The Aftermath of SALT

...The payload capacity of the Soviet "heavy" ICBM's exceeds the entire United States payload by a factor of three...

...The purpose of the Interim Agreement on offensive arms is to "freeze," for five years, the deployment of ICBM's and SLBM's at specified limits...

...The SALT Accords and the Strategic Balance: a Primer On May 26, 1972 President Nixon and Soviet Communist party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev signed two agreements: the first is in the form of an Executive Agreement (Interim Offensive Agreement) limiting the deployment of intercontinental (ICBM) and submarine-launched (SLBM) ballistic missiles...

...ultimately thirty-one will be equipped with Poseidon multiple warhead (MIRV) missies, the remaining ten submarines will be equipped with the older Polaris missile with a single warhead...

...The Soviets may not convert their "light" ICBM's into "Heavy" ICBM's, nor may the United States do so...

...only has 54 older ballistic missiles (the Titan II) which it may dismantle to add three additional submarines to those already deployed (41) for a total of 44...

...The Soviet Union has 26 modern submarines of the "Y" class in operation, and 17 more under construction...

...is free to make further qualitative improvements to its forces, including multiple warheads (MIRV), improved accuracy, and others...

...The U.S...

...The agreement does not impose limitation on bombers, number of warheads (of the "MIRV" or multiple warhead type), missile accuracy or other characteristics of strategic nuclear forces...

...Since the U.S...

...Neither the U.S...

...With regard to ICBM's only two properties are restricted: the total number of ICBM's (limited to those in operation or under construction as of July 1, 1972), and the approximate size of the missile silos, the underground housing for the ICBM...

...Moreover, the treaty seeks to permanently prevent any future technological development, test or deployment (for example, a space-based ABM system "laser") which could provide for a highly effective defense for population centers, against ballistic missile attack from being applied in that role...

...The amendment provided for three things: (1) Failure to reach a permanent agreement within five years could "jeopardize the supreme national interests of the United States...

...explicit expression of Congressional attitude...

...to a maximum of 44 modern submarines with no more than 710 SLBM's...

...The effect of the agreement with regard to ICBM's is as below...

...During the term of the Interim Agreement, both sides are to seek a permanent set of limitations on strategic offensive arms including elements not included in the Interim Agreement such as strategic intercontinental bombers and U.S...

...However, the Soviet Union will be able to "modernize" their "heavy" missiles, 313 SS-9's with a new missle (noted above) with nearly twice the payload capacity of the existing SS-9's...

...The United States has forty-one modern submarines capable of launching SLBM's...

...William Schneider, Jr., formerly of the Hudson Institute, now serves on the staff of New York's Senator James Buckley...

...That perception appears to have won the day with a majority of the United States Senate...

...The ABM Treaty provides that neither side shall maintain a system to defend against attacks by ballistic missiles except for the nominal defense (a total of 200 anti-ballistic missiles) of national capitals (Washington and Moscow) and a single strategic missile base...

...3) The Congress committed itself to support a vigorous R&D effort...

...is free to develop and deploy the Trident (ULMS) submarine...

...For example, if one missile has twice the payload capacity of another missile, the larger missile can carry twice the number of warheads carried by the smaller...

...Between the time when agreements were signed, and when the Congress ratified them, perceptions changed indicating at least some disquiet over the consequences of the first round of the SALT accords...

...This may be something of an overstatement but based upon the attitudes expressed bv these officials at the hearings, it is not too wide of the mark...

...The Jackson Amendment: Delayed Reaction to SALT For over a month, the Senate Armed Services Committee-, spearheaded by Senator Jackson proceeded to drag a host of unpleasant details out of the United States negotiating team...

...The Protocol restricts the U.S...

...Moreover, the Soviet Union will have to contend with a more These estimates are conservative because mey assume that tne Soviet Union will not be capable of matching the United States engineering ability in multiple warhead technology within the next five years...

...If the Soviet Union were able to do so, they have sufficient payload capacity in their ICBM force alone to mount 35,000 of our Poseidon-type warheads...

...ACDA cannot carry its free-and-easy attitude toward the United States defense posture to the bargaining table because there are enough votes in the Senate to prevent the acceptance of a permanent agreement which is as disadvantageous to the United States as the Interim Agreement is...

...The terms of the Interim Agreement permit the Soviet Union to have a greater number of ICBM's, as well as a greater payload capacity in its entire strategic force...

...For example, the United States Secretary of Defense could not agree with the SALT delegation head as to whether the Soviet Union could increase their ICBM silo volume by 15 per cent of 52 per cent...

...Thus, the Congress was unwilling to accept complex theories of how parity exists by pointing to elements of the strategic balance which lie outside of the agreement itself...

...These are each equipped with 16 SLBM's each with single warheads...

...The second is a formal treaty restricting to nominal levels, the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles systems (ABM...

...Unaffected by the agreement are manned strategic intercontinental bombers and qualitative improvements to the existing forces such as multiple warheads, improved accuracy and other improvements...

...Near the end of the decade, the ten Polaris firing submarines will be replaced by a larger submarine known as Triden (formerly called ULMS...

...The terms of the SALT accords will permit the Soviets to build 62 modern (Polaris-equivalent) submarines...

...If no permanent agreement is reached, or both sides do not renew the agreement at the end of five years, both sides may resume their deployment of strategic offensive systems...

...Because it is entitled the United States rather than the Soviet Union Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the negotiators feel impelled to disarm the United States rattier than the Soviet Union...

...Both sides may convert their obsolete ICBM's into an equivalent number of SLBM's...

...Both sides are prohibited from taking defensive measures (other than civil defense) to protect their citizens against the consequences of a failure of deterrence at any time in the future even if technology should provide such means...

...The current SS-9 missile has a payload capacity five times that of the Minuteman III missile, our largest and most modern ICBM, and an even larger Soviet missile with a payload capacity eight times that of the Minuteman III could be used to replace the SS-9, further augmenting the Soviet advantage in payload capacity...

...The U.S...

...The Soviet leadership in the hands of what the British Sovietologist, Robert Conquest described as "third rate men" encourages great prudence in any long term arms limitation with the Soviet Union...

...is not permitted any heavy missiles under the agreement, the payload capacity of the U.S...

...is free to develop and deploy the B-l bomber, the proposed new intercontinental bomber...

...Senator Jackson and others were appalled at this performance and were determined to provide the SALT team with some explicit Congressional guidance as to the appropriate formulation for any permanent agreement on offensive arms...

...One observer has noted that a consequence of the title of the parent agency of the United States SALT team, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has given the negotiations the wrong perspective...

...The ABM Treaty seeks to maintain the existing deterrent relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union by prohibiting each side from obtaining a capacity to protect its strategic nuclear forces or civilian population centers from ballistic missile attacks...

...or the Soviet Union may increase the number of their ICBM force...

...The danger lies in the fact that the United States might feel constrained to accept a disadvantageous limitation in Forward Based Systems or manned bombers to reduce the Soviet advantage gained in SALT I in ICBM's and SLBM's...

...The latter restriction places a ceiling on the most important characteristic of ballistic missiles in the long run its payload capacity (or "throw-weight") by limiting the size of the missile which can be placed in a silo...

...aircraft carriers with aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons on Soviet territory (known as "Forward Based Systems...

...forces...

...The cries of anguish from Senator...

...While retaining a semblance of a sound defense posture...

...The U.S...

...The near term result is likely to be Soviet stalling on the modification of the ICBM and SLBM limitations since they already have a major advantage...

...The significance of this characteristic is that the payload capacity determines the maximum number of individual warheads that can be placed upon a single missile...

...The result was Administration support of the Jackson amendment to the Interim Agreement...

...Thus the Congress would not be willing to live with the SALT I disparity for more than five years...

...The consequences for our future negotiating posture are substantial...

...Polaris-Poseidon-type (the Soviet "Y" class...

...J. W. Fulbright et al...

...Such confusion is understandable since the accords themselves are so poorly drafted in detail that an ambiguous interpretation in almost every detail is feasible...

...How this concern developed, and the outlook for phase two, is instructive as to how the Congress is likely to behave in the future...

...The Soviet Union is free to develop its modified "Y" class submarine to accommodate a recently developed new SLBM...

...Despite the Stakhanovite appearance of the Brezhnev regime, Soviet society is unstable with a number of internal political, social and economic pressures which could alter the character of the regime...

...The subject of discussion of course, is the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords...

...ICBM force cannot be significantly increased...

...Thus, the strategic balance could be as below if the Soviets make only modest qualitative improvements in their forces permitted under the agreements...

...The Interim Agreement on offensive forces provides for limitations on offensive weapons deployment for ICBM's and SLBM's only...

...The U.S...

...In addition, the Soviets may retain 22 older "G" class submarines firing three SLBM's each...

...The terms of the Interim Agreement permit the Soviet Union to dismantle their 209 obsolete SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's as well as some of their older diesel-powered ballistic missile launching submarines into modern nuclear powered submarines similar to the U.S...

...were as noisy as they were predictable, but, after weeks of debate, they were passed by a substantial margin...

...aircraft based in Europe as well as U.S...

...The Soviet Union is free to develop and deploy its new intercontinental bomber, the Backfire...

...The Soviet Union is also free to make qualitative improvements of the same kind...

...Each carries sixteen SLBM's...

...The defense philosophy mandated by the ABM Treaty is that deterrence is to be maintained by assuring the mutual vulnerability of each side's civilian population...

...However, because of the advantage conferred on the Soviet Union by the SALT accords in payload capacity of ICBM's, (a 5-to-l advantage) and numbers of SLBM's, (a 3-to-2 advantage) their potential for qualitative improvement is vastly greater than for U.S...

...2) The United States should not accept an inferior number of whatever parameter was fixed in a permanent agreement from that assignd to the Soviet Union...

...The United States has no counterpart to the heavy Soviet ICBM's...

...The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 SLBM's or no more than 62 modern submarines for a total of 84 submarines and 1016 SLBM's...

...This determination coincided with growing concern within the administration as to the ability of the United States to negotiate a favorable agreement in the future...

...More than any other arms control arrangement we have entered into, details make a difference, not merely for the purpose of carrying out the intent of the original agreement, but also for our negotiating posture for the second round of SALT...

...Since 1966, the Soviet Union has focused its strategic buildup on ICBM's and SLBM's...

...The long term outlook is less related to technical details than it is to the "temperature" of international relations...