Why Israel Won't Promise Palestinian Sovereignty: A Reply
ALPHER, JOSEPH
Why IsraeiWon't Promise Pmestinian Sovereignty: A Reply JOSEPH ALPHER Helena Cobban is right in urging Israel to sit down with Palestinians—either sd'aJ the PLO or its representatives in Judea,...
...it would probably generate unrest in the West Bank...
...growing domestic discontent and societal polarization in Israel...
...From the standpoint of many Israelis, a few years of peace and quiet between Jews and Arabs would eliminate a lot of doubts about the Palestinians' ability to maintain a peaceful state...
...Cobban assumes a Palestinian state that is a well-defined, stable institution...
...And the Palestinians would most probably need a commitment that, if they complied with the aforementioned confidence-building measures, the U.S...
...Thus we have described a course for a Palestinian-Israeli solution in which Israel' does not negate the possiblity of the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state, [albeit a highly constrained one], but does not commit itself in advance to this outcome...
...It could turn into a Lebanese-style base for terrorism and chaos...
...Such institutions have never existed...
...A few—the legacy of the Holocaust and of the rootlessness of exile— are arguably not directly relevant to the Palestinians' predicament...
...She agrees with us regarding the Palestinians' basic need to receive assurances at the start of the peace process that they will attain some form of sovereignty at the end...
...Yet it is currently not feasible, primarily because it is unacceptable to most of the Palestinians This option is not currently being advocated even by Jordan...
...If they can't give the Palestinians this assurance, even in the long term, well, we can't give it for them...
...Some of them could be resettled in the West Bank during the autonomy transition stage, as the "right of return" is redefined to mean the right to citizenship ("a flag and a passport") in the territories that are destined, by international guarantee, for Palestinian sovereignty...
...It could well bring to power extremist Palestinians who would exploit it to bring about renewed escalatioa Annexation...
...Toward A Solution details the nature of some of those deeds: • To persuade Israelis of the justice and viability of Palestinian statehood, it is not sufficient for Palestinian refugees who fled Israel during the 1948 war merely to hint that they would not seek actively to implement their "right of return" to Jaffa and Haifa...
...Except Dore Gold 4) that no settlement of the conflict is possible without direct negotiations with authoritative representatives of the Palestinians...
...The settlement must also be ratified by the surrounding Arab world by means of peace treaties with Israel...
...Finally, to persuade Israelis to agree to Palestinian sovereignty it is necessary for additional Arab states to make peace with Israel...
...In addition, a solution to the refugee problem would be a sine qua non of any settlement To reach this result Israel will have to negotiate with the PLO or Palestinians identified with the PLO...
...The Israelis need to be convinced that the risk is worth taking—no one else can or should make that painful judgment for them," he added...
...the Palestinians would have to discontinue the violence and begin a refugee resettlement program outside the State of Israel...
...4) agree that a final settlement with Israel will involve territorial concessions in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and permanent security arrangements...
...That will not happen unless Israelis and Palestinians can enter the process without conceding their most fundamental positions...
...Certainly in the eyes of Prime Minister Shamir (who equates talking with the PLO to accepting the inevitability of a Palestinian state in the territories), this kind of offer by Washington is similar to the "rabbit" proposed by the Jaffee Center report...
...In Israeli eyes, the emergence of a regional atmosphere of non-belligerence would offer reassurance that a small and potentially unstable and overcrowded Palestinian state would not be exploited by extremist Palestinians, backed by Syria, seeking to incite the Arab world to another round of war with Israel...
...Most of these fears are justified in strategic terms, insofar as they derive from decades of rejection and hostility on the part of the Arabs...
...For this to happen, Israel must realize 1) that remaining in all the territories and ruling over the Palestinians indefinitely will cause Israel to pay a heavy strategic price...
...Indeed, one impressive aspect of the intifada is precisely the vision of Palestinians finally building those institutions from the grassroots...
...This will entail progressive deterioration in Israel's strategic standing It will probably produce a growing radicalization of Palestinian Arabs and an intensification of the intifada...
...Lewis told MOMENT, "In my view, the United States cannot and should not assure the Palestinians that at the end of the road they will get an independent state It is out of the question from a political standpoint, in the first place But, moreover, it would be morally wrong for the U.S...
...14) and Joseph Alpher's article (p...
...It may be possible for Israel to "muddle through* for an undetermined period of time Yet the potential dangers require that Israel make a concerted search for alternatives Autonomy...
...Economic damage would include a drastic reduction in ' American aid...
...A Palestinian State This is virtually the only choice of Palestinians...
...moreover, not a single Palestinian spokesman has indicated that he would reject superpower guarantees and hold out for Israeli assurances...
...renouncing the "right of return" and renouncing any claim to pre-1967 Israeli territory or additional territory conceded to Israel within a final settlement 2) enter a peace process in which Israel itself offers no commitment regarding the nature of the ultimate settlement 3) agree to an extended transition stage (10-15 years) in which there is no Palestinian state, and comprehensive Israeli security arrangements are maintained...
...we rejected wishful thinking as to what they perhaps should be...
...this in turn would cause more and more Israelis to contemplate expelling large numbers of Arabs ("transfer")—an act that would vastly amplify all the negative ramifications of annexation...
...We could not promise to deliver...
...If the PLO is serious about laying the conflict to rest and coexisting alongside Israel, it must, with extensive Arab and world aid, actively rehabilitate and resettle the refugees, so that they no longer constitute an irredentist element...
...The Palestinians would reject this option even as an interim arrangement, as long as a post-autonomy transition to sovereign independence were not agreed upon...
...as these national institutions evolve in a peaceful atmosphere, Israelis can be persuaded of the viability of the Palestinian sovereign ideal...
...Unilateral Withdrawal from Gaza...
...None of the options currently on Israel's agenda seems to offer a reasonable avenue for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza.—Ed...
...It would entail an unbearable demographic burden...
...As for Bush administration thinking, Lewis added, "I don't think what I've said is different from the administration view...
...Only Israel has the power to give such an assurance in a credible form...
...and such other third parties) will, if the Palestinians have lived up to their obligations, support the Palestinian demand for a sovereign state in part of the West Bank and Gaza...
...Yet if Yasir Arafat's "shana tova" is sufficient to warrant talking to him, it is a far cry from the reassurances we need in order to agree to Palestinian statehood...
...As these changes in fundamental perceptions take place, the two parties should enter a dynamic of prolonged mutual confidence-building* In order to facilitate this process, the United States, possibly in conjunction with additional external parties, could play a critical role...
...We asked what the two parties' minimal positions were...
...And in ignoring this mood she applies a double standard to the needs of the Palestinians, on the one hand, and those of Israel on the other...
...But Cobban is mistaken if she thinks that even the most benign form of sovereignty that the Palestinians might advocate in such conversations would be endorsed by Israel immediately...
...With all due respect to Ambassador Lewis's admonition, Cobban should be advised that not all senior American policymakers to whom we have spoken reject this idea out of hand...
...Jordanian-Palestinian Federation...
...it has never been tested...
...In the course of the process Israel would most probably need a commitment that in the event of Palestinian noncompliance with the aforementioned confidence-building measures, the U.S...
...Cobban has not done this...
...The problems confronting Israel in the West Bank and Gaza are extremely grave They do not lend themselves to risk-free solution...
...and increased strains in US-Israeli relations and in Israel's ties with Western Europe The result may be a considerable erosion in Israeli deterrence, and the specter of an eventual Arab-Israeli war...
...But I am not persuaded that it is a pragmatic idea...
...Any attempt to reach a settlement must provide for adequate discussion of Syria or, alternatively—if at all possible—its constructive involvement in a solution that deals with its own conflict with Israel...
...To persuade Israelis to agree to Palestinian sovereignty, it will also be necessary to curb The Seventh Option: Toward a Solution The Jaffee Center Study Group* that produced The West Bank and Gaza—Israel's Options For Peace—which rejected all six options currently on Israel's agenda—prepared a separate study entitled The West Bank and Gaza—Toward a Solution, containing what is tantamount to a seventh option...
...and associated external powers would support Israel in invoking unilateral cor* In this process, Israel would agree to comprehensive autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza and naturally refrain from establishing any new settlements in the territories...
...It gradually creates a situation in which it would be both unlikely and highly disadvantageous for Israel to try to back out of the process...
...principle to return some day to homes abandoned three generations ago in Tiberias and Beersheba...
...Negotiations with Palestinians over statehood would elicit widespread opposition, some of it violent among those Israelis who consider any Palestinian state option as an existential threat to the State of Israel...
...American Jewry, Israel's most important strategic ally, would be increasingly alienated...
...Certainly without extensive transition stages to test Palestinian intentions, and confidence-building measures to improve the regional environment Palestinian statehood is potentially extremely risky from a security standpoint and is as dangerous for the fabric of Israeli society as is annexation...
...This would end a decade-long trend of Arab accommodation with Israel, and would begin a spiral toward war, possibly with Soviet support for Arab belligerents...
...Understandable as these sentiments may be, Israelis see them as part of a long-range plan to subvert the state, once a sovereign forward base is established in Judea, Samaria and Gaza...
...Yet she begrudges the "bothersome fact" that most of the Israeli public, and its representatives, will refuse to give such an assurance themselves...
...This takes time, however...
...Probing further behind Cobban's effort to persuade Israelis to accept Palestinian sovereignty now, she ignores some of the deepseated "psychostrategic" reasons why—as we assess Israeli thinking on the issue—such an acceptance can—and should—only follow a prolonged transition period...
...A summary of the seventh option follows Israel perceives a Palestinian state as a threat to its existence, while the Palestinians see a state in Palestine as their primary aim, one over which they cannot make concessions...
...In the present context, the Soviets find the idea intriguing...
...Cobban's accusation that Israel and the Arab states have engaged in "the systematic dismantling of [Palestinian] national institutions" is unfounded...
...Perhaps most significant, in late Spring 1989 Washington was reportedly already considering offering assurances to the PLO that that organization would represent the Palestinians at second-stage talks concerning a final settlement if, as a first stage, it permitted local West Bank and Gazan Palestinians to negotiate an interim autonomy arrangement with Israel...
...Joe Alpher may have found someone in the State Department on the professional staff who disagrees with me, but I don't think any of the high-level Bush appointees would...
...Yet a Palestinian state has never existed...
...For their part, the Palestinians must 1) accept Israel's existence, with all that this implies: recognition of the legitimacy and permanency of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel for the Jewish people...
...government to give this kind of assurance, even if we wished to do so...
...The U.S...
...ambassador to Israel and now president of the United States Institute of Peace, to expand on his negative judgment of the Jaffee Center's proposal that the United States or other third parties give the Palestinians the minimal assurances they need that eventually they will get their own state...
...rather than argue against them, we sought ways to accomodate them...
...2) that Israeli security can be maintained through continued military deployment but without physical control over all of the territories and all of their Palestinian inhabitants...
...And any attempt by Israel to renege would be met by overwhelming international pressure, generated by the very "rabbit" mechanism of international assurances we have advocated...
...Certainly countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, perhaps Iraq too, should have no reason not to accept Israel openly once a process is in motion that satisfies their only remaining, declared objection to peace: the absence of a Palestinian settlement...
...It would bring a violent Palestinian reaction...
...Cobban may have, in abstract terms, a better idea...
...The six options and a summary of the findings follow: The Status Quo...
...8' Former U.S...
...The transfer of authority and control over law and order in the territories is perhaps the most thorny issue of a transition period...
...For Israelis this is more acceptable than Palestinian statehood...
...Lewis's views are referred to both in Helena Cobban's article (p...
...It was precisely such separate assurances from President Carter to Israel and Egypt that enabled the two of them to overcome their final differences and make peace ten years ago...
...By analyzing the options for a Palestinian settlement that are on Israel's agenda, the Jaffee Center Study (The West Bank and Gaza-Israel's Options For Peace) hoped to introduce a greater measure of rationality into the discussion of these options...
...She offers no counterargument to our assessment that the Israeli people, by and large, and their government, are in no mood to make such a commitment...
...Its most imaginative innovation includes a suggestion that the U.S., and perhaps other third parties, but not Israel, assure the Palestinians that at the end of a confidence-building transition period, the U.S...
...rective measures...
...Moderate Palestinians should themselves be interested in a phased security transition, in order to maintain a smooth process and ensure eventual firm Palestinian control...
...And deeds take time...
...The Palestinians too have their legitimate fears of Israeli longterm aims: the Jaffee Center report does recommend a provision mandating "reciprocal curbs on irredentist actions," as Cobban suggests...
...they are also aware and appreciative of the PLO mainstream's newfound moderation...
...One key Arab state that would probably attempt to obstruct almost any reasonable Palestinian solution is Syria...
...No progress toward a settlement appears to be possible without each side accepting that it must act to accomodate the other's basic needs, as well as to alter the fundamental approaches of the other...
...This is likely to be perceived as a retreat It might result in some loss of Israeli deterrence It would amount to the creation of a Palestinian mini-state in Gaza that would owe Israel nothing in return...
...In our study group deliberations, we therefore insisted on applying objective measures of analysis and strategic impact equally to the fundamental positions of the Palestinians and of Israel...
...A transition stage unfettered by an unequivocal Israeli commitment to Palestinian sovereignty has an additional key function that the Palestinians should welcome...
...Our essay The West Bank and Gaza—Toward a Solution advocates such contacts, and the sooner the better...
...Annexation would also generate a crisis within Israeli society and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF...
...radicalization of Israeli Arabs...
...Why IsraeiWon't Promise Pmestinian Sovereignty: A Reply JOSEPH ALPHER Helena Cobban is right in urging Israel to sit down with Palestinians—either sd'aJ the PLO or its representatives in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District—and discuss modes of sovereignty...
...But these are the two sides' fundamental positions...
...Hence, the "rabbit from a hat"—third party assurances to both Israel and the Palestinians, to bridge the gap between them...
...and associated external powers would support their quest for an independent sfate'IEmphasis suppliedj At the conclusion of the confidence-building stage—assuming it reached a successful conclusion—negotiations would be conducted between Israel and the Palestinians on a final peace settlement including the dimensions of territorial adjustments, the demarcation of final boundaries, and permanent ways in which Israel's security requirements and Palestinian sovereignty could be accommodated...
...Assuming the Palestinians carry out their interim phase obligations in good faith, an ever-increasing majority of Israelis will be persuaded of the justice, viability and necessity of the Palestinian quest for sovereignty...
...It is not in the history books and the political almanacs (like Egypt or even Jordan, as young a state as that is...
...However, most Israelis would regard this option as unacceptable It involves a danger that in the long term, the Palestinian state would attempt to realize the Palestinians' aspirations for Greater Palestine (the "right of return") by terrorism, subversion and/or by catalyzing an Arab war coalition against Israel (the "strategy of stages...
...Can Arafat's "Force 17" (Fatah's security unit) take over intelligence and terrorist-prevention functions from Israel's General Security Service and the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) the moment agreement is reached, and guarantee that extremist Palestinians, or for that matter Israeli settlers, will not carry out rash and brutal acts aimed at torpedoing the confidence-building process...
...terrorism and subversion by malingering extremist Palestinians during the transition phase...
...Moderate Palestinians—and Cobban too, I dare say—have little appreciation of the fear they instill in Israeli hearts when they talk benignly of at least preserving their right in Six Rejected Options The Jaffee Center study, entitled The West Bank and Gaza—Israel's Options for Peacetexamines six "peace" options that are currently on the table and considers whether they are feasible and beneficial from Israel's viewpoint The study rejects them all either as not feasible, not beneficial, or both...
...Arafat and his Arab supporters must produce deeds, not words, if Israelis are to believe in the viability of the peace they will receive in return for territories...
...This in turn points to the need and usefulness of United States and additional international guarantees given at an early stage...
...an enhanced unilateral Palestinian statebuilding effort in the West Bank and Gaza...
...they harbor sharp existential fears...
...Ambassador to Israel Rejects Jaffee Center Proposal MOMENT asked Samuel Lewis, former U.S...
...Lewis went on, "It is the Israelis who have to run the risks involved in making this tough choice...
...Many Israelis, including the members of the Jaffee Center study group, are aware that Israel is a veritable superpower alongside any conceivable Palestinian state...
...An extended transition is absolutely necessary to lay this issue to rest—on both sides...
...Israelis are a people traumatized...
...Unilaterally-imposed autonomy might be understood as a sign of Israeli weakness...
...3) that at the end of the peace process some form of a Palestinian state may emerge in most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that in view of Israeli security measures, does not necessarily threaten Israel either strategically or by terrorism...
...Moreover, Jordan must not only ratify the agreement but collaborate in the security arrangements...
...The confidence-building dynamic we have described can only take place as a peace process gets underway...
...That is why a long transition period is needed...
...would disassociate from Israel...
Vol. 14 • August 1989 • No. 5
