The West Bank As a Military Asset-How Important?: For Israel's Security, We Must Retain the Territories

LEVRAX, AHARON

The West Bank Asa Military How Important? For Israel's Security, We Must Retain the Territories AHARON LEVRAN In the waning days of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State George Shultz...

...November 1988...
...Unlike in 1973, today Egypt has good reasons for preserving the peace rather than violating it for the sake of the Palestinian cause...
...My contention is that territorial depth— land as security—is still of the utmost importance even in this age of missiles...
...By means of a peace accord, the Arabs might attempt to implement their old "strategy of stages," which calls for Israel's gradual elimination...
...Moreover, territory/strategic depth is no less important for a nation's defensive capability—to deny the enemy's offensive maneuverability...
...The danger of Israel's making a preemptive strike would increase substantially...
...Imagine what would have happened in the 1973 Yom Kippur War if that war had opened not on the remote banks of the Suez Canal or on the Golan Heights, but on the Green Line...
...The only way Israel can assure demilitarization of the West Bank is by its own physical presence on the ground and its own control of the areas vital for its security...
...the domestic political rift within the country weakens motivation...
...Wars are won first and foremost by physical conquest of vital territories through the movement of forces...
...This is another reason why if at all possible, Israel should fight away from its population centers...
...This dramatically increases the Arabs' mobility and their potential to inflict damage in a surprise attack...
...Precedents in the Middle East and elsewhere demonstrate that demilitarization and security arrangements in populated areas are unreliable and cause more problems than they solve...
...Strategic depth is also crucial for operational purposes during a war...
...Reducing Arab temptation to attack Israel is an important stabilizing element that will continue to demand our attention even if there is a future peace accord...
...Aerial electronic devices (like AW ACS) can at best supplement Israel's land intelligence network...
...The West Bank's strategic depth reduces any Arab temptation to inflict a death blow on a dwindled Israel...
...It is true that if Israel continues to hold the territories, this will be a constant stimulus for certain Arab states to attack...
...Sell Weapons to Friendly Arab States...
...To deprive Israel of its strategic depth would destabilize the region by making Israel more edgy...
...For example: • Although the cease-fire in 1948 between Jordan and Israel provided for Israel's free approach to Mount Scopus, this was not the case in practice...
...These reasons include keeping the Suez Canal open, not losing Sinai again, and not endangering the generous U.S...
...This is especially true of many of the missiles in the Arabs' arsenal...
...The Jordanians were committed not to deploy armored units in the West Bank, but this did not prevent them from dispatching two armored brigades on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War...
...Territorial depth is needed to give adequate time to mobilize reserves, and also to provide for placement of forward early warning stations of extremely complex character...
...strategic depth becomes even more critical...
...By contrast, strategic depth has the potential to relieve Israel of the necessity of resorting to a preemptive strike, because with an improved defensive capability, it can absorb a first strike...
...Moreover, Syria regards the land of Palestine as a part of Greater Syria...
...An Israel with adequate territorial depth makes extremist Arabs think twice before risking a war...
...The strategic depth offered Israel by the West Bank is also vital in reducing any Arab temptation to inflict a death blow on a dwindled Israel...
...Thus, adequate territory and strategic depth are crucial, particularly for maneuverability, through which wars are won...
...If we look at the human factor, we find that Israel has been adversely affected...
...Thus, the nearer the Israeli troops to the missile sites, the more vulnerable they are...
...Moreover, for almost every weapons system, suitable coun-termeasures can be developed rather easily...
...The implied argument is that in the age of surface-to-surface missiles, it makes little difference whether or not Israel retains the West Bank—at least from a military standpoint...
...was ready to bring itself and the world to the brink of war in order to prevent the deployment of missiles near its borders...
...they are to a large extent determined...
...The human and territorial components of military power, however, are inherently less adjustable...
...In addition, in the past decade Arab armies have been transformed from infantry soldiers to armored and mechanized units...
...Demilitarization in an unpopulated peninsula cannot be equated to areas densely populated by people who "would become the laughing stock of the Arab world without national armed forces," in the words of the renowned Palestinian writer Walid Khaledi ("Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," Foreign Affairs, July 1978...
...aerial surveillance is not a reliable substitute for intelligence on the ground...
...Firepower such as bombs and missiles causes destruction, disruption and casualties, but it does not determine the conquest of territories, on which victory ultimately depends...
...Missiles significantly enhance the attacker's initial advantages— initiative, surprise, planning and so on...
...Those who would encourage Israel to * See "Arms for the Arabs: Should the U.S...
...In 1973, the Iraqi army had three or four armored or mechanized divisions...
...It is not plausible to make a dramatic change in concepts of defense and borders whenever a more advanced aircraft—or any other system, for that matter—is introduced...
...The area of el-Hama on the Jordan River, near the border of Israel with Syria, was proclaimed a demilitarized zone, but this did not prevent the Syrians from practically annexing it...
...As a military man, I have confined myself to military/ strategic considerations which to my mind must be given first and utmost priority...
...Today, they have about 14...
...For Israel's Security, We Must Retain the Territories AHARON LEVRAN In the waning days of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State George Shultz asserted that "the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles into Arab arsenals has changed the concept of defense of Israel's future borders...
...therefore, they can be traded off less easily from a military viewpoint...
...The West Bank terrain provides adequate space for defensive measures, intelligence installations, logistic infrastructure and other military means that enhance the absorption capability of Israel's defense...
...Since it became a state, Israel has faced a fundamental security problem, particularly on its eastern border because of the ratio of forces in the Arabs' favor combined with Israel's lack of strategic depth...
...Arab armies are not only far larger than Israel's, but Arab countries rely predominantly on regular forces, not reserves...
...today, they have ten...
...Missiles—like aircraft—are merely another weapons system...
...Israel is likely to be the defender in a war with its Arab neighbors...
...In the recent war between Iran and Iraq, both sides had enormous firepower, including missiles...
...In addition, the greater the distance between the missile launch site and the target, the less accurate the missile...
...Only by maintaining a substantial force west of the Jordan can Israel block a surprise attack and interdict terrorist activities...
...Israel's population triangle—Haifa-Jerusalem-Tel Aviv—is so close to its eastern and northeastern borders that it may constitute a permanent temptation for the Arabs to try to cut the country across its narrow waistline, or conquer its vital centers by a swift attack...
...In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Syrian and Jordanian ground forces included only five armored and mechanized divisions...
...To counter the attacker's advantages, the defender needs more of the other two components of overall military strength—the human factor and territory...
...But Sinai is a different case entirely...
...Even the Egyptian army's armored and mechanized divisions have doubled since 1973, from five to ten...
...Unlike the Arabs, Israel cannot afford to lose even one war...
...Moreover, if Egypt cheats in Sinai, Israel still has a security margin it would not have in the West Bank...
...Although at that time Russian missiles could reach the United States directly from the Soviet Union, the U.S...
...To illustrate how proximity of territory counts even to a gigantic country like the United States, recall the 1962 Cuban missile crisis...
...Israel's qualitative edge in firepower has also eroded in the last decade, in part because the Arabs have acquired sophisticated arms from the West, including the U.S.* At the same time, Israel's economic shortcomings make it harder to allocate appropriate financial resources to keep up with the race in weaponry needed to maintain an edge...
...Arab missiles, so the argument runs, can reach Israel's population centers as easily from east of the Jordan as from anywhere in the West Bank...
...aid, amounting annually to S2.3 billion, which has no substitute from Arab or other sources...
...With Israel's qualitative edge eroded, and its difficulty in financing the ever more expensive and sophisticated arms systems and its weakened morale, Israel must recognize that the territorial component of its overall military strength is even more critical...
...Three vital components affect overall military strength: (1) the human factor, (2) the territorial factor and (3) the factor of weapons systems...
...Israel cannot risk having to wage a war in its vital civilian centers...
...Ballistic missiles and other "smart" weapons add new elements to available firepower, but conventional wars in general—and Middle Eastern wars in particular—are not decided by weapons or firepower...
...Iraq enjoyed superiority over Iran in military hardware and firepower, but it couldn't conquer Iran because of Iran's vast strategic depth and human resources...
...Territory provides the defender with two salient advantages: absorption capability, and time and space to detect and disrupt enemy missiles if they are used...
...But Egypt and Syria are the only two Arab states that have the capability of initiating a war against Israel...
...Admittedly, other considerations—ideological, political, demographic—must1 also be considered in any determination of whether Israel should retain the territories...
...A valid example that demonstrates this is Israel's presence in the security belt in Southern Lebanon...
...Thus, retaining the territories not only provides Israel with the security it needs, it also may enhance regional stability...
...For Israel's security, we must retain the territories...
...As is well known, Israel is supersensitive to human losses...
...But this alone could not determine the outcome...
...Ejrially, I would like to consider the argument that demilitarization or security arrangements can compensate for less territory...
...For Israel will continue to be regarded by the Arabs as a foreign implant in the region...
...give up the territories point to 'Sinai as evidence, where security arrangements made up for the loss of strategic depth...
...Strategic depth sharply reduces the temptation to attack Israel's "soft belly," as well as the actual menace of the Arab military option...
...Demilitarization is at best a supplementary measure, not a substitute that will meet Israel's security needs...
...Thus, despite the potential stimulus to an Arab attack caused by holding the territories, the practical risks of war today are substantially lower than they have been...
...Syria, on the other hand, will launch a war against Israel whenever it suits her own interests, but this is unrelated to Palestinian aspiratiofts...
...Devoid of adequate territory for defense, Israel will be ever more sensitive to Arab threats and suspicious of its neighbors' every move...

Vol. 14 • March 1989 • No. 2


 
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