Operation Avalanche and Soviet Capitulation

Strmecki, Marin

Marin Strmecki OPERATION AVALANCHE AND SOVIET CAPITULATION Gorbachev wants out of Afghanistan, but if we cut off aid to the resistance he may never leave. W ithin the last six months, the war in...

...The accords should also stipulate that when the Kremlin completes its withdrawal, the cutoff of outside military aid will apply not only to the Afghan resistance but also to Afghan Communists...
...With hundreds of rocket rounds at the site, Wardak knew it would be clearly visible and highly vulnerable to air strikes in the morning...
...16 THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR APRIL 1988 with maximum force and Wardak had no illusions about his ability to control the area indefinitely...
...While major national newspapers ran brief stories of the battle soon after it took place, the following account provides operational details that for security purposes were not revealed immediately but that demonstrate more clearly than the initial coverage the growing military sophistication of the Afghan resistance...
...An Alpha commando unit had struck the Sorubi hydroelectric station, damaging it severely, with a column of thick black smoke rising into the evening sky...
...Meanwhile the enemy would be blinded by the sinking sun, have too little time to bring in major reinforcements, and probably ground his air power after nightfall...
...Resistance commanders also estimated enemy fatalities at eighty to one hundred Kabul government troops and 900 to 1,000 Soviet troops...
...He would initiate attacks with his forward forces, see how the enemy responded, and only then choose whether to commit his full force or pull back...
...When the first battle reports reached Wardak, he decided he could safely throw his full force into combat...
...Resistance units seldom have the time to fire enough rounds to home in on their target before Soviet artillery, aided by high-tech equipment to fix on resistance positions, returns the fire...
...intelligence sources said that the resistance estimates were "in the ballpark," and others would confirm only that about 200 to 400 enemy troops were killed...
...It is easy to see why...
...Operation Avalanche was reported by a three-man CBS camera crew, and Pakistani and U.S...
...They would also cut down on losses among rocket-propelled grenade operators, many of whom are killed by enemy fire as they try to get within a couple of hundred yards to shoot at tanks and APCs...
...Three hours later, Wardak received word from task force Alpha that a Soviet armored column was approaching the northern mouth of the gorge, coming from Kabul apparently to relieve the besieged posts or to evacuate the dead and wounded from the firstconvoy...
...However reckless the action, at least it was part of a proposal that called for a much quicker Soviet withdrawal...
...When the Soviet force reached Charlie's entrenched positions, a few of the lead vehicles were set on fire, and the rest were stopped in their tracks...
...By radio, Wardak ordered his forces to hold their fire...
...At eight o'clock the next morning, Wardak received word from Charlie and Delta that a Soviet supply column returning from Jalalabad to Kabul was traveling toward the eastern mouth of the gorge...
...After zeroing in on Sorubi with the help of a local resistance fighter, Wardak gave the order to "fire in group...
...The most important is the termination of outside assistance to the resistance...
...Operation Avalanche had required a massive logistical effort, with 250 to 300 tons of ammunition carried in on horses and mules and on foot, first to forward assembly areas and then to the front...
...He then ordered Delta to let the convoy into the gorge—in effect holding the door open as it passed...
...Earlier in the month, a coalition of forces from both moderate and fundamentalist Afghan resistance groups succeeded in slowing down, and occasionally pushing back, Soviet and Afghan government columns attempting to relieve the besieged garrison in the eastern city of Khost...
...He now opted to attack in the late afternoon, thereby allowing resistance forces several hours' progress before nightfall...
...policy is leading Afghanistan into a deadlock situation...
...Again, he held the door open until the whole column had driven into the gorge...
...That turned out to be a fatal miscalculation...
...But Soviet troops had no place to hide...
...By now, however, the Soviets had had enough time to react Gorbachev continues to insist that all aid must end by the start of the Soviet pull-out, which in effect would cut the resistance off from any new supplies for almost a year...
...Resistance agents reported that after the operation Soviet trucks took away piles of dead bodies from the base at Sorubi...
...The Soviet forces apparently thought that the resistance—in keeping with its traditional hit-and-run tactics—had pulled out after the previous night's attack...
...F or the next four hours, a special detachment of Alpha operating in Bravo's zone pummeled the tanks, APCs, and trucks with fire...
...will have no way of knowing whether Gorbachev's current peace offensive amounts to anything more than a cynical attempt to put an end to arms shipments to the Afghan resistance...
...Resistance forces were to be armed with AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, mortars, single-barrel rocket launchers (SBRL), and some with multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL...
...W hile Afghan resistance losses totaled only thirty-eight men killed and wounded, Wardak's men estimated that they destroyed four jets, one helicopter, fifty tanks and APCs, eighty-three trucks, four bridges, nineteen Soviet posts, three Afghan government posts, three Soviet bases, and one major hydroelectric plant...
...Operation Avalanche's effects reverberated in Moscow...
...More Stinger missiles would enable the resistance to shut down isolated Soviet and government garrisons that can be resupplied only by helicopter...
...need not feel bound to this State Department pledge...
...intelligence agencies were able to confirm some of the specific enemy losses...
...Platoon-size enemy security posts and a half dozen larger bases—which Wardak's intelligence officers reported were manned almost entirely by Soviet troops rather than the demoralized conscripts of Kabul's army—stood every 300 to 500 meters along the road...
...Each task force was to establish both frontline and fall-back positions...
...Wardak's plan assigned separate sectors of the road to four task forces, which he designated, from the left flank to the right flank, as Alpha, Bravo, Delta, and Charlie...
...Soviet troops desperately scurried in search of cover...
...Once the Soviet forces were inside, he slammed the door shut...
...But if the Soviets finally do pull out and permit the Afghans to restore their independence, operation Avalanche and the other subsequent large-scale engagements will undoubtedly have played a role in convincing Gorbachev that there was no light at the end of the tunnel...
...The walls of the gorge ran down to the left-hand side of the road, and on the right-hand side ran the surging white-water rapids of the Kabul River...
...Bravo, Delta, and Charlie had each destroyed some enemy posts with mortars and rocket fire, as well as taking out several tanks and APCs...
...In short, the U.S...
...THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR APRIL 1988 17...
...Again, the forces of Alpha's special detachment ripped the Soviet forces apart with withering fire...
...He therefore decided to withdraw the bulk of his men and leave only a small residual force to harass reentering Soviet units, thereby blocking the road another three days...
...For all their importance, communications during Avalanche were only partially secure...
...Originally the plan was to attack at dawn, when intelligence reports indicated even enemy guards tended to be asleep...
...First, he changedthe hour of attack...
...Normally, after a quick victory Afghan forces would have pulled out to escape the wrath of Soviet airpower...
...General Abdul Rahim Wardak of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), one of the seven resistance organizations based in Peshawar, Pakistan, commanded the insurgent forces...
...Without such guarantees, the U.S...
...O nly a few days before the operation, it appeared someone had tipped the enemy off because Soviet forces suddenly began to reinforce the security posts and bases along Highway 1. But Wardak decided it was too late to turn back...
...Moreover, it was possible that while the Soviets might know something was up they might not know enough to foil the operation...
...Its objectives included interdicting Highway 1, striking two dozen roadside enemy posts and bases, and destroying several bridges and two nearby hydroelectric power stations...
...While the Afghan resistance's classic small-scale, hit-and-run guerrilla tactics have long frustrated Moscow's efforts to consolidate control over the country, for the first time resistance forces have demonstrated in key strategic areas a new capability to hold their own in limited conventional battles at times and places of their own choosing...
...In November, a coalition of resistance forces launched an offensive Marin Strmecki is a research associate in the office of Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Center for Strategic and International Studies...
...Four days later, Gorbachev had a hastily arranged meeting with Afghan puppet Najibullah...
...Among the aid still needed: Secure radio communications would enable the resistance to execute more large-scale, coordinated operations, to warn supply caravans of Soviet special operation forces lying in ambush, and to improve the accuracy of resistance artillery by posting spotters near the target to adjust fire via radio...
...A major MBRL detachment and additional air defense units equipped with heavy machine guns and SA-7 and Stinger missiles further backed up the task forces...
...Range finding equipment would help resistance forces overcome their difficulty with mortar and rocket fire...
...Gorbachev continues to insist that all aid must end by the start of the Soviet pull-out, which in effect would cut the resistance off from any new supplies for almost a year...
...A few days later, high-ranking Soviet and Afghan government generals toured the battlefield...
...A demolition team from Charlie blew the bridge up...
...In a three-hour personal briefing, Wardak, who as an officer in the Afghan army before the Communist coup in 1978 had been graduated with distinction from three U.S.military science training programs, gave a detailed account of the battle, supported by operational maps and classified resistance intelligence and military documents...
...Resistance fighters nearest the road later said the smoke from burning tanks, APCs, and trucks was so thick it made breathing difficult...
...While none of the individual resistance actions—striking a power plant, ambushing a convoy, blowing up a bridge, or overrunning a garrison—were unprecedented, operation Avalanche as a whole was...
...They were supported by artillery, rocket launchers, and heavy mortars at nearby Soviet bases...
...First, he waited for the column to cross the Kah Kas bridge...
...But after resistance air defense forces shot down an SU-20 with a Stinger missile, enemy aircraft retreated to higher altitudes, thereby diminishing their accuracy...
...no one in the remainder of the convoy survived...
...No single battle turns the tide in a war...
...Under the cover of their air-defense weapons, the resistance task forces vanquished the remaining Soviet forces over the next few days, overrunning and shelling posts and bases and hunting down scattered Soviet troops...
...A fifth task force, Echo, made up of 3,000 men, was to serve as a ready reserve and provide for defense against enemy counterattacks by blocking key mountain passes to prevent Soviet flanking maneuvers and by preparing ambushes at potential landing THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR APRIL 1988 15 areas for Soviet heliborne assault forces...
...Over the next few hours more than 700 107mm rockets soared into the evening sky, with about 200 landing directly on the Soviet cantonment area in Sorubi...
...As one vehicle after another burst into flames, it was foolish to stay near them...
...A dispute has recently erupted over whether the State Department pledged itself to an immediate cutoff in 1985...
...Altogether in the two ambushes, resistance fighters estimated that they destroyed nineteen tanks and APCs and fifty-one trucks and killed more than 400 Soviet troops...
...In late January, Afghan resistance fighters using long-range mortars destroyed an estimated 300 Soviet vehicles in the strategic Kunar valley in eastern Afghanistan...
...While these all involved a new order of magnitude for resistance fighting capability—and in the casualties inflicted on enemy forces—the most successful such operation, code-named "Avalanche," inaugurated the new phase in the war last July...
...He therefore decided to adjust fire by radio from the command post, which had a better line of sight...
...Second, he decided to hold back in the first phase of the operation...
...By July 9, Wardak's men had achieved most, though not all, of their major objectives...
...But this time the resistance units stayed put...
...should not rush into a deal on Gorbachev's terms...
...A major column of enemy reinforcements tried to push through from Jalalabad, but was severely handicapped by the need to travel single file down the road...
...This is reason enough why the U.S...
...Among other things, operation Avalanche also demonstrated how filling just two specific military needs of the resistance—radios and air-defense missiles—can pay off in major Soviet losses...
...In addition, Bravo used a rocket-propelled grenade and heavy machine guns to shoot down a helicopter flying at extremely low altitude to avoid the threat of anti-aircraft missiles...
...Wardak's plans targeted a 65-kilometer stretch of Highway 1, the main roadway from Kabul to the Khyber Pass and a vital supply line for Sovietunits in eastern Afghanistan...
...Moreover, if the Soviet military command threw in its division-sized reinforcements from Kabul and Jalalabad, Wardak's assault force could have found itself outnumbered by more than twenty to one...
...Upon regrouping, the column tried to advance up the road first at dusk and later in the dead of night but failed...
...Higher-range anti-aircraft missiles stationed in the large areas of rural Afghanistan under resistance control could shoot down high-flying Soviet transports and reconnaissance planes...
...What the United States should insist on in the current negotiations is an agreement under which assistance to the resistance is phased down in amounts proportionate to the withdrawal of Soviet forces...
...636—was to strike the two-lane asphalt road where it ran parallel to the Kabul River and threaded through the 600-foot-deep Sorubi gorge...
...Some U.S...
...Soviet troops requisitioned all the civilian buses in nearby towns to transport the dead and wounded to Kabul...
...against Soviet and Afghan government positions along a 55-kilometer front in the Kunar valley...
...An American businessman with close ties to top Soviet leaders said they were "shaken" by the defeat...
...A few vehicles managed ,to escape...
...While the drone of Soviet reconnaissance planes began before sunrise and the bombardment of fighter-bombers soon after, it did little to help Soviet ground forces...
...It took place in one of the most strategically vital areas of Afghanistan, involved coordinated operations along an extended front, included specialized assault and demolition teams assigned specific tasks as part of an overall plan,and proved that resistance forces could decisively defeat a force composed purely of Soviet troops...
...Just in case, however, Wardak did make two changes...
...Wardak's plan was to force the hand of local Soviet commanders...
...While he has said the "political decision" to withdraw has been made, shortened the pull-out timetable to ten months, and offered to remove the bulk of his forces in the first two months and to prohibit offensive operations during the withdrawal, several key issues in the U.N.-sponsored proximity talks remain unresolved...
...Jets scattered butterfly mines and dropped napalm, high-explosive munitions, and cluster bombs...
...Wardak knew differently...
...This created interlocking fields of fire, and these posts were further protected by positions on the bluffs above...
...In December, a force of 5,000 resistance fighters attacked enemy security posts and bases along a 40-kilometer front east of Kabul...
...proximity talks on the war, including most recently an offer to begin on May 15 a ten-month withdrawal of Soviet forces, though the proposal remains contingent on an immediate cut-off of outside assistance to the Afghan resistance...
...If they wanted to send reinforcements to relieve the besieged security posts and bases in and around the Sorubi gorge, they would have to send them up Highway 1—right into the teeth of the firmly entrenched task forces...
...A contingent of 500 guerrillas overran two belts of security posts around the capital and got within range to fire more than one hundred 122mm rockets at the city's government district, which includes the presidential palace...
...Whether one accepts the high or low estimates, operation Avalanche amounted to one of Moscow's worst defeats in eight years of fighting...
...A 2,000-man assault force—code-named "Yarmuk" after the battle in which Byzantium lost the Middle East to Islam in A.D...
...The enemy retreated after six hours of indecisive combat...
...Resistance logistics simply could not keep front-line forces supplied with the hundreds of tons of ammunition needed for sustained conventional operations...
...Professional military training would enable the resistance to field soldiers rather than warriors...
...Enemy troops were equipped with heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, mortars, recoilless rifles, and AK-74 assault rifles, and tanks or armored personnel carriers (APCs) were stationed at one out of every two or three posts...
...With range-finding equipment, the resistance could make its first shots count...
...Longer-range anti-tank weapons would open up a greater array of potential targets during a major battle...
...Each was composed of 300-750 men and included specialized assault and demolition teams...
...But serious gaps still remain in the military assistance the Afghans receive from the United States, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and some West European powers...
...Pakistani intelligence estimates paralleled those of the resistance...
...It did indeed make sucha commitment, and without White House knowledge...
...Later, a problem arose when theMBRL commander informed Wardak that hazy skies and approaching darkness made adjusting fire to hit targets around Sorubi increasingly difficult and asked whether he should break off for the night...
...W ithin the last six months, the war in Afghanistan has moved into a dramatic new phase, both on the battlefield and around the negotiating table...
...Fighters now receive a few weeks of schooling in weapons operation and maintenance, but they still do not receive needed training in battlefield tactics and the elementary principles of the military art...
...Moreover, Wardak's task forces and enemy units were soon so close to each other that Soviet pilots could not hit one without imperiling the other...
...It is still not certain that Gorbachev has concluded the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable...
...Since resistance forces had never before been able to mass the fire power necessary for a protracted conventional engagement, Soviet officers evidently believed the first two rounds of fighting had exhausted the insurgents' ammunition...
...On July 16, in an uncharacteristically candid comment, Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadyshev said the Afghan guerrillas had achieved a measure of battlefield superiority and that "U.S...
...As a result, almost all the enemy's unrelenting bombardment fell harmlessly to the rear of resistance positions...
...Alpha had hit an ammunition dump at a Soviet base and pinned down all enemy forces in its sector...
...At the same time, probably partly as a result of this escalation, Mikhail Gorbachev has made a string of concessions in the so-called U.N...

Vol. 21 • April 1988 • No. 4


 
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