time, along with the newly trained Ethiopian forces, rolled the Somalis back, ending the threat to the Ethiopian regime...
...involvement whether or not the Soviets and their allies are present, and above all, that arms transfers and other forms of security assistance are a basically dirty business to be avoided whenever possible (a view reflected in President Carter's ill-fated and Shortlived arms transfer policy...
...It takes approximately nine months for trained Third World pilots to adapt to new aircraft and about six months to retrain tank crews...
...This relationship ended abruptly in 1974 when the Emperor Halle Selassie was deposed in a military coup...
...This is all the more true since most Third World forces lack the requisite training and expertise to operate sophisticated weaponry (particularly a i r c r a f t ) . As regards the levels of weaponry most commonly used in Third World conflicts--the assault rifles, artillery, armored personnel carriers, antitank arms, and even tanks--it is the Soviets who often possess the qualitative edge...
...The arms did arrive promptly in March, but the North Yemenis did not have the faintest idea how to use them and American efforts to persuade the Saudis to serve as proxies proved fruitless...
...While the Soviet advantages in arms production, quality, and price are certainly attractive to regimes considering a proSoviet alignment (and chilling to those that are not), it is the speedwith which the Soviet Union can respond to immediate crises faced by Third World leaders that ultimately makes it such an attractive patron...
...meanwhile, King Hassan's problems with the Polisario could yet result in the Moroccan leader's fall from power...
...Finally, there is the moral factor...
...The East Germans have been particularly useful in training bodyguards, advising both military and civilian intelligence agencies, and in establishing secret police networks...
...This process seems in one respect to be very complex...
...Their huge stockpiles enable them to draw from existing stocks, while the United States must frequently delay arms shipments (as we did with an Ethiopian request for Phantoms) until the requested arms can be manufactured...
...Maintenance personnel for new equipment take even longer to train...
...These considerations cannot, however, exist in isolation from what is happening now and what is needed now...
...Second, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR NOVEMBER 1980 21 countries which in themselves are not important to the United States may border on countries which are...
...Our frequent demands for payments in hard currency have left some regimes (e.g...
...Yet we should not make these sacrifices in advance, nor underestimate what the care- ful use of American power can achieve...
...Normally, delivery of these arms would have required several years, but in February 1979 North Yemen was invaded from the South...
...For less-thanvital countries the United States should have prearranged plans with allies or proWestern regimes in the area for rapid transport of loyalist or proxy troops to defend pro-American regimes (Libya and Egypt demonstrated the value of cooperative efforts when they jointly reversed a Communist-inspired coup against President Numeiry of Sudan in 1971...
...To see how the Soviets have increased their control over Third World leaders, one need only look at the Soviet use of East Germans and Cubans in Ethiopia, whose leader, Mengistu, now finds himself$2 billion in debt to the Russians and saddled with an increasingly unpopular presence of some 15,000 Cuban troops as well as several thousand Soviet and East German advisors...
...And this will be possible only if the United States can convince these select individuals that political alignment with the West is in their best personal interest...
...In response, a few brief points: First, though not vital to the United States many Third World countries (such as Zaire) contain needed raw materials...
...Yet as important as it may seem (the examples of China in 1949 or Iran in 1978 come to mind), revolution is a rare phenomenon, and one that we do not really understand and can rarely influence...
...While the East Germans are consequently in an ideal position to prevent coups, their activities have not all been defensive...
...For all their importance, however, these long-term American advantages are of little consolation to a regime that is in immediate need of military assistance...
...In addi...
...government officials...
...intervention whenever a regime faced trouble...
...By utilizing Cuban and East German security personnel, this "cocoon"like strategy ensures effectiveness and loyalty to Soviet goals without incurring the political costs direct Soviet involvement would bring...
...Candidate Jimmy Carter used these statistics to proclaim that the United States cannot be the world's leading supplier of arms and'the world's leading supporter of peace...
...One does not have to view the Cubans as Soviet puppets to realize that the coincidence of Cuban and Russian interests, whether forced or not, is rapidly producing a situation whereby Soviet support is perceived as being tantamount to victory...
...Generally, Soviet weapons cost much less than their Western equivalents...
...Therefore, to secure a pro-American align- ment it is reasonable that the United States meet the needs of this narrow but critical elite...
...With Saudi backing, North Yemen concluded two arms deals with the United States in 1976 and 1978...
...Indeed, when one examines the upper reaches of technology, U.S...
...One wonders what the U.S...
...This remains a noble idea...
...troops in a matter of hours than to transport an armored division in a matter of weeks...
...It is, of course, difficult to devise strategies for the protection of friendly regimes against people in their own midst...
...The United States must, how-ever, demonstrate that it will act effec- tively within the limits of its commitment to make certain that the leadership it chooses to support remains in power, Aclmittedly this appears to be a short-term solution, but it must be remembered that such "short-term leaders" as President Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan are still with us...
...Because political and other factors have precluded direct Western and Soviet interventions in most Third World conflicts, the capacity to project force into Third World conflicts through well-trained and disciplined proxy troops has become highly significant...
...Again, skilled use of proxies is crucial to this :process...
...By protecting and threatening a leader at the same time, the East Germans have made it clear that the survival of the regime is in their hands, giving them enormous power over that regime's decisions...
...For these suggestions to have any impact, basic changes must first occur in the attitudes of many U.S...
...For a less vital country this would be unthinkable...
...As depressing as the military assistance picture might seem for the United States, it is not entirely bleak...
...Now that the most dangerous external threats to his survival have been overcome, Mengistu must be under cqnsiderable pressure to emulate Anwar Sadat and expel the Soviets and their allies, repudiate his debt, and perhaps even turn to the West for assistance...
...doubt will India take seriously the impor- tance of good relations with the United States...
...In effect, then, the preferred policy has been to rely on American economic strength in the belief that, in the long term, once the shooting has ended, countries will turn to the United States for developmental assistance...
...With the United States and our allies so increasingly dependent on raw materials such as oil, however, we can no longer afford to wait for the Saudi Arabias of the world to transform themselves into functioning democracies...
...Unfortunately, as the world's leading producer of conventional arms, the Soviets are already the preferred patron in situations requiring security assistance...
...By the same token, journalists and government officials of the small European states will say privately that a stronger Germany actually increases their stake in NATO, and their incentives to keep pace...
...The Russians began their campaign by signing a ten-year military agreement with South YemeniPresident Salim All Rubay in 1972...
...The United States, on the other hand, must normally confront a bewildering array of executive and congressional committees befi)re an arms deal can be completed...
...Fortunately, this almost comic episode did not end tragically, since Arab mediators in the meantime had succeeded in resolving the conflict...

Vol. 13 • November 1980 • No. 11


 
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