A Kind of Victory in Madrid

...providing that the "human contacts" conference-scheduled for Bern in April 1986-would simply be announced by the plenary chairman, rather than made part of the concluding document Nonetheless, the measure is to be as binding as those codified in writing, and, like the formal text, is to be published in the news media of all the signatories In addition, Kampelman, observing that the " narcotic of words" was no substitute for action, insisted that the Soviets offer some tangible demonstration of their good faith This took the form of granting exit visas to two large Siberian Pentacostal families, some of whose members had been living in the U S embassy in Moscow for approximately five years In all, about 30 of the religious dissidents were permitted to emigrate to Israel The Soviets offered assurances, too, that several political dissenters and activists would be permitted to leave the USSR before the end of the year They had at their disposal an informally supplied list of individuals whose release the U S would welcome...

...Moreover, in a major policy address at the 26th Soviet Party Congress in February 1981, the late Leonid I Brezhnev surprised everyone by declaring that he would acquiesce to giving notice of military exercises in the European sector of his country provided the West made a comparable concession When Western diplomats at Madrid inquired as to what might be considered acceptable, the Soviets' initial response was notification of military maneuvers within the Eastern seaboard of the U S and Canada After this bizarre suggestion was brushed off, Moscow retreated to a borderline deep in the Western Atlantic-A demand that did not accord with the logic of Helsinki either since security discussions there had focused on Europe...

...The second matter, disarmament talks, was to be postponed-mainly at the behest of the United States-until after some headway had been made on the first The purpose of setting the two issues so clearly apart was evident to keep Madrid from becoming purely a forum for Soviet propaganda against the deployment of U S cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe The nato command's decision to go ahead with these weapons-assuming no progress were made in medium-range arms reductions talks with the Soviets—had been announced m December 1979, nine months before the Madrid meeting convened...

...Excessive enthusiasm about the outcome at Madrid is clearly unwarranted The scope of human rights gains was sharply restricted Efforts to halt the jamming of Western radio broadcasts were frustrated by the Warsaw Pact, despite the Helsinki tenet of "freer movement of ideas " Still more disturbing was the failure of intensive American efforts to protect the Helsinki monitors in the USSR and the Charter 77 group in Czechoslovakia In blatant disregard of the core Helsinki principle guaranteeing the individual's "right to know and act upon his rights" most of these courageous activists have been arrested or dispersed In September 1982, the vanguard Moscow Helsinki group decided to formally disband At Madrid, the West won only a veiled reference to the subject, in the form of a requirement that signatories "encourage genuine efforts" to carry out the Helsinki Accord...

...The language on trade union rights-a topic especially germane to Poland-was much less forthcoming than what the West had pressed for, yet, it did represent an improvement on the Helsinki Accord, which made no mention of the matter at all " The right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions" was affirmed, while stronger phraseology concerning "independent" unions and the right to strike was effectively resisted by the Eastern bloc Furthermore, the Communists pushed through a clause specifying that the union rights have to be exercised " m compliance with the law of the state ". Finally, the signatories scheduled a conference of human rights experts for May 1985 in Ottawa This could present a meaningful opportunity to air violations of the newly accepted provisions, as well as of those recorded in Basket 3 and Principle VII of the Helsinki document...

...Besides emigration, modest progress was registered in the areas of terrorism and religious and trade union rights The Madrid conferees agreed to "take effective measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, both at the national level and through international cooperation " How the USSR will interpret this obligation cannot be ascertained, but its very willingness to accept such language could prove helpful in coping with international terrorism...

...that emigration fees be kept at "a moderate level in relation to the average monthly income " The safeguard has a special pertinence that is evident from what happened in Romania There the totalitarian regime last November imposed exorbitant taxes on would-be emigrants with higher education Only a U S threat to withdraw Bucharest's Most Favored Nation trading status, under the provisions of the Jackson-Vaink Amendment, persuaded President Nicolae Ceaucescu to rescind the levy late last spring Although agreements on salutary language may be important, naturally state conduct is far more so At present, the USSR has virtually shut off the emigration of Jews (from 4,500 a month m 1979 to 100 a month in 1983), as well as of Germans and Armenians To reinforce the intent of the new language, therefore, the U S and Canada lobbied for a conference on the reunion of families to be set up under the euphemistic designation of "human contacts ". Should the Soviets continue to hold departures to a trickle, they would be the major targets of such a colloquy Accordingly, they mounted a sustained and powerful drive against it, and a neutral/ nonahligned...

...But Moscow's most significant concession came, ironically enough, in the human rights field As early as July 29, 1980, six weeks before the Madrid preparatory talks got under way, Brezhnev had hinted at the possibility of a cooperative posture In a Pravda interview, he said the Kremlin might make "important" changes m Soviet internal policy if the "military detente and disarmament" conference it wanted were to become a reality At the formal opening session in Madrid on November 12, chief Soviet delegate Leonid F Ilyichev spoke more specifically If "forward moves" were made in the security area, he said, the USSR was prepared to consider "in a businesslike way" the "easing of conditions for the reunions of families " And the family issue was in fact prominent among the positive, if circumscribed, human rights advances accepted by Moscow The Helsinki signatories pledged to "favorably deal with" and "decide upon" applications for the "reunion of families " Emigration requests in this category are to be answered "within six months " Where they are refused, the separated family members are to be informed ot "their right to renew applications after reasonably short intervals " In the meantime, their rights to employment, housing and education are not to be modified Another important clause mandates...

...In Washington, meanwhile, the value of the Final Act remains unquestioned Undersecretary of State Lawrence S Eagleburger summed up the Reagan Administration's position when he told Congress last year that Helsinki is "terribly valuable" to the whole process of American foreign policy, because it "gives us a forum that the Soviets simply cannot ignore, nor can the people of the world ". William Korey is International Policy Research Director of B'nai B'rith...

...In Madrid, by contrast, the agenda included from the outset a nato-endorsed French plan that addressed both of Moscow's major concerns measures to allay the increasing fear of surprise attack, and talks on disarmament The two issues were carefully delineated and separated...

...Thus Madrid did not end in failure, as had the previous Helsinki review meeting held in Belgrade from October 1977-March l978 The concluding document then was brief, stating that the opposing sides had agreed to disagree without actually halting the Helsinki process Not a word was mentioned about human rights The gathering foundered because the West could not offer the Soviets even part of what they wanted The Kremlin was chiefly interested in obtaining from nato the chimerical pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and the Alliance was of course totally unresponsive...

...Indeed, it was precisely the mention of disarmament that attracted Moscow, since it urgently wished to prevent the installation of the new weapons Hoping to secure the cherished conference before the missiles were a fait accompli (December 1983 was subsequently set as a target date for putting the first ones in place) the Kremlin dumped the disarmament scheme that it had prepared for Madrid and agreed to negotiate on the French plan...

...compromise deleted the provision Kampelman, however, would not give way, believing the principle at stake constituted the core of Basket 3, the human rights portion of the Helsinki charter The situation remained at stalemate until, on June 17, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez put forward a new solution that left the Washington/Ottawa proposal intact Since Moscow was ardently courting the recently elected Socialist leader, it would have been unseemly to reject his plan outright Consequently, the two top Soviet representatives flew to Moscow for consultations Upon their return Anatoly G Kovaley, who had replaced livichey in 1982, told the Madrid plenary that the USSR was prepared to act within the framework to the Spanish initiative " The Kremlin's loss of face had to be mitigated a bit more, though, before it would grant its full assent A timely Swiss maneuyci served this purpose by...

...A group of neutral and nonaligned nations offered a compromise that drew the line at the sea and air space adjoining Europe The West readily consented Moscow stonewalled (as it did on numerous occasions throughout the conference), yet ultimately settled for the formula, adding only a footnote defining "adjoining sea area" as inclusive of the "ocean area adjoining Europe " The USSR was also obliged to accept January 1984 as the date for a disarmament conference in Stockholm With the deadline for deploying the cruise and Pershings already past, the propaganda value of the talks will clearly be diminished...

...The USSR, as one might expect, has often found itself acutely embarrassed at the Helsinki review sessions, and has increasingly been playing down the accord it so exultantly praised in the period immediately following 1975 Since 1980, for example, the Helsinki agreement has been deprived of its former place among the priority slogans proclaimed by the Soviet Communist Party on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution...

...The heart of the new pact, like that of the original Helsinki Final Act, is a trade-off between West and East Eight years ago, the Kremlin's desire for ratification of the postwar map of Eastern Europe was balanced against the democratic world's demand for the recognition of human rights as a fundamental principle of international relations This time, the USSR sought a Helsinki-sponsored conference on disarmament and confidence-building measures in the military sphere, while the West, vigorously led by U S Ambassador Max M Kampelman, insisted upon a further extension of human rights guarantees...

...Yet the Madrid agreement did succeed in perpetuating the Helsinki process, and in some ways enhanced it Future review sessions-the next one will be in Vienna m November 1986-together with the experts' meetings in Ottawa and Bern will lend themselves to raising the consciousness of the civilized international community to the Soviet bloc's denial of human rights During the course of the Madrid marathon, the U S publicly named over 120 Eastern Europeans whose rights were being trampled on, and in several cases the exposure precipitated remedial action Not to be minimized either is the moral sustenance the meetings provide Harassed democrats and dissidents in the USSR and its satellites have repeatedly told Western visitors that the very existence of these forums where rights issues aired before the entire world is for them an indispensable beacon of hope...

...The Russians' eagerness for the arms forum was strong enough to provide a certain degree of leverage against them But this was weakened by the fact that a number of the U S ' Western European allies were themselves anxious to have a disarmament parley, if only to demonstrate their concern about the nuclear threat to their electorates back home The situation placed a great premium on the patience that Kampelman implored his colleagues to maintain, and his ability to preserve unity in the Western ranks is a testimonial to the effectiveness of his statesmanship...

...To deter unexpected invasion, Paris proposed a broader definition of the types of military maneuvers requiring advance notification to other countries In particular, it wanted Moscow to announce maneuvers conducted on Soviet soil anywhere west of the Urals The corresponding sections in the Helsinki agreement were limited to a strip extending 150 miles into the Soviet Union Not insignificantly, the French insisted that discussions of the subject at Madrid be restricted to relevant and verifiable procedures...

...On religion, the Madrid pact clearly states that participating nations will " take the action necessary to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief " And "religious faiths, institutions [and] organizations" must be allowed to "develop contacts and meetings among themselves and [to] exchange information " Again, even if it is highly uncertain that these promises will ever be implemented in Eastern Europe, the commitment itself may prove useful...

...END OF THE MARATHON A Kind of Victory in Madrid BY WILLIAM KOREY Damon Runyon might have called it the oldest established permanent floating talkfest in the Western world The Madrid review meeting of the 35 signatories to the 1975 Helsinki Accord on Security and Cooperation in Europe-all the European states plus the U S and Canada-was in session for nearly three years Nevertheless, to the surprise of many, an agreement was reached late last July, and the scheduled signing next month will probably bring together a mini-summit of foreign ministers, among them Secretary of State George P Shultz and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei A Gromyko...