Italy's Elusive Coalition

SENIGALLIA, SILVIO F.

WAITING FOR OCTOBER Italy's Elusive COalitiOn SILVIO SENIGALLIA ROME Two months after the national election that failed to resolve this country's political impasse, horse-trading among the...

...WAITING FOR OCTOBER Italy's Elusive COalitiOn SILVIO SENIGALLIA ROME Two months after the national election that failed to resolve this country's political impasse, horse-trading among the major parties does not seem likely to provide Italy with a long-lasting government m the very near future either Filippo Maria Pandolfi—the Christian Democratic (DC) Minister of the Treasury in Giulio Andreotti's caretaker government—two weeks ago failed to assemble even a viable transitional cabinet that would have consisted largely of technicians But hopes for a more enduring and socially meaningful end to the deadlock were actually dashed earlier in the month when Bettino Craxi's effort to save the situation collapsed The appointment of the Socialist Party (PSI) Secretary as Prime Minister-designate by President and fellow Socialist Sandro Pertini was greeted with enthusiasm in some circles here Many observers felt that the young and cocky politician, despite his strident criticism of the DC leadership, was the only man who could form a coalition that the Christian Democrats would participate in and the Communists (PCI) would not oppose Italy's predominantly Leftist media even hailed the possible advent of a Socialist in the Chigi Palace after 33 years of DC occupancy as the harbinger of a new era Others, however, were more skeptical, and they were soon proved right Craxi foundered on the same rocks of interparty animosity that had sunk Andreotti a few weeks earlier To be sure, both the DC and the PSI have some justification for their hostility toward each other More than three decades of Christian Democratic rule, often wielded with intolerable arrogance, especially at the provincial and municipal levels, have lowered the standards of political ethics They have also increased the influence of the Catholic Church on strictly national and local issues These serious drawbacks, attributable to both the confessional matrix of the party and to the lack of any alternative leadership, should not be overlooked on the grounds of the current state of emergency Nevertheless, the hatred and venom Socialist and Radical politicans and intellectuals have directed at the Christian Democrats are hardly disinterested Their attitude is really a mixture of old-fashioned anticlencalism, fuzzy ideology and blatant hunger for power, plus a generous dollop of intellectual arrogance Political analysis is mixed with old prejudices and frustrated ambitions 1 was told by a sincerely democratic, middle-aged Socialist friend, who fought in the resistance in 1944 and now holds a responsible position at PSI national headquarters, that he would rather face a Fascist revival than the continuation of DC supremacy "If the Fascists got into power again," he said, "I would know what to do I would grab a gun and shoot at them But with the DCs amoral interpretation of democracy I feel hopeless " Anything, he concluded, is better than the present suffocating regime based on the ruthless perpetuation of power Virtually forgotten amid such diatribes are the voters' relatively massive support of the DC (38 5 per cent m the last election), the party's contribution to the postwar national reconstruction, its staunch opposition to Communism at a time when the Socialists were allied to a Stalinist PCI, and Socialist participation for more than 10 years in coalition governments headed by the DC For their part, the Christian Democrats' dislike of Craxi goes beyond un-happiness about losing the premiership DCers cannot help remembering that the Socialist electoral campaign was overtly aimed at cutting the largest party down to size, or that the PSI officially regard itself as the Leftist alternative In addition, the DC top echelons are worried about slitting their own political throats For while Craxi is by no means the PCl's Trojan horse —as a matter of fact he fears the Communists as much as he hates the Christian Democrats—his views on economic, social and labor affairs are certainly different from those ot the DC Upon attaining the premiership, therefore, the Socialists would be unlikely to accept the kind of program they rejected sonic six months ago when the crisis began And DC Secretary Beningno Zaccagnini, although weakened by his party's constant internal warfare, was not about to have pig in a poke As the DC and the PSI battled it out, the Communists—who are In mis opposed to the Christian Democrats—remained calm and controlled Eschewing personal attacks, they have been promising to play a constructive opposition role Their approach is attributable to three factors First, they recognize the "popular nature" of large sectors of the DC electorate Second, they fear antagonizing the Catholic masses, as evidenced by their traditional caution on the divorce and abortion issues Third, their ultimate goal is still sharing power with the Christian Democrats Clearly, those who thought the results of the national (June 3-4) and European (June 10) elections would weaken party Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, and strengthen the PCI's intransigent Left-wingers, were wrong Despite the unusually critical appraisal of the 1976-79 party line following the Communist defeats in the two elections, Berlinguer continues to be in full command A few scapegoats have been found to appease his critics, but that is all, if anything, the new lineup of the secretariat, announced on June 11, has strengthened his position Rather than blaming himself, Berlinguer has successfully contended that the electoral losses were due to an incorrect understanding and enforcement of the official party line In a sense, Berlmguer s refusal to heed the party hawks' demands for a tougher opposition role and abandonment of the historic compromise policy can be viewed as a positive development On the other hand, that he prevailed is proof that the PCI is still run by the iron rule of democratic centralism At the same time, the Central Committee debate, and the comments of the Communist press, not only were more outspoken than in the past, but identified some ol the reasons tor the PCI electoral setbacks These included excessive bureaucratization, preventing any real contact with the masses, failure to understand the problems of the new generation, and unwillingness to sympathize with those efforts to resolve them that are beyond the party's control, a dogmatic class approach to issues that concern major cross sections of the population (such as women's rights, drugs, homosexuality), rigidity in facing new Leftist trends not stemming from or identifiable with Marxism None of this, though, has affected PCI policy After a brief hesitation, for example, Berlinguer did give Craxi a measure of support because he did not want to be accused of sabotaging a Left-winger—but there was no question of the Communists' joining a Socialist government Actually, Berlinguer was relieved when Craxi failed, for this provided further evidence that without Communist participation no Christian Democratic government is possible Thus the stalemate continues—and will continue as long as relations among the major parties are affected by the following ?The Communists' demands for a government role The Christian Democrats' refusal to grant it ?The Socialists' rejection of both an alliance with the Communists and a coalition with DC that does not have the blessing at the PCI The Socialists' desire to exploit the restlessness ot the electorate and its dissatisfaction with the old order For the immediate future, the prospect is either a freezing of the caretaker Andreotti government or a strictly provisional arrangement of the kind proposed by Pandolfi—a coalition of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans and technocrats?to carry the nation over until October At that time the DC national congress will be held, and the new leadership may be granted greater flexibility in its dealings with the Communists and the Socialists Meanwhile, the public is watching the all too familiar minuet ot consultations meetings and interviews with remarkable detachment The people is mam wish was aptly summed up by the title ot a recent Corriere de lla Sera editorial Please not another election Silvio F Senigallia reports regularly for The New Leader from Rome...

Vol. 62 • August 1979 • No. 16


 
Developed by
Kanda Sofware
  Kanda Software, Inc.