The Benefits from Helsinki
Clark, Donald L.
Donald L. Clark The Benefits from Helsinki Can Time, the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jackson, George Ball, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn all agree on something and still be wrong? The members of...
...I do not mean to imply that there were no problems with CSCE...
...We will simply treat it like Yalta and interpret it our way," they said...
...I frankly think that the chance to meet with European leaders was sufficient grounds for President Ford to sign the document...
...Indeed, I suspect that many of those who criticize the agreement most strenuously have actually not read it...
...Most of our allies were reluctant partners in MBFR anyhow...
...The West German government considers the agreement a success, and yet the borders issue has more significance for it than for any other Western participant...
...The Soviets fought the "human contact" issue at every point during negotiations and gave ground only grudgingly...
...Two years $15...
...And finally, many Western European leaders began to itch for some diplomatic pageantry of the sort CSCE would provide...
...We will simply treat it like Yalta and interpret it our way," they said...
...Indeed, I suspect that many of those who criticize the agreement most strenuously have actually not read it...
...planned to be a positive force in CSCE mainly to encourage positive Soviet action in MBFR...
...The U.S...
...Yet our President is criticized for signing it while their leader is lauded beyond belief...
...instead, according to the Helsinki agree-ment borders may he changed by negotiation...
...And finally, many Western European leaders began to itch for some diplomatic pageantry of the sort CSCE would provide...
...Thus, we began pushing for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Conference, MBFR...
...efforts and expectations about CSCE...
...Congress launched its strongest attack yet on the American overseas force structure, and the Administration did not know how long it could hold off the Congressional imposition of unilateral force reductions, especially in Europe...
...But if our government still does want mutual force reductions in Europe, it blew its best opportunity to get them...
...Moreover, I contend that the "human contact" provisions of the agreement are not entirely meaningless...
...But once at the conference, the U.S...
...And besides, how would we have looked as the one holdout in 35 to oppose a document that encourages security and cooperation, that calls for limits on the use of force while permitting peaceful change, and that commits the Soviets—no matter how imperfectly—to a crack in the Iron Curtain...
...On the other hand, the U.S...
...The West German government considers the agreement a success, and yet the borders issue has more significance for it than for any other Western participant...
...The Soviets had originally proposed the conference in the hopes it would give legitimacy to the post-World War II borders...
...Two years $15...
...There have been a Vietnam debacle, a Portugal, and renewed hostilities in the Middle East since then, and obviously internal pressure for U.S...
...Furthermore, since the security of Western Europe is so closely tied to the NATO alliance, our European allies objected to Soviet proposals for a purely European conference, without full American and Canadian participation...
...This linkage is important and it goes far to explain U.S...
...Instead, it is a document of guidance, understanding, and commitment...
...Since the Soviets were sponsoring a CSCE call, and since the first big summit was abuilding, the logical diplomatic linkage became obvious and was forged...
...I contend that the Conference served American interests better than its critics have supposed...
...Norman Podhoretz THE ALTERNATIVE, Post Office Box 877, Bloomington, Indiana 47401 Enclosed is $ Please enter a ^ new ^ renewal subscription to The Alternative for: ^ One year $8...
...The United States and Western Europe said as much...
...This linkage is important and it goes far to explain U.S...
...would now support a CSCE if the Soviets would also come to MBFR...
...CSCE, as its critics poin...
...I contend that the Conference served American interests better than its critics have supposed...
...In other words, we failed to use our leverage in CSCE to keep the momentum of MBFR going...
...Stripped of the adjectives and diplomatic tone, its most important clauses state that the signatories (1) foreswear interference in the internal affairs of each other, (2) foreswear the use of force or threats of force to settle differences, (3) accept the post-World War II boundaries and promise to revise them only by negotiation and peaceful means, (4) are encouraged to pre-announce certain military maneuvers and movements near borders and invite military observers to them, (5) will attempt to increase trade and scientific cocperation, and (6) will allow increased flow of people and ideas...
...They wanted the postwar borders to be permanent, with no exceptions...
...The need for this legitimacy, however, has been much less important in the last few years, for the Soviet treaty with West Germany had ratified the German-Polish border, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia had once 22 The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 again demonstrated the powerlessness of the West to do anything about such borders...
...At first, it worked very well, and the preliminary conferences for CSCE and MBFR both began and terminated at the same time...
...Our political culture badly needs an alternative perspective to the standard positions of the Left and the Right, and I think The Alternative is more and more being true to its name in developing such a perspective...
...The Soviets now said they would accept American and Canadian participation in the conference...
...These statements strike me as being quite consistent with the traditional aims of American foreign policy...
...The Soviets now said they would accept American and Canadian participation in the conference...
...Western objectives for CSCE—pageantry, stimulus for MBFR, the fact that it was becoming difficult to object to the conference—were therefore limited...
...In a strange bit of logic, the critics claim that the agreement takes away from the West options to unite Germany or free enslaved nations, but on the other hand, where the agreement says something the West wants, like "human contact" or non-interference in others' affairs, they scoff and say the agreement is meaningless...
...CSCE was by no means a shellacking of the West by the East...
...In 1973 the U.S...
...You can't have it both ways...
...force reductions has diminished...
...I suspect, however, that if they considered the victory so hollow they wouldn't have fought against it so hard...
...I frankly think that the chance to meet with European leaders was sufficient grounds for President Ford to sign the document...
...and our allies decided to make the most of whatever bargaining power was available...
...And yet, all things considered, I don't think CSCE was as disastrous an affair as has been made out...
...The Soviet objectives in CSCE were also fairly limited...
...True, it was not an earth-shaking event, but in American terms it was never meant to be one...
...planned to be a positive force in CSCE mainly to encourage positive Soviet action in MBFR...
...I do not mean to imply that there were no problems with CSCE...
...Three years $20...
...Even on the issues of the borders, the Soviets did not attain their full objectives...
...But are we really ready to free Latvia by military intervention...
...In other words, we failed to use our leverage in CSCE to keep the momentum of MBFR going...
...True, it was not an earth-shaking event, but in American terms it was never meant to be one...
...For the U.S...
...and our allies it will be easy to adhere to but for the Communists, not so...
...expected CSCE to deal mostly with words and phrases...
...There remained the question of military forces, and this was to become the real impetus for CSCE, or at least for American participation...
...But now that CSCE is over, we still have yet to reach Phase I of MBFR...
...Moreover, I contend that the "human contact" provisions of the agreement are not entirely meaningless...
...would now support a CSCE if the Soviets would also come to MBFR...
...and our allies it will be easy to adhere to but for the Communists, not so...
...Administration leaders, strongly supported by the military, felt that troop reductions would do less harm and be far more palatable to our allies if they were accompanied by balanced Soviet reductions...
...Western businessmen were now able to sell their wares in the Comecon countries, and though movement was still restricted for citizens of those countries, Westerners could travel much more freely behind the Iron Curtain...
...What loss can it be to admit that...
...and our allies decided to make the most of whatever bargaining power was available...
...Russia had signed a four-power treaty thatcleared up problems over Berlin...
...The U.S...
...The Agreement and the Criticisms Under careful examination, the CSCE agreement clearly makes no wild claims...
...What loss can it be to admit that...
...were willing to invade Lithuania or support the next Hungarian uprising with something more than the rhetoric of last time, then the critics would be fair in their criticism...
...The Soviets had originally proposed the conference in the hopes it would give legitimacy to the post-World War II borders...
...Western businessmen were now able to sell their wares in the Comecon countries, and though movement was still restricted for citizens of those countries, Westerners could travel much more freely behind the Iron Curtain...
...There remained the question of military forces, and this was to become the real impetus for CSCE, or at least for American participation...
...In 1973 the U.S...
...instead, according to the Helsinki agree-ment borders may he changed by negotiation...
...At first, it worked very well, and the preliminary conferences for CSCE and MBFR both began and terminated at the same time...
...The U.S...
...The members of this diverse group all think that the recent Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was a best a farce and more likely a Soviet victory and an American defeat...
...The Soviet objectives in CSCE were also fairly limited...
...The U.S...
...They wanted the postwar borders to be permanent, with no exceptions...
...The primary Soviet aim for CSCE in the last few years has been pageantry, in accordance with their view that "looks are more important than deeds," and in the hopes that Brezhnev would bask in the limelight as the creator of a major conference...
...In a strange bit of logic, the critics claim that the agreement takes away from the West options to unite Germany or free enslaved nations, but on the other hand, where the agreement says something the West wants, like "human contact" or non-interference in others' affairs, they scoff and say the agreement is meaningless...
...efforts and expectations about CSCE...
...If the U.S...
...Remember what I said about the American strategy to use CSCE in order to get MBFR...
...And yet, all things considered, I don't think CSCE was as disastrous an affair as has been made out...
...For the U.S...
...The members of this diverse group all think that the recent Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was a best a farce and more likely a Soviet victory and an American defeat...
...What does it actually say...
...For the critics have concentrated single-mindedly on the legitimacy accorded the postwar borders...
...But in the era of nuclear parity, peaceful means of changing borders was the only viable option open to East or West, both before CSCE and after...
...From MBFR we expected a concrete and significant act of detente to develop—actual mutual reductions of military forces at the point where East meets West...
...Three years $20...
...Please print) Name Address City State Zip The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 23 Donald L. Clark The Benefits from Helsinki Can Time, the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jackson, George Ball, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn all agree on something and still be wrong...
...Our political culture badly needs an alternative perspective to the standard positions of the Left and the Right, and I think The Alternative is more and more being true to its name in developing such a perspective...
...But once at the conference, the U.S...
...CSCE was by no means a shellacking of the West by the East...
...By 1973 it had become much more difficult to object to Soviet proposals...
...The Western Europeans latched on to an American idea of pushing agreements to increase the flow of ideas and human contact between East and West...
...Yet our President is criticized for signing it while their leader is lauded beyond belief...
...It is not and was never meant to be enforceable...
...Most of our allies were reluctant partners in MBFR anyhow...
...Administration leaders, strongly supported by the military, felt that troop reductions would do less harm and be far more palatable to our allies if they were accompanied by balanced Soviet reductions...
...If the U.S...
...The Western Europeans latched on to an American idea of pushing agreements to increase the flow of ideas and human contact between East and West...
...Russia had signed a four-power treaty thatcleared up problems over Berlin...
...What is the point in talking about security and cooperation, we asked, if the Soviets show no willingness to reduce their forces in Central Europe, if they refuse to recognize Western rights in Berlin, and if they do not allow much trade and travel between East and West...
...The Soviets fought the "human contact" issue at every point during negotiations and gave ground only grudgingly...
...Congress launched its strongest attack yet on the American overseas force structure, and the Administration did not know how long it could hold off the Congressional imposition of unilateral force reductions, especially in Europe...
...Stripped of the adjectives and diplomatic tone, its most important clauses state that the signatories (1) foreswear interference in the internal affairs of each other, (2) foreswear the use of force or threats of force to settle differences, (3) accept the post-World War II boundaries and promise to revise them only by negotiation and peaceful means, (4) are encouraged to pre-announce certain military maneuvers and movements near borders and invite military observers to them, (5) will attempt to increase trade and scientific cocperation, and (6) will allow increased flow of people and ideas...
...The members of this diverse group all think that the recent Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was a best a farce and more likely a Soviet victory and an American defeat...
...These statements strike me as being quite consistent with the traditional aims of American foreign policy...
...And besides, how would we have looked as the one holdout in 35 to oppose a document that encourages security and cooperation, that calls for limits on the use of force while permitting peaceful change, and that commits the Soviets—no matter how imperfectly—to a crack in the Iron Curtain...
...CSCE, as its critics point out, was a Soviet idea, and when the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact satellites began suggesting an all-European conference about ten years ago, the idea was clearly not in American and Western European interests...
...But are we really ready to free Latvia by military intervention...
...Even on the issues of the borders, the Soviets did not attain their full objectives...
...The Agreement and the Criticisms Under careful examination, the CSCE agreement clearly makes no wild claims...
...It is not and was never meant to be enforceable...
...From MBFR we expected a concrete and significant act of detente to develop—actual mutual reductions of military forces at the point where East meets West...
...Indeed, I think the United States may have made a serious mistake in the course of negotiations, a mistake which has gone relatively unnoticed by the critics...
...By 1973 it had become much more difficult to object to Soviet proposals...
...there are costs to be paid in any agreement between parties...
...Please print) Name Address City State Zip The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 23 Donald L. Clark The Benefits from Helsinki Can Time, the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jackson, George Ball, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn all agree on something and still be wrong...
...Instead, it is a document of guidance, understanding, and commitment...
...CSCE, as its critics point out, was a Soviet idea, and when the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact satellites began suggesting an all-European conference about ten years ago, the idea was clearly not in American and Western European interests...
...They considered it an odious proposal and even made it clear that it would prove a hollow victory for the West if we insisted on broad rights...
...But if our government still does want mutual force reductions in Europe, it blew its best opportunity to get them...
...For the critics have concentrated single-mindedly on the legitimacy accorded the postwar borders...
...force reductions has diminished...
...Perhaps we do not want MBFR as much as we did in 1973...
...Norman Podhoretz THE ALTERNATIVE, Post Office Box 877, Bloomington, Indiana 47401 Enclosed is $ Please enter a ^ new ^ renewal subscription to The Alternative for: ^ One year $8...
...On the other hand, the U.S...
...What is the point in talking about security and cooperation, we asked, if the Soviets show no willingness to reduce their forces in Central Europe, if they refuse to recognize Western rights in Berlin, and if they do not allow much trade and travel between East and West...
...The United States and Western Europe said as much...
...What does it actually say...
...there are costs to be paid in any agreement between parties...
...I contend that the Conference served American interests better than its critics have supposed...
...Furthermore, since the security of Western Europe is so closely tied to the NATO alliance, our European allies objected to Soviet proposals for a purely European conference, without full American and Canadian participation...
...I suspect, however, that if they considered the victory so hollow they wouldn't have fought against it so hard...
...were willing to invade Lithuania or support the next Hungarian uprising with something more than the rhetoric of last time, then the critics would be fair in their criticism...
...Remember what I said about the American strategy to use CSCE in order to get MBFR...
...The primary Soviet aim for CSCE in the last few years has been pageantry, in accordance with their view that "looks are more important than deeds," and in the hopes that Brezhnev would bask in the limelight as the creator of a major conference...
...The need for this legitimacy, however, has been much less important in the last few years, for the Soviet treaty with West Germany had ratified the German-Polish border, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia had once 22 The Alternative: An American Spectator December 1975 again demonstrated the powerlessness of the West to do anything about such borders...
...expected CSCE to deal mostly with words and phrases...
...Since the Soviets were sponsoring a CSCE call, and since the first big summit was abuilding, the logical diplomatic linkage became obvious and was forged...
...Perhaps we do not want MBFR as much as we did in 1973...
...Western objectives for CSCE—pageantry, stimulus for MBFR, the fact that it was becoming difficult to object to the conference—were therefore limited...
...But in the era of nuclear parity, peaceful means of changing borders was the only viable option open to East or West, both before CSCE and after...
...There have been a Vietnam debacle, a Portugal, and renewed hostilities in the Middle East since then, and obviously internal pressure for U.S...
...Thus, we began pushing for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Conference, MBFR...
...But now that CSCE is over, we still have yet to reach Phase I of MBFR...
...Indeed, I think the United States may have made a serious mistake in the course of negotiations, a mistake which has gone relatively unnoticed by the critics...
...You can't have it both ways...
...They considered it an odious proposal and even made it clear that it would prove a hollow victory for the West if we insisted on broad rights...
Vol. 9 • December 1975 • No. 3
