Political Control of the West Bank Is Not Necessary To Israel's Security
GAZIT, SHLOMO
Political Control of the West Bank Is Not Necessary to Israel's Security SHLOMO GAZIT Iwas asked to respond to General Lev-ran's article because, like Levran, I too am a retired general in the...
...But then he goes on to state that the "military/strategic considerations . . . must be given first and utmost priority...
...Finally, he concludes that "we must retain the territories...
...We have a long experience with international observers and peace-keeping forces...
...The political borders should provide for Arab sovereignty over most of the area densely populated by Palestinians...
...And no outside Arab forces would be allowed to move in...
...I am also an active member of the executive body of a group that calls itself the Council for Peace and Security...
...This security border would deter the Arabs from attempting a surprise attack...
...We have multiplied our strategic depth four times and we have added to it physical obstacles that we never had in the past: An enemy would need to cross the Jordan River as well as the mountain ridge of the West Bank before reaching Israel proper...
...Two elements, vital to such a security border, must be incorporated in any agreement with the Arabs: 1. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be completely demilitarized...
...What may come as a surprise, perhaps, is that the majority of military experts in Israel, including the IDF officers in the Council for Peace and Security, agree that an IDF presence in the West Bank is a necessity, and that this will have to be so for a long period after the signing of any political agreement with the Arabs and the implementation of such an agreement...
...The Arabs are not interested in just "peace for peace...
...These forces are effective only as long as both parties agree to implement the agreement...
...2. Israeli forces must be responsible for guaranteeing the demilitarization of these areas...
...To this extent I agree with General Levran...
...1 oday, Israel s strategic depth is 40 miles, the distance between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea...
...it remains as valid today as it was 21 years ago...
...What I strongly disagree with is his thinly-veiled conclusion...
...Israel's security border, however, will have to be based on the Jordan River...
...Accordingly, I agree with almost everything General Levran has written in his article that analyzes the situation from a purely military viewpoint, although as I shall shortly indicate, I vehemently disagree with his implied conclusion...
...Where they disagree is on the political issue, whether Israel should insist that its security border should also be its final political border...
...The Council for Peace and Security strongly believes that it is a vital interest for Israel, from a security standpoint, to reach a political settlement with the Arabs based on territorial compromise...
...this is the only possible settlement acceptable to us Israelis...
...The viability of any political agreement must therefore depend not on the good intentions of the Arab side, but on genuine Arab interests...
...He purports only to analyze the military situation—and even specifically disclaims "ideological, political, [and] demographic" considerations...
...they must understand that if they violate the agreement, the results will be dangerous for them—so painful that it is not worth the meager chance of destroying Israel by a surprise military attack...
...Let there be no mistake about it: The vast majority of military experts agree on Israel's vital need for a viable "security border...
...What many Israelis do not understand is that for the Arabs peace with Israel is not an asset...
...Israel's cabinet introduced this very important distinction shortly after the Six-Day War...
...We can never agree to stake our existence on the performance of such forces in a crisis...
...If war were nevertheless initiated, this security border would give Israel a reasonable chance of gaining the upper hand...
...This provision must be in force for a long time—as long as necessary...
...On the contrary, peace with Israel is the high price they must pay in order to realize some of their own vital interests, interests that only Israel can provide— the territories themselves and political self-determination for the Arab population presently under Israeli military rule...
...No Arab will ever accept such a position...
...Just as we cannot rely solely on Arab intentions or goodwill reflected in a political agreement, so we cannot rely solely on the strategic depth of the West Bank and the added military security it obviously provides...
...The solution to the dilemma lies in distinguishing "political borders" from "security borders...
...This separation of political borders from security borders offers maximum flexibility for a political compromise while involving only minimal risks to Israel's security...
...It is not something they are yearning for the way we in Israel are...
...The basic fact from which much of the military discussion flows is that Israel will have to face, for a long time to come, the threat of an Arab attack from the outside...
...The solution to the dilemma lies in distinguishing "political borders" from "security borders...
...Political Control of the West Bank Is Not Necessary to Israel's Security SHLOMO GAZIT Iwas asked to respond to General Lev-ran's article because, like Levran, I too am a retired general in the Israel Defense Force...
...Before the Six-Day War, it was nine miles, the distance between the Green Line and the sea...
...It provides the only possible basis for a future settlement in the Middle East...
...The situation today is, from a military viewpoint, an enormous improvement...
...It is not a high priority goal...
...The distinction between "political borders" and "security borders" will allow us to give them this, but also to retain the necessary strategic depth we need for our defense, as long as this may be needed...
...No local Arab military forces can be allowed in these areas, except for a small police force responsible for internal security...
...But if Israel must face another major war with the Arabs, it is of utmost importance for every Israeli soldier and family to know that we have done our best to reach an honorable settlement...
...Israel must be allowed to use military force if there is any attempt to violate the demilitarization agreement...
...Moreover, an international force is always guided by political considerations...
...We should, however, agree to allowing an international force to be deployed in the area in addition to the IDF presence, to satisfy Arab fears of Israeli violations of the agreement...
...As long as the Arab states suffer from the instability that characterizes them', it would be extremely naive and irresponsible to base Israel's existence on the goodwill and fine intentions of an Arab leader or regime that may disappear from one day to the next...
...Among the members of the Council are about 120 reserve generals and 115 reserve colonels in the IDF...
...If we were to move back to the Green Line, an Arab offensive against Israel initiated from the 1967 borders could well be catastrophic...
...This is the only possible settlement acceptable to the Palestinians...
...If we adopt General Levran's position— to retain all the territories—we can be sure Gazit continued from page 40 that no political solution will be reached...
...But such an international force can never be deployed instead of an IDF presence...
...I realize that even if Israel does its best to promote such an agreement, it may be impossible to reach a political settlement at present, and another war may come...
...Even if a political settlement is reached, we must always deal with the possibility that the Arab states surrounding us have not given up their original "strategy of phases," and that they may later initiate renewed military moves to achieve their goal—the destruction of Israel...
Vol. 14 • March 1989 • No. 2
