Turkey After Cyprus

...SEARCHING FOR LEADERSHIP Turkey After Cyprus BY ELIAHU SALPETER Ankara From the prolonged tug-of-war between President Gerald Ford and Congress over the question of halting military aid to Turkey—set off by Capitol Hill's indignation at Ankara's use, in violation of U S law, of American-supplied weapons to invade Cyprus —one might reasonably assume that the resolution of the struggle was a burning issue in this capital, too But that assumption would be wide of the mark In fact, theie is almost nothing Washington might do that would have more than marginal leverage on Turkish policy To be sure, the military, who have a lot to say about what happens here, would certainly resent a freezing of the flow of U S arms and materiel, now amounting to roughly $70 million a year, but this is almost peanuts compared to the cost of the Cyprus expedition Moreover, the generals would be the last group to bow to pressures to in any way neutralize the results ot an effort they are extremely proud of Nor is that other U S carrot, economic aid, irresistibly tempting to Ankara Turkey had a balance of payments surplus of over $900 million m 1973 and may do equally well this year, despite the huge increase in the price of its oil imports American economic assistance of all kinds, meanwhile, totaled a mere $54 million in 1973—down from $237 million in 1963, when this country ran a $30 million payments deficit Still basking in the glow of their Cyprus success, the Turks do not feel Washington was especially partial to them during the fighting At most, Turkish officials and politicians acknowledge that for the first time the U S did not take the side of Greece—hastening to note that the stance was dictated purely by American interests m the Mediterranean Even Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's admirers along this capital's embassy row consider it a major foreign policy failure that Washington was left with no alternative but to choose between Athens and Ankara And many diplomats tend to agree with the Turkish opinion that the U S really did not have much of a choice Turkey, they point out, is both stronger than Greece militarily and more important strategically, since it is the only Eliahu Salpeter, our regulai Mideast coi respondent, tecently completed an extended tour of Turkey nato country bordering the Soviet Union and controls the entrance to the Black Sea In private, the same diplomats add that Washington was not worried (mistakenly, as it turned out in the end) about incurring Greek wrath because ol the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, at least while the colonels were in power in Athens On the other hand, given Turkey's accumulated backlog of anti-American sentiment, there was concern that U S interference could have some rather unpleasant effects on Ankara's relations with the West It is no secret that then Premier Bulent Ecevit's Republican People's party (RPP) encompasses Leftist elements who advocate moving away from nato and the US In addition, Ecevit's junior coalition partner at the time—the Right-wing, ultraorthodox National Salvation party (NSP)—advocates closer attachment to the Moslem (and particularly Arab) countries of the "nonaligned Third World" (The NSP, incidentally, was the mam instigator of Ankara's decision to cancel the U S -Turkish agreement that was ending opium poppy cultivation ) At the moment, Washington's potential influence is further limited by the political stalemate that has developed here In the October 1973 elections the RPP won, rather surprisingly, 189 of the 450 seats in Parliament, surpassing former Premier Suleyman Demirel's Justice party, m second place with 149 seats A majority government being impossible, Ecevit, as head of the largest bloc, was asked to form the new Cabinet After some preliminary negative reactions from other prospective partners, his choice narrowed down to the NSP, which had taken 49 seats It is hard to imagine a stranger political marriage The RPP, a slightly Left-of-center Social Democratic party (Sweden's Olof Palme is said to be one of Ecevit's models), regards itself as the inheritor and guardian of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu's principles of Westernization and secularization ol Turkey The NSP—in almost open defiance of a constitutional ban—advocates reestablishing Islam as the state religion Ecevit apparently hoped that the populist and jingoist slogans of the NSP (whose mam power base lies in the most backward rural areas ot the country), and the generous allocation to it of seven out of 24 Cabinet posts (including the deputy premiership), would leave him free to pursue his own party's liberal, reform-minded policies Instead, almost from the start, the NSP behaved as if it were the senior partner m the coalition Its leaders dismissed or retired thousands of civil servants, professionals and even technicians from the ministries that came under their control, replacing them with NSP faithfuls These ministries, and their affiliated state enterprises (particularly in agriculture), were run as NSP fiefdoms—often following policies opposed to those officially adopted by the Cabinet To take a typical if not very important example, construction of the Istanbul Sheraton was halted for months by the NSP Minister of Trade, who claimed the site involved was originally Moslem religious endowment land Besides, he argued, big hotels serve Western tourists who bring m Western ideas and manners detrimental to traditional Moslem values Though Ecevit has tried to steer a low-key, passively neutral course m the Middle East dispute, the NSP has loudly sought to push the government into the pro-Arab camp Thus some months ago the Minister of Trade also forbade the shipment of cement to Israel—Turkey's largest export item to the Jewish State, where local manufacturers could not keep pace with the building boom—despite the fact that the international market was turning soft and thousands of tons of cement were beginning to accumulate in Turkish plants More serious were the clashes between the coalition partners on basic domestic issues The NSP opposed the release of thousands of liberals and Leftists jailed by the previous military regime, it called publicly for the dismissal of the Minister of Education (a personal friend of Ecevit), because he reinstated teachers fired by the military and refused to introduce the teaching of Islam in public schools, it opposed family planning Keenly aware of his dependence on NSP votes, Ecevit swallowed his anger and tolerated the insolence of his junior partner Then came the Cyprus intervention The NSP behaved as if nothing had changed While Ecevit stressed the official government policy calling for a federated but independent and sovereign Cyprus, NSP leader and Deputy Premier Necemit Erbakan began to make speeches urging the annexation ot the Turkish part of the island But the Cyprus campaign fundamentally altered the political situation in Turkey—and hence Ecevit's position—even though the NSP apparently did not recognize this To appreciate the change, one must understand the basic motives behind Ankara's intervention To begin with, there was the feeling of solidarity with the sufferings of the Turkish minority on the island, secondly, there was deep suspicion of a revival of pan-Hellenistic expansionism, including enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece), but the most important factor was Turkish pride The Turks believe that, ever since Ataturk's victories in the 1920s, they have behaved extremely generously toward Athens Following World War II, they allowed the Dodecanese Islands, located just off the western coast of Turkey, to be handed over to Greece after they were taken away from defeated Italy They accepted a settlement for an independent Cyprus despite the infenor status it gave the Turkish minority And, twice in recent years, they abstained from stepping m when intercommunity fighting on the island led to massacres m Turkish villages and the creation of some 45,000 refugees whose sustenance had to be financed by Ankara So, when the violently anti-Turk-lsh Nikos Giorgiades Sampson overthrew President Makarios (for whom not much love was lost m Ankara, either), the overstrained Turkish pride and patience snapped "We could not tolerate Greek threats and Greek arrogance anymore," is the typical explanation I have heard here "Had we not intervened, as was our legitimate right, nobody would have ever taken us seriously We were beginning to ask ourselves, are we men or whining women'7" Or again "Ecevit finally took the step that should have been taken many years ago " Ecevit's popularity skyrocketed overnight, making him a national hero second only to Ataturk Calculating that he no longer had to tolerate the NSP's antics, he seized the opportunity afforded by its move to torpedo his scheduled state visit to Scandinavia (which Athens also tried to persuade his hosts to cancel) and handed in his resignation This brought down the entire government and treed Ecevit of his undesirable coalition partners Nobody in Ankara doubts that, should elections be held soon, Ecevit's glory would bring the RPP a big victory, possibly even a clear majority in Parliament Under the Turkish Constitution, however, only Parliament has the right to dissolve itself before its full term expires, the Premier cannot on his own declare early elections Precisely because of the expected Ecevit landslide, none ot the other political parties is exactly eager to test the will of the voters in the very near future, and he has not yet been able to push through a dissolution of Parliament Nor has he found any party willing to join the RPP in a new coalition In an effort to resolve the impasse...

...President Fahn Koruturk asked former Premier Demirel to try to form a government, but he could not succeed in putting together a coalition headed by his Justice party As the current Cabinet crisis drags on, the aura of Ecevit's Cyprus victory is gradually fading Simultaneously, the public's attention is reverting to the continuing problems of inflation, occasional scarcity ot commodities and similar daily woes Such concerns seldom add votes to the parties in power Officials in Ankara speak of a 22 per cent inflation But the actual figures indicate that from May 1973-May 1974 consumer prices rose about 35 per cent Informed economists privately predict that by December the rate will reach 50 per cent Indeed, Turkey's inflation, population growth and economic expansion are all accelerating In a sense, the outcome of the race among the three may ultimately be determined by the health of the West German economy, which provides jobs for most of the Turks who cannot find work in their own country Turkey's population has gone from 17 8 million in 1940 to nearly 40 million today Furthermore, the rate of growth rose from 2 0 per cent in the pre-World War II decade to 2 6 per cent in the '60s Failing to find jobs on the farms, many rural people began streaming to the cities in search of better opportunities Consequently, the population explosion has been accompanied by rapid urbanization In the period 1940-70, the number of Istanbul's inhabitants almost tripled to 2 3 million, Ankara jumped nearly eight-fold to 1 2 million, and by now the figure is believed to be about 1 5 million It is estimated, too, that at least a third of the capital's residents live m houses built without permits in the scores of shanty-towns and semislums that cover the surrounding hills Yet Turkey remains essentially a rural society, where 68 per cent of the working population is employed in agriculture This points up one of the weaknesses of the economy In a decade that saw the overall GNP go up 87 per cent, industrial production increased 170 per cent while farm production inched forward only 15 per cent In other words, the overwhelming majority of the people neither contributed significantly to the nation's economic expansion nor benefited greatly from it Thanks to the repatriated earnings of nearly a million Turkish workers in Western Europe—they sent home $1 2 billion in 1973 and are expected to return $1 5-2 0 billion this year—the country's balance of payments is among the healthiest in Europe, notwithstanding increasing trade deficits The latter have worsened from $330 million a decade ago to $782 million last year, yet during the same period Turkey went from a $38 million payments deficit to a whooping $904 million surplus It is not surprising, then, that Ankara's economists are anxiously following the Common Market situation, particularly its unemployment figures They are hopeful, nonetheless, that Turkish workers there will be less affected by recession than other nationalities—partly because many of them hold menial jobs that German, Belgium or Danish skilled laborers presumably would not take even if the alternative was to live, for a time, on unemployment insurance The presence of roughly 750,000 Turkish workers in Germany is recreating a special relationship between two countries that were allies before and during World War II—in which both lost their empires Today, Lufthansa and Turkish Airlines run four daily flights between Frankfurt, Munich and Istanbul In addition, there are several weekly direct flights to Ankara, and numerous charter flights shuttle Turkish workers and their families to and from the Federal Republic German is becoming the best-known foreign language in Turkish cities (and even in the countryside), m any crowd somebody can be found who has picked up at least a rudimentary facility with it Single workers tend to stay in Germany for many years, while married men usually leave their families behind and return as soon as they have accumulated a targeted amount of savings They also bring home German-made radios, televisions, appliances, and Volkswagens Many who are from rural areas use their savings to buy land or improve the family farm Those from urban areas often invest in houses, taxis or trucks as a means of gaining a higher and steadier income A more recent phenomenon is the formation of cooperative partnerships by workers who were employed in the same factory or the same industry in Germany They pool their capital to buy tools and machinery and use their newly acquired skills to establish workshops or small factories in their hometowns Another less tangible but potentially no less important benefit accruing to Turkey is the raised expectations its workers are bringing back from Western Europe Having tasted and become accustomed to much higher standards m the service industries and m public services, they now ask themselves—and the government—why standards cannot be improved at home Unlike Turkish students, the workers tend not to get involved m Leftist politics during their stay abroad, and there-tore their criticism is generally voiced in nationalistic and patriotic tones Since administration, communications and services are the weakest strands in the economic fabric ot the country, a transfusion of West European standards to Turkey could have a most beneficial impact The immediate and most serious threat to the economic and social stability of Turkey is, of course, galloping inflation Hardest hit by it are neither the farmers nor the businessmen and professionals, but the low- and middle-level public employes Their salaries are much closer to the guaranteed minimum wage than to the actual incomes of higher-level bourgeoisie, hence, they are caught in a tightening squeeze between the cost of living at the level they think they must maintain and what their salaries can in fact pay for Unless this group is given some relief, it promises to become a highly volatile element in future elections With the euphoria of the Cyprus campaign waning and its costs beginning to be felt in the economy, social unrest threatens to increase in other sectors of the population, too Indeed, until the national leadership crisis is firmly resolved, pros-spects will remain d>m both for meeting Turkey's domestic problems and for reaching a Cyprus settlement...