'Europe to the Urals'

...convenient, because American power checkmates Soviet power and permits France to employ maneuver and deception in seeking a grand policy without great power...

...The gap between French ends and means, preventing France from using economic or military power to pressure allies or to purchase friends, dictates not only a policy of sudden maneuver (for example, the exclusion of Great Britain from the Common Market) but also a posture of obstinate insistence on its point of view...

...In many respects, Russia has more to offer to France than to Germany...

...To the Germans, a continued and stable United States presence in Central Europe is essential to their security...

...Without America, Europe would have neither the military, political nor economic power to attract Eastern Europe or to assure its own security against Russia...

...Isolated from the U.S...

...The other Europeans do not relish the prospect of a Franco-German constellation leading Western Europe, exclude America, and by itself attempting to regulate with Russia the difficult legacies of World War II...

...Hopeful that Eastern Europe "will gradually come to an evolution compatible with our own transformation" (i.e., Western European independence from America), de Gaulle envisions the ultimate absorption of Eastern Europe and Russia in a larger European community, based on a common cultural and historical heritage and defined geographically (in a 1959 speech) as "Europe to the Urals.' De Gaulle sees this as the culmination of a lengthy process within the Communist states, perhaps accelerated by the SinoSoviet conflict and the growing attraction of Europe and the Common Market...

...it was content to remain on the Elbe while busy with consolidating its rear...

...America, despite what its leaders said, accepted that division...

...Given the limits imposed on German rearmament and, more important, the moral and political factors involved, de Gaulle reasonably assumed that the political (and perhaps also military) leadership in that relationship would inevitably be exercised by France...

...At best, the Germans could purchase reunification at the cost of U.S...

...Moreover, and this explains much of its appeal even among de Gaulle's European critics, it seems to be in keeping with the thrust of European development...

...Let us build Europe," he has called, evoking memories of Charlemagne as he appealed to the "Gaullic, Germanic and Latin peoples" to join in constructing a "European Europe"—that is, one free of American and Russian influence...

...De Gaulle's preoccupation with Eastern Europe reveals the strong element of sacro egoismo and deception in his policy...

...That stood in desirable contrast with the apparent willingness of the United States to pursue a détente with the Soviet Union, even though the United States had been more restrained than de Gaulle on the subject of the Oder-Neisse frontier...

...and Germany, France can only obstruct, not construct...

...In spite of de Gaulle's close ties with Germany, which he sees as the backbone of an independent Europe, he has hoped gradually to speed the process of amalgamating Russia into Europe by lessening the fear among Eastern Europeans of a renewed German Drang nach Osten...

...With the renewed emphasis on the supremacy of the nation-state, and the fears of supranational organs—be they CEMA or the EEC— the last- seems a particularly ripe terrain for the Gaullist vision of a Europe of states...

...it also provides him with subtle means for inducing the Germans to follow him out of fear that France might seek some accommodation with Russia on the basis of the European status quo...

...He categorically opposed the Soviet proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Treaty NonAggression Pact and rejected any idea of equivalence between the Atlantic Alliance and "Communist servitude...

...The long-range importance of this more than compensated, in his view, for the temporary isolation and even unpopularity of France...

...But even short of such a dramatic dénouement in the configuration of European politics, French flexibility toward the East is essential to the realization of de Gaulle's long-range vision...

...In this connection he has gone further than Washington...

...and the USSR, which in fact no longer had any incompatible interests in Europe...

...According to this version, Russian troops would withdraw from East Germany and all European satellites, with the priority given to those countries neighboring the economic community: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary...

...The intensified French contacts with Soviet statesmen, the exchanges and trade with the Communist states, and finally the much publicized French-Rumanian cooperation agreement, initiated in July 1964 after the Rumanian Premier visited de Gaulle, indicated growing French involvement in Eastern Europe, while certain ambiguous gestures toward East Germany might have been meant as pointed warning signals to Bonn...

...political influence on the Continent, hoping to replace it by Franco-German concord...

...There is little reason to believe that Washington would give Paris and Bonn a blank check for writing U.S...

...De Gaulle expressed this view on July 29, 1963: "The United States, which since Yalta and Potsdam has had nothing to demand from the Soviets, now sees prospects of understanding opening before it...

...These countries would regain free exercise of national sovereignty and would be able to associate with Europe economically and even politically...

...There is no doubt that he alone among the Western statesmen has conceived and articulated a tomorrow for Europe that appears to have more substance than either the vague American talk about a "world safe for diversity" or the crude Soviet boastings about "burying" the non-Communist way of life...

...Moscow, he felt, no longer expected to swallow up the rest of Europe, at least not in the near future...

...Hints that France would welcome German technical and especially fiscal assistance have fallen on deaf ears...

...Such a proposal is likely to unleash a flood of emotional response (on both sides of the iron Curtain) from those who are tired of the division of Europe and are impatient to find a way out...

...They fear that this re-examination will not take place according to de Gaulle's own personal timetable, i.e., when France and the "European Europe" are ready to shoulder the military burden, but much earlier—and that Germany will be the first to feel the pinch...

...Splendid isolation" was a mocking term often applied in the past to describe England in relation to the Continent...

...The exclusion of America might be especially attractive to Left-wing circles, particularly in England and Italy...

...To him this is both essential and convenient: essential, because otherwise Europe would remain the appendage of America...

...Consequently, there is little inclination on the Continent to provide material support for the French nuclear development...

...Hence the Russian offers could not be very attractive...

...Taking the new European sense of confidence and security as his point of departure, he has pressed steadily to diminish U.S...

...In addition, the Eastern option could be the source of an alternative policy in the event that the Paris-Bonn axis is ruptured...

...Since his ideal Europe is to be led by France, it follows that the two best alternatives for France are (1) a Europe divided on the Elbe, in which a divided Germany depends on France for eventual reunification, or (2) a united Europe including not only a 70-million-strong Germany but also Eastern Europe (and even Russia), since the latter combined with France would more than balance Germany...

...And this flexibility has become increasingly important as Chancellor Erhard's regime has reasserted the primacy of the GermanAmerican tie, and as Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder's new German line, executed in correspondence with the United States, has posed the risk of the Eastern European initiative being pre-empted by Washington and Bonn with France isolated on the sidelines...

...Both maneuver and deception have been important to de Gaulle, for in many respects he has sought, at least in the short run, contradictory goals...

...This courtship—exemplified by the French-Rumanian agreement, the ambiguous gestures toward East Germany, and the potential flirtation with Russia—is in direct conflict with the "hard" Eastern policy recommended by de Gaulle's German admirers and has undermined their opposition to Schroeder...

...Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, is co-author of the recent Political Power: USA/USSR...

...Paris has given no hint that eventually the French force will be transformed into a European one...

...A tightly integrated Western Europe subject to such "external" control would be, as he put it a year ago, a Europe "without soul, without backbone, and without roots," subject "to one or the other of the two foreign hegemonies...

...military policy, he transformed France into a nuclear power...

...at worst, at the cost of Communization of all Germany...

...They could forgive de Gaulle's recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier (or minimize it as mere sleight of hand) and his advocacy of individual contacts with East Germans, as long as his general posture toward the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe seemed one of uncompromising firmness...

...This obviously runs counter to the views of France.' After holding America responsible for the division of Europe, de Gaulle went on to assert that in time "a complete change in the relations between East and West in Europe" would become possible and that "when this day comes, and I have said this before, France expects to make constructive proposals concerning the peace, equilibrium and destiny of Europe...

...As "Sirius" noted in Le Monde, "Once again, the argumentation of General de Gaulle turns against him and ruins his own designs...

...Toward that end, as well as to increase Europe's ability to influence U.S...

...The vision of Europe stretching to the Urals is captivating and grandiose...

...He has had to gain West German friendship and loyalty to his scheme while simultaneously diluting the Eastern European, and even Russian, fears of the Germans...

...Most West Europeans welcomed the new cordiality between France and Germany, for that was an essential point of departure for burying the ancient antagonisms that led to the destruction of Europe...

...Indeed, it could have the effect of driving America out of Western Europe (leaving perhaps West Germany as America's last ally) without driving Russia out of Eastern Europe...

...Eventually, according to an optimistic long-range projection by one of his admirers, the "European" Europe would be able to propose to the Soviet Union a new solution for liquidating the division of Europe and providing an alternative to the Soviet-American international system...

...In his press conference last July 23, de Gaulle spoke with a touch of sadness about joint French-West German initiatives that might have been made had Bonn only followed his lead...

...On the contrary, all the French comments, projecting the state of the force into the '70s, make it clear that French control is not going to lapse...

...exclusion from Germany and dependence on Russia...

...No German believes West Berlin can remain free without that presence and without, above all, the American willingness to fight...

...To counter that, Paris has had no alternative but to activate its own policies in Eastern Europe—notwithstanding de Gaulle's earlier condemnations of the regimes as "fraudulent intermediaries of Russia," and his hope that the Eastern European initiative might have been made jointly by Bonn and Paris...

...He has.seen that acceptance of the present Polish-German frontier on the Oder-Neisse Rivers as permanent is the sine qua non for drawing Poland back into the European orbit...

...There is simply no substitute for this, and although de Gaulle has stressed the high value France attaches to the defensive NATO alliance, the Germans have been concerned that the political effect of de Gaulle's policies would be an eventual re-examination of the American commitment...

...We believe that these facts should be taken as they are and lived with...

...Having a clear goal is not the same thing as having a policy—although too often his critics (especially in the United States) have instead a policy but no goals...

...Yet in the long run, such an initiative is unlikely to do more than disunite the West...

...This is important not only to the eventual success of his policy, which requires a gradual lessening in Eastern European tensions...

...Only so could he defeat the Anglo-Saxon conception of an Atlantic community in which, as he saw it, the political and military power would be controlled by Washington and London...

...As a result, at his July press conference the French President had to list among the opponents of his concept of Europe no less than five leading European capitals (Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels, not to speak of London), in addition to the established bête noire, Washington...

...Finally, even the fleeting prospect of a Franco-German "Rapallo" is sufficient to give the Germans pause and make them wonder whether divorce from America really is necessary to consummate the otherwise convenient and desirable Paris-Bonn relationship...

...Nonetheless, the personal impatience of an aging statesman and his growing frustration with France's isolation may tempt de Gaulle to make a sudden initiative toward Moscow: a grand proposal that both sides dissolve their alliances as the preliminary step toward an eventual Europe of states...

...Five years after de Gaulle revealed his vision of Europe to the Urals, its links to practical politics still remain to be shaped...

...The power of de Gaulle's vision has not been matched by the power of his means...

...foreign policy...

...Accordingly, he has dampened German hopes of reunification: "I repeat, in the light of the extremely precarious balance that exists between the East and the West, our view on Germany is that it is not opportune, at the present time, to alter the facts that have already been accomplished there...

...The Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty would be dissolved...

...American troops would leave Europe and the European community together with Russia would engage in large-scale economic development...

...The French efforts to undercut the American position in Europe, furthermore, hurt the tenderly developed Franco-German relationship...

...German enthusiasm for de Gaulle has been further diminished by de Gaulle's "opening to the East...

...They did not welcome, however, a new condominium, and their opposition to it not only bodes ill for de Gaulle's vision of a stable Europe but tends to bring about the condition of European fragmentation that all but the Soviets wish to avoid...

...And obviously, given the geographic location of Poland and its present links with Russia, it would play a critical role in any eventual return of Russia to a European orientation...

...But if that is true, then the only logical conclusion is for each European nation to seek its own nuclear arsenal, for surely there is no reason to rely for protection on a weak and technologically doubtful French force when a much more comprehensive and impregnable American deterrent is available...

...they saw in the Bonn-Paris axis a useful lever for hardening the American posture, but certainly not a mechanism for reducing their own reliance on American protection, nor an instrument for promoting the European fragmentation so long awaited by the Soviets...

...Denied German support and committed to the eventual banishment of America from Europe, France cannot generate a positive and effective policy toward Eastern Europe and Russia, one that commands not only the visionary enthusiasm of the Western and the Eastern Europeans but also their actual energies...

...The result is the separate negotiations between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, which, starting from the restricted nuclear test agreement, appear about to be extended to other questions, notably European questions, and so far in the absence of any Europeans...

...De Gaulle has stressed the importance of an independent French nuclear deterrent on the grounds that no self-respecting nation can depend on another for its survival...

...But he does not consider this a necessarily fatal liability...

...In other words, for de Gaulle such a Europe would become the tool of the two superpowers, the U.S...

...They take little comfort in the hope that the excluded America would patiently protect Europe from a powerful Soviet Union, while having no voice in the formulation of Western European policies—be they passive or aggressive—toward Russia...

...But a France "soft" both in its overall Eastern policy and on the subject of the Oder-Neisse boundary is hardly preferable to a United States "soft" on the former but reassuring on the latter...

...implicitly accepts the division on the Elbe, explicitly preaches reunification, yet leaves the eventual eastern frontiers of Germany undefined (thereby giving the Poles no choice but to support Moscow and Pankow wholeheartedly), de Gaulle has verbally adopted a more militant stand...

...Leaving aside its military aspects, the political case for it seems contradictory...

...The Germans could be—and have been—sympathetic to de Gaulle's seemingly harder line toward the East...

...Yet basically de Gaulle's policies—even if not his ultimate image of the shape of things to come—have been contradictory and self-defeating...

...In the context of a divided Europe and a partitioned Germany, a Franco-Soviet "Rapallo" is more meaningful than a Russo-German one...

...There is little likelihood that this can be done without the participation of the United States...

...France's isolated grandeur hardly seems an auspicious point of departure toward a "European Europe.' French nuclear policy has also contributed to the isolation of France...

...Thus he does not welcome a reunification of Germany while Eastern Europe remains in the hands of a hostile and perhaps fearful Russia...

...For de Gaulle, however, a Franco-Soviet concord could have as its object the elimination of American influence from Europe and acceleration of the process of Western European federation under the aegis of France as an independent counterweight to Russia...

...He refused to participate in the American-Soviet talks on Berlin and was the only top Western leader to warn publicly of possible sanctions against Soviet ships and planes on the high seas and in the skies, should the Soviets interfere with Western access rights...

...Meanwhile, de Gaulle has been careful to keep open his doors to the East...

...Although he recognizes the continued vital importance to European security of American military power and therefore repeatedly stresses the defensive value of the alliance with America, de Gaulle purposely excludes American power from his "European Europe...

...To balance any German resentment, he has taken advantage of the present American policy: While the U.S...